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00:00:45,921 --> 00:00:48,083
[Laura Poitras, reading] "Laura, at this stage,

2
00:00:48,173 --> 00:00:50,915
I can offer nothing more
than my word.

3
00:00:51,009 --> 00:00:54,798
I am a senior government employee
in the intelligence community.

4
00:00:54,888 --> 00:00:58,131
I hope you understand that
contacting you is extremely high risk

5
00:00:58,225 --> 00:01:00,512
and you are willing to agree
to the following precautions

6
00:01:00,602 --> 00:01:02,684
before I share more.

7
00:01:02,771 --> 00:01:04,728
This will not be a waste of your time.

8
00:01:05,899 --> 00:01:07,435
The following sounds complex

9
00:01:07,526 --> 00:01:11,269
but should only take minutes
to complete for someone technical.

10
00:01:11,363 --> 00:01:13,149
I would like to confirm out of email

11
00:01:13,240 --> 00:01:15,277
that the keys we exchanged
were not intercepted

12
00:01:15,367 --> 00:01:18,735
and replaced by your surveillance.

13
00:01:18,829 --> 00:01:21,992
Please confirm that no one has
ever had a copy of your private key

14
00:01:22,082 --> 00:01:23,993
and that it uses a strong passphrase.

15
00:01:24,084 --> 00:01:27,873
Assume your adversary is capable
of one trillion guesses per second.

16
00:01:28,880 --> 00:01:30,917
If the device you store
the private key

17
00:01:31,008 --> 00:01:33,591
and enter your passphrase on
has been hacked,

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00:01:33,677 --> 00:01:36,260
it is trivial
to decrypt our communications.

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00:01:37,264 --> 00:01:39,926
Understand that the above steps
are not bulletproof

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00:01:40,017 --> 00:01:42,179
and are intended only
to give us breathing room.

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00:01:42,269 --> 00:01:44,431
In the end, if you publish
the source material,

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00:01:44,521 --> 00:01:46,603
I will likely be immediately implicated.

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00:01:46,690 --> 00:01:50,183
This must not deter you from releasing
the information I will provide.

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00:01:51,778 --> 00:01:53,644
Thank you, and be careful.

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00:01:54,781 --> 00:01:56,488
Citizenfour. "

26
00:02:16,511 --> 00:02:18,718
[man speaking over radio, indistinct]

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00:02:18,805 --> 00:02:22,218
[man] Bottom line is...
surveillance means

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00:02:22,309 --> 00:02:25,472
that there are facts
that we no longer abide to.

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00:02:25,562 --> 00:02:27,052
If you take away the surveillance,

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00:02:27,147 --> 00:02:29,479
there are no facts that
the government can manufacture.

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00:02:29,566 --> 00:02:32,729
[man 2] Ah, that's right, and this is all
about creating an independent record.

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00:02:32,819 --> 00:02:36,858
To me, this goes to the question

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00:02:36,948 --> 00:02:40,612
of independently verifying
What the government is doing.

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00:02:40,702 --> 00:02:43,410
That's why I keep going
back to that question.

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00:02:43,497 --> 00:02:47,240
[man] More with David Sirota
after CBS news,

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00:02:47,334 --> 00:02:51,703
traffic, and weather
on KKZN Denver/Boulder, AM 7...

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00:02:57,219 --> 00:02:59,335
Hey, can you hear me?

38
00:02:59,429 --> 00:03:01,090
I am here, David, how are you?

39
00:03:05,602 --> 00:03:07,639
Well I would just point--
start by pointing to

40
00:03:07,729 --> 00:03:10,141
what Barack Obama himself
said about those questions

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00:03:10,232 --> 00:03:13,099
when he was running for the office
that he now occupies.

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00:03:13,193 --> 00:03:15,275
In December of 2007,
he said, quote,

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00:03:15,362 --> 00:03:18,855
"The president does not have
the power under the Constitution

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00:03:18,949 --> 00:03:20,906
to unilaterally
authorize a military attack

45
00:03:20,992 --> 00:03:23,654
in a situation
that does not involve stopping

46
00:03:23,745 --> 00:03:25,452
an actual or imminent threat
to the nation."

47
00:03:25,539 --> 00:03:28,782
So by Obama's own words,
the president does not have the power

48
00:03:28,875 --> 00:03:31,287
that he is now exercising
under the Constitution.

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00:03:31,378 --> 00:03:35,042
And as far as why it matters,
in-- on August 1, 2007,

50
00:03:35,132 --> 00:03:38,796
when he laid out his reasons
why he was running for office

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00:03:38,885 --> 00:03:41,673
and why he thought it was so important
to change the way we were doing things,

52
00:03:41,763 --> 00:03:45,552
he said, quote, "No more ignoring
the law when it's inconvenient.

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00:03:45,642 --> 00:03:47,303
That is not who we are.

54
00:03:47,394 --> 00:03:49,431
We will again
set an example for the world

55
00:03:49,521 --> 00:03:52,513
that the law is not subject
to the whims of stubborn rulers. "

56
00:03:52,607 --> 00:03:56,145
[Greenwald continues,
audio fades]

57
00:04:21,678 --> 00:04:24,215
[woman]
You asked Why I picked you.

58
00:04:24,306 --> 00:04:26,968
I didn't. You did.

59
00:04:27,058 --> 00:04:30,050
The surveillance you've experienced
means you've been "selected, "

60
00:04:30,145 --> 00:04:32,307
a term which will mean
more to you as you learn about

61
00:04:32,397 --> 00:04:35,185
How the modern
SIGINT system works.

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00:04:36,443 --> 00:04:38,855
For now, know that
every border you cross,

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00:04:38,945 --> 00:04:41,983
every purchase you make,
every call you dial,

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00:04:42,073 --> 00:04:45,236
every cell phone tower you pass,
friend you keep,

65
00:04:45,327 --> 00:04:49,070
article you write, site you visit,
subject line you type,

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00:04:49,164 --> 00:04:51,997
and packet you route
is in the hands of a system

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00:04:52,083 --> 00:04:55,201
Whose reach is unlimited,
but whose safeguards are not.

68
00:04:56,838 --> 00:04:58,749
Your victimization
by the NSA system

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00:04:58,840 --> 00:05:00,501
means that you are
well aware of the threat

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00:05:00,592 --> 00:05:04,836
that unrestricted secret police
pose for democracies.

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00:05:04,930 --> 00:05:07,137
This is a story few
but you can tell.

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00:05:45,387 --> 00:05:47,128
[car door shuts]

73
00:05:48,390 --> 00:05:50,256
[engine starts]

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00:06:01,695 --> 00:06:03,686
[Binney]
Thank you for inviting me here

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00:06:03,780 --> 00:06:07,819
to give me the opportunity
to express my story.

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00:06:07,909 --> 00:06:09,946
Let me give you
some of my background.

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00:06:10,036 --> 00:06:13,074
I spent about four years in the military,
and then I went into NSA.

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00:06:13,164 --> 00:06:15,075
Directly, so...

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00:06:15,166 --> 00:06:19,205
So I ended up with about
37 years of service combined.

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00:06:19,296 --> 00:06:21,162
Most of it was a lot of fun,
I tell you,

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00:06:21,256 --> 00:06:23,213
it was really a lot of fun,
breaking these puzzles you know,

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00:06:23,300 --> 00:06:25,837
solving problems
and things like that.

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00:06:25,927 --> 00:06:28,965
And that's really what I did,
I fundamentally started working with data,

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00:06:29,055 --> 00:06:31,217
looking at data and data systems
and how you do that.

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00:06:31,308 --> 00:06:35,176
I was developing
this concept of analysis

86
00:06:35,270 --> 00:06:37,102
that you could lay it out
in such a way

87
00:06:37,188 --> 00:06:39,725
that it could be coded
and executed electronically.

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00:06:39,816 --> 00:06:42,228
Meaning you could automate analysis.

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00:06:42,319 --> 00:06:45,903
And it has to do with metadata
and using metadata relationships.

90
00:06:45,989 --> 00:06:48,981
So that was the whole,
that was my whole theme there at NSA.

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00:06:49,075 --> 00:06:50,736
That was eventually,
that's what I ended up to.

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00:06:50,827 --> 00:06:53,319
I was the only one there
doing that, by the way.

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00:06:53,413 --> 00:06:55,950
So any rate, 9/11 happened,

94
00:06:56,041 --> 00:07:00,877
and it must have been
rig ht after, a few days,

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00:07:00,962 --> 00:07:02,999
no more than a week after 9/11

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00:07:03,089 --> 00:07:08,835
that they decided to begin actively
spying on everyone in this country.

97
00:07:08,929 --> 00:07:10,840
And they wanted the back part

98
00:07:10,931 --> 00:07:13,889
of our program
to run all of the spying.

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00:07:13,975 --> 00:07:18,344
All right?
So, that's exactly what they did.

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00:07:18,438 --> 00:07:20,395
And then they started
taking the telecom data

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00:07:20,482 --> 00:07:21,972
and expanded after that.

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00:07:22,067 --> 00:07:25,480
I mean the one I knew was
AT&T,

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00:07:25,570 --> 00:07:28,938
and that one provided
320 million records every day.

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00:07:29,032 --> 00:07:32,400
That program was reauthorized
every 45 days

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00:07:32,494 --> 00:07:34,906
by what I call
the "yes committee,"

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00:07:34,996 --> 00:07:39,206
which was Hayden
and Tenet and the DOJ.

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00:07:39,292 --> 00:07:41,954
The program was called
Stellar Wind.

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00:07:42,045 --> 00:07:44,878
So first I went to
the House Intelligence Committee

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00:07:44,965 --> 00:07:46,797
and the staff member
that I personally knew there,

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00:07:46,883 --> 00:07:50,342
and she then went to
the chairman of the committee,

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00:07:50,428 --> 00:07:52,544
Nancy Pelosi
was the minority rep.

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00:07:53,932 --> 00:07:55,593
They were all briefed
into the program

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00:07:55,684 --> 00:07:57,345
at the time, by the way,

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00:07:57,435 --> 00:07:59,096
and all the other programs
that were going on,

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00:07:59,187 --> 00:08:01,724
including
all these CIA programs.

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00:08:01,815 --> 00:08:04,773
I wasn't alone in this.
There were four others out of NSA,

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00:08:04,859 --> 00:08:06,475
and we were all
trying to work internally

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00:08:06,569 --> 00:08:08,059
in the government
over these years

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00:08:08,154 --> 00:08:10,236
trying to get them
to come around

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00:08:10,323 --> 00:08:11,939
to being
constitutionally acceptable

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00:08:12,033 --> 00:08:13,489
and take it into the courts

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00:08:13,576 --> 00:08:15,658
and have the courts'
oversight of it too.

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00:08:15,745 --> 00:08:17,702
So we, we naively kept thinking

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00:08:17,789 --> 00:08:20,622
that could, uh,
that could happen.

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00:08:20,709 --> 00:08:22,825
And it never did.

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00:08:23,962 --> 00:08:25,498
But any rate, after that,

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00:08:25,588 --> 00:08:29,001
and all the stuff we were doing
they decided to raid us,

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00:08:29,092 --> 00:08:31,379
to keep us quiet,
threaten us, you know.

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00:08:31,469 --> 00:08:34,427
So we were raided
simultaneously, four of us.

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00:08:34,514 --> 00:08:36,471
In my case,
they came in with guns drawn.

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00:08:36,558 --> 00:08:39,641
I don't know why they did that,
but they did, so...

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00:08:59,122 --> 00:09:01,284
[woman] Laura, I will answer

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00:09:01,374 --> 00:09:03,866
What I remember of your questions
as best I can.

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00:09:03,960 --> 00:09:05,416
Forgive the lack of structure.

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00:09:05,503 --> 00:09:09,121
I am not a writer, and I have
to draft this in a great hurry.

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00:09:10,508 --> 00:09:14,001
What you know
as Stellar Wind has grown.

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00:09:14,095 --> 00:09:17,383
SSO, the expanded
Special Source Operations

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00:09:17,474 --> 00:09:19,886
that took over Stellar Wind's
share of the pie,

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00:09:19,976 --> 00:09:22,889
has spread all over the world
to practically include

140
00:09:22,979 --> 00:09:25,346
comprehensive coverage
of the United States.

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00:09:26,274 --> 00:09:29,141
<i>Disturbing! y,
the amount of US communication</i>

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00:09:29,235 --> 00:09:32,694
ingested by NSA is still increasing.

143
00:09:32,781 --> 00:09:35,398
Publicly, we complain that
things are going dark,

144
00:09:35,492 --> 00:09:38,655
but in fact,
our accesses are improving.

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00:09:38,745 --> 00:09:41,578
The truth is that the NSA
has never in its history

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00:09:41,664 --> 00:09:44,201
collected more than it does now.

147
00:09:46,044 --> 00:09:49,332
I know the location of most
domestic interception points

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00:09:49,422 --> 00:09:52,710
and that the largest
telecommunication companies in the US

149
00:09:52,801 --> 00:09:54,712
Are betraying
the trust of their customers,

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00:09:54,803 --> 00:09:57,170
which I can prove.

151
00:09:57,263 --> 00:09:59,345
We are building the greatest
weapon for oppression

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00:09:59,432 --> 00:10:00,922
in the history of man,

153
00:10:01,017 --> 00:10:04,305
yet its directors exempt themselves
from accountability.

154
00:10:05,688 --> 00:10:08,976
NSA director Keith Alexander
lied to Congress,

155
00:10:09,067 --> 00:10:11,559
which I can prove.

156
00:10:11,653 --> 00:10:15,191
Billions of US communications
are being intercepted.

157
00:10:16,449 --> 00:10:18,065
In gathering
evidence of wrongdoing,

158
00:10:18,159 --> 00:10:20,446
I focused on the wronging
of the American people,

159
00:10:20,537 --> 00:10:21,948
but believe me when I say that

160
00:10:22,038 --> 00:10:24,621
the surveillance we live under
is the highest privilege

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00:10:24,707 --> 00:10:27,745
compared to how we treat
the rest of the world.

162
00:10:27,836 --> 00:10:29,622
This I can also prove.

163
00:10:30,839 --> 00:10:33,627
On cyber operations,
the government's public position

164
00:10:33,716 --> 00:10:36,003
is that we still lack a policy framework.

165
00:10:36,094 --> 00:10:37,584
This too is a lie.

166
00:10:37,679 --> 00:10:39,841
There is a detailed
policy framework,

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00:10:39,931 --> 00:10:42,263
a kind of Marshall Law
for cyber operations

168
00:10:42,350 --> 00:10:44,136
created by the White House.

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00:10:44,227 --> 00:10:46,468
It's called Presidential
Policy Directive 20

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00:10:46,563 --> 00:10:49,396
and was finalized
at the end of last year.

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00:10:49,482 --> 00:10:52,144
This I can also prove.

172
00:10:52,235 --> 00:10:54,647
I appreciate
your concern for my safety,

173
00:10:54,737 --> 00:10:56,978
but I already know
how this will end for me,

174
00:10:57,073 --> 00:10:59,110
and I accept the risk.

175
00:10:59,200 --> 00:11:01,737
<i>If I have luck
and you are careful,</i>

176
00:11:01,828 --> 00:11:03,785
you will have
everything you need.

177
00:11:03,872 --> 00:11:06,034
I ask only that
you ensure this information

178
00:11:06,124 --> 00:11:09,082
makes it home
to the American public.

179
00:11:09,169 --> 00:11:14,084
Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizens' emails?

180
00:11:14,174 --> 00:11:15,539
No.

181
00:11:17,260 --> 00:11:23,097
Does the NSA intercept Americans'
cell phone conversations?

182
00:11:23,183 --> 00:11:24,173
No.

183
00:11:24,267 --> 00:11:26,850
- Google searches?
- No.

184
00:11:26,936 --> 00:11:29,348
- Text messages?
- No.

185
00:11:29,439 --> 00:11:32,352
- Amazon.com orders?
- No.

186
00:11:32,442 --> 00:11:34,228
- Bank records?
- No.

187
00:11:34,319 --> 00:11:37,903
What judicial consent
is required for NSA

188
00:11:37,989 --> 00:11:40,276
to intercept communications...

189
00:11:41,284 --> 00:11:44,322
and information
involving American citizens?

190
00:11:44,412 --> 00:11:47,325
Within the United States,
that would be the FBI lead.

191
00:11:47,415 --> 00:11:49,452
If it was a foreign actor
in the United States,

192
00:11:49,542 --> 00:11:52,204
the FBI would still have the lead
and could work that with--

193
00:11:52,295 --> 00:11:56,334
with NSA or other intelligence
agencies as authorized.

194
00:11:56,424 --> 00:11:57,914
But to conduct that kind of--

195
00:11:59,177 --> 00:12:02,920
of collection in the United States,
it would have to go through a court order,

196
00:12:03,014 --> 00:12:04,971
and the court
would have to authorize it.

197
00:12:05,058 --> 00:12:07,800
We are not authorized to do it,
nor do we do it.

198
00:12:14,776 --> 00:12:15,857
[banging sound]

199
00:12:15,944 --> 00:12:18,060
[woman] All rise.

200
00:12:18,154 --> 00:12:19,736
The United States
Court of Appeals

201
00:12:19,822 --> 00:12:22,985
for the Ninth Circuit
is now in session.

202
00:12:23,076 --> 00:12:24,441
Please be seated.

203
00:12:33,169 --> 00:12:36,082
Good morning, and welcome
to the Ninth Circuit.

204
00:12:37,173 --> 00:12:39,130
The first case for argument is

205
00:12:39,217 --> 00:12:42,209
Jewel versus
National Security Agency.

206
00:12:42,303 --> 00:12:43,839
You may proceed.

207
00:12:46,641 --> 00:12:48,973
May it please the court,
Kevin Bankston,

208
00:12:49,060 --> 00:12:51,097
for Carolyn Jewel and her fellow
plaintiff appellants

209
00:12:51,187 --> 00:12:53,144
in Jewel v. NSA.

210
00:12:53,231 --> 00:12:57,065
Your Honors, plaintiffs
have specifically alleged

211
00:12:57,151 --> 00:12:59,893
that their own communications
and communications records

212
00:12:59,988 --> 00:13:01,399
have been acquired
by the government.

213
00:13:01,489 --> 00:13:03,821
But the District Court
found that

214
00:13:03,908 --> 00:13:05,899
we had failed to allege facts

215
00:13:05,994 --> 00:13:08,861
that differentiated the injury
that our plaintiffs suffered

216
00:13:08,955 --> 00:13:12,573
from the injuries suffered
by every other AT&T user

217
00:13:12,667 --> 00:13:15,284
whose communications and records
have been acquired by the government,

218
00:13:15,378 --> 00:13:19,167
basically concluding that
so long as everyone is being surveilled,

219
00:13:19,257 --> 00:13:21,419
no one has standing to sue.

220
00:13:21,509 --> 00:13:23,295
However,
to deny standing to persons

221
00:13:23,386 --> 00:13:26,549
who are injured simply because
many others are also injured

222
00:13:26,639 --> 00:13:29,176
would mean that the most injurious
and widespread government actions

223
00:13:29,267 --> 00:13:30,883
could be questioned by nobody.

224
00:13:30,977 --> 00:13:33,264
[man] Do you have
anything concrete that in fact

225
00:13:33,354 --> 00:13:39,066
a specific communication
of your client was intercepted?

226
00:13:39,152 --> 00:13:41,519
[Bankston] We have evidence
that all the communications

227
00:13:41,612 --> 00:13:45,071
passing between AT&T's network
and other networks

228
00:13:45,158 --> 00:13:48,116
in their Northern California
facility have been intercepted.

229
00:13:48,202 --> 00:13:51,115
And so that would necessarily include
the Internet communications

230
00:13:51,205 --> 00:13:53,663
of our Northern California
plaintiffs.

231
00:13:53,750 --> 00:13:55,491
Okay, thank you.

232
00:13:55,585 --> 00:13:56,950
Thank you, Your Honors.

233
00:14:03,968 --> 00:14:07,006
May it please the court, I am Thomas Byron
from the Department of Justice

234
00:14:07,096 --> 00:14:09,087
here on behalf
of the government defendants.

235
00:14:09,182 --> 00:14:13,972
We think this litigation
need not be resolved in federal court

236
00:14:14,062 --> 00:14:17,145
in light of the oversight
of the political branches,

237
00:14:17,231 --> 00:14:19,598
both legislative and executive,

238
00:14:19,692 --> 00:14:23,401
which provides
a better opportunity

239
00:14:23,488 --> 00:14:26,776
for oversight and resolution
of the concerns raised

240
00:14:26,866 --> 00:14:31,360
concerning nationwide policies
of alleged surveillance,

241
00:14:31,454 --> 00:14:33,240
uh, in these complaints.

242
00:14:33,331 --> 00:14:36,414
[man] Even if it's revealed that
one or more of the plaintiffs

243
00:14:36,501 --> 00:14:39,789
had email or telephone
conversations intercepted

244
00:14:39,879 --> 00:14:42,917
that had nothing to do
with national security?

245
00:14:43,007 --> 00:14:45,294
Your Honor, I don't know
that anyone necessarily

246
00:14:45,385 --> 00:14:46,921
would have standing to raise

247
00:14:47,011 --> 00:14:49,969
the particular claims at issue
in these two cases.

248
00:14:50,056 --> 00:14:54,300
We think instead that the kinds
of claims at issue here

249
00:14:54,394 --> 00:14:56,385
against these defendants

250
00:14:56,479 --> 00:14:59,062
are those that are better suited
to resolution

251
00:14:59,148 --> 00:15:01,810
before the-- the representative
branches of our government.

252
00:15:01,901 --> 00:15:05,644
[man] <i>So what role
would the judiciary have</i>

253
00:15:05,738 --> 00:15:09,197
if your approach is adopted?

254
00:15:09,283 --> 00:15:10,819
Judge Pregerson,
I think that...

255
00:15:10,910 --> 00:15:14,198
I mean, we just
get out of the way, is that it?

256
00:15:14,288 --> 00:15:16,950
[Byron] Well, Judge Pregerson, I think
that there is a narrow category,

257
00:15:17,041 --> 00:15:22,332
a subset of cases, in which
it may be appropriate to step aside

258
00:15:22,422 --> 00:15:24,413
for that narrow category of cases.

259
00:15:24,507 --> 00:15:27,499
But the judiciary plays a role...

260
00:15:27,593 --> 00:15:28,958
To be sure, Judge Pregerson--

261
00:15:29,053 --> 00:15:31,715
- ...in our system.
- [Byron] Yes, Your Honor.

262
00:15:31,806 --> 00:15:33,467
And we don't mean
to diminish that.

263
00:15:33,558 --> 00:15:36,596
You know, you're asking us
to abdicate that role.

264
00:15:36,686 --> 00:15:40,099
[Byron] No, Your Honor, um, but it is
a question of this court's discretion

265
00:15:40,189 --> 00:15:41,930
whether to reach that issue.

266
00:15:42,024 --> 00:15:44,061
We do think that
there is simply no way

267
00:15:44,152 --> 00:15:47,110
for the litigation to proceed
without risk of divulging

268
00:15:47,196 --> 00:15:51,736
those very questions of privileged
information that would cause,

269
00:15:51,826 --> 00:15:54,067
as the Director of National
Intelligence has explained,

270
00:15:54,162 --> 00:15:55,573
exceptionally grave damage

271
00:15:55,663 --> 00:15:58,746
to national security
if disclosed.

272
00:16:01,836 --> 00:16:03,201
[man] Um, thanks for having me.

273
00:16:04,464 --> 00:16:07,582
If anybody has any questions, like I said,
basically just raise your hand

274
00:16:07,675 --> 00:16:10,463
and I'll try to call on you
as soon as I possibly can.

275
00:16:10,553 --> 00:16:13,090
So who here actually feels like

276
00:16:13,181 --> 00:16:16,094
they are under surveillance
pretty regularly?

277
00:16:17,185 --> 00:16:19,722
- [man speaks indistinctly]
- Everyone inside of Occupy.

278
00:16:19,812 --> 00:16:22,019
How many people have been
arrested and had their,

279
00:16:22,106 --> 00:16:24,643
at their court date, they had
their phone taken into the back room?

280
00:16:24,734 --> 00:16:28,068
How many people in here
had their retina scanned?

281
00:16:28,154 --> 00:16:29,440
Wow.

282
00:16:29,530 --> 00:16:33,774
Um, so you guys are actually in a sense
the canaries in the coal mine.

283
00:16:33,868 --> 00:16:36,576
Right, because the incentives
are all lined up against you.

284
00:16:36,662 --> 00:16:38,369
Anybody see on the subway,

285
00:16:38,456 --> 00:16:41,289
"Link your MetroCard
to your debit card," right?

286
00:16:41,375 --> 00:16:42,661
Like, auto-refill?

287
00:16:42,752 --> 00:16:45,244
This is a concept which is key
to everything we'll talk about today.

288
00:16:45,338 --> 00:16:46,749
And it's called linkability:

289
00:16:46,839 --> 00:16:50,252
Take one piece of data and link it
to another piece of data.

290
00:16:50,343 --> 00:16:52,380
So, for example,
if you have your MetroCard

291
00:16:52,470 --> 00:16:54,427
and you have your debit card,
you have those things

292
00:16:54,514 --> 00:16:56,425
and you can draw a line
between them, right?

293
00:16:56,516 --> 00:17:00,134
So that's, like, not a scary thing,
except your bank card is tied

294
00:17:00,228 --> 00:17:02,265
to everything else that you do
during the day.

295
00:17:02,355 --> 00:17:05,689
So now they know where you're going,
when you make purchases.

296
00:17:05,775 --> 00:17:07,436
So when they decide to target you,

297
00:17:07,527 --> 00:17:09,359
they can actually
recreate your exact steps.

298
00:17:09,445 --> 00:17:12,107
With a MetroCard
and with a credit card, alone,

299
00:17:12,198 --> 00:17:14,314
like literally where you go
and what you buy,

300
00:17:14,408 --> 00:17:16,945
and potentially by linking
that data with other people

301
00:17:17,036 --> 00:17:19,073
on similar travel plans,

302
00:17:19,163 --> 00:17:21,905
they can figure out who you talk to
and who you met with.

303
00:17:21,999 --> 00:17:25,287
When you then take cell phone data,
which logs your location,

304
00:17:25,378 --> 00:17:27,289
and you link up purchasing data,

305
00:17:27,380 --> 00:17:30,042
MetroCard data,
and your debit card,

306
00:17:30,132 --> 00:17:32,590
you start to get
what you could call "metadata"

307
00:17:32,677 --> 00:17:34,714
in aggregate
over a person's life.

308
00:17:34,804 --> 00:17:37,717
And metadata,
in aggregate, is content.

309
00:17:37,807 --> 00:17:40,925
It tells a story about you
which is made up of facts,

310
00:17:41,018 --> 00:17:42,725
but is not necessarily true.

311
00:17:42,812 --> 00:17:44,803
So for example, just because
you were on the corner

312
00:17:44,897 --> 00:17:46,558
and all those data points
point to it,

313
00:17:46,649 --> 00:17:48,185
it doesn't mean
you committed the crime.

314
00:17:48,276 --> 00:17:50,108
So it's important to note that

315
00:17:50,194 --> 00:17:52,401
if someone has a perception
of you having done a thing,

316
00:17:52,488 --> 00:17:55,071
it will now follow you
for the rest of your life.

317
00:17:55,157 --> 00:17:57,694
So just keep in mind
that what happens to you guys,

318
00:17:57,785 --> 00:18:01,824
for example, with fingerprints
and retinal scans and photographs,

319
00:18:01,914 --> 00:18:04,372
that is what is going to
happen to people in the future

320
00:18:04,458 --> 00:18:06,950
when they resist policy changes
and when they try to protest

321
00:18:07,044 --> 00:18:09,206
in a totally constitutionally
protected way.

322
00:18:10,423 --> 00:18:13,336
[man] This is for you, Director Clapper,
again on the surveillance front,

323
00:18:13,426 --> 00:18:16,009
and I hope we can do this
in just a yes or no answer

324
00:18:16,095 --> 00:18:18,336
because I know Senator Feinstein
wants to move on.

325
00:18:18,431 --> 00:18:23,551
So, does the NSA
collect any type of data at all

326
00:18:23,644 --> 00:18:27,558
on millions or hundreds
of millions of Americans?

327
00:18:27,648 --> 00:18:29,559
No, sir.

328
00:18:29,650 --> 00:18:31,482
It does not?

329
00:18:32,528 --> 00:18:34,690
Not wittingly.

330
00:18:34,780 --> 00:18:37,693
There are cases
where they could inadvertently,

331
00:18:37,783 --> 00:18:41,777
perhaps, collect, but not wittingly.

332
00:19:07,647 --> 00:19:11,356
[woman] The encrypted archive should
be available to you Within seven days.

333
00:19:11,442 --> 00:19:14,150
The key will follow
when everything else is done.

334
00:19:16,072 --> 00:19:19,064
The material I provide,
and investigative effort required

335
00:19:19,158 --> 00:19:21,616
will be too much for any one person.

336
00:19:21,702 --> 00:19:25,195
I recommend at a very minimum,
you involve Glenn Greenwald.

337
00:19:25,289 --> 00:19:26,950
I believe you know him.

338
00:19:29,085 --> 00:19:30,496
The plain text of the payload

339
00:19:30,586 --> 00:19:33,328
will include my true name details
for the record...

340
00:19:34,340 --> 00:19:36,251
though it will be your decision
as to whether

341
00:19:36,342 --> 00:19:39,505
or how to declare my involvement.

342
00:19:39,595 --> 00:19:44,135
My personal desire is that you paint
the target directly on my back.

343
00:19:44,225 --> 00:19:47,183
No one, not even my most
trusted confidante,

344
00:19:47,269 --> 00:19:49,101
is aware of my intentions,

345
00:19:49,188 --> 00:19:53,773
and it would not be fair for them
to fall under suspicion for my actions.

346
00:19:53,859 --> 00:19:55,770
You may be the only one
who can prevent that,

347
00:19:55,861 --> 00:19:58,398
and that is by immediately
nailing me to the cross

348
00:19:58,489 --> 00:20:01,322
rather than trying
to protect me as a source.

349
00:20:03,953 --> 00:20:07,787
On timing, regarding
meeting up in Hong Kong.

350
00:20:07,873 --> 00:20:09,409
The first rendezvous attempt

351
00:20:09,500 --> 00:20:12,868
will be at 10:00 am. local time
on Monday.

352
00:20:12,962 --> 00:20:17,081
We will meet in the hallway outside
of a restaurant in the Mira Hotel.

353
00:20:18,259 --> 00:20:21,377
I will be working on a Rubik's Cube
so you can identify me.

354
00:20:22,638 --> 00:20:26,427
Approach me, and ask if! know
the hours of the restaurant.

355
00:20:26,517 --> 00:20:28,804
I'll respond by stating that
I'm not sure,

356
00:20:28,894 --> 00:20:31,556
and suggest you
try the lounge instead.

357
00:20:31,647 --> 00:20:35,015
I'll offer to show you Where it is,
and at that point we 're good.

358
00:20:36,026 --> 00:20:38,142
You simply need to follow naturally.

359
00:21:15,649 --> 00:21:18,107
[man] As far as positioning,
I mean, if you want us to sit

360
00:21:18,194 --> 00:21:19,559
in any particular way or whatever.

361
00:21:19,653 --> 00:21:22,816
[woman] You know, I'm gonna go there,
to try to get better light.

362
00:21:28,579 --> 00:21:31,947
[indistinct chatter]

363
00:21:32,041 --> 00:21:35,875
So, um, there's, you know,
so many different

364
00:21:35,961 --> 00:21:37,998
enormous stories

365
00:21:38,088 --> 00:21:40,455
just, that are kind of
stand alone stories,

366
00:21:41,467 --> 00:21:43,128
that even, like, you know,

367
00:21:43,219 --> 00:21:44,709
certain things
about an individual document

368
00:21:44,804 --> 00:21:46,294
that can just be
their own story.

369
00:21:46,388 --> 00:21:49,471
And I just want to start
churning those stories out.

370
00:21:49,558 --> 00:21:52,641
I basically woke up this morning
and already started writing stories.

371
00:21:52,728 --> 00:21:54,594
So I'm hoping to, you know,

372
00:21:54,688 --> 00:21:57,146
start publishing
like within a day or two days.

373
00:21:57,233 --> 00:21:59,224
- [Snowden] Okay.
- As long as you're good with that.

374
00:21:59,318 --> 00:22:00,900
- [Snowden] Yeah.
- Um, and...

375
00:22:00,986 --> 00:22:03,774
So, as far as like the stuff
we have to talk about,

376
00:22:03,864 --> 00:22:06,447
I'm kind of dichotomizing it,

377
00:22:07,952 --> 00:22:11,035
between stuff that
I'd like to talk to you about

378
00:22:11,121 --> 00:22:12,782
in terms of like the documents
and the content,

379
00:22:12,873 --> 00:22:14,489
and Laura has a bunch of
questions about that as well,

380
00:22:14,583 --> 00:22:15,994
sort of working
through the documents,

381
00:22:16,085 --> 00:22:18,918
getting your take on
a lot of this stuff that,

382
00:22:19,004 --> 00:22:20,415
you know, will help me
understand it better.

383
00:22:20,506 --> 00:22:22,793
But then also
the sort of "you" story,

384
00:22:22,883 --> 00:22:25,796
like the who you are, what you've done,

385
00:22:25,886 --> 00:22:27,502
why you've done what you've done.

386
00:22:27,596 --> 00:22:29,178
- Yeah.
- And I'd love to do that first.

387
00:22:29,265 --> 00:22:30,505
Okay.

388
00:22:30,599 --> 00:22:33,261
Um, in part because you're
the only one who can do that.

389
00:22:33,352 --> 00:22:36,390
So I'd just like to get that done
so that it's done, um,

390
00:22:36,480 --> 00:22:37,936
and also because, you know,

391
00:22:38,023 --> 00:22:40,139
it might be that
you want to do that early.

392
00:22:40,234 --> 00:22:42,066
- Because...
- Who knows what could happen--

393
00:22:42,152 --> 00:22:45,440
It might be necessary, we might
choose to have that done early.

394
00:22:45,531 --> 00:22:47,647
Tell me your thoughts on
where you are with that--

395
00:22:47,741 --> 00:22:49,152
The primary one on that,

396
00:22:49,243 --> 00:22:51,655
I think I've expressed that
a couple times online,

397
00:22:51,745 --> 00:22:56,706
is I feel the modern media has
a big focus on personalities.

398
00:22:56,792 --> 00:22:58,203
[Greenwald] Totally.

399
00:22:58,294 --> 00:23:02,333
And I'm a little concerned
the more we focus on that,

400
00:23:02,423 --> 00:23:05,461
the more they're gonna use
that as a distraction.

401
00:23:05,551 --> 00:23:07,542
And I don't necessarily
want that to happen,

402
00:23:07,636 --> 00:23:09,843
which is why I've consistently
said, you know,

403
00:23:09,930 --> 00:23:11,466
"I'm not the story here."

404
00:23:11,557 --> 00:23:13,343
- [pen clatters on floor]
- Um...

405
00:23:13,434 --> 00:23:14,424
Nervous, huh?

406
00:23:14,518 --> 00:23:15,929
[Greenwald]
No, it's a very, very cheap pen,

407
00:23:16,020 --> 00:23:18,387
that just with the slightest
force broke, go ahead.

408
00:23:19,899 --> 00:23:22,106
But uh, yeah,

409
00:23:22,192 --> 00:23:24,980
anything I can do
to help you guys

410
00:23:25,070 --> 00:23:26,856
get this out I will do.

411
00:23:26,947 --> 00:23:31,612
I don't have,
uh, any experience with media,

412
00:23:31,702 --> 00:23:36,697
with how this works,
so I'm kind of learning as I go.

413
00:23:36,790 --> 00:23:39,122
[Greenwald] Right,
so I just want to get a sense

414
00:23:39,209 --> 00:23:41,200
of Why did you decide to do
What you've done.

415
00:23:41,295 --> 00:23:45,084
So, for me,
it all comes down to state power

416
00:23:45,174 --> 00:23:49,509
against the peoples' ability to
meaningfully oppose that power.

417
00:23:49,595 --> 00:23:52,212
And I'm sitting there,
uh, every day

418
00:23:52,306 --> 00:23:55,515
getting paid to design methods

419
00:23:55,601 --> 00:23:58,764
to amplify that state power.

420
00:23:58,854 --> 00:24:00,891
And I'm realizing that
if, you know,

421
00:24:00,981 --> 00:24:03,643
the policy switches
that are the only things

422
00:24:03,734 --> 00:24:05,975
that restrain these states,

423
00:24:06,070 --> 00:24:08,528
were changed, there...

424
00:24:08,614 --> 00:24:10,275
you couldn't
meaningfully oppose these.

425
00:24:10,366 --> 00:24:11,856
I mean you would have to be

426
00:24:11,951 --> 00:24:13,612
the most
incredibly sophisticated,

427
00:24:13,702 --> 00:24:15,534
technical actor in existence.

428
00:24:15,621 --> 00:24:17,988
I mean,
I'm not sure there's anybody,

429
00:24:18,082 --> 00:24:20,790
no matter how gifted you are,

430
00:24:20,876 --> 00:24:23,664
who could oppose
all of the offices

431
00:24:23,754 --> 00:24:26,872
and all the bright people,
even all the mediocre people

432
00:24:26,966 --> 00:24:30,004
out there with all of their tools
and all their capabilities.

433
00:24:30,094 --> 00:24:33,962
And as I saw the promise
of the Obama administration

434
00:24:34,056 --> 00:24:36,263
be betrayed
and walked away from

435
00:24:36,350 --> 00:24:38,717
and in fact, actually advance...

436
00:24:38,811 --> 00:24:39,801
[Greenwald] Uh-huh, uh-huh.

437
00:24:39,895 --> 00:24:42,136
...the things
that had been promised

438
00:24:42,231 --> 00:24:46,190
to be sort of curtailed
and reigned in and dialed back,

439
00:24:46,276 --> 00:24:48,938
and actually get worse,
particularly drone strikes,

440
00:24:49,029 --> 00:24:50,440
which I also learned at NSA,

441
00:24:50,531 --> 00:24:54,149
we could watch drone videos
from our desktops.

442
00:24:57,037 --> 00:24:59,825
As I saw that, that really
hardened me to action.

443
00:24:59,915 --> 00:25:01,576
- [Poitras] In real time?
- In real time.

444
00:25:01,667 --> 00:25:04,079
Yeah, you... it'll stream

445
00:25:04,169 --> 00:25:06,957
a lower quality of the video
to your desktop.

446
00:25:07,047 --> 00:25:09,084
Typically you'd be watching
surveillance drones

447
00:25:09,174 --> 00:25:11,415
as opposed to actually
like you know murder drones

448
00:25:11,510 --> 00:25:13,467
where they're going out there
and bomb somebody.

449
00:25:13,554 --> 00:25:16,387
But you'll have a drone that's just
following somebody's house

450
00:25:16,473 --> 00:25:18,089
for hours and hours.

451
00:25:18,183 --> 00:25:19,594
And you won't know who it is,

452
00:25:19,685 --> 00:25:22,222
because you don't have
the context for that.

453
00:25:22,312 --> 00:25:23,973
But it's just a page,

454
00:25:24,064 --> 00:25:26,852
where it's lists
and lists of drone feeds

455
00:25:26,942 --> 00:25:28,353
in all these
different countries,

456
00:25:28,444 --> 00:25:30,105
under all these
different code names,

457
00:25:30,195 --> 00:25:32,311
and you can just click on
which one you want to see.

458
00:25:34,783 --> 00:25:37,115
[Greenwald] Right,
but, so if your self-interest

459
00:25:37,202 --> 00:25:40,365
is to live in a world in which
there's maximum privacy,

460
00:25:40,456 --> 00:25:43,164
doing something
that could put you into prison,

461
00:25:43,250 --> 00:25:45,742
in which your privacy
is completely destroyed,

462
00:25:45,836 --> 00:25:47,747
is sort of
the antithesis of that.

463
00:25:47,838 --> 00:25:51,877
How did you reach the point where that
was a worthwhile calculation for you?

464
00:25:51,967 --> 00:25:55,426
I remember what the Internet was like
before it was being watched,

465
00:25:55,512 --> 00:25:58,345
and there's never been anything
in the history of man that's like it.

466
00:25:58,432 --> 00:26:01,891
I mean,
you could again have children

467
00:26:01,977 --> 00:26:06,221
from one part of the world
having an equal discussion

468
00:26:06,315 --> 00:26:08,773
where, you know,
they were sort of granted,

469
00:26:08,859 --> 00:26:12,944
um, the same respect
for their ideas and conversation,

470
00:26:13,030 --> 00:26:15,772
with experts in a field
from another part of the world,

471
00:26:15,866 --> 00:26:20,656
on any topic, anywhere,
anytime, all the time.

472
00:26:20,746 --> 00:26:22,612
And it was free
and unrestrained.

473
00:26:22,706 --> 00:26:25,915
And we've seen,
uh, the chilling of that

474
00:26:26,001 --> 00:26:28,038
and the cooling of that
and the changing of that model,

475
00:26:28,128 --> 00:26:31,746
toward something in which people
self-police their own views,

476
00:26:31,840 --> 00:26:34,798
and they literally make jokes
about ending up on "the list"

477
00:26:34,885 --> 00:26:37,422
if they donate
to a political cause

478
00:26:37,513 --> 00:26:39,504
or if they say something
in a discussion.

479
00:26:39,598 --> 00:26:42,761
Uh, and it's become an expectation

480
00:26:42,851 --> 00:26:44,808
that we're being watched.

481
00:26:44,895 --> 00:26:46,932
Um, many people I've talked to
have mentioned that

482
00:26:47,022 --> 00:26:49,684
they're careful about what
they type into search engines

483
00:26:49,775 --> 00:26:51,561
because they know that
it's being recorded.

484
00:26:51,652 --> 00:26:56,442
And that limits the boundaries
of their intellectual exploration.

485
00:26:56,532 --> 00:27:00,025
Uh... and I'm...

486
00:27:01,161 --> 00:27:06,702
I am more willing
to risk imprisonment,

487
00:27:06,792 --> 00:27:10,410
or any other negative outcome,
personally,

488
00:27:10,504 --> 00:27:14,088
than I am willing to risk

489
00:27:14,174 --> 00:27:16,836
the curtailment
of my intellectual freedom

490
00:27:16,927 --> 00:27:20,340
and that of those around me

491
00:27:20,430 --> 00:27:24,344
whom I care for, uh,
equally, as I do for myself.

492
00:27:24,434 --> 00:27:27,426
And again, that's not to say
that I'm self-sacrificing,

493
00:27:27,521 --> 00:27:29,853
because it gives me--

494
00:27:29,940 --> 00:27:33,183
I feel good
in my human experience

495
00:27:33,277 --> 00:27:35,564
to know that I can contribute
to the good of others.

496
00:27:52,045 --> 00:27:53,831
[MacAskill] Could you elaborate on that?

497
00:27:53,922 --> 00:27:58,382
So, I don't know
how much of the programs

498
00:27:58,468 --> 00:28:01,756
and the actual technical capacities
everybody's talked to you about,

499
00:28:01,847 --> 00:28:06,057
but there's an infrastructure in place
in the United States and worldwide...

500
00:28:07,227 --> 00:28:09,389
that NSA has built,

501
00:28:09,479 --> 00:28:12,972
in cooperation with
other governments as well...

502
00:28:14,568 --> 00:28:20,689
that intercepts basically
every digital communication,

503
00:28:20,782 --> 00:28:25,777
every radio communication,
every analog communication

504
00:28:25,871 --> 00:28:29,159
that it has sensors in place
to detect.

505
00:28:29,249 --> 00:28:34,039
And with these capabilities,
basically,

506
00:28:34,129 --> 00:28:38,168
the vast majority of human

507
00:28:38,258 --> 00:28:40,920
and computer-to-computer
communications,

508
00:28:41,011 --> 00:28:42,547
device-based communications,

509
00:28:42,638 --> 00:28:44,424
which sort of
inform the relationships

510
00:28:44,514 --> 00:28:46,255
between humans,

511
00:28:46,350 --> 00:28:50,389
are automatically ingested
without targeting.

512
00:28:50,479 --> 00:28:53,813
And that allows individuals
to retroactively

513
00:28:53,899 --> 00:28:58,439
search your communications
based on self-certifications.

514
00:28:58,528 --> 00:29:04,194
So, for example, if I wanted to see
the content of your email,

515
00:29:04,284 --> 00:29:08,699
or, you know, your wife's phone calls,
or anything like that,

516
00:29:08,789 --> 00:29:12,953
all I have to do is
use what's called a "selector,"

517
00:29:13,043 --> 00:29:18,209
any kind of thing
in the communications chain

518
00:29:18,298 --> 00:29:21,211
that might uniquely
or almost uniquely

519
00:29:21,301 --> 00:29:22,791
identify you as an individual.

520
00:29:22,886 --> 00:29:25,173
And I'm talking about things
like email addresses,

521
00:29:25,264 --> 00:29:28,552
IP addresses, phone numbers,
credit cards,

522
00:29:28,642 --> 00:29:31,976
um, even passwords
that are unique to you

523
00:29:32,062 --> 00:29:34,929
that aren't used by anyone else.

524
00:29:35,023 --> 00:29:37,355
I can input those
into the system,

525
00:29:37,442 --> 00:29:39,479
and it will not only go back
through the database

526
00:29:39,569 --> 00:29:43,608
and go, "Have I seen this
anywhere in the past?"

527
00:29:43,699 --> 00:29:45,189
It will,

528
00:29:45,284 --> 00:29:48,367
basically put an additional
level of scrutiny on it,

529
00:29:48,453 --> 00:29:50,740
moving into the future,
that says,

530
00:29:50,831 --> 00:29:53,619
"If this is detected now
or at anytime in the future

531
00:29:53,709 --> 00:29:56,326
I want this
to go to me immediately,

532
00:29:56,420 --> 00:29:58,206
and alert me in real time"

533
00:29:58,297 --> 00:29:59,753
that you're communicating
with someone.

534
00:29:59,840 --> 00:30:01,251
Things like that.

535
00:30:05,345 --> 00:30:07,757
So I don't know who you are
or anything about you.

536
00:30:07,848 --> 00:30:10,135
Okay. Um...

537
00:30:10,225 --> 00:30:14,389
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton,

538
00:30:14,479 --> 00:30:16,220
a defense contractor,

539
00:30:16,315 --> 00:30:18,852
I'm sort of on loan to NSA.

540
00:30:18,942 --> 00:30:20,398
I don't talk to
a Booz Allen boss,

541
00:30:20,485 --> 00:30:23,068
I don't get tasking from Booz Allen,
it's all from NSA.

542
00:30:23,155 --> 00:30:25,897
- Sorry, I don't know your name.
- Oh, sorry!

543
00:30:25,991 --> 00:30:28,904
I, uh...
my name Is Edward Snowden.

544
00:30:28,994 --> 00:30:31,361
I go by Ed. Um...

545
00:30:31,455 --> 00:30:33,742
Edward Joseph Snowden
is the full name.

546
00:30:33,832 --> 00:30:37,075
- S-N...
- O-W-D- E- N

547
00:30:37,169 --> 00:30:38,409
[MacAskill]
And where are you from?

548
00:30:38,503 --> 00:30:41,916
I'm originally,
I was born in North Carolina,

549
00:30:42,007 --> 00:30:44,248
uh, small town, Elizabeth City.

550
00:30:44,343 --> 00:30:47,426
There's a Coast Guard station there.
I'm from a military family.

551
00:30:47,512 --> 00:30:49,549
But I spent most of my time

552
00:30:49,639 --> 00:30:53,007
growing up around Fort Meade
in Maryland.

553
00:30:54,770 --> 00:30:58,934
And your family,
what's the consequences for them?

554
00:30:59,024 --> 00:31:03,393
This is actually
what has made this hardest.

555
00:31:03,487 --> 00:31:07,071
My family doesn't know
what's happening.

556
00:31:07,157 --> 00:31:08,568
They're unaware.

557
00:31:09,785 --> 00:31:15,076
I don't think I'll be able
to keep the family ties

558
00:31:15,165 --> 00:31:19,830
that I've had for my life, um,

559
00:31:19,920 --> 00:31:23,208
because of the risk
of associating them with this.

560
00:31:23,298 --> 00:31:26,791
And I'll leave, you know,
what to publish on this

561
00:31:26,885 --> 00:31:28,467
and what not to publish
to you guys.

562
00:31:28,553 --> 00:31:31,545
I trust you
to be responsible on this.

563
00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:36,305
Um, but basically,
the closer I stay to my family,

564
00:31:36,395 --> 00:31:38,511
the more likely they are to be
leaned on, you know.

565
00:31:38,605 --> 00:31:40,061
So you don't want me
to report this?

566
00:31:40,148 --> 00:31:43,686
[Greenwald] I mean, we definitely
want to do whatever we can

567
00:31:43,777 --> 00:31:46,735
not to include them
or bring them into the mix.

568
00:31:46,822 --> 00:31:49,314
[MacAskill] Yeah, yeah, sure,
that's fine, I won't...

569
00:31:49,408 --> 00:31:50,523
[Greenwald]
I'm sorry, let me interrupt you.

570
00:31:50,617 --> 00:31:53,450
Can we just stop for a second and do
the documents and then go back to that?

571
00:31:53,537 --> 00:31:54,527
- Does that makes sense?
- Sure.

572
00:31:54,621 --> 00:31:56,032
What do I need?

573
00:31:56,123 --> 00:31:58,706
Do I need an email address
that we're using, or...?

574
00:31:58,792 --> 00:32:00,874
Well, so you can, you can send them--

575
00:32:00,961 --> 00:32:03,749
once you've encrypted it, you can send it
from whatever you think is appropriate.

576
00:32:03,839 --> 00:32:06,672
The main thing is you've got
to encapsulate all of this

577
00:32:06,758 --> 00:32:11,127
in a way that it can't be
decrypted and read

578
00:32:11,221 --> 00:32:13,087
when it's in transit
across the network...

579
00:32:13,181 --> 00:32:14,421
Right.

580
00:32:14,516 --> 00:32:16,723
...or on either of the end
points that it's received at.

581
00:32:16,810 --> 00:32:18,221
Just so you know,
these documents are

582
00:32:18,311 --> 00:32:20,018
basically all gonna be uploaded

583
00:32:20,105 --> 00:32:22,517
in like 48 hours,
72 hours, whatever...

584
00:32:22,607 --> 00:32:25,224
This is simply-- you want to get in
the process of doing this for everything,

585
00:32:25,318 --> 00:32:28,276
because it seems hard, but it's not hard,
his is super easy.

586
00:32:28,363 --> 00:32:30,229
So just walk me through it, and--

587
00:32:30,323 --> 00:32:33,031
Okay. Show me-- show me
the actual folder structure

588
00:32:33,118 --> 00:32:34,734
where these files are first.

589
00:32:38,123 --> 00:32:40,239
How many documents
did you say there were?

590
00:32:40,333 --> 00:32:41,539
Seven.

591
00:32:41,626 --> 00:32:42,957
Well, while you're working
did you want to...?

592
00:32:43,044 --> 00:32:45,706
- [overlapping chatter]
- [MacAskill] Okay, go ahead.

593
00:32:45,797 --> 00:32:47,538
How many documents
are we talking about?

594
00:32:47,632 --> 00:32:49,714
Because when The Guardian
did WikiLeaks,

595
00:32:49,801 --> 00:32:52,042
technical people set up a system

596
00:32:52,137 --> 00:32:55,129
so they were available
for anybody to see.

597
00:32:55,223 --> 00:32:58,807
And I just wondered
if it's possible to do the same thing?

598
00:32:58,894 --> 00:33:01,932
That would be
the ideal end game,

599
00:33:02,022 --> 00:33:06,937
um, but because
some of these documents

600
00:33:07,027 --> 00:33:09,519
are legitimately classified
in ways

601
00:33:09,613 --> 00:33:12,605
that could cause harm to people
and methods...

602
00:33:13,617 --> 00:33:17,030
I'm comfortable in my technical
ability to protect them,

603
00:33:17,120 --> 00:33:18,781
I mean you could literally
shoot me or torture me,

604
00:33:18,872 --> 00:33:22,456
and I could not disclose
the password if I wanted to.

605
00:33:22,542 --> 00:33:27,207
Um, you know, I have
the sophistication to do that.

606
00:33:27,297 --> 00:33:30,085
There are some journalists
that I think could do that,

607
00:33:30,175 --> 00:33:32,792
but there are a number of them
that couldn't.

608
00:33:32,886 --> 00:33:34,752
But the question becomes,

609
00:33:34,846 --> 00:33:40,341
can an organization actually
control that information

610
00:33:40,435 --> 00:33:42,972
in that manner without risking

611
00:33:43,063 --> 00:33:44,849
basically
an uncontrolled disclosure?

612
00:33:44,940 --> 00:33:46,601
But I do agree with that.

613
00:33:46,691 --> 00:33:49,353
Honestly,
I don't want to be the person

614
00:33:49,444 --> 00:33:50,855
making the decisions on

615
00:33:50,946 --> 00:33:52,562
what should be public
and what shouldn't.

616
00:33:52,656 --> 00:33:56,365
Which is why, rather than
publishing these on my own,

617
00:33:56,451 --> 00:33:59,864
or putting them out openly,
I'm running them through journalists.

618
00:33:59,955 --> 00:34:02,947
So that my bias,
you know, and my things...

619
00:34:03,041 --> 00:34:05,749
Because clearly
I have some strongly held views,

620
00:34:05,835 --> 00:34:07,246
are removed from that equation,

621
00:34:07,337 --> 00:34:09,669
and the public interest
is being represented

622
00:34:09,756 --> 00:34:11,167
in the most responsible manner.

623
00:34:11,258 --> 00:34:13,249
Yeah.

624
00:34:13,343 --> 00:34:17,132
Actually, given your sort of,
you know,

625
00:34:17,222 --> 00:34:21,637
geographic familiarity
with the UK and whatnot,

626
00:34:21,726 --> 00:34:27,597
I'd like to point out
that GCHQ has, uh,

627
00:34:27,691 --> 00:34:30,353
probably the most invasive...

628
00:34:30,443 --> 00:34:32,275
[MacAskill]
I've heard about that.

629
00:34:32,362 --> 00:34:34,524
...network intercept program
anywhere in the world.

630
00:34:34,614 --> 00:34:35,979
Yeah, yeah.

631
00:34:36,074 --> 00:34:39,612
It's called Tempora,
T-E-M-P-O-R-A,

632
00:34:39,703 --> 00:34:42,365
and it's the world's first
"full take,"

633
00:34:42,455 --> 00:34:43,911
they call it,
and that means content

634
00:34:43,999 --> 00:34:46,206
in addition to metadata,
on everything.

635
00:34:49,254 --> 00:34:52,121
[Greenwald] Um, so this is what
I'd like to do in terms of scheduling,

636
00:34:52,215 --> 00:34:53,831
if it's good with everybody else.

637
00:34:53,925 --> 00:34:56,917
Um, are you... do you feel like
you're done with what you...?

638
00:34:57,012 --> 00:34:58,423
[MacAskill] I am done.

639
00:34:58,513 --> 00:35:02,177
I'm anxious to go back,
get those articles done.

640
00:35:02,267 --> 00:35:04,975
And then there's a bunch of
documents that aren't about

641
00:35:05,061 --> 00:35:07,223
those first two or three stories that
I'd like to spend time with you...

642
00:35:07,314 --> 00:35:09,430
- Sure, yeah--
- ...you know, kind of going over it.

643
00:35:09,524 --> 00:35:11,686
- Um, and...
- I'm not going anywhere!

644
00:35:11,776 --> 00:35:14,143
You're available?
You want to check your book first?

645
00:35:14,237 --> 00:35:17,195
Yeah! Let me...
uh... let me check my schedule.

646
00:35:17,282 --> 00:35:18,443
Is that good for you, Laura?

647
00:35:18,533 --> 00:35:19,864
- [Poitras] It's great.
- [Greenwald] Okay.

648
00:35:31,129 --> 00:35:33,291
[phone ringing]

649
00:35:35,884 --> 00:35:37,716
Hello?

650
00:35:37,802 --> 00:35:39,463
Yes.

651
00:35:39,554 --> 00:35:41,921
My meal was great,
thank you very much.

652
00:35:45,268 --> 00:35:47,805
No, I still have some left, and I think
I'm gonna be eating it later.

653
00:35:47,896 --> 00:35:50,058
So, uh, you can just
leave me alone for now.

654
00:35:52,400 --> 00:35:54,437
Okay, great.
Thank you so much.

655
00:35:54,527 --> 00:35:56,017
Have a good one.
Bye.

656
00:35:57,822 --> 00:36:00,814
Let's fix that real quick.

657
00:36:03,703 --> 00:36:05,865
So uh, another fun thing,
I was telling Laura about this:

658
00:36:05,955 --> 00:36:08,868
all these new VOIP phones,
they have little computers in them,

659
00:36:08,958 --> 00:36:10,995
and you can hot mic these
over the network--

660
00:36:11,086 --> 00:36:12,918
all the time,
even when the receiver's down.

661
00:36:13,004 --> 00:36:16,463
So as long as it's plugged in,
it can be listening in on you.

662
00:36:16,549 --> 00:36:18,961
And I hadn't even considered
that earlier, but yeah.

663
00:36:19,052 --> 00:36:20,042
Okay.

664
00:36:20,136 --> 00:36:22,969
There are so many ways
this could be--

665
00:36:23,056 --> 00:36:26,014
Everything in here is gonna be
on the public record at some point.

666
00:36:26,101 --> 00:36:28,092
We, we should operate on that,
that basis, because--

667
00:36:28,186 --> 00:36:29,392
[Greenwald] Yeah, we are.

668
00:36:29,479 --> 00:36:30,765
[Snowden] Do you have your
air-gapped machine with you?

669
00:36:30,855 --> 00:36:32,141
[Greenwald] I do, I do.

670
00:36:32,232 --> 00:36:33,814
[Snowden]
You can pop that out.

671
00:36:37,821 --> 00:36:39,277
Do you have an understanding
or commitment

672
00:36:39,364 --> 00:36:42,652
on when you guys are going to
press with the first stories?

673
00:36:42,742 --> 00:36:44,904
[MacAskill] I suppose seven or
eight in the morning in London.

674
00:36:44,994 --> 00:36:46,359
Uh-huh, okay.

675
00:36:48,456 --> 00:36:50,242
Now let's see here.

676
00:36:58,007 --> 00:36:59,839
Oh, hey, look,
there's the other one.

677
00:37:00,969 --> 00:37:03,256
Pro tip, let's not leave
the same SD cards

678
00:37:03,346 --> 00:37:05,383
in our laptops forever,
in the future.

679
00:37:12,230 --> 00:37:16,519
Did you know this was still
kicking around in your laptop?

680
00:37:16,609 --> 00:37:17,940
[Greenwald]
Yeah, um, that was the...

681
00:37:18,027 --> 00:37:20,109
- Okay, just making sure.
- [Greenwald] Okay, yeah.

682
00:37:21,114 --> 00:37:23,321
- This is that.
- Right there.

683
00:37:23,408 --> 00:37:26,526
You will have a new one that looks exactly
identical that's a different archive,

684
00:37:26,619 --> 00:37:30,328
so you might want to
take a Sharpie to it, or something.

685
00:37:30,415 --> 00:37:33,703
Could you pass me
my magic mantle of power?

686
00:37:33,793 --> 00:37:36,160
[Poitras] Mm-hmm.
I'm gonna go pick up...

687
00:37:42,010 --> 00:37:44,547
Is that about the possibility of--

688
00:37:44,637 --> 00:37:46,753
[Snowden] Visual--
yeah, visual collection.

689
00:37:53,688 --> 00:37:56,851
I don't think at this point there's
anything that will shock us.

690
00:37:56,941 --> 00:37:59,933
[laughing]
We've become pretty...

691
00:38:00,028 --> 00:38:03,111
In fact, Ewen said before, he's like,
he's like "I'm never leaving my room...

692
00:38:03,198 --> 00:38:06,065
I'm never leaving anything in my room
again, not a single machine."

693
00:38:06,159 --> 00:38:08,241
I was like, "You've been
infected by the paranoia bug.

694
00:38:08,328 --> 00:38:10,319
- Happens to all of us!"
- [Snowden laughing] Yeah.

695
00:38:10,413 --> 00:38:11,824
The way he said it, he was like,

696
00:38:11,915 --> 00:38:16,250
"I would never leave a single device
in the room again alone."

697
00:38:16,336 --> 00:38:17,622
My bag is getting heavier
and heavier.

698
00:38:17,712 --> 00:38:19,703
[laughter, chatter]

699
00:38:22,300 --> 00:38:23,711
That's your evil influence, Ed.

700
00:38:23,802 --> 00:38:26,464
All right, I'm going need you
to enter your root password

701
00:38:26,554 --> 00:38:28,340
because I don't know what it is.

702
00:38:30,183 --> 00:38:32,845
If you want to use this,
you're more than welcome to.

703
00:38:33,853 --> 00:38:35,969
Looks like your root password's about
four characters long anyway, so...

704
00:38:36,064 --> 00:38:39,523
[Greenwald] It's usually a lot longer, but
that's just a one-time-only thing, right?

705
00:38:39,609 --> 00:38:40,974
So it is... uh...

706
00:38:41,069 --> 00:38:43,276
It had been a lot longer,
but ever since I knew that

707
00:38:43,363 --> 00:38:45,024
it was just like a one time
only session one,

708
00:38:45,114 --> 00:38:47,526
I've been making it shorter.
Is that not good?

709
00:38:47,617 --> 00:38:51,155
It's actually not.
I was expressing this with Laura.

710
00:38:51,246 --> 00:38:54,159
The issue is, because of the fact that
it's got a hardware mac address

711
00:38:54,249 --> 00:38:55,660
and things like that,
if people are able

712
00:38:55,750 --> 00:38:59,288
to identify your machine,
and they're able to--

713
00:38:59,379 --> 00:39:01,791
[Poitras] This is the fact you're about
to break the most upsetting story--

714
00:39:01,881 --> 00:39:03,042
[Greenwald] Right,
that's true, that's true.

715
00:39:03,132 --> 00:39:04,793
Yeah, so they might kind of
prioritize you--

716
00:39:04,884 --> 00:39:07,000
[Greenwald] It's ten letters.
I type very quickly.

717
00:39:07,095 --> 00:39:08,301
It actually is ten letters.

718
00:39:08,388 --> 00:39:10,550
[Snowden]
Okay, so ten letters would be good

719
00:39:10,640 --> 00:39:12,927
if they had to brute force
the entire keyspace.

720
00:39:13,017 --> 00:39:14,428
Right.

721
00:39:14,519 --> 00:39:17,261
That would still probably
only take a couple days for NSA.

722
00:39:17,355 --> 00:39:20,313
[alarm ringing]

723
00:39:20,400 --> 00:39:22,812
That's a fire alarm.

724
00:39:22,902 --> 00:39:24,233
[Greenwald] Okay.

725
00:39:25,655 --> 00:39:28,943
Hopefully it just sounds like
a three second test.

726
00:39:29,033 --> 00:39:32,116
Or is... do you want to call
the desk and ask?

727
00:39:33,997 --> 00:39:35,283
I think it's fine.

728
00:39:35,373 --> 00:39:37,535
Yeah, I don't think it's an issue,
but it's interesting that it just--

729
00:39:37,625 --> 00:39:39,411
[MacAskill]
Did that happen before?

730
00:39:39,502 --> 00:39:41,209
Maybe they got mad when
they couldn't listen in to us

731
00:39:41,296 --> 00:39:42,786
via the phone anymore.

732
00:39:44,507 --> 00:39:47,215
[MacAskill] Has the fire alarm
gone off before?

733
00:39:47,302 --> 00:39:49,964
No, that's the first time
that's happened.

734
00:39:50,054 --> 00:39:51,465
Let me see, just in case,

735
00:39:51,556 --> 00:39:54,173
they've got an alert
that goes to...

736
00:39:55,268 --> 00:39:57,100
That's unusual.

737
00:39:57,186 --> 00:39:59,473
[alarm ringing]

738
00:39:59,564 --> 00:40:01,931
- You probably...
- We might have to evacuate.

739
00:40:02,025 --> 00:40:03,481
...shouldn't ignore that.

740
00:40:03,568 --> 00:40:06,026
- I don't know.
- [overlapping chatter]

741
00:40:06,112 --> 00:40:09,195
- [MacAskill] It's not continuous.
- [Greenwald] It's not continuous.

742
00:40:09,282 --> 00:40:12,195
No, I'm just saying, if it continues.

743
00:40:14,954 --> 00:40:17,867
[Poitras] And then we go and we
meet the guys down in the lobby...

744
00:40:17,957 --> 00:40:19,573
- [Snowden] Yeah, right?
- [Greenwald] Yeah.

745
00:40:20,752 --> 00:40:22,993
Yeah, let's uh,
let's leave it for now.

746
00:40:23,087 --> 00:40:25,328
Let me just finish this up.

747
00:40:27,258 --> 00:40:28,373
All right.

748
00:40:28,468 --> 00:40:30,960
[alarm ringing]

749
00:40:37,936 --> 00:40:39,347
[Snowden]
Not that they're going to answer,

750
00:40:39,437 --> 00:40:41,428
because they probably got
like 7,000 calls.

751
00:40:44,734 --> 00:40:46,771
[Snowden]
Hi, uh, we hear a loud buzzing

752
00:40:46,861 --> 00:40:49,023
on the tenth floor,
can you tell us what that is?

753
00:40:49,113 --> 00:40:51,650
[woman on phone, indistinct]

754
00:40:51,741 --> 00:40:53,277
[Snowden] Oh, okay.

755
00:40:53,368 --> 00:40:55,780
Okay great. Thank you.
Bye.

756
00:40:55,870 --> 00:40:56,860
[alarm ringing]

757
00:40:56,955 --> 00:40:58,787
[Snowden] Fire alarm
testing maintenance.

758
00:40:58,873 --> 00:41:00,784
[Greenwald] That's good.
That's what we wanted to hear.

759
00:41:00,875 --> 00:41:03,287
[Snowden] Nice of them to uh...

760
00:41:03,378 --> 00:41:05,995
...nice of them to let us know
about that in advance.

761
00:41:09,384 --> 00:41:10,795
Um...

762
00:41:10,885 --> 00:41:12,751
I just wanted to
give you kind of a quick tour,

763
00:41:12,845 --> 00:41:15,177
uh, when Laura was looking at this,
she was kind of salivating

764
00:41:15,264 --> 00:41:17,301
and couldn't stop actually
reading the documents...

765
00:41:17,392 --> 00:41:18,382
[Greenwald] Right, right.

766
00:41:18,476 --> 00:41:21,309
So we'll try and restrain ourselves
without promising that we'll succeed.

767
00:41:21,396 --> 00:41:23,137
Yeah, I just wanted
to kind of explain

768
00:41:23,231 --> 00:41:25,268
a brief overview
of what these are

769
00:41:25,358 --> 00:41:26,769
and how they're organized.

770
00:41:26,859 --> 00:41:28,816
Um, the beginning are
just some documents of interest.

771
00:41:28,903 --> 00:41:30,564
The primary purpose
of the second archive

772
00:41:30,655 --> 00:41:33,147
is to bring the focus
over to $80,

773
00:41:33,241 --> 00:41:34,823
as opposed to uh, PRISM.

774
00:41:34,909 --> 00:41:36,775
And this is in general.

775
00:41:36,869 --> 00:41:38,906
880 are
the Special Source Operations,

776
00:41:38,997 --> 00:41:43,207
those are the worldwide
passive collection on networks.

777
00:41:43,292 --> 00:41:45,909
They're both domestic to the US
and international.

778
00:41:46,004 --> 00:41:47,290
[alarm ringing]

779
00:41:47,380 --> 00:41:48,711
There's a lot of different ways
they do it,

780
00:41:48,798 --> 00:41:52,041
but corporate partnerships
are one of the primary things,

781
00:41:52,135 --> 00:41:54,593
uh, they do domestically,
they also do this with multinationals

782
00:41:54,679 --> 00:41:57,296
that might be headquartered
in the US they can kind of coerce,

783
00:41:57,390 --> 00:41:59,848
or just pay into giving them access.

784
00:41:59,934 --> 00:42:03,222
And they also do it bilaterally, with
the assistance of certain governments.

785
00:42:03,312 --> 00:42:05,178
And that's basically
on the premise that they go,

786
00:42:05,273 --> 00:42:06,980
"All right, we'll help you
set this system up

787
00:42:07,066 --> 00:42:08,932
if you give us
all the data from it."

788
00:42:09,027 --> 00:42:10,483
Um, so yeah...

789
00:42:10,570 --> 00:42:13,062
- [alarm ringing]
- There's, there's...

790
00:42:13,156 --> 00:42:16,865
There's a lot more in here than any
one person or probably one team could do.

791
00:42:16,951 --> 00:42:17,986
Right.

792
00:42:18,077 --> 00:42:21,991
Um, XKeyscore DeepDive,
XKeyscore in general,

793
00:42:22,081 --> 00:42:23,947
and there's a huge folder
of documentation

794
00:42:24,042 --> 00:42:26,124
on XKeyscore and how it works,

795
00:42:26,210 --> 00:42:28,872
is the front-end system that analysts use

796
00:42:28,963 --> 00:42:32,001
for querying that sort of ocean of
raw SIGINT that I was telling you about.

797
00:42:32,091 --> 00:42:35,629
All of that stuff where you can
sort of do the retroactive searches

798
00:42:35,720 --> 00:42:37,506
and live searches
and get flagging and whatnot,

799
00:42:37,597 --> 00:42:42,012
XKeyscore is the front end
for that.

800
00:42:42,101 --> 00:42:43,762
I'm just gonna show you
one slide here

801
00:42:43,853 --> 00:42:46,390
'cause Laura thought
it was valuable,

802
00:42:46,481 --> 00:42:48,893
and I was talking about
kind of how these,

803
00:42:48,983 --> 00:42:54,149
uh, capabilities ramp up
in sophistication over time.

804
00:42:54,238 --> 00:42:57,151
This is kinda nice.
As of fiscal year 2011,

805
00:42:57,241 --> 00:43:01,075
they could monitor one billion
telephone or Internet sessions

806
00:43:01,162 --> 00:43:04,530
simultaneously
per one of these devices.

807
00:43:04,624 --> 00:43:09,869
And they could collect at the rate
of about 125 gigabytes a second,

808
00:43:09,962 --> 00:43:11,373
which is a terabit.

809
00:43:11,464 --> 00:43:13,000
[Greenwald] That's just
each one of these devices.

810
00:43:13,091 --> 00:43:14,673
That's for each one of these,
yeah.

811
00:43:14,759 --> 00:43:17,091
[MacAskill] And how many Tumult
machines would there be, then?

812
00:43:17,178 --> 00:43:20,421
Uh... per this, back then,
there were 20 sites,

813
00:43:20,515 --> 00:43:24,850
there's 10 at DOD installations,
but these are all outdated.

814
00:43:24,936 --> 00:43:27,018
We've expanded pretty rapidly.

815
00:43:28,523 --> 00:43:31,231
But still 20 sites,
that's at least 20 billion.

816
00:43:31,317 --> 00:43:33,183
[Greenwald] This all needs
to get out, you know I mean?

817
00:43:33,277 --> 00:43:34,813
It's like...

818
00:43:34,904 --> 00:43:40,195
just in terms of understanding
the capabilities. It's so opaque.

819
00:43:40,284 --> 00:43:43,447
[Snowden] It's not science fiction.
This stuff is happening right now.

820
00:43:43,538 --> 00:43:46,451
No, that's what I mean, it's like,
the, the magnitude of it, and...

821
00:43:46,541 --> 00:43:51,035
...and, like, this is a pretty
inaccessible technical document,

822
00:43:51,129 --> 00:43:54,042
but even this,
like, is really chilling.

823
00:43:54,132 --> 00:43:55,463
- Do you know what I mean?
- Yeah.

824
00:43:55,550 --> 00:43:58,212
Yeah, I mean we should have--
we should be having debates about

825
00:43:58,302 --> 00:43:59,713
whether we want governments--

826
00:43:59,804 --> 00:44:02,546
I mean, this is massive
and extraordinary.

827
00:44:02,640 --> 00:44:04,096
It's amazing.

828
00:44:04,183 --> 00:44:06,845
Even though you know it,
even though you know that...

829
00:44:06,936 --> 00:44:10,349
...to see it, like,
the physical blueprints of it,

830
00:44:10,439 --> 00:44:12,680
and sort of
the technical expressions of it,

831
00:44:12,775 --> 00:44:15,688
really hits home
in like a super visceral way

832
00:44:15,778 --> 00:44:17,314
that is so needed.

833
00:44:22,285 --> 00:44:24,447
[male announcer]
This is CNN Breaking News.

834
00:44:24,537 --> 00:44:28,326
An explosive new report
is reigniting the concerns

835
00:44:28,416 --> 00:44:32,501
that your privacy is being violated
to protect America's security.

836
00:44:32,587 --> 00:44:36,376
It reveals a court order giving
the National Security Agency

837
00:44:36,465 --> 00:44:41,301
blanket access to millions of Verizon
customers' records on a daily basis.

838
00:44:41,387 --> 00:44:43,879
Earlier! had the chance to
conduct the first TV interview

839
00:44:43,973 --> 00:44:47,091
with the reporter who broke
this story wide open:

840
00:44:47,185 --> 00:44:49,222
Glenn Greenwald of The Guardian.

841
00:44:50,229 --> 00:44:51,515
Congratulations on the scoop.

842
00:44:51,606 --> 00:44:55,850
Explain for our viewers
why this is important.

843
00:44:55,943 --> 00:44:58,150
It's important
because people have understood

844
00:44:58,237 --> 00:44:59,819
that the law that this was done under,

845
00:44:59,906 --> 00:45:02,568
which is the Patriot Act,
enacted in the wake of 9/11,

846
00:45:02,658 --> 00:45:04,240
was a law that allowed the government

847
00:45:04,327 --> 00:45:07,536
very broad powers
to get records about people

848
00:45:07,622 --> 00:45:11,911
with a lower level of suspicion than
probable cause, the traditional standard.

849
00:45:12,001 --> 00:45:14,288
So it's always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act,

850
00:45:14,378 --> 00:45:16,244
if the government
had even any suspicion

851
00:45:16,339 --> 00:45:18,421
that you were involved
in a crime or terrorism,

852
00:45:18,507 --> 00:45:20,623
they could get a lot of
information about you.

853
00:45:20,718 --> 00:45:23,551
<i>Mat this court order does
that makes it so striking,</i>

854
00:45:23,638 --> 00:45:25,925
is that it's not directed
at any individuals

855
00:45:26,015 --> 00:45:29,303
who they believe or have suspicion
of committing crimes

856
00:45:29,393 --> 00:45:30,804
or are part of a terrorist organization,

857
00:45:30,895 --> 00:45:33,887
it's collecting the phone records
of every single customer

858
00:45:33,981 --> 00:45:35,813
of Verizon business

859
00:45:35,900 --> 00:45:39,734
and finding out every single call that
they've made, internationally and locally,

860
00:45:39,820 --> 00:45:41,811
so it's indiscriminate and it's sweeping.

861
00:45:41,906 --> 00:45:44,318
It's a government program
designed to collect information

862
00:45:44,408 --> 00:45:46,445
about all Americans,
not just people

863
00:45:46,535 --> 00:45:49,653
Where they believe there's reason
to think they've done anything wrong.

864
00:46:49,557 --> 00:46:51,719
Ah, it's,
it's a tough situation,

865
00:46:51,809 --> 00:46:54,517
you know, hearing that
the person that you love,

866
00:46:54,603 --> 00:46:57,265
that you've spent
the decade with,

867
00:46:57,356 --> 00:46:58,938
may not be coming back.

868
00:47:03,863 --> 00:47:05,900
[Poitras] What did they ask her?

869
00:47:05,990 --> 00:47:09,028
Um, when was the last time
she saw me,

870
00:47:09,118 --> 00:47:12,110
where am I,
um, what am I doing,

871
00:47:12,204 --> 00:47:13,990
you know,
what does she know about

872
00:47:14,081 --> 00:47:16,789
my illness, things like that.

873
00:47:16,876 --> 00:47:17,866
Uh...

874
00:47:19,503 --> 00:47:20,584
SO.

875
00:47:20,671 --> 00:47:24,380
Yeah, they're um...
they're pretty solidly aware.

876
00:47:25,468 --> 00:47:26,583
'Cause, uh...

877
00:47:27,636 --> 00:47:30,128
I'm clearly not at home "I.

878
00:47:42,777 --> 00:47:46,395
[door opens]

879
00:47:51,160 --> 00:47:52,696
- [MacAskill] Hello?
- [Greenwald] Hello?

880
00:47:52,787 --> 00:47:57,122
Hello, let me disconnect
from the Internet.

881
00:47:59,668 --> 00:48:03,582
[Greenwald]
So, there's some news?

882
00:48:03,672 --> 00:48:06,710
Yes, there was indeed some news.
I have config.

883
00:48:06,801 --> 00:48:10,044
Today, I think,
maybe just a few hours ago?

884
00:48:10,137 --> 00:48:13,471
[Greenwald] What...
what kind of people visited?

885
00:48:13,557 --> 00:48:15,093
Uh...

886
00:48:15,184 --> 00:48:17,846
An H.R. lady,
I'm assuming from NSA

887
00:48:17,937 --> 00:48:21,555
as opposed to,
uh, as opposed to Booz Allen,

888
00:48:21,649 --> 00:48:23,435
because she was accompanied
by a police officer,

889
00:48:23,526 --> 00:48:25,108
which means NSA police.

890
00:48:25,194 --> 00:48:26,605
And they were planning
to break into my house,

891
00:48:26,695 --> 00:48:29,027
which regular police don't do.

892
00:48:29,115 --> 00:48:30,321
[Greenwald] Does she live there?

893
00:48:30,408 --> 00:48:34,743
Yeah, she lives there.
So I told her to cooperate fully--

894
00:48:34,829 --> 00:48:36,240
[Greenwald] I can't find
my phone, just one second...

895
00:48:36,330 --> 00:48:37,365
You know, don't worry about herself.

896
00:48:37,456 --> 00:48:40,369
[Greenwald] You know what, I'll just
take out the stuff I wanna use...

897
00:48:40,459 --> 00:48:42,496
Okay.

898
00:48:42,586 --> 00:48:45,499
[Greenwald] Okay, well look, I mean,
this is not a surprising development.

899
00:48:45,589 --> 00:48:47,830
Nah, I know, I planned for it,
but it's just, you know,

900
00:48:47,925 --> 00:48:49,586
when it's impacting them
and they're talking to you,

901
00:48:49,677 --> 00:48:50,883
it's a little bit different.

902
00:48:50,970 --> 00:48:51,960
[Greenwald] Absolutely.

903
00:48:53,722 --> 00:48:56,965
But it's possible that they just
noticed that you're missing.

904
00:48:57,059 --> 00:48:58,470
I guess
it's not really a possibility.

905
00:48:58,561 --> 00:49:00,723
It is, but they're, I mean...

906
00:49:05,276 --> 00:49:08,610
Um...
Lot me just got rid or this.

907
00:49:10,865 --> 00:49:14,233
Sorry, I obviously was focused on
other things than appearance this morning.

908
00:49:16,745 --> 00:49:19,407
How was-- How did she react?
Was she relatively calm about it?

909
00:49:19,498 --> 00:49:20,988
She's relatively calm...

910
00:49:21,083 --> 00:49:23,666
Does she know anything about
what you're doing and why?

911
00:49:23,752 --> 00:49:25,789
She has no idea.

912
00:49:25,880 --> 00:49:27,462
And that's, I mean, I...

913
00:49:28,507 --> 00:49:31,545
I feel badly about that, but that's
the only way I could think of where,

914
00:49:31,635 --> 00:49:33,296
like, she can't be in trouble.

915
00:49:33,387 --> 00:49:35,298
Did you just basically do a,
"I have to go somewhere

916
00:49:35,389 --> 00:49:37,471
for reasons that I can't tell you
about" kind of thing, or...?

917
00:49:37,558 --> 00:49:39,925
I just disappeared
when she was on vacation.

918
00:49:40,019 --> 00:49:44,388
Um, and I left a note saying, "Hey, I'm
going to be gone for a while for work,"

919
00:49:44,482 --> 00:49:46,314
which isn't unusual for me
in my business.

920
00:49:46,400 --> 00:49:48,732
- [Greenwald] Right.
- You know, so...

921
00:49:48,819 --> 00:49:51,402
Okay, so let me ask you
a couple things just quickly.

922
00:49:51,489 --> 00:49:54,982
Are they gonna be able to go into
your stuff and figure out what you took?

923
00:49:55,075 --> 00:50:00,161
Um, in some kind of...

924
00:50:00,247 --> 00:50:03,831
some sort of, like, peripheral senses,
but not necessarily...

925
00:50:03,918 --> 00:50:05,909
- Not with great specificity.
- Yes.

926
00:50:06,003 --> 00:50:08,540
Because I cast such a wide net.

927
00:50:08,631 --> 00:50:10,838
If they do that the only thing
they're gonna do is have a heart attack

928
00:50:10,925 --> 00:50:12,791
because they're gonna go,
"He had access to everything."

929
00:50:12,885 --> 00:50:14,091
[Greenwald] Yeah.

930
00:50:14,178 --> 00:50:17,296
And they're not gonna know
what specifically has been done.

931
00:50:17,389 --> 00:50:20,177
I think they're gonna start to
actually feel a little better,

932
00:50:20,267 --> 00:50:22,804
although
they're not gonna be wild

933
00:50:22,895 --> 00:50:25,512
about this in any case,
when they see that the stories

934
00:50:25,606 --> 00:50:28,314
are kind of cleaving to a trend,
you know, it's not like,

935
00:50:28,400 --> 00:50:30,858
"Here's the list of everybody
who works everywhere."

936
00:50:30,945 --> 00:50:32,060
[Greenwald] Right.

937
00:50:32,154 --> 00:50:34,816
I also think, you know, they're gonna
be paranoid in the extreme,

938
00:50:34,907 --> 00:50:38,616
and assuming all kinds of
worst case scenarios,

939
00:50:38,702 --> 00:50:41,364
which is gonna,
you know, I think make them

940
00:50:41,455 --> 00:50:42,866
react in ways
that probably aren't,

941
00:50:42,957 --> 00:50:46,746
like, gonna be particularly
rational on their part.

942
00:50:46,835 --> 00:50:48,872
But, at the same time,

943
00:50:48,963 --> 00:50:51,580
there's... I do think
they're limited for the moment.

944
00:50:51,674 --> 00:50:56,043
[Snowden] I agree, and I mean,
I had kinda time to set a stage

945
00:50:56,136 --> 00:50:58,719
where we all enjoy at least
a minimum level of protection,

946
00:50:58,806 --> 00:51:00,717
you know, no matter who we are,
who's involved in this,

947
00:51:00,808 --> 00:51:03,675
you know, you're either a journalist,
or you're either out of jurisdiction,

948
00:51:03,769 --> 00:51:06,727
so we have some time to play this
before they can really get nasty.

949
00:51:06,814 --> 00:51:08,350
I think it's over, you know, the weeks
when they have times,

950
00:51:08,440 --> 00:51:12,855
to get lawyers really sort of go,
"This is a special situation.

951
00:51:12,945 --> 00:51:14,777
How can we interpret this
to our advantage?"

952
00:51:14,863 --> 00:51:16,774
We... we see them do this
all the time, you know,

953
00:51:16,865 --> 00:51:19,277
whether it's drones
or wiretapping or whatever,

954
00:51:19,368 --> 00:51:22,656
they'll go, "Well according
to this law from the 1840s,

955
00:51:22,746 --> 00:51:25,283
you know,
with X, Y, or Z authority..."

956
00:51:25,374 --> 00:51:27,490
But that takes time.
And that takes agreement--

957
00:51:27,585 --> 00:51:29,417
[Greenwald]
And also, you know, I mean,

958
00:51:29,503 --> 00:51:32,666
I think the more public we are
out there too, like as journalists,

959
00:51:32,756 --> 00:51:35,498
The more protection
that's gonna give as well.

960
00:51:36,635 --> 00:51:39,878
Have you started to give thought to
when you're ready to come forward?

961
00:51:39,972 --> 00:51:43,306
I'm ready whenever, um...

962
00:51:43,392 --> 00:51:46,180
Honestly, I think
there's sort of an agreement

963
00:51:46,270 --> 00:51:48,932
that it's not going to bias
the reporting process.

964
00:51:49,023 --> 00:51:50,184
That's my primary concern
at this point.

965
00:51:50,274 --> 00:51:52,686
I don't want to get myself
into the issue

966
00:51:52,776 --> 00:51:55,393
before it's gonna happen anyway,
and where it takes away

967
00:51:55,487 --> 00:51:56,898
from the stories
that are getting out.

968
00:52:05,539 --> 00:52:07,121
[pop song plays]

969
00:52:36,236 --> 00:52:39,149
[woman, faintly] We're talking about
tens of millions of Americans,

970
00:52:39,239 --> 00:52:41,446
who weren't suspected
of doing anything,

971
00:52:41,533 --> 00:52:43,069
who were surveilled in this way.

972
00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:45,697
[man] Hold your thoughts for a moment.
I want to continue this conversation

973
00:52:45,788 --> 00:52:47,870
because these are really important,
sensitive issues,

974
00:52:47,956 --> 00:52:51,074
and the public out there
has a right to know what's going on.

975
00:52:51,168 --> 00:52:53,580
[announcer] This is CNN Breaking News.

976
00:52:54,588 --> 00:52:56,875
Another explosive article
has just appeared,

977
00:52:56,965 --> 00:52:58,876
this time in The Washington Post.

978
00:52:58,967 --> 00:53:01,959
It's breaking news
and it reveals another broad

979
00:53:02,054 --> 00:53:04,637
and secret US government
surveillance program.

980
00:53:04,723 --> 00:53:07,215
The Washington Post
and The Guardian in London

981
00:53:07,309 --> 00:53:09,641
reporting that the NSA
and the FBI

982
00:53:09,728 --> 00:53:12,766
are tapping directly
into the central servers

983
00:53:12,856 --> 00:53:15,143
of nine leading
Internet companies,

984
00:53:15,234 --> 00:53:17,976
including Microsoft,
Yahoo, Google, Facebook,

985
00:53:18,070 --> 00:53:20,903
AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple.

986
00:53:20,989 --> 00:53:23,151
The Post says
they're extracting audio,

987
00:53:23,242 --> 00:53:26,234
video, photographs,
emails, documents,

988
00:53:26,328 --> 00:53:28,490
and connection logs
that enable analysts

989
00:53:28,580 --> 00:53:32,164
to track a person's movements
and contacts over time.

990
00:53:32,251 --> 00:53:36,996
Let's discuss this latest revelation--
they're coming out fast. Bill Binney,

991
00:53:37,089 --> 00:53:40,252
former official of the NSA
who quit back in 2001,

992
00:53:40,342 --> 00:53:42,174
you were angry over
What was going on,

993
00:53:42,261 --> 00:53:44,343
you are known
as a Whistleblower right now.

994
00:53:44,430 --> 00:53:46,637
Bill, What do you think about
this Washington Post story?

995
00:53:46,724 --> 00:53:50,183
Well, I assume it's just a continuation
of What they've been doing all along.

996
00:53:50,269 --> 00:53:51,509
[Blitzer] So you're not surprised.

997
00:53:51,603 --> 00:53:53,810
Do you have any idea who is
leaking this information?

998
00:53:53,897 --> 00:53:56,059
I don't know who leaked this.

999
00:53:56,150 --> 00:53:58,141
I have no doubt
that the administration

1000
00:53:58,235 --> 00:54:00,397
will launch an investigation,

1001
00:54:00,487 --> 00:54:04,321
not into who approved these programs
but into who leaked the information.

1002
00:54:04,408 --> 00:54:07,196
[man 1] I'm not shocked
the companies are denying it,

1003
00:54:07,286 --> 00:54:09,448
- I don't assume--
- [man 2] Do you believe them?

1004
00:54:09,538 --> 00:54:11,199
There may be some technical basis

1005
00:54:11,290 --> 00:54:14,453
on which they can say that
we are not actively collaborating

1006
00:54:14,543 --> 00:54:17,581
or they don't have what we consider
in our own definition

1007
00:54:17,671 --> 00:54:19,332
to be direct access to our servers

1008
00:54:19,423 --> 00:54:22,336
but What I do know is that I 've talked
to more than one person

1009
00:54:22,426 --> 00:54:26,340
who has sat at a desk at a web portal

1010
00:54:26,430 --> 00:54:31,015
and typed out commands and reached
into those servers from a distance.

1011
00:54:31,101 --> 00:54:34,184
So Whatever they want to call that,
that's what's happening.

1012
00:54:34,271 --> 00:54:36,603
[man 2] Well, what I would call it
is the single biggest infringement

1013
00:54:36,690 --> 00:54:39,603
on American civil liberties
probably of all time, isn't it?

1014
00:54:39,693 --> 00:54:41,684
[man 3] It's interesting, already
you have The New York Times

1015
00:54:41,779 --> 00:54:44,441
now today saying that the administration
has lost all credibility.

1016
00:54:44,531 --> 00:54:46,522
The New York Times
slammed President Obama for this,

1017
00:54:46,617 --> 00:54:48,028
and frankly I was used to that.

1018
00:54:48,118 --> 00:54:49,904
The New York Times
used to slam George Bush

1019
00:54:49,995 --> 00:54:51,827
for protecting the country
and for the steps he took.

1020
00:54:51,914 --> 00:54:54,872
I don't want us to drop our guard,
I don't want us to be struck again.

1021
00:54:54,958 --> 00:54:58,121
As we saw in Boston,
Anderson, people are willing

1022
00:54:58,212 --> 00:54:59,623
to sacrifice their civil liberties.

1023
00:54:59,713 --> 00:55:01,078
People sheltered inside--

1024
00:55:01,173 --> 00:55:03,084
[man 2] How can you believe
in freedom, do you think--

1025
00:55:03,175 --> 00:55:05,007
I mean, try and play
Devil's Advocate for me,

1026
00:55:05,093 --> 00:55:09,087
when you have secret courts,
secret operations like PRISM

1027
00:55:09,181 --> 00:55:12,048
secret investigations which go
into every spit and cough

1028
00:55:12,142 --> 00:55:13,758
of every American's lives,

1029
00:55:13,852 --> 00:55:15,843
Without any member of the American
public knowing about it.

1030
00:55:15,938 --> 00:55:17,394
That's not freedom, is it?

1031
00:55:17,481 --> 00:55:20,644
In 2008, they eliminated
the warrant requirement

1032
00:55:20,734 --> 00:55:23,772
for all conversations
except ones that take place

1033
00:55:23,862 --> 00:55:26,320
by and among Americans
exclusively on American soil.

1034
00:55:26,406 --> 00:55:29,489
So they don't need warrants
now for people

1035
00:55:29,576 --> 00:55:31,158
who are foreigners
outside of the US,

1036
00:55:31,245 --> 00:55:33,987
but they also don't need
warrants for Americans

1037
00:55:34,081 --> 00:55:36,288
who are in the United States
communicating with people

1038
00:55:36,375 --> 00:55:38,662
reasonably believed to be
outside of the US.

1039
00:55:38,752 --> 00:55:41,244
So again, the fact that there are
no checks, no oversight

1040
00:55:41,338 --> 00:55:43,670
about who is looking
over the NSA's shoulder,

1041
00:55:43,757 --> 00:55:45,418
means that they can take
Whatever they want.

1042
00:55:45,509 --> 00:55:47,796
And the fact that it's all
behind a wall of secrecy

1043
00:55:47,886 --> 00:55:50,048
and they threaten people
who want to expose it,

1044
00:55:50,138 --> 00:55:53,506
means that whatever they're doing,
even violating the law,

1045
00:55:53,600 --> 00:55:56,718
is something that we're unlikely to know
until we start having real investigations

1046
00:55:56,812 --> 00:56:00,271
and real transparency into
What it is that the government is doing.

1047
00:56:00,357 --> 00:56:04,146
Glenn Greenwald, congratulations again
on exposing What is a true scandal.

1048
00:56:04,236 --> 00:56:05,647
I appreciate you joining me.

1049
00:56:15,789 --> 00:56:17,371
[typing]

1050
00:56:51,825 --> 00:56:55,614
I just heard from Lindsay,

1051
00:56:55,704 --> 00:56:59,572
and uh, she's still alive,
which is good, and free.

1052
00:56:59,666 --> 00:57:02,454
My rent checks
apparently are no longer

1053
00:57:02,544 --> 00:57:04,205
getting through
to my landlord,

1054
00:57:04,296 --> 00:57:06,833
uh, so they said
if we don't pay them

1055
00:57:06,924 --> 00:57:09,712
in five days we'll be evicted,
which is strange

1056
00:57:09,801 --> 00:57:13,214
because I've got a system set
up that automatically pays them.

1057
00:57:14,473 --> 00:57:16,384
Uh, so there's that,

1058
00:57:16,475 --> 00:57:18,386
and apparently
there's construction trucks

1059
00:57:18,477 --> 00:57:21,344
all over the street of my house,
so that's uh...

1060
00:57:24,858 --> 00:57:26,474
I wonder
what they're looking for.

1061
00:58:07,776 --> 00:58:09,016
[chuckling]

1062
00:58:10,028 --> 00:58:15,649
It is... uh, it is an unusual feeling
that's kind of hard to...

1063
00:58:15,742 --> 00:58:19,451
hard to like describe or...
or convey in words,

1064
00:58:19,538 --> 00:58:21,950
but not knowing what's going to
happen the next day,

1065
00:58:22,040 --> 00:58:25,158
the next hour,
the next week, it's scary,

1066
00:58:25,252 --> 00:58:26,663
but at the same time
it's liberating.

1067
00:58:26,753 --> 00:58:28,835
You know, the, uh...

1068
00:58:28,922 --> 00:58:30,583
the planning comes a lot easier

1069
00:58:30,674 --> 00:58:33,041
because you don't have that many
variables to take into play.

1070
00:58:33,135 --> 00:58:35,752
You can only act
and then act again.

1071
00:58:36,930 --> 00:58:39,467
[male reporter] Now all these phone calls
are being recorded digitally,

1072
00:58:39,558 --> 00:58:42,266
not for content
but for origin and destination,

1073
00:58:42,352 --> 00:58:44,844
now word the government is going
right into the servers

1074
00:58:44,938 --> 00:58:46,520
of these large Internet companies.

1075
00:58:46,606 --> 00:58:49,314
How does the government,
politically speaking,

1076
00:58:49,401 --> 00:58:52,484
make the argument that this is
essential to national security

1077
00:58:52,571 --> 00:58:56,656
and not a dramatic overreach
in terms of personal privacy?

1078
00:58:56,742 --> 00:58:59,484
It's difficult Matt, because,
as Peter was pointing out,

1079
00:58:59,578 --> 00:59:03,492
overnight we had an extraordinary,
late-night-- close to midnight--

1080
00:59:03,582 --> 00:59:05,164
announcement and a declassification

1081
00:59:05,250 --> 00:59:06,991
from the Director
of National Intelligence.

1082
00:59:07,085 --> 00:59:08,246
They are scrambling.

1083
00:59:08,336 --> 00:59:11,795
The administration's already supported
strongly by leaders in both parties

1084
00:59:11,882 --> 00:59:13,338
from the intelligence committees.

1085
00:59:13,425 --> 00:59:17,635
GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia,
at the top secret,

1086
00:59:17,721 --> 00:59:19,462
you know, super classified level, uh,

1087
00:59:19,556 --> 00:59:22,298
where anybody working intelligence
can work on anything they want.

1088
00:59:22,392 --> 00:59:23,382
Yep.

1089
00:59:23,477 --> 00:59:25,809
That's what this is, I'm giving it to you,
you can make the decisions on that,

1090
00:59:25,896 --> 00:59:27,307
what's appropriate, what's not.

1091
00:59:27,397 --> 00:59:29,513
It's going to be
documents of different types,

1092
00:59:29,608 --> 00:59:33,226
pictures and PowerPoints,
Word documents, stuff like that.

1093
00:59:33,320 --> 00:59:34,606
- Um...
- Sony. can I take a seat?

1094
00:59:34,696 --> 00:59:35,686
Yeah.

1095
00:59:38,241 --> 00:59:42,280
Sorry, I get you to repeat,
so in these documents they all show...

1096
00:59:42,370 --> 00:59:44,156
[Snowden] Yeah, there'll be
a couple more documents on that,

1097
00:59:44,247 --> 00:59:45,658
that's only one part though.

1098
00:59:45,749 --> 00:59:48,036
Like, it talks about Tempora
and a little more thing,

1099
00:59:48,126 --> 00:59:50,242
that's the Wiki article itself.

1100
00:59:50,337 --> 00:59:52,795
It was also talking about
a self-developed tool

1101
00:59:52,881 --> 00:59:56,044
called UDAQ, U-D-A-Q.

1102
00:59:56,134 --> 00:59:58,546
It's their search tool
for all the stuff they collect,

1103
00:59:58,637 --> 01:00:00,253
was what it looked like.

1104
01:00:00,347 --> 01:00:01,553
It's going to be projects,

1105
01:00:01,640 --> 01:00:05,008
it's going to be troubleshooting pages
for a particular tool...

1106
01:00:05,102 --> 01:00:06,092
Thanks.

1107
01:00:06,186 --> 01:00:08,553
Um... what's the next step?

1108
01:00:08,647 --> 01:00:10,433
When do you think
you'll go public?

1109
01:00:10,524 --> 01:00:13,937
Ah, I think it's pretty soon,
I mean with the reaction,

1110
01:00:14,027 --> 01:00:15,267
this escalated more quickly.

1111
01:00:15,362 --> 01:00:18,650
I think pretty much as soon as they start
trying to make this about me,

1112
01:00:18,740 --> 01:00:20,572
which should be any day now.

1113
01:00:20,659 --> 01:00:22,070
Yep.

1114
01:00:22,160 --> 01:00:23,571
I'll come out just to go,

1115
01:00:23,662 --> 01:00:29,453
"Hey, this is not a question of somebody
skulking around in the shadows."

1116
01:00:29,543 --> 01:00:32,035
These are public issues,
these are not my issues,

1117
01:00:32,129 --> 01:00:34,336
you know,
these are everybody's issues.

1118
01:00:34,422 --> 01:00:35,912
And I'm not afraid of you, you know.

1119
01:00:36,007 --> 01:00:40,217
You're not going to bully me into silence
like you've done to everybody else.

1120
01:00:40,303 --> 01:00:42,510
And if nobody else is gonna do it, I will,

1121
01:00:42,597 --> 01:00:45,305
and hopefully when I'm gone,
whatever you do to me,

1122
01:00:45,392 --> 01:00:47,474
there will be somebody else
who'll do the same thing.

1123
01:00:47,561 --> 01:00:50,724
It'll be the sort of Internet
principle of the hydra.

1124
01:00:50,814 --> 01:00:54,227
You know, you can stomp one person,
but there's gonna be seven more of us.

1125
01:00:54,317 --> 01:00:56,024
[MacAskill] Yeah.

1126
01:00:58,572 --> 01:00:59,983
Are you getting more nervous?

1127
01:01:00,073 --> 01:01:04,863
Um... [laughs] I mean, no.

1128
01:01:04,953 --> 01:01:06,489
I think, uh...

1129
01:01:06,580 --> 01:01:09,072
I think the way
I look at stress,

1130
01:01:09,166 --> 01:01:11,999
particularly because I sort of
knew this was coming,

1131
01:01:12,085 --> 01:01:14,873
you know,
because I sort of volunteered

1132
01:01:14,963 --> 01:01:17,170
to walk into it, um...

1133
01:01:19,301 --> 01:01:23,135
I'm already sort of familiar
with the idea.

1134
01:01:23,221 --> 01:01:24,632
I'm not worried about it.

1135
01:01:24,723 --> 01:01:26,839
When somebody, like,
busts in the door?

1136
01:01:26,933 --> 01:01:28,515
Suddenly I'll get nervous,
and it'll affect me,

1137
01:01:28,602 --> 01:01:31,845
but until they do...
I don't know, you know.

1138
01:01:31,938 --> 01:01:36,353
I'm eating a little less,
that's the only difference, I think.

1139
01:01:41,990 --> 01:01:44,027
[Greenwald]
Let's talk about the issue with,

1140
01:01:44,117 --> 01:01:45,699
when we're gonna say
who you are.

1141
01:01:45,785 --> 01:01:47,401
Yeah.

1142
01:01:47,495 --> 01:01:50,408
This is, you know, you have to
talk me through this.

1143
01:01:50,498 --> 01:01:52,159
Because I have a big worry
about this.

1144
01:01:52,250 --> 01:01:53,240
Okay, tell me.

1145
01:01:53,335 --> 01:01:57,078
Which is that,
if we come out and...

1146
01:01:58,256 --> 01:02:01,624
I know that you believe
that your detection

1147
01:02:01,718 --> 01:02:04,676
is inevitable and that
it's inevitable imminently.

1148
01:02:04,763 --> 01:02:06,595
There's, you know,
in the New York Times today,

1149
01:02:06,681 --> 01:02:11,050
Charlie Savage, the fascinating
Sherlock Holmes of political reporting,

1150
01:02:11,144 --> 01:02:13,806
deduced that the fact that there's
been these leaks in succession

1151
01:02:13,897 --> 01:02:16,559
probably means that there's some
one person who decided to leak--

1152
01:02:16,650 --> 01:02:19,438
Somebody else quoted you
as saying it was one of your readers,

1153
01:02:19,527 --> 01:02:21,188
and somebody else
put another thing,

1154
01:02:21,279 --> 01:02:23,691
So, you know, it's fine.
I want people...

1155
01:02:23,782 --> 01:02:27,571
I want it to be like,
you know, like, this is a person...

1156
01:02:27,661 --> 01:02:30,278
I want to start introducing the concept
that this is a person

1157
01:02:30,372 --> 01:02:33,364
who has a particular set
of political objectives

1158
01:02:33,458 --> 01:02:35,916
about informing the world
about what's taking place.

1159
01:02:36,002 --> 01:02:39,040
So I'm keeping it all
anonymous, totally,

1160
01:02:39,130 --> 01:02:41,371
but I want to start
introducing you

1161
01:02:41,466 --> 01:02:43,298
in that kind of incremental way.

1162
01:02:43,385 --> 01:02:45,342
But... here's the thing.

1163
01:02:45,428 --> 01:02:48,386
What I'm concerned is that
if we come out and say,

1164
01:02:48,473 --> 01:02:50,134
"Here's who this is,
here's what he did,"

1165
01:02:50,225 --> 01:02:51,807
the whole thing
that we talked about,

1166
01:02:51,893 --> 01:02:54,055
that we're gonna basically be doing
the government's work for them.

1167
01:02:54,145 --> 01:02:56,557
And we're basically
going to be handing them,

1168
01:02:56,648 --> 01:02:59,265
you know, a confession,

1169
01:02:59,359 --> 01:03:01,521
and helping them
identify who found it.

1170
01:03:01,611 --> 01:03:02,817
Maybe you're right,

1171
01:03:02,904 --> 01:03:05,566
maybe they'll find out quickly,
and maybe they'll know,

1172
01:03:05,657 --> 01:03:07,443
but is there any possibility
that they won't?

1173
01:03:07,534 --> 01:03:12,404
Are we kind of giving them
stuff that we don't...or, or...

1174
01:03:12,497 --> 01:03:13,658
[Poitras]
The possibility that they know

1175
01:03:13,748 --> 01:03:15,409
but they don't want to reveal it
because they don't know.

1176
01:03:15,500 --> 01:03:18,037
Or that they don't know and we're
going to be telling them, like...

1177
01:03:18,128 --> 01:03:21,416
Is it a possibility that they're going
to need two, three months of uncertainty,

1178
01:03:21,506 --> 01:03:23,713
and we're going to be
solving that problem for them?

1179
01:03:23,800 --> 01:03:27,418
Or, let me just say, the or part,
maybe it doesn't matter to you,

1180
01:03:27,512 --> 01:03:30,470
maybe... [stammering]

1181
01:03:30,557 --> 01:03:33,675
You're not coming out
because you think inevitably

1182
01:03:33,768 --> 01:03:36,351
they're going to catch you,
and you want to do it first,

1183
01:03:36,438 --> 01:03:38,429
you're coming out because
you want to fucking come out.

1184
01:03:38,523 --> 01:03:39,934
- And you wanna be heard.
- Well, there is that.

1185
01:03:40,025 --> 01:03:42,312
I mean that's the thing,
I don't want to hide on this

1186
01:03:42,402 --> 01:03:44,734
and skulk around,
I don't think I should have to.

1187
01:03:44,821 --> 01:03:47,313
Um, obviously there are circumstances
that are saying that,

1188
01:03:47,407 --> 01:03:50,115
and I think it is powerful
to come out and be like,

1189
01:03:50,201 --> 01:03:52,363
look, I'm not afraid, you know,

1190
01:03:52,454 --> 01:03:54,115
and I don't think
other people should either.

1191
01:03:54,205 --> 01:03:57,197
I was sitting in the office
right next to you last week.

1192
01:03:57,292 --> 01:04:00,000
You know, we all have a stake in this.
This is our country.

1193
01:04:00,086 --> 01:04:04,080
And the balance of power between
the citizenry and the government

1194
01:04:04,174 --> 01:04:06,962
is becoming that of the ruling
and the ruled

1195
01:04:07,052 --> 01:04:10,465
as opposed to actually, you know,
the elected and the electorate.

1196
01:04:10,555 --> 01:04:12,387
[Greenwald] Okay,
so that's what I needed to hear,

1197
01:04:12,474 --> 01:04:15,216
that this is not about--

1198
01:04:15,310 --> 01:04:17,017
But I do want to say:

1199
01:04:17,103 --> 01:04:20,221
I don't think there's a case
that I'm not going to be discovered

1200
01:04:20,315 --> 01:04:23,228
in the fullness of time,
it's a question of time frame.

1201
01:04:23,318 --> 01:04:25,730
You're right, it could take them
a long time. I don't think it will.

1202
01:04:25,820 --> 01:04:28,403
But I didn't try to hide
the footprint because again,

1203
01:04:28,490 --> 01:04:30,322
I intended to come forward
the whole time.

1204
01:04:30,408 --> 01:04:34,197
I'm going to post this morning just
a general defense of whistleblowers...

1205
01:04:34,287 --> 01:04:35,698
That's fine, yeah.

1206
01:04:35,789 --> 01:04:38,076
...and you in particular without
saying anything about you.

1207
01:04:38,166 --> 01:04:39,327
I'm gonna go post that
right when I get back.

1208
01:04:39,417 --> 01:04:41,875
And I'm also doing like
a big fuck-you to all the people

1209
01:04:41,961 --> 01:04:43,872
who keep, like,
talking about investigations.

1210
01:04:43,963 --> 01:04:45,294
I want that to be...

1211
01:04:46,299 --> 01:04:48,256
The fearlessness
and the fuck-you to,

1212
01:04:48,343 --> 01:04:50,710
like, the bullying tactics
has gotta be

1213
01:04:50,804 --> 01:04:52,886
completely pervading
everything we do.

1214
01:04:52,972 --> 01:04:54,883
[Snowden]
And I think that's brilliant.

1215
01:04:54,974 --> 01:04:58,387
Your principles on this I love,
I can't support them enough.

1216
01:04:58,478 --> 01:05:02,597
Because it's inverting the model
that the government has laid out,

1217
01:05:02,690 --> 01:05:04,852
where people who are trying to,
you know, say the truth

1218
01:05:04,943 --> 01:05:06,399
skulk around
and they hide in the dark

1219
01:05:06,486 --> 01:05:07,976
and they quote anonymously
and whatnot...

1220
01:05:08,071 --> 01:05:09,152
I say yes, fuck that, let's just--

1221
01:05:09,239 --> 01:05:11,480
Okay, so here's the plan then.

1222
01:05:11,574 --> 01:05:13,485
And this is the thing.

1223
01:05:14,619 --> 01:05:16,280
I think
we just all felt the fact

1224
01:05:16,371 --> 01:05:18,658
that this is the right way
to do it.

1225
01:05:18,748 --> 01:05:21,740
You feel the power of your
choice, you know what I mean?

1226
01:05:21,835 --> 01:05:24,372
I want that power
to be felt in the world.

1227
01:05:24,462 --> 01:05:25,998
And it is...

1228
01:05:26,089 --> 01:05:27,796
it's the ultimate standing
up to them.

1229
01:05:27,882 --> 01:05:30,499
Right, like,
"I'm not gonna fucking hide,

1230
01:05:30,593 --> 01:05:32,175
even for like one second,

1231
01:05:32,262 --> 01:05:34,128
I'm gonna get right
in your face.

1232
01:05:34,222 --> 01:05:35,633
You don't have to investigate,

1233
01:05:35,723 --> 01:05:37,805
there's nothing to investigate,
here I am."

1234
01:05:37,892 --> 01:05:38,927
- Yeah.
- You know?

1235
01:05:39,018 --> 01:05:41,806
And I just think that is
just incredibly powerful.

1236
01:05:41,896 --> 01:05:44,263
And then the question
just becomes

1237
01:05:44,357 --> 01:05:45,768
how do we do this
in the right...

1238
01:05:45,859 --> 01:05:47,691
you know, the perfect way,
and that's my burden.

1239
01:05:47,777 --> 01:05:49,142
And that's what I'm gonna...

1240
01:05:49,237 --> 01:05:52,025
So today is gonna be
the story in the morning,

1241
01:05:52,115 --> 01:05:54,277
assuming that it doesn't change
with The Guardian,

1242
01:05:54,367 --> 01:05:55,357
it's gonna be the story
in the morning,

1243
01:05:55,452 --> 01:05:58,945
just to keep the momentum going,
just to keep the disclosures coming,

1244
01:05:59,038 --> 01:06:00,449
a big one at night.

1245
01:06:00,540 --> 01:06:05,535
Now it's becoming, like, okay,
this is a major leak, and after today,

1246
01:06:05,628 --> 01:06:07,835
when we post the two things
that we're gonna post,

1247
01:06:07,922 --> 01:06:11,290
it's gonna be,
"What the fuck is this leak,

1248
01:06:11,384 --> 01:06:13,216
and who did it,"
I guarantee you.

1249
01:06:23,521 --> 01:06:25,979
[Poitras] I just want to make sure...
move over slightly.

1250
01:06:26,065 --> 01:06:27,931
Do you want me to move
a little more over, or, okay.

1251
01:06:28,026 --> 01:06:29,516
[Poitras]
I just wanna... all right.

1252
01:06:32,197 --> 01:06:33,687
All right, we're rolling.

1253
01:06:33,781 --> 01:06:36,569
[Greenwald] So let's just begin with
some basic background information,

1254
01:06:36,659 --> 01:06:38,741
like, just state your name,

1255
01:06:38,828 --> 01:06:40,739
what position you held
in the intelligence community,

1256
01:06:40,830 --> 01:06:44,118
and-- and how long you
worked within that community.

1257
01:06:44,209 --> 01:06:46,746
Okay, um, just so I'm aware of
where we're going,

1258
01:06:46,836 --> 01:06:48,873
how in depth are we going,
just in general,

1259
01:06:48,963 --> 01:06:50,829
like 'I'm currently
an infrastructure analyst

1260
01:06:50,924 --> 01:06:52,835
you know, Booz Allen Hamilton,

1261
01:06:52,926 --> 01:06:54,508
not going through
my whole back story...'

1262
01:06:54,594 --> 01:06:55,584
- [Poitras] Yeah.
- Okay.

1263
01:06:55,678 --> 01:06:57,009
[Greenwald] Just like,
yeah, summary kind of...

1264
01:06:57,096 --> 01:06:58,131
Okay.

1265
01:06:58,223 --> 01:07:01,090
Uh, My name's Ed Snowden,
I'm, uh, 29 years old,

1266
01:07:01,184 --> 01:07:03,767
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton

1267
01:07:03,853 --> 01:07:07,596
as an infrastructure analyst
for NSA, uh, in Hawaii.

1268
01:07:08,608 --> 01:07:10,019
[Greenwald] And what are
some of the positions

1269
01:07:10,109 --> 01:07:12,771
that you held previously within
the intelligence community?

1270
01:07:12,862 --> 01:07:16,605
Uh, I've been, uh, a systems engineer,
systems administrator,

1271
01:07:16,699 --> 01:07:21,910
uh, senior advisor, uh, for the, uh,

1272
01:07:21,996 --> 01:07:23,407
Central Intelligence Agency,

1273
01:07:23,498 --> 01:07:25,990
solutions consultant and a, uh,

1274
01:07:26,084 --> 01:07:29,042
telecommunications informations
systems officer.

1275
01:07:29,128 --> 01:07:31,790
[Greenwald] And what kind of
clearances have...

1276
01:07:31,881 --> 01:07:33,622
have you held,
what kind of classification?

1277
01:07:33,716 --> 01:07:37,254
Uh, Top Secret, uh...
Hm...

1278
01:07:40,014 --> 01:07:43,257
So people in my levels of access
for systems administration

1279
01:07:43,351 --> 01:07:45,934
or as a--
a infrastructure analyst,

1280
01:07:46,020 --> 01:07:48,512
typically have,
uh, higher accesses

1281
01:07:48,606 --> 01:07:51,894
than an NSA employee
would normally have.

1282
01:07:51,985 --> 01:07:55,068
Normal NSA employees have
a combination of clearances

1283
01:07:55,154 --> 01:07:59,443
called TS, SI, TK, and Gamma.

1284
01:07:59,534 --> 01:08:01,901
Um, that's Top Secret,

1285
01:08:01,995 --> 01:08:05,454
uh, Signals Intelligence,
Talent Keyhole, and Gamma.

1286
01:08:05,540 --> 01:08:07,451
And they all,
uh, relate to certain things

1287
01:08:07,542 --> 01:08:10,204
that are sort of core
to the NSA mission.

1288
01:08:10,295 --> 01:08:12,457
As a systems administrator,

1289
01:08:12,547 --> 01:08:14,584
you get a special clearance
called PRIVAC,

1290
01:08:14,674 --> 01:08:16,290
for Privileged Access,

1291
01:08:16,384 --> 01:08:18,170
which allows you to be exposed

1292
01:08:18,261 --> 01:08:20,343
to information
of any classification,

1293
01:08:20,430 --> 01:08:23,388
regardless of what your position
actually needs.

1294
01:08:58,343 --> 01:09:00,630
[newswoman] Just before we go,
a reminder of our top story,

1295
01:09:00,720 --> 01:09:03,257
that's that
the former CIA technical worker

1296
01:09:03,348 --> 01:09:07,137
Edward Snowden says he's responsible
for leaking information

1297
01:09:07,226 --> 01:09:12,016
that US authorities had been
monitoring phone and Internet data.

1298
01:09:12,106 --> 01:09:13,767
The US Justice Department confirmed

1299
01:09:13,858 --> 01:09:17,146
it's in the first stages
of a criminal investigation.

1300
01:09:17,236 --> 01:09:19,728
Leave it longer or cut it shorter,
what do you think?

1301
01:09:19,822 --> 01:09:22,029
As far as the video
that people saw?

1302
01:09:22,116 --> 01:09:24,733
- Am I less identifiable now?
Lose it?

1303
01:09:24,827 --> 01:09:27,285
Cause I can't go all the way down.
It's still gonna be stubble.

1304
01:09:27,372 --> 01:09:29,579
I don't have the blade
for closer.

1305
01:09:32,126 --> 01:09:35,539
[man] Will you be talking
to any other media about this story today?

1306
01:09:35,630 --> 01:09:37,496
I am.

1307
01:09:37,590 --> 01:09:39,251
[man] Will you be coming to our
office at Associated Press?

1308
01:09:39,342 --> 01:09:42,505
We'd be interested to ask about where
is Snowden now, what his plans are.

1309
01:09:42,595 --> 01:09:44,757
I'm not going to talk about that,
so unless you have other questions,

1310
01:09:44,847 --> 01:09:46,258
it's gonna be a fruitless interview.

1311
01:09:46,349 --> 01:09:47,885
What are your plans, please?

1312
01:09:47,975 --> 01:09:49,682
Are you staying in Hong Kong
for the time being?

1313
01:09:49,769 --> 01:09:51,100
For a little while.

1314
01:09:51,187 --> 01:09:54,054
[man] And do you have any hopes
to write more about this story,

1315
01:09:54,148 --> 01:09:55,980
or are you stopping
new writing about this story?

1316
01:09:56,067 --> 01:09:57,603
No, I'm gonna continue
to write about it.

1317
01:09:57,694 --> 01:09:58,684
[bell dinging]

1318
01:09:58,778 --> 01:10:00,519
[man] Have you had any pressure
from the US authorities

1319
01:10:00,613 --> 01:10:03,071
- about continuing to report on this?
- No.

1320
01:10:03,157 --> 01:10:06,695
And have you heard anything
about what could be the attitude

1321
01:10:06,786 --> 01:10:08,697
of Hong Kong authorities
towards this case,

1322
01:10:08,788 --> 01:10:11,576
whether they've contacted you
or asked you anything about

1323
01:10:11,666 --> 01:10:14,658
the whereabouts of Snowden
and whether that is another--

1324
01:10:14,752 --> 01:10:17,494
I haven't heard from the authorities
of any government.

1325
01:10:18,923 --> 01:10:22,211
[man] And where do you think
the story is going, for you

1326
01:10:22,301 --> 01:10:25,464
and of course for Snowden,
and of course for the US media

1327
01:10:25,555 --> 01:10:27,216
and the US administration
in general?

1328
01:10:27,306 --> 01:10:29,843
Well, for me I can tell, I'm
gonna continue to report on...

1329
01:10:29,934 --> 01:10:32,175
do my reporting on what
the government has been doing

1330
01:10:32,270 --> 01:10:34,432
and what I think my readers
should know about.

1331
01:10:34,522 --> 01:10:36,513
Um, as for him, I don't...
I don't think anyone knows.

1332
01:10:36,607 --> 01:10:38,393
[Snowden] They could have
people come after me

1333
01:10:38,484 --> 01:10:40,851
or any of their third-party partners.

1334
01:10:40,945 --> 01:10:43,812
You know, they work closely
with a number of other nations.

1335
01:10:43,906 --> 01:10:45,988
Or, you know,
they could pay off the triads.

1336
01:10:46,075 --> 01:10:48,362
You know,
any of their agents or assets,

1337
01:10:48,453 --> 01:10:51,115
uh... we have a CIA station
just up the road,

1338
01:10:51,205 --> 01:10:53,822
at the consulate here in Hong Kong.

1339
01:10:53,916 --> 01:10:56,829
[chatter on TV, indistinct]

1340
01:11:19,233 --> 01:11:22,351
[woman, on TV] Hello, I'm
Daniela Ritorto. the top stow this hour:

1341
01:11:22,445 --> 01:11:26,109
facing a criminal investigation,
the whistleblower who revealed details

1342
01:11:26,199 --> 01:11:31,490
on how the US is monitoring phone
calls and Internet data goes public.

1343
01:11:31,579 --> 01:11:35,368
Security forces in Afghanistan
say a number of Taliban insurgents

1344
01:11:35,458 --> 01:11:38,166
have targeted Kabul's airport.

1345
01:11:38,252 --> 01:11:40,414
Now it's time
for our newspaper review

1346
01:11:40,505 --> 01:11:43,167
and looking at what's making
headlines around the world.

1347
01:11:43,257 --> 01:11:45,168
Let's start with The Guardian,
our top stow,

1348
01:11:45,259 --> 01:11:49,423
which is revealing the identity
of the former CIA employee

1349
01:11:49,514 --> 01:11:51,300
who the paper says leaked information

1350
01:11:51,390 --> 01:11:56,100
exposing the scale of American
surveillance of the Internet.

1351
01:11:56,187 --> 01:11:57,302
Edward Snowden.

1352
01:11:57,396 --> 01:11:58,511
[man, on TV] What a great story.

1353
01:11:58,606 --> 01:11:59,687
[woman]
Kira, Ewen, What do you think?

1354
01:11:59,774 --> 01:12:01,264
[Ewen] Well,
I think it's a fantastic story--

1355
01:12:01,359 --> 01:12:03,942
first off, it could be straight
out of a John Le Carre novel.

1356
01:12:04,028 --> 01:12:06,395
I mean, when you read What he did,
yes, he got the material.

1357
01:12:06,489 --> 01:12:08,730
He then decided to go
to the place he identified

1358
01:12:08,825 --> 01:12:10,361
as being very difficult
for America to get at him...

1359
01:12:10,451 --> 01:12:11,441
God damn it.

1360
01:12:11,536 --> 01:12:15,404
...Which is Hong Kong, because,
of course, technically inside China,

1361
01:12:15,498 --> 01:12:18,081
the one country,
two systems policy there,

1362
01:12:18,167 --> 01:12:21,785
meaning he would get potentially
some protection abroad.

1363
01:12:21,879 --> 01:12:24,712
All very well-planned. It could have
been just out of a spy novel.

1364
01:12:24,799 --> 01:12:26,130
But What about the details?

1365
01:12:26,217 --> 01:12:29,960
[TV continues, indistinct]

1366
01:12:30,054 --> 01:12:32,295
Well, that could make it worse,
but...

1367
01:12:36,060 --> 01:12:39,143
I don't know, only shows
the lower half of my face.

1368
01:12:41,440 --> 01:12:43,306
[TV continues, indistinct]

1369
01:12:57,039 --> 01:12:58,700
[sighs]

1370
01:13:12,680 --> 01:13:15,217
[man on TV] Snowden says
he'd become increasingly dismayed

1371
01:13:15,308 --> 01:13:18,642
by What he saw as
the growing power of the NSA,

1372
01:13:18,728 --> 01:13:21,015
hence his decision
to pass on documents

1373
01:13:21,105 --> 01:13:24,097
which are said to reveal
not only that the organization

1374
01:13:24,191 --> 01:13:26,398
monitored millions of phone calls,

1375
01:13:26,485 --> 01:13:28,772
but that it had direct access
to some of the biggest...

1376
01:13:28,863 --> 01:13:29,853
[Poitras] How do you feel?

1377
01:13:31,157 --> 01:13:33,273
Um...

1378
01:13:33,367 --> 01:13:36,280
what happens, happens.
We've, uh, we've talked about this.

1379
01:13:36,370 --> 01:13:38,782
I knew what the risks were.

1380
01:13:38,873 --> 01:13:40,864
If I get arrested, I get arrested.

1381
01:13:40,958 --> 01:13:41,993
Um...

1382
01:13:43,002 --> 01:13:47,496
We were able to get the information,
uh, that needed to get out, out.

1383
01:13:48,883 --> 01:13:52,626
And you and Glenn
are able to keep reporting,

1384
01:13:52,720 --> 01:13:54,757
regardless
of what happens to me.

1385
01:13:56,140 --> 01:13:59,303
Now what 29-year-old
Edward Snowden said that US...

1386
01:13:59,393 --> 01:14:00,758
[phone ringing]

1387
01:14:04,899 --> 01:14:07,186
The Guardian newspaper
reveals his identity...

1388
01:14:07,276 --> 01:14:08,892
[Snowden] Yes?

1389
01:14:08,986 --> 01:14:10,568
...from Washington,
David Willis has this.

1390
01:14:10,655 --> 01:14:12,771
[Snowden]
Uh, I'm sorry, who's asking?

1391
01:14:15,159 --> 01:14:16,695
Uh, I'm afraid
you have the wrong room.

1392
01:14:16,786 --> 01:14:19,027
- Thank you.
- [hangs up receiver]

1393
01:14:19,121 --> 01:14:20,532
[Snowden] Wall Street Journal.

1394
01:14:20,623 --> 01:14:22,785
[phone ringing]

1395
01:14:31,884 --> 01:14:34,546
- Yes?
- [woman on phone, indistinct]

1396
01:14:36,055 --> 01:14:37,796
Uh, I'm sorry, say again?

1397
01:14:40,059 --> 01:14:42,346
Uh, no. No thank you.
No calls.

1398
01:14:42,436 --> 01:14:44,018
I think they have
the wrong number.

1399
01:14:45,314 --> 01:14:48,557
Yeah, no calls. Thank you.
Uh, wait, I'm sorry.

1400
01:14:48,651 --> 01:14:52,110
If it's uh, if it's two men
from the front desk,

1401
01:14:52,196 --> 01:14:53,857
they can call,
but no outside calls...

1402
01:14:53,948 --> 01:14:55,905
Wait, actually,
just let them through.

1403
01:14:58,035 --> 01:15:00,072
Wait, wait, ma'am?
[whispering] Fuck!

1404
01:15:00,162 --> 01:15:01,152
[hangs up receiver]

1405
01:15:02,957 --> 01:15:05,244
[phone ringing]

1406
01:15:05,334 --> 01:15:07,166
- Yes?
- [woman on phone, indistinct]

1407
01:15:12,174 --> 01:15:14,461
Uh, wait, is it...
is it a lawyer?

1408
01:15:16,679 --> 01:15:19,091
Yeah, no, no, no, I mean
the people who are asking,

1409
01:15:19,181 --> 01:15:21,172
ask them if they are lawyers.

1410
01:15:27,189 --> 01:15:30,398
Uh, no. Tell her that, uh,
she has the wrong number

1411
01:15:30,484 --> 01:15:32,691
and there's no Mr. Snowden here.

1412
01:15:40,745 --> 01:15:43,407
Hi, Robert, can you talk right now?

1413
01:15:43,497 --> 01:15:46,205
I safely got into the room.

1414
01:15:46,292 --> 01:15:49,125
I'm now safely with the client, okay?

1415
01:15:49,211 --> 01:15:52,749
So, can we talk together
about the plan?

1416
01:15:52,840 --> 01:15:56,708
Did this application start already
or what? Technically?

1417
01:15:59,513 --> 01:16:00,924
Yeah, but...

1418
01:16:01,015 --> 01:16:03,222
So technically it hasn't started yet.

1419
01:16:13,152 --> 01:16:15,769
Would you mind to talk
in speakerphone?

1420
01:16:16,947 --> 01:16:18,108
Sorry.

1421
01:16:18,199 --> 01:16:19,360
Hey, Robert.

1422
01:16:19,450 --> 01:16:20,940
Yeah, hi.

1423
01:16:21,035 --> 01:16:22,525
Hi, I'm the client.

1424
01:16:23,537 --> 01:16:25,448
Hi, Edward,
how are you holding up?

1425
01:16:25,539 --> 01:16:28,281
Uh, pretty good. I'm doing well.

1426
01:16:28,375 --> 01:16:33,711
Okay, I just met with the head
of the UNHCR here in Hong Kong,

1427
01:16:33,798 --> 01:16:37,291
and they are aware
that you are raising

1428
01:16:37,384 --> 01:16:40,968
the protection you are entitled to
under the UNHCR and

1429
01:16:41,055 --> 01:16:43,171
and they would like you
to come in with us to the UN.

1430
01:16:43,265 --> 01:16:44,596
Okay.

1431
01:16:45,184 --> 01:16:47,300
If you come now, it's lunchtime,

1432
01:16:47,394 --> 01:16:50,182
but they're gonna let us in.
No one else can get in.

1433
01:16:50,272 --> 01:16:51,728
Okay.

1434
01:16:51,816 --> 01:16:54,808
At the UNHCR there are
separate exits from the building

1435
01:16:54,902 --> 01:16:56,267
so we have a good opportunity,

1436
01:16:56,362 --> 01:16:58,694
if any of the media
finds out you're there...

1437
01:16:58,781 --> 01:16:59,771
Yeah.

1438
01:16:59,865 --> 01:17:01,902
...you'll be able to exit
a different way from the building.

1439
01:17:01,992 --> 01:17:04,700
Okay, that's great.
Is it okay if I bring equipment?

1440
01:17:04,787 --> 01:17:06,323
'Cause I'm just kind of going

1441
01:17:06,413 --> 01:17:08,245
so I can leave in any direction
at any time

1442
01:17:08,332 --> 01:17:10,573
and not come back, if necessary.

1443
01:17:10,668 --> 01:17:13,126
Just walk out of there.
You don't have to go back.

1444
01:17:13,212 --> 01:17:14,202
Okay.

1445
01:17:14,296 --> 01:17:16,708
Take Whatever you want with you,
and just go with Mr. Man.

1446
01:17:16,799 --> 01:17:19,416
I will pick you-- he knows Where
I'm gonna pick you guys up,

1447
01:17:19,510 --> 01:17:20,966
and then I'll bring you
to the UNHCR.

1448
01:17:21,053 --> 01:17:22,464
Okay, that sounds good.

1449
01:17:23,472 --> 01:17:25,133
Thank you, uh, thank you
so much for helping me.

1450
01:17:25,224 --> 01:17:28,307
He's quite worried
about the next step,

1451
01:17:28,394 --> 01:17:30,726
about accommodation,
where he is going to stay,

1452
01:17:30,813 --> 01:17:35,478
whether there is something private and
he would not be discovered by the police.

1453
01:17:35,568 --> 01:17:38,686
Don't worry about that now.
Let's just get him to the UN.

1454
01:17:38,779 --> 01:17:39,769
Okay, I see.

1455
01:17:39,864 --> 01:17:43,232
Okay, I will give you a call
before we start, okay?

1456
01:17:43,325 --> 01:17:44,315
- Okay, thank you.
- Okay, thank you.

1457
01:17:44,410 --> 01:17:45,491
- Bye-bye.
- Bye.

1458
01:17:45,578 --> 01:17:46,568
[Snowden clears throat]

1459
01:17:46,662 --> 01:17:48,244
So...

1460
01:17:48,747 --> 01:17:50,613
We don't have a car.

1461
01:17:50,708 --> 01:17:51,698
Okay.

1462
01:17:51,792 --> 01:17:53,703
What I'm thinking--

1463
01:17:53,794 --> 01:17:58,459
we may ask the concierge
to arrange a car,

1464
01:17:58,549 --> 01:18:00,790
or we just go down
and catch a taxi.

1465
01:18:00,885 --> 01:18:02,341
But it's quite...

1466
01:18:02,428 --> 01:18:06,672
The traffic here in Tsim Sha Tsui
is quite difficult to get a taxi.

1467
01:18:06,765 --> 01:18:07,846
Yeah...

1468
01:18:07,933 --> 01:18:10,300
And so is there
a precedent for this,

1469
01:18:10,394 --> 01:18:14,103
where Hong Kong would extradite
someone for political speech?

1470
01:18:14,190 --> 01:18:16,181
No, I'm not aware of.

1471
01:18:16,275 --> 01:18:18,266
But if we have a torture claim

1472
01:18:18,360 --> 01:18:20,101
or asylum-seeking claim,

1473
01:18:20,196 --> 01:18:22,278
then they ought, under the law,

1474
01:18:22,364 --> 01:18:24,822
they ought to give you recognizance

1475
01:18:24,909 --> 01:18:26,445
for you to stay in Hong Kong

1476
01:18:26,535 --> 01:18:30,745
because they don't know
where to dump you back yet.

1477
01:19:21,715 --> 01:19:23,547
[man] The president certainly
does not welcome the way

1478
01:19:23,634 --> 01:19:26,001
that this debate has earned
greater attention in the last week,

1479
01:19:26,095 --> 01:19:29,133
the leak of classified information
about sensitive programs

1480
01:19:29,223 --> 01:19:31,385
that are important in our fight
against terrorists

1481
01:19:31,475 --> 01:19:34,763
who would do harm to Americans,
is a problem.

1482
01:19:34,853 --> 01:19:38,391
But the debate itself is legitimate
and should be engaged.

1483
01:20:27,531 --> 01:20:29,647
[sounds of keyboard clicking]

1484
01:21:11,992 --> 01:21:13,323
[rain pattering]

1485
01:21:14,244 --> 01:21:16,235
[thunder rumbles]

1486
01:21:20,376 --> 01:21:23,539
[conversing in Portuguese]

1487
01:21:25,631 --> 01:21:30,671
"The US Spied on Millions of
Brazilian Emails and Phone Calls"

1488
01:21:31,887 --> 01:21:35,255
I'd like to show you
the new document now.

1489
01:21:35,349 --> 01:21:38,637
You'll see it much more clearly.

1490
01:21:38,727 --> 01:21:45,099
This map shows the cables they use
to collect the data for PRISM.

1491
01:21:45,192 --> 01:21:49,106
Here it shows how much
they are collecting.

1492
01:21:49,196 --> 01:21:53,281
The thicker the line,
the more they're collecting.

1493
01:21:53,367 --> 01:21:55,483
You can see these lines,

1494
01:21:55,577 --> 01:22:00,447
the cables, are quite thick
in the south of Brazil

1495
01:22:00,541 --> 01:22:02,999
and up north in the Sea of Brazil.

1496
01:22:03,085 --> 01:22:06,043
So they're collecting a lot
through the PRISM program,

1497
01:22:06,130 --> 01:22:09,623
which I think is very important
because PRISM is Facebook,

1498
01:22:09,716 --> 01:22:12,799
Skype, YouTube, Yahoo, Hotmail.

1499
01:22:12,886 --> 01:22:15,753
And it shows a lot
is being stolen from Brazil.

1500
01:22:16,515 --> 01:22:21,009
But we don't know how much
the Brazilian government knows,

1501
01:22:21,103 --> 01:22:26,064
or whether it's collaborating
with Brazilian companies.

1502
01:22:26,150 --> 01:22:28,232
But we're going to know, I believe.

1503
01:22:28,318 --> 01:22:30,730
One day we will know everything.
Or almost everything.

1504
01:22:30,821 --> 01:22:31,811
Yes.

1505
01:22:37,786 --> 01:22:39,151
[typing]

1506
01:23:29,922 --> 01:23:32,129
[man] All right, so which ones
do we want here, then?

1507
01:23:32,216 --> 01:23:35,004
This is operational stuff,
so we mustn't say any of this...

1508
01:23:35,093 --> 01:23:36,299
So redact that.

1509
01:23:36,386 --> 01:23:38,002
Go... go to top.

1510
01:23:38,096 --> 01:23:39,507
What about
the Alexander quote?

1511
01:23:39,598 --> 01:23:41,009
[man 2] Yeah, that's in TARMAC.

1512
01:23:41,099 --> 01:23:44,387
“Why can't we collect
all the signals all the time?

1513
01:23:44,478 --> 01:23:47,436
Sounds like a good summer
homework project for Menwith."

1514
01:23:47,523 --> 01:23:50,641
Keith Alexander, the head of the NSA,
on a visit to UK.

1515
01:23:50,734 --> 01:23:52,600
- This one.
- Yeah.

1516
01:23:52,694 --> 01:23:55,436
Secret document, isn't it?
Secret document.

1517
01:23:55,531 --> 01:23:59,866
We've got a stick here that should
just have three single slides on them.

1518
01:23:59,952 --> 01:24:03,866
If it's got more than three single slides,
we have to be extremely careful.

1519
01:24:06,500 --> 01:24:08,161
- [man] Yeah?
- Yeah, that's it.

1520
01:24:08,252 --> 01:24:12,120
This is really dangerous
stuff for us, The Guardian, isn't it?

1521
01:24:12,214 --> 01:24:15,047
You make mistakes and at the very end
where we kept it all under lock and key...

1522
01:24:15,133 --> 01:24:17,625
And no one knows.
I'm not saying that...

1523
01:24:18,762 --> 01:24:20,924
They will come in and smack
the front door down if we...

1524
01:24:21,014 --> 01:24:22,379
if we elaborate on that.

1525
01:24:23,475 --> 01:24:26,809
He said the Prime Minister's
extremely concerned about this.

1526
01:24:26,895 --> 01:24:29,637
And they kept saying,
"This is from the very top."

1527
01:24:32,526 --> 01:24:35,018
[overlapping chatter continues,
low and indistinct]

1528
01:25:40,177 --> 01:25:41,713
[male reporter]
As you can see on this map,

1529
01:25:41,803 --> 01:25:43,544
the flight that reportedly
has Snowden aboard

1530
01:25:43,639 --> 01:25:46,006
has almost reached
its destination here in Moscow,

1531
01:25:46,099 --> 01:25:48,887
scheduled to land in the
Russian capital within minutes.

1532
01:25:48,977 --> 01:25:54,723
As you may have heard,
there is a CIA Agent

1533
01:25:54,816 --> 01:25:57,274
who has revealed a lot of information,

1534
01:25:57,361 --> 01:26:01,980
and he is now trapped in the,
urn, the airport in Moscow.

1535
01:26:02,074 --> 01:26:04,315
We managed to get him
out of Hong Kong,

1536
01:26:04,409 --> 01:26:06,992
but when he landed
in the Moscow airport,

1537
01:26:07,079 --> 01:26:10,947
the American government
had canceled his passport.

1538
01:26:11,041 --> 01:26:14,079
So, formally, he hasn't
entered into Russian territory.

1539
01:26:14,169 --> 01:26:17,082
He is in the transit area
of the airport,

1540
01:26:17,172 --> 01:26:20,415
and one of our people
is accompanying him.

1541
01:26:20,509 --> 01:26:26,676
We are trying to arrange
a private jet to, um

1542
01:26:26,765 --> 01:26:32,056
take him from Moscow to Ecuador

1543
01:26:32,145 --> 01:26:37,561
or perhaps maybe Venezuela
or maybe Iceland,

1544
01:26:37,651 --> 01:26:39,358
countries where he will be safe.

1545
01:26:52,999 --> 01:26:55,536
[man, in Portuguese] The floor is yours,
for the time that you deem necessary.

1546
01:26:55,627 --> 01:26:58,619
[in Portuguese]
Thank you and hello.

1547
01:26:58,714 --> 01:27:04,175
First of all, Americans' justification
for everything

1548
01:27:04,261 --> 01:27:07,970
since the September 11 attacks
is terrorism.

1549
01:27:08,056 --> 01:27:10,218
Everything is in the name
of national security,

1550
01:27:10,308 --> 01:27:12,174
to protect our population.

1551
01:27:12,269 --> 01:27:18,015
In reality, it's the opposite.
A lot of the documents

1552
01:27:18,108 --> 01:27:24,650
have nothing to do with
terrorism or national security,

1553
01:27:24,740 --> 01:27:27,573
but with competition between countries,

1554
01:27:27,659 --> 01:27:32,620
and with companies' industrial,
financial, or economic issues.

1555
01:27:32,706 --> 01:27:35,949
Secondly, there's XKeyscore.

1556
01:27:36,042 --> 01:27:40,878
When we first started publishing articles,

1557
01:27:40,964 --> 01:27:42,955
the US government's defense

1558
01:27:43,049 --> 01:27:47,088
was that it was not invading
the content of communications,

1559
01:27:47,179 --> 01:27:48,795
just taking the metadata.

1560
01:27:48,889 --> 01:27:54,180
That means the names
of the people talking,

1561
01:27:54,269 --> 01:27:58,137
who is calling whom, call durations.

1562
01:27:58,231 --> 01:28:03,101
But if I know all the people
you are communicating with,

1563
01:28:03,195 --> 01:28:06,278
and everyone
they are communicating with,

1564
01:28:06,364 --> 01:28:09,152
where you are
when you are communicating,

1565
01:28:09,242 --> 01:28:11,574
the call duration and the location,

1566
01:28:11,661 --> 01:28:14,870
then I can learn a lot
about your personality,

1567
01:28:14,956 --> 01:28:17,163
your activity, and your life.

1568
01:28:17,250 --> 01:28:20,834
This is a major invasion of privacy.

1569
01:28:20,921 --> 01:28:24,380
In reality, that defense is totally false.

1570
01:28:24,466 --> 01:28:29,586
The US government has the ability
to get not only metadata,

1571
01:28:29,679 --> 01:28:36,301
but the actual content of your emails
or what you say on the phone,

1572
01:28:36,394 --> 01:28:41,810
the words you type into Google searches,

1573
01:28:41,900 --> 01:28:45,564
the websites you visit,

1574
01:28:45,654 --> 01:28:49,613
the documents you send to colleagues.

1575
01:28:49,699 --> 01:28:57,447
This system can track nearly everything
that every individual is doing online.

1576
01:28:57,541 --> 01:29:02,832
So if you're a journalist investigating
the American government,

1577
01:29:02,921 --> 01:29:08,633
if you work for a company
with American competitors,

1578
01:29:08,718 --> 01:29:14,384
or if you work in human rights
involving the American government,

1579
01:29:14,474 --> 01:29:16,715
or any other field,

1580
01:29:16,810 --> 01:29:21,555
they can very easily
intercept your communication.

1581
01:29:21,648 --> 01:29:24,982
If you're an American living in the US,

1582
01:29:25,068 --> 01:29:28,356
they have to seek permission
from a court,

1583
01:29:28,446 --> 01:29:30,062
but they always get it.

1584
01:29:30,156 --> 01:29:34,320
But if you're not American,
they don't need anything,

1585
01:29:34,411 --> 01:29:37,870
no special permission at all.

1586
01:29:37,956 --> 01:29:44,373
I think the consequences of eliminating
privacy are difficult to predict,

1587
01:29:44,462 --> 01:29:49,673
but we must understand that this
will have an enormous impact.

1588
01:29:49,759 --> 01:29:53,343
The population's ability
to have demonstrations

1589
01:29:53,430 --> 01:30:01,430
or to organize is greatly reduced
when people don't have privacy.

1590
01:30:09,279 --> 01:30:11,862
[man] May I collect all phones, please?

1591
01:30:15,535 --> 01:30:16,650
Okay.

1592
01:30:20,040 --> 01:30:21,371
[man 2]
I have everything here, so...

1593
01:30:24,294 --> 01:30:25,750
[man 3]
Put them in the refrigerator.

1594
01:30:25,837 --> 01:30:26,998
[man 2 laughs]

1595
01:30:29,799 --> 01:30:30,914
[man 2] So...

1596
01:30:36,932 --> 01:30:40,175
So as you know, in June,

1597
01:30:40,268 --> 01:30:45,183
Snowden was charged
with three legal violations,

1598
01:30:45,273 --> 01:30:50,609
felonies, principally under
a World War I-era criminal law

1599
01:30:50,695 --> 01:30:52,185
called the Espionage Act.

1600
01:30:53,448 --> 01:30:56,816
The Espionage Act
is an extremely broad criminal

1601
01:30:56,910 --> 01:31:00,869
prohibition against the sharing
or dissemination

1602
01:31:00,956 --> 01:31:02,947
of what's called
national defense information.

1603
01:31:03,041 --> 01:31:07,160
It was only used to,
uh, prosecute people

1604
01:31:07,253 --> 01:31:10,245
who had been accused of acting
with a foreign power.

1605
01:31:10,340 --> 01:31:11,751
Spies, not whistleblowers.

1606
01:31:11,841 --> 01:31:14,924
And it's a very unusual
legal representation, I think,

1607
01:31:15,011 --> 01:31:17,628
not just for all of you
but for me as well.

1608
01:31:18,807 --> 01:31:22,175
The Espionage Act does not
distinguish between leaks

1609
01:31:22,268 --> 01:31:24,430
to the press in the public interest

1610
01:31:24,521 --> 01:31:26,512
and selling secrets
to foreign enemies

1611
01:31:26,606 --> 01:31:28,096
for personal profit.

1612
01:31:28,191 --> 01:31:31,900
So under the Espionage Act,
it's not a defense

1613
01:31:31,987 --> 01:31:35,275
if the information that was
disclosed should not have been

1614
01:31:35,365 --> 01:31:37,948
withheld in the first place,
that it was improperly classified,

1615
01:31:38,034 --> 01:31:40,822
it's not a defense
if the dissemination

1616
01:31:40,912 --> 01:31:42,994
was in the public interest,
that it led to reforms,

1617
01:31:43,081 --> 01:31:46,574
um, even if a court determines
that the programs

1618
01:31:46,668 --> 01:31:49,205
that were revealed were illegal
or unconstitutional,

1619
01:31:49,295 --> 01:31:51,787
that's still not a defense
under the Espionage Act,

1620
01:31:51,881 --> 01:31:54,839
the government doesn't have
to defend the classification,

1621
01:31:54,926 --> 01:31:58,169
it doesn't have to demonstrate
harm from the release,

1622
01:31:58,263 --> 01:32:00,129
um, all of this is irrelevant.

1623
01:32:00,223 --> 01:32:03,090
So when we say
that the trial wouldn't be fair,

1624
01:32:03,184 --> 01:32:06,552
we're not talking about
what human rights lawyers

1625
01:32:06,646 --> 01:32:08,228
think
of as fair trial practices.

1626
01:32:08,314 --> 01:32:10,180
We're saying the law,
the statute itself...

1627
01:32:11,818 --> 01:32:14,355
eliminates
any kind of defense that Snowden

1628
01:32:14,446 --> 01:32:15,857
might be able to make,

1629
01:32:15,947 --> 01:32:18,609
and essentially would equate him
with a spy.

1630
01:32:18,700 --> 01:32:21,488
And of course those
three counts could be increased

1631
01:32:21,578 --> 01:32:23,615
to a hundred or two hundred
or three hundred.

1632
01:32:23,705 --> 01:32:25,616
They could charge him separately
for each document

1633
01:32:25,707 --> 01:32:28,870
that has been published
by a journalist.

1634
01:32:28,960 --> 01:32:31,372
And I think that--
that we all recognize,

1635
01:32:31,463 --> 01:32:34,330
even though we sit here
as lawyers in a lawyer's meeting,

1636
01:32:34,424 --> 01:32:37,962
that it's probably
95 percent politics

1637
01:32:38,053 --> 01:32:41,921
and five percent law
how this will be resolved.

1638
01:33:13,922 --> 01:33:16,880
Mr. Snowden has been charged
with very serious crimes,

1639
01:33:16,966 --> 01:33:19,424
and he should be returned
to the United States

1640
01:33:19,511 --> 01:33:21,172
where he will be granted
full due process

1641
01:33:21,262 --> 01:33:24,971
and every right available to him
as a United States citizen...

1642
01:33:26,309 --> 01:33:28,550
facing our justice system
under the Constitution.

1643
01:33:28,645 --> 01:33:30,135
[drill whirring]

1644
01:34:19,946 --> 01:34:22,108
[Obama] No, [don't think
Mr. Snowden was a patriot.

1645
01:34:22,198 --> 01:34:28,160
I called for a thorough review
of our surveillance operations

1646
01:34:28,246 --> 01:34:30,203
before Mr. Snowden made these leaks.

1647
01:34:31,541 --> 01:34:36,502
My preference, and I think the
American peoples' preference,

1648
01:34:36,588 --> 01:34:39,376
would have been for a lawful,

1649
01:34:39,465 --> 01:34:42,503
orderly examination
of these laws.

1650
01:34:42,594 --> 01:34:48,089
A thoughtful, fact-based debate,

1651
01:34:48,183 --> 01:34:51,721
uh, that would then lead us
to a better place.

1652
01:35:29,265 --> 01:35:32,383
[Greenwald]
Oh, my God. David.

1653
01:35:34,646 --> 01:35:37,183
Hello, my baby, how you doing?

1654
01:35:37,273 --> 01:35:38,604
- I'm okay.
- You okay?

1655
01:35:38,691 --> 01:35:39,897
Let's go.

1656
01:35:43,738 --> 01:35:44,899
[Miranda]
I just want to go home.

1657
01:35:44,989 --> 01:35:47,276
[Greenwald] Okay, okay,
you just have to walk.

1658
01:35:55,166 --> 01:35:56,247
[Miranda] How are you?

1659
01:35:56,334 --> 01:35:58,450
Good, I'm totally fine,
I didn't sleep at all,

1660
01:35:58,544 --> 01:35:59,659
- I couldn't sleep.
- I know.

1661
01:35:59,754 --> 01:36:04,590
"Brazil Demands Explanation
from UK Government"

1662
01:36:22,318 --> 01:36:24,605
[woman] Recent reports
have revealed that the NSA

1663
01:36:24,696 --> 01:36:26,858
have access to encryption keys

1664
01:36:26,948 --> 01:36:28,359
and they paid tech companies

1665
01:36:28,449 --> 01:36:30,861
to introduce back doors
in encryption protocols.

1666
01:36:30,952 --> 01:36:32,693
So we're going to talk about

1667
01:36:32,787 --> 01:36:35,245
ways in which we can
defend ourselves

1668
01:36:35,331 --> 01:36:38,198
against
governments spying on us.

1669
01:36:38,293 --> 01:36:40,625
So Mr. Jacob Applebaum
is an encryption

1670
01:36:40,712 --> 01:36:43,204
and security software developer
and journalist.

1671
01:36:43,298 --> 01:36:47,587
Ladar Levinson is the founder
of the encrypted email service

1672
01:36:47,677 --> 01:36:49,884
Lavabit, used by Edward Snowden.

1673
01:36:49,971 --> 01:36:51,382
You have the floor.

1674
01:36:51,472 --> 01:36:52,587
[Levinson] Thank you.

1675
01:36:52,682 --> 01:36:55,891
Lavabit is an email service
that hopefully one day will be able

1676
01:36:55,977 --> 01:37:00,266
to stand on its own without
any references to Snowden.

1677
01:37:00,356 --> 01:37:03,815
My service
was designed to remove me

1678
01:37:03,901 --> 01:37:09,237
from the possibility of being
forced to violate a person's privacy.

1679
01:37:09,324 --> 01:37:12,533
Quite simply,
Lavabit was designed to remove

1680
01:37:12,618 --> 01:37:14,575
the service provider
from the equation.

1681
01:37:14,662 --> 01:37:18,621
By not having logs on my server
and not having access

1682
01:37:18,708 --> 01:37:21,040
to a person's emails on disk,

1683
01:37:21,127 --> 01:37:24,119
I wasn't eliminating
the possibility of surveillance,

1684
01:37:24,213 --> 01:37:28,047
I was simply removing myself
from that equation.

1685
01:37:28,134 --> 01:37:31,877
In that surveillance would have
to be conducted on the target,

1686
01:37:31,971 --> 01:37:34,679
either the sender
or the receiver of the messages.

1687
01:37:34,766 --> 01:37:39,010
But I was approached by the FBI
quite recently

1688
01:37:39,103 --> 01:37:43,017
and told that because I couldn't
turn over the information

1689
01:37:43,107 --> 01:37:45,144
from that one particular user,

1690
01:37:45,234 --> 01:37:47,521
I would be forced to give up
those SSL keys

1691
01:37:47,612 --> 01:37:49,649
and let the FBI collect
every communication

1692
01:37:49,739 --> 01:37:52,652
on my network without
any kind of transparency.

1693
01:37:52,742 --> 01:37:54,608
And of course...

1694
01:37:55,995 --> 01:37:59,579
I wasn't comfortable with that,
to say the least.

1695
01:37:59,665 --> 01:38:01,326
More disturbing was the fact that

1696
01:38:01,417 --> 01:38:03,624
I couldn't even tell anybody
that it was going on.

1697
01:38:04,796 --> 01:38:09,211
So I decided if I didn't win
the fight to unseal my case,

1698
01:38:09,300 --> 01:38:11,917
if I didn't win the battle
to be able to tell people

1699
01:38:12,011 --> 01:38:14,002
what was going on,

1700
01:38:14,097 --> 01:38:17,010
then my only ethical choice left
was to shut down.

1701
01:38:19,769 --> 01:38:20,975
Think about that.

1702
01:38:22,688 --> 01:38:24,099
I believe in the rule of law,

1703
01:38:24,190 --> 01:38:27,103
I believe in the need
to conduct investigations.

1704
01:38:28,152 --> 01:38:31,520
But those investigations are
supposed to be difficult for a reason.

1705
01:38:31,614 --> 01:38:36,029
It's supposed to be difficult
to invade somebody's privacy.

1706
01:38:36,119 --> 01:38:37,860
Because of how intrusive it is.

1707
01:38:38,871 --> 01:38:40,407
Because of how disruptive it is.

1708
01:38:41,791 --> 01:38:44,328
If we can't... if we don't
have our right to privacy,

1709
01:38:44,419 --> 01:38:46,410
how do we have a free
and open discussion?

1710
01:38:47,547 --> 01:38:49,754
What good is the right
to free speech...

1711
01:38:52,510 --> 01:38:53,796
if it's not protected...

1712
01:38:55,179 --> 01:38:57,466
in the sense that you can't have
a private discussion

1713
01:38:57,557 --> 01:39:00,015
with somebody else about
something you disagree with.

1714
01:39:01,060 --> 01:39:03,347
Think about the chilling effect
that that has.

1715
01:39:03,438 --> 01:39:05,429
Think about
the chilling effect it does have

1716
01:39:05,523 --> 01:39:08,732
on countries that don't have
a right to privacy.

1717
01:39:08,818 --> 01:39:11,185
[Appelbaum] I've noticed
a really interesting discussion point.

1718
01:39:11,279 --> 01:39:13,566
Which is that what people used
to call liberty and freedom,

1719
01:39:13,656 --> 01:39:15,067
we now call privacy.

1720
01:39:16,451 --> 01:39:19,569
And we say, in the same breath,
that privacy is dead.

1721
01:39:20,830 --> 01:39:23,868
This is something that really
concerns me about my generation.

1722
01:39:23,958 --> 01:39:26,575
Especially when we talk about
how we're not surprised by anything.

1723
01:39:26,669 --> 01:39:28,376
I think that we should
consider that

1724
01:39:28,463 --> 01:39:32,127
when we lose privacy,
we lose agency, we lose liberty itself.

1725
01:39:32,216 --> 01:39:34,548
Because we no longer feel
free to express what we think.

1726
01:39:34,635 --> 01:39:37,627
There's this myth of the passive
surveillance machine.

1727
01:39:37,722 --> 01:39:40,589
But actually what is
surveillance, except control?

1728
01:39:40,683 --> 01:39:43,550
This notion that the NSA
are passive, this is nonsense.

1729
01:39:43,644 --> 01:39:46,602
What we see is that they actively
attack European citizens,

1730
01:39:46,689 --> 01:39:49,397
American citizens, and in fact,
anyone that they can

1731
01:39:49,484 --> 01:39:51,100
if they perceive an advantage.

1732
01:40:06,209 --> 01:40:09,577
[in German]
And then there's the key paragraph that says

1733
01:40:09,670 --> 01:40:13,334
it was the SCS that intercepted

1734
01:40:13,424 --> 01:40:16,792
Chancellor Merkel's mobile phone.

1735
01:40:16,886 --> 01:40:18,342
We have the number.

1736
01:40:18,846 --> 01:40:21,588
[chatter in German continues]

1737
01:41:31,460 --> 01:41:34,077
[man, indistinctly]
What will you tell the German people?

1738
01:41:35,131 --> 01:41:36,838
[Binney] I'll have to
give that in testimony.

1739
01:41:36,924 --> 01:41:39,541
[man 2] What are you
going to tell?

1740
01:41:39,635 --> 01:41:41,046
[Binney]
Everything I can, truthfully.

1741
01:41:43,431 --> 01:41:45,638
[man 3]
What will you talk about?

1742
01:41:45,725 --> 01:41:47,136
Whatever the questions they ask me.

1743
01:41:48,144 --> 01:41:49,350
[woman]
Yeah, I think it's over there.

1744
01:41:49,437 --> 01:41:52,350
[Binney] Okay, all right.
Thank you.

1745
01:41:56,944 --> 01:41:58,105
[woman] Hello, Mr. Binney.

1746
01:41:58,195 --> 01:42:01,733
Hey, how are you? How are you?
Good to see you again.

1747
01:42:01,824 --> 01:42:03,030
Nice to meet you again, yes.

1748
01:42:13,628 --> 01:42:17,212
It is my pleasure to be here.
I feel that it's important to testify

1749
01:42:17,298 --> 01:42:19,710
about what's really going on
behind the scenes

1750
01:42:19,800 --> 01:42:22,758
in the intelligence communities
around the world.

1751
01:42:22,845 --> 01:42:24,836
Not just in NSA.

1752
01:42:24,930 --> 01:42:27,422
All those programs that
Edward Snowden has exposed

1753
01:42:27,516 --> 01:42:31,430
fundamentally are ways
of acquiring information.

1754
01:42:31,520 --> 01:42:34,638
Every dictatorship down through
history has always done that.

1755
01:42:34,732 --> 01:42:36,518
One of the first things they need to do

1756
01:42:36,609 --> 01:42:39,442
is try to acquire knowledge
of their population.

1757
01:42:39,528 --> 01:42:42,236
And that's exactly
what these programs do.

1758
01:42:42,323 --> 01:42:46,317
I see this as the most major threat
to our democracies all around the world.

1759
01:43:35,251 --> 01:43:37,583
[man] What do you think
they're doing to reporters,

1760
01:43:37,670 --> 01:43:39,206
those of us
that are working directly

1761
01:43:39,296 --> 01:43:41,583
with the Snowden documents?

1762
01:43:41,674 --> 01:43:44,712
How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?

1763
01:43:44,802 --> 01:43:46,634
You're on the cast iron
cover list.

1764
01:43:47,805 --> 01:43:51,173
Which means any...
any electronic device you use

1765
01:43:51,267 --> 01:43:55,010
that they can attach to you they'll record
and capture all that data.

1766
01:43:55,104 --> 01:43:58,222
And what do they do with that data?
Trying to figure out what we're doing?

1767
01:43:58,315 --> 01:44:00,556
Uh, well, that's part of it,

1768
01:44:00,651 --> 01:44:03,234
but the other part
for them I think

1769
01:44:03,320 --> 01:44:05,311
is to find the sources
of information you're getting.

1770
01:44:05,406 --> 01:44:07,192
So if I have a confidential source

1771
01:44:07,283 --> 01:44:09,695
who's giving me information
as a whistleblower,

1772
01:44:09,785 --> 01:44:11,367
and he works
within the US government,

1773
01:44:11,454 --> 01:44:13,320
and he's concerned about

1774
01:44:13,414 --> 01:44:16,748
what he perceives as violations
of the Constitution,

1775
01:44:16,834 --> 01:44:20,623
and he gets in touch with me,
they... go ahead.

1776
01:44:20,713 --> 01:44:24,126
From there on, they would nail him
and start watching everything he did,

1777
01:44:24,216 --> 01:44:27,049
and if he started passing data,
I'm sure they'd take him off the street.

1778
01:44:28,345 --> 01:44:31,883
I mean, the way you'd have to do
it is like Deep Throat did, right?

1779
01:44:31,974 --> 01:44:33,385
In the Nixon years.

1780
01:44:33,476 --> 01:44:37,515
Meet in the basement
of a parking garage, physically.

1781
01:45:17,645 --> 01:45:20,307
[Poitras reading] "Let's disassociate
our metadata one last time...

1782
01:45:20,397 --> 01:45:22,764
so we don't have a record
of your true name

1783
01:45:22,858 --> 01:45:25,190
in our final communication chain.

1784
01:45:25,277 --> 01:45:28,315
This is obviously not to say
you can 't claim your involvement,

1785
01:45:28,405 --> 01:45:32,114
but as every trick in the book
is likely to be used in looking into this,

1786
01:45:32,201 --> 01:45:34,363
I believe it's better that
that particular disclosure

1787
01:45:34,453 --> 01:45:35,864
come on your own terms.

1788
01:45:37,665 --> 01:45:39,781
Thank you again for all you've done.

1789
01:45:39,875 --> 01:45:41,957
So sorry again for the multiple delays,

1790
01:45:42,044 --> 01:45:45,287
but we 've been in uncharted territory
with no model to benefit from.

1791
01:45:47,049 --> 01:45:50,963
If all ends well, perhaps
the demonstration that our methods worked

1792
01:45:51,053 --> 01:45:52,885
will embolden more to come forward.

1793
01:45:53,931 --> 01:45:55,046
Citizen. "

1794
01:46:00,104 --> 01:46:02,095
[Greenwald] So the update
that I wanna give you

1795
01:46:02,189 --> 01:46:04,897
is about the new, um...

1796
01:46:06,569 --> 01:46:08,560
the new source that we...

1797
01:46:09,572 --> 01:46:10,937
[Snowden] Okay.

1798
01:46:11,031 --> 01:46:13,944
That...
This is what...

1799
01:46:17,079 --> 01:46:19,241
This is the person
who's doing the most...

1800
01:46:19,331 --> 01:46:20,867
Mm-hmm, right.

1801
01:46:20,958 --> 01:46:22,448
...the work on it, um...

1802
01:46:24,295 --> 01:46:27,333
And now,
basically what's happened is...

1803
01:46:30,759 --> 01:46:31,749
And...

1804
01:46:31,844 --> 01:46:34,836
That's actually...
that's really dangerous.

1805
01:46:34,930 --> 01:46:38,264
Um... on the source's side.

1806
01:46:38,350 --> 01:46:39,966
Do they know how to
take care of themselves?

1807
01:46:40,060 --> 01:46:43,928
I mean he...
it's all being done...

1808
01:46:46,317 --> 01:46:47,523
through this.

1809
01:46:47,610 --> 01:46:48,850
[Snowden] Okay.

1810
01:46:48,944 --> 01:46:50,355
And they're all talking...

1811
01:46:51,405 --> 01:46:52,611
this way.

1812
01:46:52,698 --> 01:46:54,109
[Snowden] Okay.

1813
01:46:54,199 --> 01:46:56,782
I was gonna say,
one of the big questions there is,

1814
01:46:56,869 --> 01:46:58,530
can they handle it?

1815
01:46:58,621 --> 01:47:00,658
No, they're very careful.

1816
01:47:00,748 --> 01:47:02,614
- Even... through that. Yeah.

1817
01:47:07,880 --> 01:47:09,086
[Greenwald] And...

1818
01:47:16,513 --> 01:47:17,719
That's where that is.

1819
01:47:20,017 --> 01:47:21,758
[Snowden] Wow,
that's really something.

1820
01:47:25,856 --> 01:47:27,096
[chuckling]

1821
01:47:34,490 --> 01:47:36,106
[Greenwald]
Did you know that?

1822
01:47:42,373 --> 01:47:44,455
It's not the actual planes.

1823
01:47:44,541 --> 01:47:47,078
[Snowden] Right, right,
you mean the control.

1824
01:47:47,169 --> 01:47:49,877
[Greenwald] It's the process,
who's sending the... yeah.

1825
01:47:49,964 --> 01:47:52,456
There's a chart.

1826
01:47:52,549 --> 01:47:55,291
There's like a whole layout
for every one...

1827
01:47:55,386 --> 01:47:57,969
That is really bold;
it's really risky.

1828
01:47:58,055 --> 01:48:00,467
You know, that's the thing,
if they understand what they're doing...

1829
01:48:00,557 --> 01:48:03,049
[Greenwald] There's this chart,
it goes like this.

1830
01:48:03,143 --> 01:48:05,555
It shows
the decision-making chart.

1831
01:48:05,646 --> 01:48:07,432
It's shaped like this:

1832
01:48:13,821 --> 01:48:15,983
- 80 up here it says...
- Mm-hmm.

1833
01:48:16,073 --> 01:48:19,691
That's the decision-making chart
for each... one.

1834
01:48:24,790 --> 01:48:28,033
- [Snowden] It's so political!
- This is this part's amazing.

1835
01:48:35,092 --> 01:48:38,130
- That's...
- That's fucking ridiculous.

1836
01:48:38,220 --> 01:48:39,836
[Greenwald] This is...
It's so shocking.

1837
01:48:46,061 --> 01:48:49,554
[Snowden] That's... that's the
population of entire countries.

1838
01:48:53,360 --> 01:48:55,601
[Greenwald]
That's what we're working on.

1839
01:49:09,918 --> 01:49:11,329
[Snowden] That person
is incredibly bold.

1840
01:49:11,420 --> 01:49:12,626
But, um...

1841
01:49:12,713 --> 01:49:15,455
But also very well aware.

1842
01:49:15,549 --> 01:49:17,790
You know, I just hope...
I mean...

1843
01:49:17,885 --> 01:49:20,001
No, I mean,
the boldness of it is shocking,

1844
01:49:20,095 --> 01:49:23,133
but it was obviously
motivated by what you did,

1845
01:49:23,223 --> 01:49:25,339
- I mean--
- This is going to.

1846
01:49:25,434 --> 01:49:29,348
This is going to
That could raise the profile...

1847
01:49:30,439 --> 01:49:31,895
of this
whole political situation

1848
01:49:31,982 --> 01:49:34,223
with whistleblowing
to a whole new level.

1849
01:49:34,318 --> 01:49:36,400
- [Greenwald] Exactly.
- It's gonna...

1850
01:49:36,487 --> 01:49:39,229
[Greenwald] Yeah,
I actually think that's a great thing.

1851
01:49:39,323 --> 01:49:42,657
And I think people are gonna see
what's being hidden again,

1852
01:49:42,743 --> 01:49:46,077
again, by a totally different
part of the government.

1853
01:50:05,974 --> 01:50:07,965
[♪ slow electronic music]