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00:00:46,683 --> 00:00:48,122
"Laura,"
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00:00:48,342 --> 00:00:51,329
at this stage, I can offer
nothing more than my word.
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00:00:51,678 --> 00:00:55,574
I'm a senior government employee
in the intelligence community
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00:00:55,744 --> 00:00:58,851
I hope you understand that contacting
you is extremely high risk
5
00:00:59,071 --> 00:01:01,350
and you are willing to agree
to the following precautions
6
00:01:01,469 --> 00:01:02,917
before I share more.
7
00:01:03,497 --> 00:01:05,894
This will not be a waste of your time.
8
00:01:06,643 --> 00:01:08,192
The following sounds complex,
9
00:01:08,372 --> 00:01:11,638
but should only take minutes to
complete for someone technical.
10
00:01:12,028 --> 00:01:15,824
I would like to confirm out of email that
the keys we exchanged were not intercepted
11
00:01:16,234 --> 00:01:18,272
and replaced by your surveillants.
12
00:01:19,381 --> 00:01:22,647
Please confirm that no one
has ever had a copy of your private key
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00:01:22,817 --> 00:01:24,795
and that it uses a strong passphrase.
14
00:01:24,935 --> 00:01:28,462
Assume your adversary is capable
of one trillion guesses per second.
15
00:01:29,700 --> 00:01:33,217
If the device you store the private key
and enter your passphrase on
16
00:01:33,417 --> 00:01:34,555
has been hacked,
17
00:01:34,735 --> 00:01:36,913
it is trivial to decrypt
our communications.
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00:01:38,142 --> 00:01:40,470
Understand that the above steps
are not bullet proof,
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00:01:40,629 --> 00:01:42,797
and are intended only to
give us breathing room.
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00:01:43,017 --> 00:01:45,225
In the end if you publish
the source material,
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00:01:45,475 --> 00:01:47,223
I will likely be immediately implicated.
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00:01:47,413 --> 00:01:50,949
This must not deter you from releasing
the information I will provide.
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00:01:52,418 --> 00:01:53,936
Thank you, and be careful.
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00:01:55,594 --> 00:01:58,881
Citizen Four...
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00:02:21,279 --> 00:02:24,266
Radio:... surveillance
means that there are facts
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00:02:24,436 --> 00:02:26,014
under the law to apply to
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00:02:26,224 --> 00:02:27,552
if we should take away the surveillance
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00:02:27,782 --> 00:02:29,960
there are no facts the
government could manufacture.
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00:02:30,380 --> 00:02:33,058
Oh, that's right and it's all about
creating an independent record.
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00:02:33,506 --> 00:02:37,343
To me this goes to the question
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00:02:38,042 --> 00:02:39,540
of independently verifying
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00:02:39,880 --> 00:02:42,368
what the government is doing.
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00:02:42,677 --> 00:02:44,476
That's why I keep going
back to that question.
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00:02:45,205 --> 00:02:50,180
So, that was David Suruda.
After CBS News traffic and weather...
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00:02:57,742 --> 00:02:59,201
Hey, can you hear me?
36
00:03:00,000 --> 00:03:01,998
I am here David, how are you?
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00:03:06,423 --> 00:03:07,572
Well, I would just point...
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00:03:07,722 --> 00:03:10,729
start by pointing to (what) Barack Obama
himself said about those questions
39
00:03:10,919 --> 00:03:13,636
when he was running for
the office that he now occupies.
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00:03:13,816 --> 00:03:17,193
On December 2007 he said
"The president does not have"
41
00:03:17,502 --> 00:03:21,408
the power under the Constitution to
unilaterally authorize a military attack
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00:03:21,708 --> 00:03:25,824
in a situation that does not involve stopping
an actual or imminent threat to the nation...
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00:03:26,144 --> 00:03:30,419
So by Obama's own words, the president doesn't
have the power that he is now exercising
44
00:03:30,609 --> 00:03:32,118
under the Constitution.
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00:03:32,378 --> 00:03:35,554
And as far of why it matters,
in... on August 1st 2007
46
00:03:35,804 --> 00:03:39,111
when he laid out his reasons
why he was running for office
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00:03:39,341 --> 00:03:41,948
and why he thought it was so important
to change the way we were doing things
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00:03:42,358 --> 00:03:42,997
he said.
49
00:03:43,207 --> 00:03:46,453
"No more ignoring the law
when it's inconvenient,"
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00:03:46,653 --> 00:03:48,072
that is not who we are.
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00:03:48,232 --> 00:03:52,038
We will again set an example for the world
that the law is not subject
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00:03:52,188 --> 00:03:53,547
"to the whims of stubborn rulers."
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00:03:53,766 --> 00:03:56,643
So to allow presidents to simply
start wars on their own without any...
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00:04:37,003 --> 00:04:41,159
For now, know that every border you
cross, every purchase you make,
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00:04:41,498 --> 00:04:44,375
every call you dial, every
cell phone tower you pass,
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00:04:44,615 --> 00:04:46,783
friend you keep, article you write,
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00:04:47,033 --> 00:04:49,440
site you visit, subject line you type,
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00:04:49,920 --> 00:04:51,308
and packet you route,
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00:04:51,688 --> 00:04:53,936
is in the hands of a system
whose reach is unlimited
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00:04:54,136 --> 00:04:56,164
but whose safeguards are not.
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00:04:57,492 --> 00:05:00,349
Your victimisation by the NSA system means
that you are well aware
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00:05:00,539 --> 00:05:03,466
of the threat
that unrestricted secret police pose
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00:05:03,656 --> 00:05:05,494
for democracies.
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00:05:05,674 --> 00:05:07,972
This is a story few, but you, can tell.
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00:06:02,417 --> 00:06:03,736
Thank you for inviting me here,
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00:06:04,166 --> 00:06:08,222
to give me the opportunity
to express my story.
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00:06:08,371 --> 00:06:10,050
But let me give you some of my background.
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00:06:11,039 --> 00:06:14,565
I spent about 4 years in the military
and then I went to NSA directly, so...
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00:06:15,424 --> 00:06:19,680
so I ended up with about 37
years of service combined.
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00:06:20,030 --> 00:06:22,427
Most of it was a lot of fun!
I tell you, it was really a lot of fun,
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00:06:22,607 --> 00:06:23,726
breaking these puzzles.
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00:06:23,876 --> 00:06:25,754
You know, solving problems
and things like that.
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00:06:25,784 --> 00:06:27,632
So, and that's really what I did.
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00:06:27,922 --> 00:06:31,049
Fundamentally started working with data,
looking at data and datasystems
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00:06:31,248 --> 00:06:32,297
and how you do that.
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00:06:32,577 --> 00:06:37,402
I was developing this concept of analysis
where you could lay it out in such a way
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00:06:37,792 --> 00:06:42,647
that it could be coded and executed electronically.
Meaning you could automate analysis.
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00:06:42,957 --> 00:06:46,493
And it has to do with metadata
and using metadata relationships.
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00:06:46,693 --> 00:06:49,330
So that was the whole,
that was my whole theme there at NSA
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00:06:49,790 --> 00:06:53,266
that was eventually what I ended up to, I was
the only one there doing that, by the way.
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00:06:54,176 --> 00:06:56,253
So any rate, you know, 9/11 happened.
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00:06:57,962 --> 00:07:00,409
And it must have been right after.
83
00:07:00,559 --> 00:07:02,957
A few days, no more than a week after 9/11
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00:07:03,476 --> 00:07:08,881
that they decided to begin actively
spying on everyone in this country.
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00:07:09,260 --> 00:07:14,495
And they wanted that back part of
our program to run all the spying.
86
00:07:15,155 --> 00:07:18,181
So that's that's exactly what they did.
87
00:07:18,921 --> 00:07:20,760
And then they started
taking the telecom data,
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00:07:20,899 --> 00:07:22,487
and expanded after that.
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00:07:23,996 --> 00:07:25,854
So, I mean, the one I knew was AT&T,
90
00:07:26,074 --> 00:07:29,131
and that one provided
320 million records every day.
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00:07:30,249 --> 00:07:33,067
That program was reauthorized
every 45 days by the,
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00:07:33,696 --> 00:07:35,174
what I call the "Yes Committee"
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00:07:35,374 --> 00:07:39,071
which way Hayden, and Tenet, and the DOJ,
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00:07:40,040 --> 00:07:42,227
that program was called STELLARWIND.
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00:07:42,447 --> 00:07:45,224
So first I went to the
House Intelligence Committee,
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00:07:45,424 --> 00:07:47,292
and the staff member I
personally knew there
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00:07:48,022 --> 00:07:51,358
and she then went to the Chairman
of that Committee, Nancy Pelosi,
98
00:07:51,598 --> 00:07:53,686
who was the Minority Rep.
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00:07:54,285 --> 00:07:57,442
They were all briefed in to
the program at the time, by the way,
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00:07:57,732 --> 00:07:59,571
and all the other programs
that were going on,
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00:07:59,600 --> 00:08:02,217
including all those CIA programs.
102
00:08:02,497 --> 00:08:04,985
I wasn't alone in this,
there were four others out of NSA,
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00:08:05,264 --> 00:08:08,431
we were all trying to work interally
in the government over these years
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00:08:08,711 --> 00:08:12,357
trying to get them to come around,
to being constitutionally acceptable,
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00:08:12,637 --> 00:08:15,914
and take it in to the courts
and have the courts' oversight of it too.
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00:08:16,513 --> 00:08:20,759
So we na�vely kept thinking
that that could, that could happen,
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00:08:21,748 --> 00:08:23,336
and it never did.
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00:08:24,125 --> 00:08:27,102
But any rate after that
and all the stuff we were doing
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00:08:27,802 --> 00:08:30,179
they decided to raid us
to keep us quiet,
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00:08:30,559 --> 00:08:31,678
threaten us, you know.
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00:08:31,968 --> 00:08:34,675
So we were raided simultaneously,
four of us.
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00:08:34,885 --> 00:08:36,783
In my case they came in
with guns drawn,
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00:08:36,983 --> 00:08:39,900
I don't know why they did that,
but they did. So...
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00:08:59,420 --> 00:09:00,459
"Laura,"
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00:09:01,188 --> 00:09:02,077
I will answer what I remember
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00:09:02,307 --> 00:09:04,135
of your questions as best I can.
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00:09:04,445 --> 00:09:06,723
Forgive the lack of
structure, I am not a writer,
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00:09:06,953 --> 00:09:08,971
and I have to draft this in a great hurry.
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00:09:11,178 --> 00:09:12,927
What you know as STELLARWIND has grown,
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00:09:14,245 --> 00:09:15,224
SSO,
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00:09:15,384 --> 00:09:19,230
the expanded Special Source Operations
that took over STELLARWIND's share
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00:09:19,450 --> 00:09:20,469
of the pie
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00:09:20,659 --> 00:09:22,197
has spread all over the world
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00:09:22,397 --> 00:09:23,276
to practically include
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00:09:23,586 --> 00:09:26,293
comprehensive coverage
of the United States.
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00:09:26,543 --> 00:09:29,230
Disturbingly, the amount
of US communication
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00:09:29,490 --> 00:09:32,427
ingested by NSA is still increasing.
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00:09:32,937 --> 00:09:33,866
Publicly,
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00:09:34,095 --> 00:09:35,655
we complain that things are going dark,
130
00:09:35,914 --> 00:09:38,881
but in fact our accesses are improving.
131
00:09:39,160 --> 00:09:40,989
The truth is that the NSA has never
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00:09:41,168 --> 00:09:41,798
in its history
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00:09:41,988 --> 00:09:45,174
collected more than it does now.
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00:09:46,323 --> 00:09:49,340
I know the location of most
domestic interception points,
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00:09:49,770 --> 00:09:52,837
and that the largest
telecommunication companies in the US
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00:09:53,136 --> 00:09:54,985
are betraying the trust of their customers,
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00:09:55,234 --> 00:09:56,583
which I can prove.
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00:09:57,772 --> 00:10:01,128
We are building the greatest weapon
for oppression in the history of Man.
139
00:10:01,328 --> 00:10:05,294
Yet its directors
exempt themselves from accountability.
140
00:10:05,784 --> 00:10:09,130
NSA director Keith Alexander
lied to Congress,
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00:10:09,380 --> 00:10:10,819
which I can prove.
142
00:10:11,838 --> 00:10:15,444
Billions of US communications
are being intercepted.
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00:10:16,663 --> 00:10:18,301
In gathering evidence of wrongdoing
144
00:10:18,571 --> 00:10:21,088
I focused on the wronging
of the American people,
145
00:10:21,268 --> 00:10:23,666
but believe me when I say that
the surveillance we live under
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00:10:23,876 --> 00:10:25,884
is the highest privilege
compared to how we treat
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00:10:26,103 --> 00:10:27,532
the rest of the world,
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00:10:27,932 --> 00:10:29,979
this I can also prove.
149
00:10:31,638 --> 00:10:34,665
On cyberoperations
the government's public position
150
00:10:34,964 --> 00:10:36,613
is that we still lack a policy framework.
151
00:10:36,813 --> 00:10:37,922
This too is a lie.
152
00:10:38,111 --> 00:10:39,740
There is a detailed policy framework,
153
00:10:40,059 --> 00:10:42,427
a kind of martial law for Cyber Operations
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00:10:42,717 --> 00:10:44,295
created by the White House.
155
00:10:44,495 --> 00:10:46,653
It's called "Presidential
Policy Directive 20"
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00:10:46,813 --> 00:10:49,520
and was finalized at the end of last year.
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00:10:49,730 --> 00:10:51,918
This I can also prove.
158
00:10:52,627 --> 00:10:54,795
I appreciate your concern for my safety,
159
00:10:55,074 --> 00:10:57,162
but I already know how
this will end for me,
160
00:10:57,352 --> 00:10:58,821
and I accept the risk.
161
00:10:59,330 --> 00:11:01,088
If I have luck, and you are careful,
162
00:11:02,337 --> 00:11:03,806
you will have everything you need.
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00:11:03,985 --> 00:11:05,194
I ask only that you ensure
164
00:11:05,384 --> 00:11:08,261
this information makes it home
to the American public.
165
00:11:10,249 --> 00:11:14,125
Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizen's emails?
166
00:11:14,825 --> 00:11:15,609
No.
167
00:11:17,222 --> 00:11:23,346
Does the NSA intercept Americans'
cell phone conversations.
168
00:11:23,676 --> 00:11:24,505
No.
169
00:11:24,755 --> 00:11:25,953
Google searches?
170
00:11:26,143 --> 00:11:26,952
No.
171
00:11:27,142 --> 00:11:28,361
Text messages?
172
00:11:28,541 --> 00:11:29,210
No.
173
00:11:29,420 --> 00:11:31,298
Amazon.com orders?
174
00:11:31,658 --> 00:11:32,537
Nope.
175
00:11:32,757 --> 00:11:33,586
Bank records?
176
00:11:33,826 --> 00:11:34,385
No.
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00:11:34,655 --> 00:11:37,752
What judicial consent is required for NSA
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00:11:37,941 --> 00:11:39,630
to intercept communications
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00:11:40,629 --> 00:11:44,075
and information
involving American citizens?
180
00:11:44,405 --> 00:11:47,412
Within the United States
that would be the FBI lead.
181
00:11:47,712 --> 00:11:49,551
If it was a foreign actor
in the United states
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00:11:49,730 --> 00:11:53,056
the FBI would still have the lead
and could work that with NSA
183
00:11:53,266 --> 00:11:55,844
or other intelligence
agencies as authorized.
184
00:11:56,323 --> 00:11:57,372
But to conduct that kind
185
00:11:58,281 --> 00:12:00,249
of collection within the United states
186
00:12:00,649 --> 00:12:02,427
it would have to go through a court order.
187
00:12:03,346 --> 00:12:04,994
And the court would have to authorize it.
188
00:12:05,244 --> 00:12:06,223
We are not authorized to do it,
189
00:12:06,433 --> 00:12:09,010
nor do we do it.
190
00:12:16,153 --> 00:12:17,941
All rise.
191
00:12:18,341 --> 00:12:19,701
The United States Court of Appeals
192
00:12:19,720 --> 00:12:21,658
for the Ninth Circuit is now in session.
193
00:12:23,156 --> 00:12:26,053
Please be seated.
194
00:12:34,585 --> 00:12:36,384
Good morning and welcome
to the Ninth Circuit.
195
00:12:37,202 --> 00:12:41,748
The first case for argument is
Jewell vs. National Security Agency.
196
00:12:42,337 --> 00:12:43,466
You may proceed.
197
00:12:46,683 --> 00:12:49,790
May it please the Court,
Kevin Bankston for Carolyn Jewell
198
00:12:50,109 --> 00:12:52,876
and her fellow plaintiff appellants
in Jewell vs. NSA.
199
00:12:53,116 --> 00:12:54,465
Your Honors,
200
00:12:54,655 --> 00:12:58,351
plaintiffs have specifically
alleged that their own communications
201
00:12:58,561 --> 00:13:01,588
and communications records have been
acquired by the government.
202
00:13:01,847 --> 00:13:05,584
But the District Court found that
we failed to allege facts
203
00:13:05,963 --> 00:13:08,920
that differentiated the injury
of our plaintiffs sufferred
204
00:13:09,130 --> 00:13:12,497
from the injury suffered
by every other AT&T user
205
00:13:12,856 --> 00:13:15,615
whose communications and records
have been acquired by the government.
206
00:13:15,714 --> 00:13:18,980
Basically concluding that so long as
every one is being surveilled,
207
00:13:19,470 --> 00:13:21,248
no one has standing to sue.
208
00:13:22,167 --> 00:13:24,395
However to deny standing to persons
who are injured simply because
209
00:13:24,585 --> 00:13:27,262
many others are also injured
would mean that the most injurious
210
00:13:27,672 --> 00:13:30,199
and widespread government actions
could be questioned by nobody.
211
00:13:31,238 --> 00:13:36,023
Do they have anything concrete
that in fact a specific communication
212
00:13:36,393 --> 00:13:39,310
of your client was intercepted?
213
00:13:39,510 --> 00:13:41,638
We have evidence that all
the communications passing
214
00:13:41,827 --> 00:13:45,294
between AT&T's network and other networks
in their Northern California facility
215
00:13:46,892 --> 00:13:49,750
have been intercepted,
so that would necessarily include
216
00:13:49,979 --> 00:13:53,566
the Internet communications of
our Northern California plaintiffs.
217
00:13:53,885 --> 00:13:55,234
Okay, thank you.
218
00:13:55,813 --> 00:13:57,392
Thank you, your honor.
219
00:14:04,145 --> 00:14:04,814
May it please the Court,
220
00:14:05,044 --> 00:14:06,883
I'm Thomas Byron from
the Department of Justice
221
00:14:07,062 --> 00:14:08,820
here on behalf of
the Government defendants.
222
00:14:09,440 --> 00:14:13,656
We think this litigation
need not be resolved in Federal Court.
223
00:14:14,035 --> 00:14:16,932
In light of the oversight
of the political branches
224
00:14:17,192 --> 00:14:18,990
both Legislative and Executive,
225
00:14:19,600 --> 00:14:24,315
which provides a better opportunity
for oversight and resolution
226
00:14:25,114 --> 00:14:27,901
of the concerns raised
concerning nationwide policies
227
00:14:28,411 --> 00:14:32,866
of alleged surveillance
in these complaints.
228
00:14:33,366 --> 00:14:36,443
Even if it's revealed
that one or more of the plaintiffs
229
00:14:36,742 --> 00:14:41,098
had email or telephone conversations
intercepted that had nothing to do
230
00:14:41,308 --> 00:14:42,796
with the national security?
231
00:14:43,076 --> 00:14:45,074
Your honor, I don't know
that anyone necessarily
232
00:14:45,414 --> 00:14:48,341
would have standing to raise
the particular claims that issue
233
00:14:48,531 --> 00:14:50,139
in these 2 cases.
234
00:14:50,479 --> 00:14:56,063
We think instead that the kinds of claims
that issue here against these defendants
235
00:14:56,313 --> 00:14:58,850
are those that are
better suited to resolution
236
00:14:59,839 --> 00:15:01,737
before the representative branches
of our government...
237
00:15:01,967 --> 00:15:08,131
What role... would the Judiciary have
if your.. approach is adopted...
238
00:15:08,391 --> 00:15:10,579
Judge Peterson, I think the...
239
00:15:10,948 --> 00:15:14,045
I mean, we just get out
of the way, is that it?
240
00:15:14,335 --> 00:15:16,473
Well, Judge Peterson, what I think
is that there is a narrow category,
241
00:15:16,882 --> 00:15:20,958
subset of cases in which
it may be appropriate
242
00:15:21,168 --> 00:15:24,714
to step aside
for that narrow category of cases.
243
00:15:24,904 --> 00:15:27,342
But mmm... the Judiciary plays a role...
244
00:15:27,512 --> 00:15:28,670
To be sure, Judge Peterson...
245
00:15:28,790 --> 00:15:29,989
in our system.
246
00:15:30,149 --> 00:15:33,086
Yes Your Honor and we don't
mean to diminish that.
247
00:15:33,326 --> 00:15:35,773
You're asking us to abdicate that role.
248
00:15:36,173 --> 00:15:37,492
No, Your Honor,
249
00:15:37,861 --> 00:15:41,368
but it is a question of this court's
discretion whether to reach that issue.
250
00:15:41,907 --> 00:15:45,484
We do think that there is simply
no way for the litigation to proceed
251
00:15:45,793 --> 00:15:49,999
without risk of divulging those very
questions of privileged information
252
00:15:50,519 --> 00:15:52,656
that would cause,
as Director of National Intelligence
253
00:15:52,826 --> 00:15:54,065
has explained,
254
00:15:54,595 --> 00:15:57,192
exceptionally great damage to
National Security's disclose.
255
00:16:01,827 --> 00:16:03,006
Thanks for having me.
256
00:16:03,975 --> 00:16:06,103
Hum, if anybody has any questions,
like I said just..
257
00:16:06,293 --> 00:16:08,920
Basically just raise your hand
and I'll try to call on you
258
00:16:09,120 --> 00:16:10,429
as soon as I possibly can.
259
00:16:11,078 --> 00:16:14,015
So, who here actually feels like
they are under surveillance,
260
00:16:14,555 --> 00:16:15,943
pretty regularly?
261
00:16:18,551 --> 00:16:19,590
Everyone inside of Occupy.
262
00:16:19,819 --> 00:16:21,379
How many people here have been arrested
263
00:16:21,518 --> 00:16:24,425
and at their Court date had
their phone taken into the back room?
264
00:16:25,044 --> 00:16:27,002
How many people here
had their retina scanned?
265
00:16:28,181 --> 00:16:29,300
Wow.
266
00:16:31,827 --> 00:16:33,745
So you guys are actually, in a sense,
the canaries in the coal mine,
267
00:16:33,955 --> 00:16:34,694
right,
268
00:16:34,924 --> 00:16:36,662
because the incentives
are all lined up against you.
269
00:16:36,912 --> 00:16:39,719
Anybody see how the subway link
your metro card to your debit card,
270
00:16:40,808 --> 00:16:42,557
right? And, like, auto refill.
271
00:16:42,906 --> 00:16:45,164
This is a concept which is key
to everything we'll talk about today.
272
00:16:45,364 --> 00:16:46,652
And it's called linkability.
273
00:16:46,872 --> 00:16:49,689
Take one piece of data
and link it to another piece of data.
274
00:16:50,089 --> 00:16:51,108
So for example,
275
00:16:51,328 --> 00:16:53,567
if you have your metro card
and you have your debit card,
276
00:16:53,715 --> 00:16:55,574
you have those things
and you can draw a line between them right?
277
00:16:56,143 --> 00:16:58,541
So that's, like, not a scary thing.
278
00:16:58,760 --> 00:17:02,057
Except your bank card is tied to everything
else that you do during the day.
279
00:17:02,247 --> 00:17:05,234
So now they know where you're going,
when you make purchases.
280
00:17:05,893 --> 00:17:09,230
So when they decide to target you, they
can actually recreate your exact steps.
281
00:17:09,520 --> 00:17:11,577
With a metro card and
with a credit card alone.
282
00:17:11,927 --> 00:17:13,685
Like literally where you
go and what you buy
283
00:17:14,095 --> 00:17:16,602
and potentially by linking
that data with other people
284
00:17:16,802 --> 00:17:18,810
on similar travel plans,
285
00:17:19,040 --> 00:17:21,279
they can figure out who you
talk to and who you met with.
286
00:17:21,637 --> 00:17:24,395
When you then take cellphone data,
which logs your location
287
00:17:24,984 --> 00:17:29,809
and you link up purchasing data,
metro card data and your debit card.
288
00:17:30,069 --> 00:17:32,307
You start to get what you
could call metadata,
289
00:17:32,487 --> 00:17:34,335
an aggregate over a person's life.
290
00:17:34,574 --> 00:17:37,342
And metadata, an aggregate, is content.
291
00:17:37,551 --> 00:17:39,240
It tells a story about you,
292
00:17:39,490 --> 00:17:42,407
which is made up of facts,
but is not necessarily true.
293
00:17:42,566 --> 00:17:44,604
So for example, just because
you were on the corner,
294
00:17:44,754 --> 00:17:48,131
and all these data points point to it,
it doesn't mean you committed the crime.
295
00:17:48,481 --> 00:17:50,039
So it's important to note
296
00:17:50,329 --> 00:17:52,277
that if someone has a perception
of you having done a thing,
297
00:17:52,457 --> 00:17:54,854
it will now follow you
for the rest of your life.
298
00:17:55,214 --> 00:17:57,761
So just keep in mind that
what happens to you guys for example
299
00:17:57,991 --> 00:18:01,737
with fingerprints, and retinal
scans, and photographs.
300
00:18:02,057 --> 00:18:04,025
That is what is going to happen
to people in the future
301
00:18:04,215 --> 00:18:06,163
when they resist policy changes
and when they try to protest
302
00:18:06,572 --> 00:18:09,829
in a totally constitutionally
protected way.
303
00:18:10,389 --> 00:18:11,662
This is for you, Director Clapper,
again on the surveillance front.
304
00:18:13,016 --> 00:18:15,623
And I hope we can do this
in just a yes or no answer,
305
00:18:15,843 --> 00:18:17,921
because I know Senator
Feinstein wants to move on.
306
00:18:18,391 --> 00:18:23,386
So, does the NSA collect
any type of data at all,
307
00:18:23,575 --> 00:18:26,592
on millions or hundreds
of millions of Americans?
308
00:18:27,771 --> 00:18:28,900
No sir.
309
00:18:29,599 --> 00:18:30,598
It does not?
310
00:18:32,127 --> 00:18:34,075
Not wittingly.
311
00:18:34,465 --> 00:18:37,402
There are cases where
they could inadvertently,
312
00:18:38,111 --> 00:18:41,477
perhaps, collect, but not wittingly.
313
00:18:57,202 --> 00:19:00,389
Email from April 2013.
314
00:19:07,202 --> 00:19:08,161
The encrypted archive
315
00:19:08,321 --> 00:19:10,928
should be available to
you within seven days.
316
00:19:11,108 --> 00:19:13,945
The key will follow when
everything else is done.
317
00:19:15,623 --> 00:19:17,032
The material provided,
318
00:19:17,322 --> 00:19:21,128
and investigative effort required
will be too much for any one person.
319
00:19:21,358 --> 00:19:24,674
I recommend at a very minimum
you involve Glen Greenwald.
320
00:19:24,874 --> 00:19:26,822
I believe you know him.
321
00:19:28,810 --> 00:19:30,049
The plaintext of the payload
322
00:19:30,229 --> 00:19:33,076
will include my true name details
for the record.
323
00:19:33,855 --> 00:19:35,124
Though it will be your decision
324
00:19:35,354 --> 00:19:38,351
as to whether or how
to declare my involvement.
325
00:19:39,210 --> 00:19:43,795
My personal desire is that you
paint the target directly on my back.
326
00:19:44,035 --> 00:19:49,330
No one, not even my most trusted confidant,
is aware of my intentions
327
00:19:49,869 --> 00:19:53,256
and it would not be fair for them
to fall under suspicion for my actions.
328
00:19:53,495 --> 00:19:55,423
You may be the only one
who can prevent that,
329
00:19:55,863 --> 00:19:58,231
and that is by immediately
nailing me to the cross
330
00:19:58,460 --> 00:20:01,447
rather than trying
to protect me as a source.
331
00:20:03,825 --> 00:20:07,461
On timing, regarding
meeting up in Hong Kong,
332
00:20:07,721 --> 00:20:10,638
the first rendezvous attempt
will be at 10 A.M. local time
333
00:20:10,848 --> 00:20:12,766
on Monday.
334
00:20:13,076 --> 00:20:15,324
We will meet in the hallway
outside of the restaurant
335
00:20:15,483 --> 00:20:17,072
in the Mira Hotel.
336
00:20:17,851 --> 00:20:19,250
I will be working on a Rubik's cube
337
00:20:19,429 --> 00:20:20,728
so that you can identify me.
338
00:20:22,007 --> 00:20:25,883
Approach me and ask if I know
the hours of the restaurant.
339
00:20:26,063 --> 00:20:28,460
I'll respond by stating that I'm not sure
340
00:20:28,760 --> 00:20:31,278
and suggest you try the lounge instead.
341
00:20:31,447 --> 00:20:35,463
I'll offer to show you where it
is, and at that point we're good.
342
00:20:35,843 --> 00:20:38,470
You simply need to follow naturally.
343
00:21:15,264 --> 00:21:16,672
As far as positioning I mean
344
00:21:16,842 --> 00:21:19,081
if you want us to sit in any
particular way or whatever.
345
00:21:19,140 --> 00:21:22,007
You know, I'm gonna go there
just like we get better light.
346
00:21:33,206 --> 00:21:34,944
There is, you know, so many different
347
00:21:35,254 --> 00:21:37,331
enormous stories
348
00:21:37,561 --> 00:21:39,769
just that are kind of standalone stories
349
00:21:41,088 --> 00:21:43,815
that, even like you know certain
things on my individual document
350
00:21:43,995 --> 00:21:46,013
that can just be their own story
351
00:21:46,213 --> 00:21:48,320
and I just want to start
turning those stories out.
352
00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:51,397
I basically woke up this morning and
I already started writing stories
353
00:21:52,037 --> 00:21:53,915
hum so I'm hoping to, you know,
354
00:21:54,145 --> 00:21:56,462
start publishing within
like a day or two days.
355
00:21:56,812 --> 00:21:57,521
OK
356
00:21:57,661 --> 00:21:59,180
It's as long as you're good with that.
357
00:21:59,230 --> 00:21:59,819
Yeah
358
00:22:00,378 --> 00:22:01,697
and so as far as I...
359
00:22:01,867 --> 00:22:03,146
the stuff we have to talk about,
360
00:22:03,236 --> 00:22:04,384
I mean I'm kind of like
361
00:22:04,734 --> 00:22:07,951
dichotomizing it between,
362
00:22:08,680 --> 00:22:10,268
you know, stuff that I'd like
to talk you about,
363
00:22:10,428 --> 00:22:12,267
in terms of like the documents
and the content.
364
00:22:12,326 --> 00:22:13,865
Laura has a bunch of questions
about that as well.
365
00:22:14,105 --> 00:22:16,702
So while we're working through
the documents getting your take-on,
366
00:22:16,822 --> 00:22:18,470
a lot of the stuff that, you know,
367
00:22:18,690 --> 00:22:22,117
help me understand it better, but then
also the sort of You story, right...
368
00:22:22,386 --> 00:22:24,005
like the who you are?
369
00:22:24,195 --> 00:22:24,694
Yeah
370
00:22:24,934 --> 00:22:26,932
what you've done, why you've
done what you've done.
371
00:22:26,962 --> 00:22:27,461
Yeah
372
00:22:27,931 --> 00:22:28,870
and I'd love to do that first.
373
00:22:29,030 --> 00:22:29,529
OK
374
00:22:30,039 --> 00:22:32,366
In part because, you are
the only one who can do that.
375
00:22:32,556 --> 00:22:33,056
Yeah
376
00:22:33,255 --> 00:22:35,583
so I'd like to just get it done
so let it's done,
377
00:22:35,753 --> 00:22:39,489
and also because, you know,
it might be that you wanna do that early.
378
00:22:39,729 --> 00:22:40,318
Yeah
379
00:22:40,918 --> 00:22:44,324
because, it might be necessary,
we might choose to have that done early.
380
00:22:44,664 --> 00:22:47,401
What are you... tell me your thoughts,
just where you are with that?
381
00:22:47,671 --> 00:22:49,759
So primary one on that,
I think I've expressed it
382
00:22:49,989 --> 00:22:51,108
a couple times online,
383
00:22:51,337 --> 00:22:56,053
is I feel the modern media
has a big focus on personalities.
384
00:22:56,252 --> 00:22:57,082
Totally.
385
00:22:57,341 --> 00:23:01,787
And I'm a little concerned (that)
the more we focus on that
386
00:23:01,967 --> 00:23:04,005
the more they're going
to use that as a distraction.
387
00:23:04,894 --> 00:23:09,170
I don't necessarily want that to happen, which
is why I've consistently said, you know,
388
00:23:09,399 --> 00:23:13,395
I'm not the story here,
hum haha, nervous uh?
389
00:23:14,105 --> 00:23:18,270
No it's a very very cheap pen, I
just, the slider is broke, go ahead.
390
00:23:19,239 --> 00:23:25,064
Hum, but hum, yeah, anything I can do
to help you guys get this out,
391
00:23:25,483 --> 00:23:26,402
I will do,
392
00:23:26,692 --> 00:23:33,225
I don't have any experience
with media, with how this works
393
00:23:33,625 --> 00:23:36,392
so I'm kind of learning as I go.
394
00:23:36,842 --> 00:23:40,368
Right, so, I just want to get a sense of
why did you decide to do what you've done.
395
00:23:40,738 --> 00:23:45,933
So for me it all comes down to
State Power against the people's ability
396
00:23:46,182 --> 00:23:48,750
to meaningfully oppose that power.
397
00:23:49,000 --> 00:23:51,557
And I'm sitting there everyday,
398
00:23:51,757 --> 00:23:57,451
getting payed to design methods
to amplify that State Power.
399
00:23:58,350 --> 00:24:01,767
And I'm realizing that if, you know,
the policy switches,
400
00:24:02,226 --> 00:24:05,753
that there are the only things that
restrains these states, were changed,
401
00:24:07,082 --> 00:24:09,629
there, you couldn't meaningfully
oppose these.
402
00:24:09,869 --> 00:24:14,964
I mean, you have to be the most incredibly
sophisticated ta* col* actor in existence.
403
00:24:15,393 --> 00:24:19,889
I'm not sure there's anybody,
no matter how gifted you are,
404
00:24:20,138 --> 00:24:24,434
who could oppose all of the
offices and all the bright people
405
00:24:24,854 --> 00:24:29,229
even all the mediocre people out there with all
of their tools and all of their capabilities.
406
00:24:30,568 --> 00:24:33,585
And as I saw the promise
of the Obama administration
407
00:24:35,114 --> 00:24:38,990
be betrayed and walk away from it.
In fact, actually advance
408
00:24:39,939 --> 00:24:43,955
the things that had been promised
to be sort of curtailed and rained in
409
00:24:44,394 --> 00:24:45,793
and dialed back.
410
00:24:45,983 --> 00:24:48,330
It actually gets worse,
particularly drone strikes.
411
00:24:48,660 --> 00:24:49,809
Which I also learned in NSA,
412
00:24:50,069 --> 00:24:53,016
we could watch drone videos
from our desktops,
413
00:24:56,652 --> 00:24:58,820
as I saw that, that really
hardened me to action.
414
00:24:59,109 --> 00:25:00,049
In real time?
415
00:25:00,238 --> 00:25:01,427
In real time, yeah,
416
00:25:01,687 --> 00:25:06,252
it'll stream a lower quality
of the video to your desktop,
417
00:25:06,732 --> 00:25:09,729
typically you'd be watching surveillance drones
as opposed to actually letting you know,
418
00:25:09,989 --> 00:25:12,756
murder drones really going out there
and bomb somebody.
419
00:25:13,695 --> 00:25:16,212
But you'll have a drone
that's just following somebody's house
420
00:25:16,402 --> 00:25:17,761
for hours and hours.
421
00:25:17,951 --> 00:25:19,829
And you won't know who
it is because, you know,
422
00:25:20,059 --> 00:25:23,245
you don't have the context for that
but it's just a page
423
00:25:23,405 --> 00:25:26,492
where it's lists
and lists of drone feeds
424
00:25:26,692 --> 00:25:29,439
and all these different countries
with all these different code names
425
00:25:29,659 --> 00:25:32,846
and you can just click
on which one you want to see.
426
00:25:34,134 --> 00:25:37,531
Right, so if your self interest
is to live in a world in which
427
00:25:37,741 --> 00:25:39,799
there's maximum privacy,
428
00:25:39,979 --> 00:25:42,526
doing something that could
put you into prison,
429
00:25:42,746 --> 00:25:46,622
in which your privacy is completely destroyed
is sort of the antithesis of that,
430
00:25:47,002 --> 00:25:50,868
how did you reach the point where
that was a worthwhile calculation for you?
431
00:25:51,827 --> 00:25:54,814
I remember what the Internet was like
before it was being watched.
432
00:25:55,153 --> 00:25:57,851
And there has never been anything
in the history of man like it.
433
00:25:58,270 --> 00:26:02,556
I mean you could have children
from one part of the world
434
00:26:03,205 --> 00:26:04,924
having an equal discussion,
435
00:26:05,493 --> 00:26:07,501
where you know they were sort of granted
436
00:26:08,590 --> 00:26:11,497
the same respect
for their ideas and conversation,
437
00:26:12,096 --> 00:26:14,874
with experts in the field
from another part of the world
438
00:26:15,253 --> 00:26:18,440
on any topic, anywhere,
anytime, all the time.
439
00:26:20,768 --> 00:26:22,256
And it was free and unrestrained.
440
00:26:22,446 --> 00:26:26,522
And we've seen the chilling of that,
the cooling of that and the changing
441
00:26:26,712 --> 00:26:30,958
of that model towards something
which people self police their own views.
442
00:26:31,197 --> 00:26:34,024
And they literally make
their own jokes on ending up on the list
443
00:26:34,384 --> 00:26:39,489
if they donate to a political cause
or if they say something in a discussion.
444
00:26:39,799 --> 00:26:43,675
And it has become an expectation
that we're being watched.
445
00:26:44,444 --> 00:26:47,211
Many people I've talked to have mentioned
that they're careful about what they type
446
00:26:47,541 --> 00:26:48,930
into search engines.
447
00:26:49,229 --> 00:26:50,948
Because they know that it's being recorded.
448
00:26:51,097 --> 00:26:54,993
And that limits the boundaries
of their intellectual exploration.
449
00:26:59,799 --> 00:27:04,594
And I'm more willing to risk
450
00:27:05,183 --> 00:27:06,232
imprisonment
451
00:27:06,442 --> 00:27:09,459
or any other negative outcome personally
452
00:27:09,819 --> 00:27:13,185
than I am willing to risk
453
00:27:13,615 --> 00:27:16,042
the curtailment of my intellectual freedom
454
00:27:16,832 --> 00:27:19,359
and that of those around me,
455
00:27:19,689 --> 00:27:23,325
whom I care for equally as I do for myself.
456
00:27:23,795 --> 00:27:26,522
And again that's not to say
that I'm self sacrificing
457
00:27:29,069 --> 00:27:30,758
because it gives me, I feel good,
458
00:27:31,287 --> 00:27:32,706
in my human experience
459
00:27:32,985 --> 00:27:35,063
to know that I can contribute
to the good of others.
460
00:27:51,797 --> 00:27:53,555
Could you elaborate on that?
461
00:27:54,314 --> 00:27:58,760
So, I don't know how much the programs
and the actual technical capacities
462
00:27:59,079 --> 00:28:02,366
everybody's talked to you about
but there is an infrastructure in place
463
00:28:02,596 --> 00:28:07,451
in the United States
and world wide that NSA has built
464
00:28:08,450 --> 00:28:13,125
in cooperation with
other governments as well,
465
00:28:14,064 --> 00:28:15,863
that intercepts
466
00:28:17,081 --> 00:28:18,220
basically every
467
00:28:18,490 --> 00:28:20,228
digital communication,
468
00:28:20,668 --> 00:28:22,546
every radio communication,
469
00:28:23,085 --> 00:28:24,794
every analog communication
470
00:28:25,153 --> 00:28:28,410
that it has sensors in place to detect.
471
00:28:28,750 --> 00:28:31,157
And with these capabilities,
472
00:28:31,597 --> 00:28:35,153
basically the vast majority
473
00:28:36,142 --> 00:28:36,911
of human
474
00:28:37,711 --> 00:28:39,839
and computer to computer communications,
475
00:28:40,168 --> 00:28:41,317
device-based communication,
476
00:28:41,667 --> 00:28:44,893
which that sort of then forms
the relationships between humans,
477
00:28:46,492 --> 00:28:49,119
are automatically ingested
without targeting.
478
00:28:50,188 --> 00:28:52,985
And that allows individuals
to retroactively
479
00:28:53,385 --> 00:28:57,361
search your communications
based on self certifications.
480
00:28:57,731 --> 00:29:01,287
So for example, if I wanted
to see the content
481
00:29:01,527 --> 00:29:03,535
of your email or,
482
00:29:04,064 --> 00:29:05,583
you know, your wife's phone calls
483
00:29:05,833 --> 00:29:07,461
or anything like that.
484
00:29:07,860 --> 00:29:11,757
All I have to do is use
what's called a selector.
485
00:29:12,006 --> 00:29:15,173
Any kind of thing
486
00:29:15,603 --> 00:29:17,461
in the communication's chain
487
00:29:18,350 --> 00:29:20,947
that might uniquely or almost uniquely
488
00:29:21,157 --> 00:29:21,916
identify you as an individual.
489
00:29:22,126 --> 00:29:24,084
And I'm talking about
things like email addresses,
490
00:29:24,384 --> 00:29:25,773
IP addresses, phone numbers,
491
00:29:25,992 --> 00:29:27,021
credit cards,
492
00:29:28,390 --> 00:29:29,848
even passwords
493
00:29:30,188 --> 00:29:32,636
that are unique to you,
that aren't used by anyone else.
494
00:29:33,824 --> 00:29:35,962
I can input those into the system
495
00:29:36,432 --> 00:29:38,450
and it will not only go
back through the database
496
00:29:39,049 --> 00:29:42,466
and go
"have I seen this anywhere in the past?",
497
00:29:43,884 --> 00:29:47,181
it will basically put an
additional level of scrutiny on it
498
00:29:47,791 --> 00:29:49,489
moving into the future that says
499
00:29:50,198 --> 00:29:52,436
"if this is detected now
or at anytime in the future,"
500
00:29:54,174 --> 00:29:57,201
I want this to go to me immediately"
and alert me in real time
501
00:29:57,391 --> 00:29:58,979
that you're communicating
with someone,
502
00:29:59,159 --> 00:29:59,898
things like that.
503
00:30:04,484 --> 00:30:06,582
So I don't know who you are
or anything about you.
504
00:30:08,250 --> 00:30:14,644
Ok. I work for Booz Allen Hamilton,
defense contractor.
505
00:30:15,822 --> 00:30:19,239
I am sort of on loan to NSA,
I don't talk to Booz Allen boss,
506
00:30:19,489 --> 00:30:21,717
I don't get tasking from Booz Allen,
it's all from NSA.
507
00:30:22,486 --> 00:30:23,645
So, I don't know your name.
508
00:30:23,954 --> 00:30:27,371
Oh, sorry, my name is Edward Snowden,
509
00:30:27,721 --> 00:30:29,099
I go by Ed.
510
00:30:30,298 --> 00:30:32,586
Edward Joseph Snowden is the full name.
511
00:30:32,845 --> 00:30:35,942
(spelling) S. N. O. W. D. E. N..
512
00:30:36,282 --> 00:30:37,431
And where are you from?
513
00:30:37,890 --> 00:30:41,167
I'm originally...
I was born in North Carolina,
514
00:30:41,547 --> 00:30:43,355
small town, Elizabeth City.
515
00:30:43,545 --> 00:30:44,514
There is a Coast Guard station there,
516
00:30:44,773 --> 00:30:46,052
I'm from a military family.
517
00:30:46,811 --> 00:30:50,977
But I spent most of my time
growing up around Fort Meade in Maryland.
518
00:30:53,784 --> 00:30:57,830
And your family,
what's the consequences for them?
519
00:30:59,738 --> 00:31:02,416
This is actually
what has made this hardest.
520
00:31:02,795 --> 00:31:08,290
My family doesn't know
what's happening, they're unaware.
521
00:31:11,537 --> 00:31:14,554
I don't think I'll be able
to keep the family ties
522
00:31:14,843 --> 00:31:18,739
that I've had for all my life
523
00:31:19,099 --> 00:31:22,396
because of the risk of
associating them with this.
524
00:31:23,754 --> 00:31:27,591
And I'll leave what to publish
and what not to publish to you guys,
525
00:31:28,220 --> 00:31:34,983
I trust you'll be responsible on this. But
basically, the closer I stay to my family,
526
00:31:36,961 --> 00:31:38,561
the more likely they are
to be leaned on.
527
00:31:38,580 --> 00:31:40,018
So you don't want me to report this?
528
00:31:40,028 --> 00:31:42,026
We dont have... I mean,
we definitely want to do
529
00:31:42,046 --> 00:31:45,623
whatever we can not to
include them or bring them into the mix.
530
00:31:46,102 --> 00:31:48,160
Oh I'm sorry that's fine, I won't...
531
00:31:48,829 --> 00:31:49,858
I'm sorry I'm going to interrupt you.
532
00:31:50,198 --> 00:31:53,035
Can we just stop for a second,
do the document and then go back to that?
533
00:31:53,744 --> 00:31:57,411
What do I need? Do I need
an email address that we're using or...
534
00:31:57,700 --> 00:32:02,945
Well you can send... Once you've encrypted it, you
can send it from whatever you think is appropriate.
535
00:32:03,425 --> 00:32:05,643
The main thing is
you've got to encapsulate all of this
536
00:32:06,092 --> 00:32:10,068
in a way that it can't be
decrypted and read
537
00:32:10,478 --> 00:32:15,023
once it's in transit across the
network or on either of the end points.
538
00:32:15,533 --> 00:32:18,251
Ok I mean just so you know
these documents are basically all going
539
00:32:18,380 --> 00:32:20,248
to be uploaded within like 48 hours.
540
00:32:20,638 --> 00:32:21,926
This is simply..
541
00:32:22,166 --> 00:32:24,354
You want to get in the process
of doing this for everything because
542
00:32:24,634 --> 00:32:27,621
it seems hard but it's not hard,
this is super easy.
543
00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:29,279
Ok so just walk me through it.
544
00:32:29,519 --> 00:32:33,794
Ok. Show me the actual folder structure
where these files are first.
545
00:32:38,150 --> 00:32:39,359
How many documents
did you say there were?
546
00:32:39,728 --> 00:32:40,987
Seven.
547
00:32:41,197 --> 00:32:41,866
Ok well, while you're working...
548
00:32:42,126 --> 00:32:43,794
Ok go ahead.
549
00:32:45,103 --> 00:32:46,252
How many documents are we talking about?
550
00:32:46,701 --> 00:32:47,391
Because in The Guardian,
551
00:32:47,650 --> 00:32:49,399
that Wikileaks, technical people
552
00:32:49,579 --> 00:32:51,167
set up a system
553
00:32:51,417 --> 00:32:53,754
so that they were available
for anybody to see
554
00:32:54,863 --> 00:32:57,710
and I just wonder if it's
possible to do the same thing.
555
00:32:58,939 --> 00:33:00,627
That would be the ideal end game.
556
00:33:02,715 --> 00:33:07,640
But because some of these documents
are legitimately classified
557
00:33:08,290 --> 00:33:11,606
in ways that could cause harm
to people and methods.
558
00:33:12,645 --> 00:33:15,802
I'm comfortable in my
technical ability to protect them.
559
00:33:16,082 --> 00:33:18,000
I mean you could literally
shoot me or torture me
560
00:33:18,400 --> 00:33:21,487
and I could not disclose
the password, if I wanted to.
561
00:33:23,195 --> 00:33:25,922
I have the sophistication to do that.
562
00:33:26,292 --> 00:33:29,179
There are some journalists
that I think could do that,
563
00:33:29,618 --> 00:33:31,527
but there are a number
of them that couldn't.
564
00:33:31,826 --> 00:33:33,704
But the question becomes,
565
00:33:33,944 --> 00:33:35,952
can an organization
566
00:33:36,262 --> 00:33:39,079
actually control that information
567
00:33:39,349 --> 00:33:40,647
in that manner
568
00:33:40,947 --> 00:33:43,724
without risking basically
an uncontrolled disclosure?
569
00:33:44,354 --> 00:33:45,972
But I do agree with that, honestly
570
00:33:46,601 --> 00:33:49,269
I don't want to be
the person making the decisions
571
00:33:49,608 --> 00:33:51,327
on what should be public
and what shouldn't.
572
00:33:51,646 --> 00:33:54,753
Which is why rather than
publishing these on my own,
573
00:33:55,383 --> 00:33:58,839
or putting them out openly,
I'm running them through journalists.
574
00:33:59,089 --> 00:34:01,576
So that my bias, and my things,
575
00:34:01,826 --> 00:34:04,354
because clearly
I have some strongly held views,
576
00:34:04,643 --> 00:34:06,611
are removed from that equation
577
00:34:07,171 --> 00:34:10,168
and the public interest is being
represented in the most responsible manner.
578
00:34:10,418 --> 00:34:11,247
Yeah.
579
00:34:12,136 --> 00:34:18,889
Actually given your sort of...
Geographic familiarity
580
00:34:19,249 --> 00:34:20,547
with the U.K and whatnot.
581
00:34:21,077 --> 00:34:28,989
I'd like to point out that
GCHQ has probably the most invasive...
582
00:34:29,279 --> 00:34:34,104
I know - network intercept
program anywhere in the world.
583
00:34:34,653 --> 00:34:38,569
It's called TEMPORA,
(spelling) T. E. M. P. O. R. A.
584
00:34:39,978 --> 00:34:42,656
And it's the world's first "full take",
they call it, and that means
585
00:34:42,925 --> 00:34:44,214
content in addition to metadata
586
00:34:44,384 --> 00:34:45,842
on everything.
587
00:34:48,320 --> 00:34:51,037
So this is what I'd like to do
just in term of scheduling
588
00:34:51,227 --> 00:34:54,793
if it's good with everybody else.
Are you feeling you're done?
589
00:34:55,023 --> 00:34:56,192
Yeah yeah I'm done.
590
00:34:57,381 --> 00:34:59,369
So, I'm anxious to go back,
591
00:34:59,648 --> 00:35:00,957
get those articles done
592
00:35:01,556 --> 00:35:03,105
and then there is a
bunch of documents
593
00:35:03,295 --> 00:35:06,072
that aren't about those first two or three
stories that I'd like to spend time with you...
594
00:35:06,292 --> 00:35:06,991
Sure yeah
595
00:35:07,191 --> 00:35:08,100
kinda going over.
596
00:35:08,849 --> 00:35:10,697
I'm not going anywhere.
597
00:35:10,927 --> 00:35:13,245
You're available?
You want to check your book first?
598
00:35:14,683 --> 00:35:16,032
Let me check my schedule.
599
00:35:16,272 --> 00:35:17,121
Is that good for you Laura?
You want to...
600
00:35:17,191 --> 00:35:19,349
- It's great.
- OK.
601
00:35:34,354 --> 00:35:36,282
Hello.
602
00:35:36,521 --> 00:35:37,810
Yes.
603
00:35:38,010 --> 00:35:43,624
My meal was great thank you very much.
604
00:35:43,964 --> 00:35:46,991
No I still have some left and I think
I'm gonna be eating it later
605
00:35:47,261 --> 00:35:50,977
so you can just leave me alone for now.
606
00:35:51,377 --> 00:35:54,483
Ok great thank you so
much, have a good one bye.
607
00:35:57,740 --> 00:35:59,978
Let's fix that real quick.
608
00:36:02,276 --> 00:36:03,914
So another fun thing I was telling
Laura about this:
609
00:36:04,304 --> 00:36:05,942
All these new VOIP phones
610
00:36:06,192 --> 00:36:07,551
they have little computers in them
611
00:36:07,710 --> 00:36:09,918
and you can hot mike these
over the network,
612
00:36:10,118 --> 00:36:12,226
all the time even when
the receiver's down so...
613
00:36:12,835 --> 00:36:13,874
as long as it's plugged in
614
00:36:14,134 --> 00:36:15,054
it can be listening on.
615
00:36:15,452 --> 00:36:18,030
And I haven't even considered
that earlier. But yeah...
616
00:36:18,220 --> 00:36:18,899
OK.
617
00:36:19,079 --> 00:36:20,837
There are so many ways...
This could be...
618
00:36:21,686 --> 00:36:23,175
Everything that's in here
is pretty much gonna be
619
00:36:23,494 --> 00:36:24,893
on the public record at some point.
620
00:36:25,083 --> 00:36:26,342
We should operate on that.
621
00:36:26,571 --> 00:36:28,230
Yeah. Yeah, I think...
I think we are...
622
00:36:28,829 --> 00:36:30,747
So, do you have your
air gapped machine with you?
623
00:36:30,817 --> 00:36:31,736
I do, I do.
624
00:36:31,926 --> 00:36:33,035
Let me pop that out.
625
00:36:36,631 --> 00:36:38,050
Do you have an
understanding or commitment on
626
00:36:38,340 --> 00:36:40,647
when you guys are gonna
to press for the first stories?
627
00:36:41,377 --> 00:36:43,544
It's very seven or eight
in the morning in London.
628
00:36:44,164 --> 00:36:45,193
Uh uh, OK.
629
00:36:47,211 --> 00:36:50,427
Oh, let's see here.
630
00:36:56,941 --> 00:36:58,809
Ok, hey look there's another one.
631
00:37:00,887 --> 00:37:06,232
Pro tip, let's not leave the same SD cards
in our laptops forever in the future.
632
00:37:11,317 --> 00:37:14,483
Did you know this was still
kicking around in your laptop?
633
00:37:15,043 --> 00:37:15,602
Yeah, I mean that was the... mmh...
634
00:37:15,822 --> 00:37:16,902
OK, just to make it sure.
635
00:37:17,890 --> 00:37:19,229
OK, yeah. This is it?
636
00:37:19,408 --> 00:37:19,908
Yeah.
637
00:37:20,028 --> 00:37:20,527
OK.
638
00:37:20,657 --> 00:37:21,218
Right there.
639
00:37:21,886 --> 00:37:24,443
Thanks. You will have a new one
who will look exactly identical
640
00:37:24,473 --> 00:37:26,791
but it's a different archive.
So you might want to take.
641
00:37:29,039 --> 00:37:32,345
Could you pass me my
magic mantle of power?
642
00:37:32,565 --> 00:37:34,004
Uh uh...
643
00:37:40,717 --> 00:37:43,464
Is that about possibility of overhead?
644
00:37:43,944 --> 00:37:49,878
Visual. Yes, Visual collection.
645
00:37:52,216 --> 00:37:53,624
I don't think at this point
there is anything in this regards
646
00:37:53,884 --> 00:37:55,622
that would shock us.
647
00:37:56,501 --> 00:37:58,749
We become pretty...
Ewen you once said before,
648
00:37:58,979 --> 00:38:01,247
he's like, he's like:
I'm never leaving my room,
649
00:38:01,426 --> 00:38:03,404
I'm never leaving anything
in my room again.
650
00:38:03,604 --> 00:38:04,453
And the single machine...
I was like
651
00:38:04,673 --> 00:38:09,189
you've been infected by the paranoia bug,
happens to all of us.
652
00:38:09,408 --> 00:38:12,166
He was like... I would never
leave a single of these device,
653
00:38:12,395 --> 00:38:14,343
and I would never leave my and again alone.
654
00:38:14,873 --> 00:38:16,391
My bag's getting heavier and heavier.
655
00:38:16,401 --> 00:38:17,191
Exactly.
656
00:38:22,575 --> 00:38:24,014
Alright, I'm gonna need you to enter
657
00:38:24,054 --> 00:38:28,299
your root password 'cause
I don't know what it is.
658
00:38:28,779 --> 00:38:31,546
If you wanna use this
you're more than welcome, so uh ..
659
00:38:31,886 --> 00:38:34,543
OK, looks like your root
password's not 4 caracters long anyway.
660
00:38:34,733 --> 00:38:37,850
It's usually a lot longer but that's
just like a one time only thing, right?
661
00:38:38,140 --> 00:38:39,748
So, it is uh...
662
00:38:39,988 --> 00:38:43,464
It had been a lot longer but ever since I
knew is that it was a one time only session,
663
00:38:43,614 --> 00:38:45,662
I've been making it shorter.
Is that not good?
664
00:38:46,042 --> 00:38:49,568
It's actually not. I was expressing this
with Laura either.
665
00:38:50,287 --> 00:38:52,206
The issue is because of the fact
it's got a hardware MAC address
666
00:38:52,465 --> 00:38:53,304
and things like that,
667
00:38:53,534 --> 00:38:57,990
and if people are able to identify
your machine and they're able to...
668
00:38:58,160 --> 00:39:00,168
This is the fact you're about
to break the most upsetting story?
669
00:39:00,417 --> 00:39:01,476
Yeah, that's true.
670
00:39:01,906 --> 00:39:03,185
So they might kinda prioritize.
671
00:39:03,474 --> 00:39:06,451
It's ten letters I type very quickly.
Actually it's ten letters but...
672
00:39:06,731 --> 00:39:11,516
So ten letters would be good if they
had to bruteforce the entire key space.
673
00:39:12,735 --> 00:39:15,912
That would still probably only take
a couple of days for NSA. Uh...
674
00:39:18,929 --> 00:39:23,304
That's a fire alarm, OK...
675
00:39:24,204 --> 00:39:28,639
hopefully this just sounds like
a 3 seconds test or is this...
676
00:39:28,859 --> 00:39:33,784
Do you wanna to call the desk and ask?
It's fine.
677
00:39:34,054 --> 00:39:36,732
Yeah, I don't think it's an issue,
but it's interesting that I just.
678
00:39:36,791 --> 00:39:37,890
Did that happen before?
679
00:39:38,090 --> 00:39:42,215
Maybe they got mad cause they couldn't
listen into us through the phone anymore.
680
00:39:43,065 --> 00:39:45,692
Has the fire alarm gone off before?
681
00:39:46,052 --> 00:39:54,044
No that's the first time that has happened. Let me...
so just in case they have like an alert.
682
00:39:58,100 --> 00:39:59,248
We probably...
683
00:39:59,448 --> 00:40:01,067
We might have to evacuate.
684
00:40:01,286 --> 00:40:03,694
Should we ignore that, I don't know?
685
00:40:03,984 --> 00:40:05,442
It's not continuous.
686
00:40:05,692 --> 00:40:09,948
It's not continuous.
No, I'm just saying if it continues...
687
00:40:13,904 --> 00:40:16,063
And then we come and
meet the guys down in the lobby.
688
00:40:16,571 --> 00:40:17,210
Yeah, alright.
689
00:40:17,460 --> 00:40:18,639
Yeah.
690
00:40:19,428 --> 00:40:25,312
Yeah let's, let's leave for now
when we'll have finished this up.
691
00:40:36,501 --> 00:40:39,079
Not that they're gonna answer 'cause
they probably have seven thousands calls.
692
00:40:39,288 --> 00:40:40,447
Yeah.
693
00:40:43,234 --> 00:40:45,942
Hi, we hear a loud buzzing
on the tenth flour.
694
00:40:46,211 --> 00:40:47,410
Can you tell us what that is?
695
00:40:49,848 --> 00:40:50,647
Ah, OK.
696
00:40:51,456 --> 00:40:52,245
OK, great.
697
00:40:52,425 --> 00:40:53,644
Thank you, bye.
698
00:40:55,172 --> 00:40:57,280
Fire alarm testing, maintenance.
699
00:40:57,530 --> 00:40:59,448
Yes. That's good,
that's what I wanted to hear.
700
00:41:01,386 --> 00:41:07,370
Nice of them to...
Nice of them to let us know.
701
00:41:09,059 --> 00:41:11,156
Uhm, I just wanna give you
kind of a quick tour, uh..
702
00:41:11,426 --> 00:41:13,784
When Laura was looking at this
she was kind of salivating...
703
00:41:13,934 --> 00:41:16,132
and couldn't stop like
actually reading these documents.
704
00:41:16,291 --> 00:41:18,209
Right, right.
So we'll try and restrain ourselves
705
00:41:18,219 --> 00:41:20,019
although I don't promise
that it will succeed.
706
00:41:20,088 --> 00:41:22,225
I just wanna kinda explain
a brief overview
707
00:41:22,925 --> 00:41:24,773
of what these are
and how they're organized.
708
00:41:25,103 --> 00:41:27,110
On the beginning of
document of interest,
709
00:41:27,420 --> 00:41:29,798
the primary purposes of the second archive
is to bring the focus over to.
710
00:41:30,048 --> 00:41:33,104
SSO as opposed to PRISM.
711
00:41:33,344 --> 00:41:36,671
This is in general.
SSO are the Special Source Operations.
712
00:41:37,230 --> 00:41:41,446
This is the world wide
passive collection on networks
713
00:41:41,906 --> 00:41:45,302
they're both domestic to the US
and international.
714
00:41:45,732 --> 00:41:47,840
There's a lot of
different ways they do it
715
00:41:48,089 --> 00:41:50,897
but, uh corporate partnerships
are one of the primary things,
716
00:41:51,096 --> 00:41:53,335
they do domestically
they also do this for multinationals
717
00:41:53,454 --> 00:41:55,812
that might be headquarted
in the US so they can kinda coerce
718
00:41:55,902 --> 00:41:57,920
or just pay into giving them access.
719
00:41:58,269 --> 00:42:01,396
And they also do bilaterally
with the assistance of certain governments.
720
00:42:02,016 --> 00:42:03,774
And that's based on the
premise that they go.
721
00:42:03,864 --> 00:42:07,160
"All right, we'll help you set the system
up if you give us all the data from it".
722
00:42:08,259 --> 00:42:12,755
Hum, there's... there's a lot more here
723
00:42:13,074 --> 00:42:15,172
than any one person
or probably one team could do.
724
00:42:15,362 --> 00:42:16,321
Right.
725
00:42:16,561 --> 00:42:18,449
Hum, XKEYSCORE Deep Dive.
726
00:42:18,859 --> 00:42:22,155
XKEYSCORE in general, and there's
a huge folder of documentation
727
00:42:22,355 --> 00:42:24,153
on XKEYSCORE and how it works,
728
00:42:24,963 --> 00:42:27,140
is the front-end system
that analysts use
729
00:42:29,568 --> 00:42:30,477
for querying that sort of ocean of raw
singing that I was telling you about.
730
00:42:30,877 --> 00:42:33,814
All that stuff where you can sort of
do the retroactive searches,
731
00:42:34,163 --> 00:42:35,962
live searches, get flagging, what not.
732
00:42:36,701 --> 00:42:39,078
XKEYSCORE is the front-end for that.
733
00:42:40,787 --> 00:42:44,613
I'm just gonna show you one slide here,
'cause Laura thought it was valuable
734
00:42:44,823 --> 00:42:49,218
on this talk on kinda
how these capabilities ramp up
735
00:42:49,428 --> 00:42:51,886
in sophistication over time.
736
00:42:52,355 --> 00:42:53,644
This is kinda nice.
737
00:42:53,964 --> 00:42:55,852
As of fiscal year 2011, they could monitor
738
00:42:56,241 --> 00:43:00,657
1 billion telephones and
internet sessions simultanously,
739
00:43:00,917 --> 00:43:02,485
per one of these devices,
740
00:43:02,955 --> 00:43:07,820
and they can collect at a rate
of 125 Gigabytes a second,
741
00:43:09,698 --> 00:43:10,897
which is a Terabit per second.
742
00:43:11,106 --> 00:43:11,816
That's for each one of these?
743
00:43:12,075 --> 00:43:13,554
That's for each one of these, yeah.
744
00:43:13,624 --> 00:43:16,041
How many TUMULT missions
would that be then?
745
00:43:16,241 --> 00:43:18,579
Part of this, back then
there were 20 sites,
746
00:43:18,949 --> 00:43:21,846
there's ten at DOD installations.
747
00:43:22,065 --> 00:43:24,813
But these are all outdated,
we've expanded pretty rapidly.
748
00:43:27,440 --> 00:43:29,548
But still 20 sites, that's
at least 20 billion.
749
00:43:29,808 --> 00:43:33,034
This all need to get out.
You know what I mean, it's like...
750
00:43:33,414 --> 00:43:39,088
Just in terms of understanding,
the capabilities, it's so opaque.
751
00:43:39,398 --> 00:43:41,836
It's not science fiction.
This stuff is happening right now.
752
00:43:41,896 --> 00:43:44,213
No, that's what I mean, it's like...
The magnitude of it,
753
00:43:44,843 --> 00:43:49,058
and like this a pretty inaccessible
technical document.
754
00:43:49,898 --> 00:43:52,755
But, even this it's really chilling,
you know what I mean?
755
00:43:53,164 --> 00:43:55,772
Yeah, I mean, we should be having debates
756
00:43:56,241 --> 00:43:57,969
about whether we want Government
757
00:43:58,319 --> 00:44:01,806
I mean this is massive and extraordinary.
It's amazing...
758
00:44:02,725 --> 00:44:04,884
Even though you know it...
Even though you know that...
759
00:44:04,933 --> 00:44:08,329
to see it like the
physical blueprints of it
760
00:44:08,689 --> 00:44:10,477
and sort of the technical
expressions of it,
761
00:44:11,396 --> 00:44:15,527
brutally hits home like...
in a super visceral way that is so needed.
762
00:44:21,386 --> 00:44:22,615
This is CNN Breaking news.
763
00:44:22,915 --> 00:44:26,451
An explosive new report is
re-igniting the concerns
764
00:44:26,741 --> 00:44:30,577
that your privacy is being violated
to protect America's "security".
765
00:44:30,996 --> 00:44:34,783
It reveals a court order giving
the National Security Agency
766
00:44:35,482 --> 00:44:38,189
blanket access to millions of
Verizon customer's records
767
00:44:38,469 --> 00:44:39,868
on a daily basis.
768
00:44:40,097 --> 00:44:42,125
Earlier I had the chance to
conduct the first TV interview
769
00:44:42,365 --> 00:44:44,663
with the reporter
who broke this story wide open,
770
00:44:45,102 --> 00:44:47,430
Glenn Greenwald, of The Guardian.
771
00:44:48,269 --> 00:44:49,428
Congratulations on the scoop!
772
00:44:49,718 --> 00:44:52,695
Explain for our viewers
why this is important?
773
00:44:54,313 --> 00:44:56,112
It's important because
people have understood
774
00:44:56,241 --> 00:44:58,779
that the law that this was done under,
which is the Patriot Act
775
00:44:59,008 --> 00:45:00,617
enacted in the wake of 9/11.
776
00:45:00,996 --> 00:45:04,473
Was a law that allowed the government
very broad powers to get records
777
00:45:04,703 --> 00:45:10,047
about people with a lower level of suspicion
and probable cause to traditional standards.
778
00:45:10,257 --> 00:45:12,496
So it has always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act,
779
00:45:12,585 --> 00:45:14,833
if the government had even any suspicion
that you where involved
780
00:45:14,982 --> 00:45:18,249
in a crime or terrorism, they could
get a lot of information about you.
781
00:45:18,579 --> 00:45:21,476
What this court order does
that makes it so striking
782
00:45:21,726 --> 00:45:26,391
is that it's not directed at any individuals
who they believe or have suspicion of
783
00:45:26,651 --> 00:45:28,918
committing crime or a part of
a terrorist organization.
784
00:45:29,238 --> 00:45:33,943
It's collecting the phone records of
every single customer of Verizon business
785
00:45:34,373 --> 00:45:37,531
and finding out every single call that
they've made internationally and locally.
786
00:45:37,929 --> 00:45:41,346
So it's indiscriminant and it's sweeping.
It's a Government program designed
787
00:45:41,636 --> 00:45:43,354
to collect information about all Americans
788
00:45:43,684 --> 00:45:46,001
not just people
where they believe there is reason to think
789
00:45:46,131 --> 00:45:47,251
they've done anything wrong.
790
00:46:49,228 --> 00:46:50,417
It's a tough situation.
791
00:46:50,667 --> 00:46:51,875
You know hearing that
792
00:46:52,085 --> 00:46:54,942
the person that you love
that you've spent the decade with
793
00:46:55,422 --> 00:46:57,090
may not be coming back.
794
00:47:01,935 --> 00:47:03,154
What did they ask her?
795
00:47:04,832 --> 00:47:06,780
Hum... When was the last time she saw me?
796
00:47:06,950 --> 00:47:08,249
Where am I?
797
00:47:08,559 --> 00:47:10,027
What am I doing?
798
00:47:10,267 --> 00:47:11,106
Hum.. you know.
799
00:47:11,306 --> 00:47:13,164
What does she know about my illness?
800
00:47:13,614 --> 00:47:14,683
Things like that.
801
00:47:17,909 --> 00:47:22,934
So yeah they're pretty solidly aware.
802
00:47:23,304 --> 00:47:25,112
Cause she's...
803
00:47:25,422 --> 00:47:28,269
I'm clearly not at home ill.
804
00:47:49,068 --> 00:47:51,016
Hello, hello.
805
00:47:52,415 --> 00:47:55,422
Hello, let me disconnect
from the Internet.
806
00:47:59,817 --> 00:48:01,466
So there is some news?
807
00:48:02,025 --> 00:48:03,594
Yes there was indeed some news.
808
00:48:05,222 --> 00:48:08,109
I have config today, I think,
maybe just a few hours ago.
809
00:48:08,619 --> 00:48:11,835
What kind of people does it...?
810
00:48:13,933 --> 00:48:19,218
An HR lady I'm assuming from NSA
as opposed to Booz Allen.
811
00:48:19,697 --> 00:48:21,246
Because she has was accompanied
by a police officer
812
00:48:21,536 --> 00:48:24,593
which mean the NSA police
and they're planning to break into my house
813
00:48:24,982 --> 00:48:27,430
which regular police don't do.
814
00:48:27,650 --> 00:48:29,128
Does she lives there?
815
00:48:29,398 --> 00:48:32,485
Yeah she lives there so I
told her to cooperate fully
816
00:48:33,054 --> 00:48:34,573
I can't find my phone just one second.
817
00:48:34,822 --> 00:48:36,081
And don't worry about herself.
818
00:48:36,351 --> 00:48:38,479
You know what I gonna do,
I'll just take out the stuff I want to use.
819
00:48:38,728 --> 00:48:39,707
OK
820
00:48:40,447 --> 00:48:43,064
OK well look I mean this
is not a surprise at all.
821
00:48:43,314 --> 00:48:46,351
Not yeah I know I planned for it but
it's just you know when it's impacting
822
00:48:46,601 --> 00:48:48,668
and when they're talking to you
it's a little bit different.
823
00:48:48,938 --> 00:48:49,618
Absolutely.
824
00:48:51,626 --> 00:48:54,902
But it's possible that they just noticed
that you're missing
825
00:48:55,092 --> 00:48:56,412
I guess it's not really possible.
826
00:48:56,611 --> 00:49:01,516
It is but yeah they're I mean.
827
00:49:04,503 --> 00:49:06,591
Hum... let me just get rid of this.
828
00:49:08,589 --> 00:49:12,555
So I obviously was focused on other things
than appearance this morning.
829
00:49:14,752 --> 00:49:17,669
How was she? How does she reacted?
Was she relatively calm about it?
830
00:49:17,849 --> 00:49:19,048
She's relatively calm.
831
00:49:19,338 --> 00:49:21,177
Does she know anything
about what you're doing?
832
00:49:21,206 --> 00:49:23,244
She has, she has no idea
833
00:49:23,703 --> 00:49:27,280
and that's I mean I feel badly about that
834
00:49:27,510 --> 00:49:29,349
but that's the only way
I could think of where
835
00:49:29,647 --> 00:49:31,765
like she can't be in trouble.
836
00:49:31,965 --> 00:49:33,623
Did you just basically do a
"I have to go somewhere for reasons
837
00:49:33,893 --> 00:49:35,651
"that I can't tell you
about" kind of thing?
838
00:49:35,701 --> 00:49:37,859
I just disappeared
when she was on vacation
839
00:49:38,269 --> 00:49:40,487
and I left a note saying.
840
00:49:40,676 --> 00:49:42,734
"Hey I'm gonna be away
for a while for work"
841
00:49:42,954 --> 00:49:44,972
which isn't unusual for me in my business.
842
00:49:45,472 --> 00:49:46,031
Right
843
00:49:46,281 --> 00:49:46,850
you know so.
844
00:49:47,090 --> 00:49:49,328
OK so let me ask a couple
things just quickly.
845
00:49:49,548 --> 00:49:52,754
Are they gonna be able to go into your
stuff and figure out what you took?
846
00:49:55,641 --> 00:50:02,155
Hum in some kind of some sort of like
peripheral sense but not necessarily.
847
00:50:02,664 --> 00:50:06,301
Yes because I cast such a wide net
848
00:50:06,541 --> 00:50:08,588
I they do that the only thing they're gonna
do is they're gonna have a heart attack
849
00:50:08,808 --> 00:50:10,646
because they're gonna go
"He had access to everything".
850
00:50:10,906 --> 00:50:11,406
Yeah
851
00:50:11,625 --> 00:50:14,812
and they not gonna know what
specifically has been done.
852
00:50:15,092 --> 00:50:17,919
I think they're gonna start to
actually feel a little better
853
00:50:18,219 --> 00:50:21,745
although they're not gonna be
wild about this in any case.
854
00:50:22,205 --> 00:50:25,212
When they see that the stories
are kind of cleaving to a trend
855
00:50:25,611 --> 00:50:26,532
you know it's not like.
856
00:50:26,670 --> 00:50:28,748
"Here is the list of everybody
who works everywhere."
857
00:50:28,838 --> 00:50:29,627
Right.
858
00:50:29,907 --> 00:50:32,535
I also think you know there're gonna be
paranoid in the extreme
859
00:50:32,894 --> 00:50:34,682
and assuming all kind of
worst case scenarios
860
00:50:36,231 --> 00:50:37,669
which is gonna you know I think
861
00:50:37,969 --> 00:50:42,205
make them react in ways that probably
aren't like gonna be particularly
862
00:50:42,574 --> 00:50:44,533
rational on their part
863
00:50:45,611 --> 00:50:48,279
but at the same time there's...
I do think they're limited
864
00:50:48,479 --> 00:50:49,617
for the moment.
865
00:50:49,837 --> 00:50:54,083
I agree and I mean,
I had kind of time to set a stage where
866
00:50:54,413 --> 00:50:56,770
we all enjoy at least a minimum
level of protection you know
867
00:50:56,790 --> 00:50:59,348
no matter who we are who's involved in this
you know you're either a journalist.
868
00:50:59,597 --> 00:51:00,177
Right
869
00:51:00,367 --> 00:51:01,805
or you're either out of jurisdiction
870
00:51:01,895 --> 00:51:04,533
so we have some time to play this
before they can really get nasty.
871
00:51:04,572 --> 00:51:06,860
I think it's over you know the weeks
when they have times to get lawyers,
872
00:51:07,300 --> 00:51:08,548
really sort of go.
873
00:51:08,718 --> 00:51:12,415
"This is a special situation how can
we interpret this to our advantage?"
874
00:51:12,944 --> 00:51:14,333
like we seen them do this
all the time you know
875
00:51:14,752 --> 00:51:17,100
whether it's drones or wiretapping
or whatever they'll go.
876
00:51:17,529 --> 00:51:20,576
Well according to this law
from the 1840's you know.
877
00:51:20,926 --> 00:51:22,025
Yeah yeah of course
878
00:51:22,225 --> 00:51:22,954
we can apply x, y to the Authority.
879
00:51:23,234 --> 00:51:25,152
But that takes time and
that takes agreement.
880
00:51:25,382 --> 00:51:27,190
Yeah and also you know I mean I think
881
00:51:27,490 --> 00:51:29,897
the more public we are out there
to like as journalists
882
00:51:30,816 --> 00:51:33,164
and the more protection
it's gonna give as well.
883
00:51:34,273 --> 00:51:37,779
Have you started to give thoughts
to when you're ready to come forward?
884
00:51:38,349 --> 00:51:44,023
I'm ready whenever huh honestly
I think there is sort of an agreement
885
00:51:44,343 --> 00:51:46,690
that it's not going to bias
the reporting process.
886
00:51:46,990 --> 00:51:47,899
That's my primary concern at this point.
887
00:51:48,139 --> 00:51:51,675
I don't want to get myself into the issue
before it's gonna happen anyway
888
00:51:52,245 --> 00:51:54,692
and where it takes away
for the stories that are getting out.
889
00:52:33,583 --> 00:52:35,576
We're talking about tens of millions
of Americans
890
00:52:37,360 --> 00:52:38,919
who weren't suspected of doing anything
891
00:52:39,178 --> 00:52:40,726
who were surveilled in this way.
892
00:52:41,046 --> 00:52:43,523
Thoughts for a moment, I want to
continue this conversation,
893
00:52:43,563 --> 00:52:45,282
these are really important sensitive issues
894
00:52:45,621 --> 00:52:48,698
and the public out there has the right
to know what's going on... Stand by...
895
00:52:48,998 --> 00:52:51,545
This is CNN breaking news.
896
00:52:52,095 --> 00:52:56,341
Another explosive article has just appeared
this time in the Washington Post
897
00:52:56,850 --> 00:53:01,895
it's breaking news and it reveals another broad
and secret US government surveillance program.
898
00:53:02,375 --> 00:53:07,160
The Washington Post and The Guardian in
London reporting that the NSA and the FBI
899
00:53:07,549 --> 00:53:12,574
are tapping directly into the central
servers of nine leading Internet companies
900
00:53:13,014 --> 00:53:18,618
including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google,
Facebook, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple.
901
00:53:18,918 --> 00:53:23,324
Reports says they're extracting audio,
video, photographs, e-mails, documents
902
00:53:23,863 --> 00:53:29,477
and connection logs that enable analysts to track
a person's movements and context over time.
903
00:53:31,056 --> 00:53:33,883
Let's discuss this latest revelation
that coming out fast,
904
00:53:34,273 --> 00:53:36,660
Bill Binney, the formal official of the NSA
905
00:53:36,900 --> 00:53:39,787
who quit back in 2001, you were angry about
what was going on
906
00:53:40,187 --> 00:53:42,026
you've been known as
a whistleblower right now.
907
00:53:42,195 --> 00:53:44,512
- Bill, what do you think about
this Washington Post story?
908
00:53:44,542 --> 00:53:47,740
- Well, I assume it's just the continuation
of what they've been doing all along.
909
00:53:47,809 --> 00:53:48,848
- So you're not surprised?
910
00:53:49,108 --> 00:53:49,727
- No.
911
00:53:49,887 --> 00:53:51,455
- Do you have any idea who's
leaking this information?
912
00:53:51,725 --> 00:53:53,553
- I don't know who leaked this,
913
00:53:53,863 --> 00:53:56,920
I have no doubt that the administration
will launch an investigation
914
00:53:57,919 --> 00:54:01,955
not into who approved these programs
but into who leaked the information.
915
00:54:02,694 --> 00:54:06,001
I'm not shocked they come to
denying it, I don't assume that...
916
00:54:06,231 --> 00:54:07,220
Do you believe it?
917
00:54:07,609 --> 00:54:10,566
- There're maybe some technical basis
on which they can say that we are not
918
00:54:10,916 --> 00:54:15,032
actively collaborating or they don't have
what we consider in our definition
919
00:54:15,332 --> 00:54:18,438
to be direct access to our servers
but what I do know is that I've talked to
920
00:54:18,938 --> 00:54:20,546
more that one person
921
00:54:20,896 --> 00:54:25,441
who has sat at a desk at a web portal
and typed out commands
922
00:54:25,821 --> 00:54:28,348
and reached into those servers
from a distance.
923
00:54:29,158 --> 00:54:31,116
So, whatever they want to call that,
that's what's happening.
924
00:54:31,545 --> 00:54:35,501
Hold on, what are we calling the single biggest
infringement on American civil liberties
925
00:54:35,911 --> 00:54:37,469
probably of all time, isn't it?
926
00:54:38,029 --> 00:54:42,225
- ...we already have the New York Times now today saying
that the Administration has lost all credibility.
927
00:54:42,734 --> 00:54:44,113
- The New York Times slammed
President Obama for this
928
00:54:44,512 --> 00:54:45,711
and frankly I was used to that
929
00:54:45,821 --> 00:54:48,968
the New York Times used to slam George Bush for
protecting the country for the steps he took.
930
00:54:49,367 --> 00:54:50,727
I don't want us to drop our guard.
931
00:54:51,026 --> 00:54:53,803
I don't want us to be struck
again as we saw in Boston,
932
00:54:54,053 --> 00:54:55,062
I understand,
933
00:54:55,391 --> 00:54:59,387
people are willing to sacrifice their civil liberties,
people are sheltered inside which is enough...
934
00:54:59,447 --> 00:55:00,746
How can you believe
in freedom, do you see?
935
00:55:01,016 --> 00:55:04,053
I mean try and play the devil's advocate
for me, when you have secret courts,
936
00:55:04,203 --> 00:55:08,558
secret operations like PRISM,
secret investigations which go into
937
00:55:08,948 --> 00:55:12,974
every spit and cough of every American's lives
without any Member of the American public
938
00:55:13,363 --> 00:55:15,082
knowing about it. That's not freedom is it?
939
00:55:15,182 --> 00:55:19,228
- In 2008, they eliminated the
warrant requirement for all conversations
940
00:55:19,567 --> 00:55:22,215
except ones that takes place
by and among Americans
941
00:55:22,624 --> 00:55:24,332
exclusively on America's soil.
942
00:55:24,652 --> 00:55:27,649
So they don't need warrants now for people
who are foreigners
943
00:55:28,049 --> 00:55:30,996
outside of the US but they also don't need
warrants for Americans
944
00:55:31,375 --> 00:55:33,493
who are in the United States
communicating with people
945
00:55:33,833 --> 00:55:35,911
reasonably believed to be
outside of the US.
946
00:55:36,350 --> 00:55:40,966
So again, the fact that there are no checks, no
oversight about who's looking over the NSA's shoulder,
947
00:55:41,285 --> 00:55:43,933
means that they can take whatever they want
and the fact that it's all behind a wall
948
00:55:44,203 --> 00:55:47,339
of secrecy and they threaten people
who want to expose it
949
00:55:47,679 --> 00:55:50,746
means that whatever they're doing
even violating the law
950
00:55:51,126 --> 00:55:53,673
is something we're unlikely to know
until we start having real investigations
951
00:55:54,103 --> 00:55:57,609
and real transparency into
what it is the government is doing.
952
00:55:57,979 --> 00:56:01,505
Glenn Greenwald, congratulations again
on exposing what is a true scandal,
953
00:56:01,785 --> 00:56:02,964
I appreciate you joining me.
954
00:56:51,635 --> 00:56:57,040
Hey I just heard from Lindsay and huh...
she's still alive, which is good and free.
955
00:56:58,438 --> 00:57:01,965
My rent checks apparently are no longer
getting through to my landlord
956
00:57:02,474 --> 00:57:06,470
so they said if we don't pay them
in five days we will be evicted,
957
00:57:07,269 --> 00:57:11,026
which is strange because I got a system
set up that automatically pays them.
958
00:57:13,323 --> 00:57:16,340
So there is that apparently there is
construction trucks all over the street
959
00:57:20,057 --> 00:57:26,001
of my house, so that's, I wonder
what they're looking for.
960
00:58:07,939 --> 00:58:12,884
It is... It is an unusual feeling
that's kind of hard to...
961
00:58:14,992 --> 00:58:18,458
hard to like, describe or convey in words
but not knowing what's gonna happen
962
00:58:19,157 --> 00:58:21,735
in the next days, the next hour
or the next week
963
00:58:23,044 --> 00:58:26,001
it's scary but at the same time
it's liberating, you know,
964
00:58:27,749 --> 00:58:29,867
the planning comes a lot easier
because you don't have
965
00:58:29,887 --> 00:58:32,944
that many variables to take into plate,
you can only act, and then act again.
966
00:58:34,362 --> 00:58:36,480
Now all these phone calls
are being recorded digitally
967
00:58:36,960 --> 00:58:39,347
not for content but
for origin and destination
968
00:58:39,727 --> 00:58:43,493
now word the government is going right into the
servers of these large Internet companies.
969
00:58:44,282 --> 00:58:48,248
How does the government politically speaking
make the argument that this is essential
970
00:58:48,658 --> 00:58:51,085
to National Security and not
a dramatic overreach
971
00:58:51,815 --> 00:58:54,033
in terms of personal privacy?
972
00:58:54,312 --> 00:58:57,329
It's difficult Matt, because
as Peter was pointing out, overnight
973
00:58:58,378 --> 00:59:01,125
we had an extraordinary late night
close to midnight announcement
974
00:59:01,395 --> 00:59:03,993
and a declassification from the
Director of National Intelligence.
975
00:59:04,392 --> 00:59:08,039
They are scrambling, the Administration is
already supported strongly by leaders
976
00:59:08,428 --> 00:59:10,406
in both parties from the
Intelligence Committees.
977
00:59:10,896 --> 00:59:16,260
GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia at the top
secret you know, super classified level
978
00:59:17,309 --> 00:59:19,907
where anybody working intelligence
can work on anything they want.
979
00:59:20,566 --> 00:59:25,031
That's what this is, I'm giving it to you, you can make
the decision on that what's appropriate what's not.
980
00:59:25,341 --> 00:59:27,179
Hum it's gonna be documents of,
you know, different types,
981
00:59:27,549 --> 00:59:30,366
pictures and Power Points and Word documents.
Stuff like that...
982
00:59:30,916 --> 00:59:32,164
Sorry can I take that seat?
983
00:59:32,414 --> 00:59:33,373
Yeah.
984
00:59:35,781 --> 00:59:39,477
Sorry, I'm sorry I've got used to repeat,
so in these documents, they will show...
985
00:59:39,707 --> 00:59:41,405
Yeah there will be
a couple more documents on that,
986
00:59:41,705 --> 00:59:44,602
that's only one part though,
like it talks about Tempora
987
00:59:44,862 --> 00:59:47,389
and a little more thing
that's the wiki article itself.
988
00:59:48,438 --> 00:59:54,352
It was also talking about a self-developed tool
called UDAQ U.D.A.Q. it's their search tool
989
00:59:54,592 --> 00:59:56,940
for all the stuff they collect
was what it looked like.
990
00:59:57,239 --> 00:59:57,739
Yeah.
991
00:59:58,078 --> 01:00:00,636
Hum it's gonna be projects,
it's gonna be troubleshooting pages
992
01:00:00,846 --> 01:00:02,174
for a particular tool.
993
01:00:02,424 --> 01:00:03,103
Thanks.
994
01:00:03,793 --> 01:00:07,589
And, the next step,
when do you think you'll go public?
995
01:00:08,268 --> 01:00:12,934
Arh... I think it's pretty soon, I mean, with
the reaction, this escalated more quickly,
996
01:00:13,253 --> 01:00:16,011
I think pretty much as soon as they
start trying to make this about me
997
01:00:16,350 --> 01:00:17,709
which should be any day now.
998
01:00:17,929 --> 01:00:18,558
Yeah.
999
01:00:19,167 --> 01:00:24,232
Hum I'll come out just to go hey,
you know, this is not a question of
1000
01:00:24,712 --> 01:00:27,569
somebody skulking around in the shadows.
These are public issues,
1001
01:00:27,959 --> 01:00:30,746
these are not my issues
you know these are everybody's issues,
1002
01:00:31,695 --> 01:00:34,712
I'm not afraid of you, you know,
you're not gonna bully me in the silence
1003
01:00:34,981 --> 01:00:36,740
like you've done to everybody else
1004
01:00:37,329 --> 01:00:38,967
and if no body else is gonna do it I will
1005
01:00:39,966 --> 01:00:42,054
and hopefully when I'm gone
whatever you do to me,
1006
01:00:42,444 --> 01:00:44,603
there will be somebody else
who will do the same thing.
1007
01:00:45,361 --> 01:00:47,919
It will be the sort of Internet principle
you know, of the Hydra:
1008
01:00:48,848 --> 01:00:51,405
You can stop one person
but there is gonna be seven more of us.
1009
01:00:51,675 --> 01:00:52,684
Yeah.
1010
01:00:55,741 --> 01:00:57,499
Are you getting more nervous?
1011
01:01:00,596 --> 01:01:06,210
I mean... no. I think the way
I look at stress... particularly because
1012
01:01:07,429 --> 01:01:13,023
I sort of knew this was coming... because
I sort of volunteered to walk into it.
1013
01:01:16,810 --> 01:01:20,656
I'm already sort of familiar with the idea.
1014
01:01:20,846 --> 01:01:21,924
I'm not worried about it.
1015
01:01:22,244 --> 01:01:24,192
When somebody like
busts in the door suddenly
1016
01:01:24,392 --> 01:01:25,111
I'll get nervous and it'll affect me
but until they do, you know...
1017
01:01:26,020 --> 01:01:26,540
Yeah, yeah.
1018
01:01:26,670 --> 01:01:29,137
But until they do umm... you know.
1019
01:01:29,347 --> 01:01:32,344
I'm eating a little less
that's the only difference I think.
1020
01:01:41,165 --> 01:01:43,804
Let's talk about the issue with
when we're gonna say who you are.
1021
01:01:43,843 --> 01:01:44,392
Yeah.
1022
01:01:44,672 --> 01:01:49,407
This is, you know, you have to talk me through
this because I have a big worry about this.
1023
01:01:49,597 --> 01:01:50,416
OK tell me.
1024
01:01:50,935 --> 01:01:53,992
Which is that...
if we come out and
1025
01:01:55,171 --> 01:01:59,597
I know that you believe
that your detection is inevitable
1026
01:01:59,956 --> 01:02:01,715
and that it's inevitable imminently.
1027
01:02:02,544 --> 01:02:04,871
There is, you know, in the New York Times
today Charlie Savage the fascinating.
1028
01:02:05,621 --> 01:02:08,118
Sherlock Holmes of political
reporting deduced that
1029
01:02:09,297 --> 01:02:10,945
the fact that there has been
these leaks in succession
1030
01:02:11,165 --> 01:02:13,573
probably means that there's some one person
that decided to leak...
1031
01:02:13,803 --> 01:02:16,160
Somebody else quoted you saying
it was one of your readers.
1032
01:02:16,240 --> 01:02:16,740
Yeah.
1033
01:02:17,279 --> 01:02:18,348
And somebody else is putting on things.
1034
01:02:18,628 --> 01:02:22,554
Yeah so you know, I mean it's fine
I want people to, I wanted to be like.
1035
01:02:22,923 --> 01:02:23,423
Yeah.
1036
01:02:23,643 --> 01:02:26,330
You know like this is a person,
I want to start introducing the concept of
1037
01:02:26,550 --> 01:02:29,956
this is a person who has a particular set
of political objectives
1038
01:02:30,316 --> 01:02:32,354
about informing the world about
what's taking place.
1039
01:02:32,654 --> 01:02:35,920
Like you know,
I'm keeping it all anonymous totally
1040
01:02:36,140 --> 01:02:39,707
but I want to start introducing you
in that kind of incremental way.
1041
01:02:40,865 --> 01:02:42,044
But here's the thing.
1042
01:02:42,514 --> 01:02:45,221
What I'm concerned about it
that if come out and say
1043
01:02:45,501 --> 01:02:47,619
here's who this is, here's what he did
the whole thing
1044
01:02:47,819 --> 01:02:48,658
that we talked about.
1045
01:02:49,657 --> 01:02:51,095
Then we're gonna basically be doing
the government's work for them
1046
01:02:51,675 --> 01:02:54,492
and we're gonna basically be handing them
you know a confession
1047
01:02:56,520 --> 01:02:58,518
and helping them identify who find it.
1048
01:02:59,037 --> 01:03:01,805
I mean maybe you're right,
maybe they'll find out quickly
1049
01:03:02,054 --> 01:03:04,812
and maybe they'll know but is there
any possible idea that they won't?
1050
01:03:04,971 --> 01:03:08,078
Are we kind of giving them stuff
that we don't...? Or...
1051
01:03:09,377 --> 01:03:11,435
It's possible that they already know
but they don't want to reveal
1052
01:03:11,785 --> 01:03:13,643
it because they don't know...
1053
01:03:13,922 --> 01:03:15,151
Or that they don't know
and we're gonna be telling them like
1054
01:03:15,201 --> 01:03:18,598
is it a possibility that they're gonna
need like 23 months or uncertainty
1055
01:03:18,907 --> 01:03:20,865
and we're gonna be
solving their problem for them?
1056
01:03:21,015 --> 01:03:24,282
Or let me just say the or part
maybe it doesn't matter to you,
1057
01:03:24,542 --> 01:03:27,259
maybe you want it, maybe, I mean,
1058
01:03:27,609 --> 01:03:29,317
you're not coming out because
1059
01:03:29,557 --> 01:03:31,415
you think inevitably
they're gonna catch you
1060
01:03:31,894 --> 01:03:33,014
and you want to do it first,
1061
01:03:33,593 --> 01:03:35,341
you're coming out because
you want to fucking come out and...
1062
01:03:35,701 --> 01:03:37,589
Oh there is that,
I mean that's the thing,
1063
01:03:38,058 --> 01:03:40,016
I don't want to hide on this
and skulk around,
1064
01:03:40,486 --> 01:03:41,685
I don't think I should have to
1065
01:03:42,484 --> 01:03:44,602
obviously there is circumstances
that are saying that.
1066
01:03:44,851 --> 01:03:46,989
I think it is powerful
to come out and be like
1067
01:03:47,419 --> 01:03:50,915
look I'm not afraid and I don't think
other people should either,
1068
01:03:51,165 --> 01:03:53,952
you know, I was sitting
in the office right next to you last week,
1069
01:03:54,292 --> 01:03:56,759
we all have a stake in this,
this is our country
1070
01:03:57,669 --> 01:04:00,885
and the balance of power
between the citizenry and the government
1071
01:04:01,715 --> 01:04:03,802
is becoming that
of the ruling and the ruled
1072
01:04:04,122 --> 01:04:07,739
as opposed to actually, you know,
the elected and the electorate.
1073
01:04:08,228 --> 01:04:11,095
OK so that's what I need to hear,
that this is not about...
1074
01:04:12,154 --> 01:04:15,361
But I do want to say,
I don't think there is a case
1075
01:04:15,661 --> 01:04:18,708
that I'm not gonna be discovered,
in the fullness of time.
1076
01:04:19,197 --> 01:04:20,346
It's just a question of time for me.
1077
01:04:20,606 --> 01:04:22,064
You're right, it could take them
a long time, I don't think it will
1078
01:04:23,223 --> 01:04:26,700
but I didn't try to hide the footprint
because again I intended to come forward.
1079
01:04:27,239 --> 01:04:31,455
OK I'm gonna post this morning
just a general defense of whistleblowers
1080
01:04:31,774 --> 01:04:34,891
and you in particular
without saying anything about you.
1081
01:04:35,231 --> 01:04:36,240
I'm gonna go post
that right when I get back
1082
01:04:36,939 --> 01:04:39,007
and I'm also doing like a big fuck you
to all the people who keep like talking
1083
01:04:39,397 --> 01:04:42,304
about investigations like that.
I want that to be like...
1084
01:04:43,293 --> 01:04:46,000
the fearlessness and the fuck you to like
the bullying tactics,
1085
01:04:47,699 --> 01:04:50,296
has go to be completely preventing
every thing we do.
1086
01:04:50,566 --> 01:04:53,163
I think that's brilliant.
I mean your principles on this I love,
1087
01:04:53,453 --> 01:04:57,828
I can't support them enough because it is,
it's inverting the model
1088
01:04:58,248 --> 01:05:00,606
of the government has laid out
where people where trying to,
1089
01:05:00,815 --> 01:05:03,373
you know, say the truth, skulk around,
and then hide in the dark,
1090
01:05:03,633 --> 01:05:06,680
and then quote anonymously.
I say yes, fuck that, let's just...
1091
01:05:07,309 --> 01:05:10,715
OK, so here is the plan then,
I mean, and this is a thing, it's like
1092
01:05:11,075 --> 01:05:14,252
once, I think we all just felt the fact
that this is the right way to do it.
1093
01:05:15,131 --> 01:05:17,808
You feel the power of your choice,
you know what I mean,
1094
01:05:18,168 --> 01:05:20,556
it's like I want that power
to be felt in the world.
1095
01:05:20,755 --> 01:05:21,355
OK
1096
01:05:22,204 --> 01:05:24,771
And it is the...
it's the ultimate standing up to them
1097
01:05:25,031 --> 01:05:28,158
right like I'm not gonna fucking hide
even for one second,
1098
01:05:29,337 --> 01:05:30,855
I'm gonna get right in your face,
1099
01:05:31,155 --> 01:05:33,593
you don't have to investigate,
there's nothing to investigate,
1100
01:05:33,782 --> 01:05:35,161
here I am!
1101
01:05:35,481 --> 01:05:38,807
You know, and I think that
is just incredibly powerful,
1102
01:05:39,567 --> 01:05:40,926
and then the question just becomes
1103
01:05:41,455 --> 01:05:43,693
how do we do this in the right,
you know the perfect way,
1104
01:05:43,812 --> 01:05:46,570
that's my burden and
that's what I'm gonna spend...
1105
01:05:47,029 --> 01:05:48,947
So today it's gonna be
this story in the morning,
1106
01:05:49,187 --> 01:05:51,125
assuming that
it doesn't change in The Guardian,
1107
01:05:51,365 --> 01:05:52,474
it's gonna be this story in the morning,
1108
01:05:52,634 --> 01:05:55,561
just to keep the mental going,
just to keep like the disclosures coming.
1109
01:05:55,980 --> 01:05:58,667
A big one at night, now it's becoming like.
1110
01:05:59,017 --> 01:06:01,465
"OK, this is a major leak"
1111
01:06:01,704 --> 01:06:04,542
and after today when we post
the two stuff things that we're gonna post.
1112
01:06:04,781 --> 01:06:09,117
It's gonna be "what the fuck
is this leak and who did it?"
1113
01:06:09,387 --> 01:06:10,456
I guarantee you.
1114
01:06:20,246 --> 01:06:22,623
I just want to make sure,
move over slightly...
1115
01:06:22,873 --> 01:06:24,672
Do you want me to move
a little move over...
1116
01:06:24,701 --> 01:06:25,980
I just wanna move... all right.
1117
01:06:27,169 --> 01:06:30,076
OK
1118
01:06:30,306 --> 01:06:30,935
We are ready.
1119
01:06:31,155 --> 01:06:32,475
So let's us begin with some basic
1120
01:06:32,554 --> 01:06:33,752
background information like
1121
01:06:34,212 --> 01:06:35,051
just state your name,
1122
01:06:35,620 --> 01:06:37,598
what position you held
in intelligence community
1123
01:06:37,868 --> 01:06:39,896
and how long you worked
within that community.
1124
01:06:41,545 --> 01:06:44,811
OK, uh... just some...
how are we going, like,
1125
01:06:45,291 --> 01:06:46,160
in depth or
are we going like in general,
1126
01:06:46,440 --> 01:06:48,218
like I'm currently
an infrastructure analyst, you know,
1127
01:06:48,518 --> 01:06:50,875
Booz Allen Hamilton,
not going through my whole back story.
1128
01:06:51,315 --> 01:06:51,814
Yes.
1129
01:06:51,934 --> 01:06:52,514
OK,
1130
01:06:52,733 --> 01:06:53,813
Just like summary kind of.
1131
01:06:53,972 --> 01:06:54,601
OK
1132
01:06:54,851 --> 01:06:57,718
My Name is Ed Snowden,
I'm 29 years old,
1133
01:06:58,627 --> 01:07:01,744
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton
as an infrastructure analyst
1134
01:07:01,964 --> 01:07:04,222
for NSA in Hawaii.
1135
01:07:05,590 --> 01:07:08,148
And what are some of the positions
that you held previously
1136
01:07:08,548 --> 01:07:09,926
within the intelligence community?
1137
01:07:10,136 --> 01:07:13,533
I've been a system engineer,
system administrator, uh...
1138
01:07:14,931 --> 01:07:19,896
senior advisor, uh...
for the, Central Intelligence Agency,
1139
01:07:20,206 --> 01:07:23,772
solutions consultant and a
telecommunications information
1140
01:07:23,982 --> 01:07:25,730
systems officer.
1141
01:07:26,729 --> 01:07:29,027
And what kind of clearances have...
have you held,
1142
01:07:29,207 --> 01:07:30,426
what kinda classification?
1143
01:07:31,355 --> 01:07:33,413
Uh... Top secret,
1144
01:07:36,649 --> 01:07:39,726
So, people in my levels of access
for systems administration
1145
01:07:40,366 --> 01:07:44,681
or as a infrastructure analyst
typically have higher accesses
1146
01:07:45,331 --> 01:07:48,228
than an NSA employee would normally have.
1147
01:07:48,677 --> 01:07:51,495
Normal NSA employees have a
combination of clearances called.
1148
01:07:52,294 --> 01:07:55,700
TS SI TK and Gamma.
1149
01:07:57,179 --> 01:08:00,995
Uh, that's a Top Secret Signals
Intelligence Talent Keyhole
1150
01:08:01,415 --> 01:08:02,294
and Gamma.
1151
01:08:02,573 --> 01:08:06,190
And they all relate to certain things
that are sort of core to the NSA mission.
1152
01:08:07,219 --> 01:08:10,146
As a systems administrator
you get a special clearance
1153
01:08:10,476 --> 01:08:12,853
called PrivAcc
for Privileged Access,
1154
01:08:13,233 --> 01:08:17,039
which allows you to be exposed
to informations of any classification
1155
01:08:17,329 --> 01:08:20,156
regardless of what
your position actually needs.
1156
01:08:37,129 --> 01:08:37,628
Monday.
1157
01:08:42,983 --> 01:08:45,660
June 10, 2013.
1158
01:08:55,091 --> 01:08:56,939
Just before we go,
a remind of our top story,
1159
01:08:57,179 --> 01:09:00,296
and that's the full map,
CIA typically worked at Edward Snowden
1160
01:09:00,655 --> 01:09:05,910
says he's responsible for leaking information
that US authorities have been monitoring
1161
01:09:06,310 --> 01:09:08,298
phone and Internet data.
1162
01:09:08,887 --> 01:09:11,544
The US justice deparment confirmed
it is the first stages
1163
01:09:12,174 --> 01:09:14,052
of a criminal investigation.
1164
01:09:14,292 --> 01:09:16,599
Leave it long or got it shorter,
what do you think?
1165
01:09:16,959 --> 01:09:19,806
As far as the video the people saw.
Am I less identifiable now?
1166
01:09:20,066 --> 01:09:20,585
Lose it?
1167
01:09:20,785 --> 01:09:24,272
Lose it? Cause I can't go all the way
down, it's still gonna be stubble.
1168
01:09:24,511 --> 01:09:26,759
I don't have the blade for closer.
1169
01:09:29,037 --> 01:09:31,554
Will you be talking
to any other media about this story today?
1170
01:09:32,254 --> 01:09:32,953
I am.
1171
01:09:34,302 --> 01:09:35,740
Uh, will you be coming to our office
1172
01:09:35,770 --> 01:09:38,318
about where is Snowden
now, what his plans are?
1173
01:09:39,217 --> 01:09:41,524
No, I won't talk about that,
so unless you have any other questions...
1174
01:09:41,764 --> 01:09:42,264
OK
1175
01:09:42,643 --> 01:09:45,760
What are you plans please?
Are you staying in Hong Kong
1176
01:09:45,960 --> 01:09:46,799
for a the time being?
1177
01:09:47,019 --> 01:09:47,858
For a little while.
1178
01:09:47,978 --> 01:09:50,585
And do you have any hopes
to write more about this story
1179
01:09:50,835 --> 01:09:52,983
or are you stopping
new writing about this story?
1180
01:09:53,193 --> 01:09:54,332
No, I'm gonna continue
to write about it.
1181
01:09:54,761 --> 01:09:56,759
Have you had any pressure
from the US Authorities
1182
01:09:56,779 --> 01:09:58,258
about continuing to report on this?
1183
01:09:58,437 --> 01:09:59,157
No.
1184
01:09:59,686 --> 01:10:01,724
And have you heard anything about
what could be...
1185
01:10:01,964 --> 01:10:05,740
asked you the Hong Kong Authorities
towards this case,
1186
01:10:06,010 --> 01:10:09,208
whether they contacted you or asked you
anything about the whereabouts of Snowden
1187
01:10:09,786 --> 01:10:11,146
and whether that's just another...
1188
01:10:11,554 --> 01:10:14,272
I haven't heard about
the Authorities of any Government.
1189
01:10:15,480 --> 01:10:17,928
And do, where do you think
this story is going then?
1190
01:10:18,258 --> 01:10:22,264
For you and of course for Snowden
and of course for the US media
1191
01:10:22,453 --> 01:10:23,932
and the US Administration in general?
1192
01:10:24,112 --> 01:10:25,830
Uh, for me, I'm gonna continue to report.
1193
01:10:26,399 --> 01:10:30,705
Reporting on what the Government has been doing
and what I think people should know about.
1194
01:10:31,374 --> 01:10:33,273
As for him I don't think anyone knows
1195
01:10:34,142 --> 01:10:39,526
people come after me or any of their third partners you
know they work closely with a number of other nations
1196
01:10:40,515 --> 01:10:45,530
or you know they could pay off the trial
you know any of their agents are assets...
1197
01:11:19,796 --> 01:11:26,709
A criminal investigation the whistleblower...
monitoring phone calls and Internet data goes public...
1198
01:11:28,068 --> 01:11:32,004
Security forces in Afghanistan
say a number of...
1199
01:11:34,921 --> 01:11:38,337
Now it's time for our news paper review
and looking at what's making headlines
1200
01:11:38,787 --> 01:11:39,846
around the world.
1201
01:11:40,266 --> 01:11:45,700
Let's start with The Guardian our top story which is
revealing the identity of the former CIA employee.
1202
01:11:46,140 --> 01:11:51,514
The paper says he leaks information exposing the
scale of American's surveillance of the Internet.
1203
01:11:52,753 --> 01:11:55,011
Edward Snowden,
what a great story...
1204
01:11:56,319 --> 01:11:59,926
Well I think it's a fantastic story this could
be straight out from a John Le Carr� novel
1205
01:12:00,595 --> 01:12:02,874
I mean when you read what he did,
yes he got the material,
1206
01:12:03,482 --> 01:12:07,398
he then decided to go to a place he identified
to be very difficult for America to get at him.
1207
01:12:07,608 --> 01:12:08,637
God dammit
1208
01:12:09,187 --> 01:12:14,192
which is Hong Kong because of course technically
inside China, the one country two systems policy
1209
01:12:14,571 --> 01:12:17,398
there meaning he would get
potentially some protection,
1210
01:12:17,648 --> 01:12:20,895
he thought, all very well planned,
could be just out of a spy novel.
1211
01:12:21,284 --> 01:12:22,673
But what about the details.
1212
01:12:26,839 --> 01:12:34,831
That could make it worse.
But just the lower half of my face.
1213
01:13:09,346 --> 01:13:13,482
Snowden says he'd become increasingly
dismay by what he saw as the growing power
1214
01:13:13,852 --> 01:13:14,881
of the NSA.
1215
01:13:15,200 --> 01:13:18,327
And it's his decision to pass on
documents which is said to reveal
1216
01:13:18,847 --> 01:13:22,863
the organisation monitored
millions of phone calls
1217
01:13:23,103 --> 01:13:25,640
but that it had direct access
to some of the...
1218
01:13:25,940 --> 01:13:26,959
How do you feel?
1219
01:13:27,228 --> 01:13:28,627
Internet companies in the world.
1220
01:13:30,086 --> 01:13:32,783
Uuh what happens, happens.
We've uh we've talked about this
1221
01:13:32,993 --> 01:13:36,349
I knew what the risks and if I
get arrested, I get arrested,
1222
01:13:39,586 --> 01:13:43,632
we were able to get the information
that needed to get out, out.
1223
01:13:46,000 --> 01:13:50,935
And you and Glenn are able to keep
reporting regardless what happens to me.
1224
01:13:53,172 --> 01:13:58,337
Now 29 year old Edward Snowden says that US intelligence
agencies gathered millions of phone records
1225
01:13:59,007 --> 01:14:01,484
and monitored Internet data...
1226
01:14:07,378 --> 01:14:09,166
Yes. I'm sorry who's asking?
1227
01:14:11,834 --> 01:14:16,789
I'm afraid you have the wrong room thank you.
Wall Street Journal.
1228
01:14:32,723 --> 01:14:35,061
Yes. I'm sorry say again?
1229
01:14:36,629 --> 01:14:38,157
Uh, no thank you. No calls.
1230
01:14:38,587 --> 01:14:40,175
I think they have the wrong number.
1231
01:14:41,654 --> 01:14:43,142
Yeah, no calls. Thank you.
1232
01:14:43,482 --> 01:14:49,826
Uh wait I'm sorry if it's two men from the
front desk they can call but no outside calls.
1233
01:14:50,355 --> 01:14:55,290
Wait actually just... let them through.
Wait, wait m'am?
1234
01:14:55,750 --> 01:14:56,299
Fuck.
1235
01:15:03,552 --> 01:15:11,544
Yes. Wait is it a lawyer?
Yeah, no no no I mean,
1236
01:15:15,120 --> 01:15:20,845
the people who are asking. Ask
them if they are lawyers.
1237
01:15:26,889 --> 01:15:29,846
No tell her that she has the wrong number
and there is no Mr. Snowden here.
1238
01:16:09,166 --> 01:16:11,834
Would you mind to talk in speakerphone?
1239
01:16:13,242 --> 01:16:14,041
Sorry.
1240
01:16:18,717 --> 01:16:19,517
Hi. I'm the client.
1241
01:16:21,824 --> 01:16:23,812
Pretty good. I'm doing well.
1242
01:16:40,305 --> 01:16:40,805
Ok.
1243
01:16:46,329 --> 01:16:46,979
Ok.
1244
01:16:58,187 --> 01:17:03,842
Ok, that's great. Is it OK if I bring equipment? Because
I'm just kind of going, so I can leave in any direction,
1245
01:17:04,111 --> 01:17:06,689
at any time, and not come back.
If necessary.
1246
01:17:17,508 --> 01:17:18,697
Ok, that sounds good.
1247
01:17:20,285 --> 01:17:22,124
Thank you, thank you
so much for helping us.
1248
01:18:04,761 --> 01:18:08,727
Yeah... And so, is there a precedent for
this where Hong Kong would extradite someone
1249
01:18:08,986 --> 01:18:10,495
for political speech?
1250
01:19:17,808 --> 01:19:20,055
"The President surely does not welcome
the way that this debate"
1251
01:19:20,205 --> 01:19:21,963
has earned a greater attention
the last week,
1252
01:19:22,433 --> 01:19:25,640
the leaked classified information about
sensitive programs that are
1253
01:19:25,909 --> 01:19:27,618
important in our
fight against terrorists
1254
01:19:27,957 --> 01:19:30,375
who would do harm
to Americans is a problem,
1255
01:19:31,694 --> 01:19:35,240
but the debate itself is legitimate
and should be engaged.
1256
01:23:25,959 --> 01:23:28,257
Right, so which one do we want here then.
1257
01:23:28,457 --> 01:23:30,944
This is operational stuff,
so we mustn't say any of this.
1258
01:23:31,194 --> 01:23:32,133
So redact that.
1259
01:23:32,632 --> 01:23:33,951
Go near the top.
1260
01:23:34,181 --> 01:23:35,989
What about the Alexander's quote,
is that something...
1261
01:23:36,219 --> 01:23:39,995
Yeah. That's in TARMAC. "Why can't we
collect all the signals all the times?"
1262
01:23:40,195 --> 01:23:43,362
Sounds like a good
summer homework project for Menwith".
1263
01:23:43,601 --> 01:23:46,668
Keith Alexander the head of the NSA
on a visit to the UK. This one.
1264
01:23:47,078 --> 01:23:47,907
Yeah.
1265
01:23:48,157 --> 01:23:51,534
Yeah. It's a secret document
in that secret document.
1266
01:23:51,773 --> 01:23:55,480
We've got a stick here that should
just have three single slides on it.
1267
01:23:55,749 --> 01:23:59,306
If it's got more than three single slides,
we have to be extremely careful.
1268
01:24:02,313 --> 01:24:02,812
Yeah?
1269
01:24:02,962 --> 01:24:04,011
Yeah, that's it.
1270
01:24:04,550 --> 01:24:07,128
This is really dangerous
stuff for us, Guardian.
1271
01:24:07,398 --> 01:24:09,645
If we make mistakes, ...very angry.
1272
01:24:09,995 --> 01:24:13,322
We kept it all under lock and key
and no one knows. No, I'm not saying that.
1273
01:24:14,521 --> 01:24:15,090
OK
1274
01:24:15,370 --> 01:24:18,327
They will come in and snap the front
door down if we elaborate on that...
1275
01:24:19,116 --> 01:24:19,855
And he said...
1276
01:24:20,225 --> 01:24:22,852
The Prime Minister is extremely
concerned about this.
1277
01:24:23,152 --> 01:24:25,160
And they kept saying, "this
is from the very top."
1278
01:25:36,598 --> 01:25:39,086
As you can see on this map the flight
that probably has Snowden aboard,
1279
01:25:39,306 --> 01:25:42,158
has almost reached its destination here
in Moscow's scheduled plan,
1280
01:25:42,832 --> 01:25:44,700
in the Russian capital within minutes...
1281
01:25:46,279 --> 01:25:51,329
As you may have heard, there is a CIA agent
who has revealed a lot of information
1282
01:25:53,112 --> 01:25:54,261
and he is now trapped in the
1283
01:25:56,349 --> 01:25:57,497
airport in Moscow.
1284
01:25:58,407 --> 01:25:59,966
We managed to get him out of Hong Kong,
1285
01:26:00,155 --> 01:26:02,073
but when he landed in the Moscow airport,
1286
01:26:02,772 --> 01:26:06,658
the American government had
canceled his passport.
1287
01:26:07,058 --> 01:26:09,705
So formally he hasn't entered
into Russian territory,
1288
01:26:10,035 --> 01:26:11,673
he is in the transit area of the airport.
1289
01:26:13,421 --> 01:26:15,849
And one of our people is accompanying him.
1290
01:26:16,179 --> 01:26:18,626
We are trying to arrange a private jet
1291
01:26:20,434 --> 01:26:25,000
to take him from Moscow
1292
01:26:25,959 --> 01:26:30,874
to Ecuador or perhaps maybe Venezuela
1293
01:26:31,124 --> 01:26:32,133
or maybe Iceland,
1294
01:26:32,992 --> 01:26:34,480
countries where he would be safe.
1295
01:30:05,000 --> 01:30:08,546
May I collect all the phones please?
1296
01:30:15,759 --> 01:30:17,677
I have everything in here.
1297
01:30:19,825 --> 01:30:22,372
Put them in the refrigerator.
1298
01:30:33,152 --> 01:30:35,409
So, as you know, in June,
1299
01:30:35,819 --> 01:30:39,136
Snowden was in charge with 3
1300
01:30:39,525 --> 01:30:40,564
legal violations felonies.
1301
01:30:42,192 --> 01:30:44,400
Principaly under a World War I era
1302
01:30:45,379 --> 01:30:47,028
criminal law called the Espionage Act.
1303
01:30:48,756 --> 01:30:51,074
The Espionage Act is an extremely broad
1304
01:30:51,713 --> 01:30:52,852
criminal prohibition against
1305
01:30:54,111 --> 01:30:55,849
the sharing or dissemination
1306
01:30:56,458 --> 01:30:58,297
of what's called
"National Defense information"
1307
01:30:58,816 --> 01:31:01,373
it was only used to
1308
01:31:01,713 --> 01:31:03,811
prosecute people who had been accused of
1309
01:31:04,091 --> 01:31:07,257
acting with a foreign power,
spies not whistleblowers
1310
01:31:07,657 --> 01:31:09,775
and it's a very unusual legal
representation I think
1311
01:31:10,284 --> 01:31:12,962
not just for all of you,
but for me as well.
1312
01:31:13,791 --> 01:31:16,918
The Espionage Act has not
distinguished between
1313
01:31:17,337 --> 01:31:19,205
leaks to the press
and the public interest,
1314
01:31:19,695 --> 01:31:21,843
and selling secrets to foreign enemies
1315
01:31:22,412 --> 01:31:23,921
for personal profit.
1316
01:31:24,440 --> 01:31:25,929
So, under the Espionage Act
1317
01:31:26,168 --> 01:31:29,275
it's not a defense if the
information that was disclosed
1318
01:31:29,545 --> 01:31:31,683
should not have been withheld
in the first place,
1319
01:31:31,923 --> 01:31:33,282
that it was improperly classified.
1320
01:31:33,621 --> 01:31:36,798
It's not a defense if the
dissemination was in the public interest
1321
01:31:37,227 --> 01:31:38,426
that it led to reforms.
1322
01:31:38,926 --> 01:31:42,432
Even if the court determines
that the programs that were revealed
1323
01:31:42,732 --> 01:31:44,360
were illegal or unconstitutional.
1324
01:31:44,620 --> 01:31:46,878
That's still not a defense
under the Espionage Act,
1325
01:31:47,127 --> 01:31:49,915
the Government doesn't have
to defend the classification,
1326
01:31:50,234 --> 01:31:53,181
it doesn't have to demonstrate
harm from the release,
1327
01:31:53,621 --> 01:31:55,439
All this is irrelevant.
1328
01:31:55,929 --> 01:31:58,596
So when we say that
the trial wouldn't be fair,
1329
01:31:59,495 --> 01:32:01,763
we are not talking about
what human rights lawyers think
1330
01:32:02,043 --> 01:32:03,411
of this fair trial practices.
1331
01:32:03,721 --> 01:32:05,409
We are saying the law, the statute itself,
1332
01:32:06,798 --> 01:32:09,145
eliminates any kind of defense
1333
01:32:09,495 --> 01:32:11,163
that Snowden might be able to make
1334
01:32:11,573 --> 01:32:13,861
and essentially will equate him with a spy.
1335
01:32:14,200 --> 01:32:18,506
And of course those three counts could be
increased to a hundreed or two hundreed
1336
01:32:18,806 --> 01:32:20,484
or three hundreed, they
could charge him separately
1337
01:32:20,754 --> 01:32:23,871
for each document that has been
published by a journalist.
1338
01:32:24,390 --> 01:32:27,247
And I think that we all recognize,
even though we sit here as lawyers
1339
01:32:28,786 --> 01:32:29,665
in a lawyer's meeting
1340
01:32:30,464 --> 01:32:34,740
that it's propably
95% politics and 5% law.
1341
01:32:35,429 --> 01:32:37,427
How this would be resolved.
1342
01:33:09,185 --> 01:33:12,382
"Mr. Snowden has been charged
with very serious crimes"
1343
01:33:13,171 --> 01:33:16,688
and he should be returned to the United States
where he would be granted full due process
1344
01:33:16,798 --> 01:33:20,304
and every right available to him
as a United States citizen.
1345
01:33:21,563 --> 01:33:24,420
"Facing our justice system
under the Constitution."
1346
01:34:15,549 --> 01:34:17,307
No, I don't think
Mr. Snowden was a Patriot.
1347
01:34:17,417 --> 01:34:19,875
I called for a federal review
1348
01:34:20,664 --> 01:34:23,411
of our surveillance operations
1349
01:34:23,891 --> 01:34:26,358
before Mr. Snowden made these leaks.
1350
01:34:26,698 --> 01:34:28,286
My preference,
1351
01:34:29,954 --> 01:34:31,423
and I think the American
people's preference,
1352
01:34:31,633 --> 01:34:35,149
would have been for a lawful, orderly
1353
01:34:35,489 --> 01:34:37,767
examination of these laws.
1354
01:34:38,456 --> 01:34:43,101
A thoughtful, fact based debate,
1355
01:34:43,591 --> 01:34:46,768
that would then lead us to a better place.
1356
01:35:28,256 --> 01:35:30,903
Oh my God. David. Hello my baby.
1357
01:35:32,242 --> 01:35:32,822
I'm OK.
1358
01:35:33,051 --> 01:35:34,270
You're OK?
1359
01:35:38,995 --> 01:35:39,915
I just wanna go home.
1360
01:35:40,474 --> 01:35:43,461
OK, OK OK. You just have to walk...
1361
01:35:50,344 --> 01:35:51,413
How are you?
1362
01:35:51,743 --> 01:35:54,110
Good, good. I'm totally fine, I
didn't sleep at all, I couldn't sleep.
1363
01:35:54,320 --> 01:35:55,309
I know.
1364
01:35:55,559 --> 01:36:00,154
"Brazil Demands Explanation
from UK Government."
1365
01:36:17,617 --> 01:36:21,683
Recent reports have revealed that the NSA
have access to encryption keys
1366
01:36:22,042 --> 01:36:25,299
and they paid tech companies to introduce
backdoors in encryption protocols.
1367
01:36:26,078 --> 01:36:30,803
So we are going to talk about ways in which
we can defend ourselves against
1368
01:36:31,143 --> 01:36:33,171
governments spying on us.
1369
01:36:33,421 --> 01:36:37,057
So Mr. Jacob Appelbaum, as an encryption
and security software developper,
1370
01:36:37,267 --> 01:36:38,376
and journalist.
1371
01:36:38,736 --> 01:36:41,922
Ladar Levison, the founder of the
encrypted email service.
1372
01:36:42,392 --> 01:36:43,741
Lavabit
1373
01:36:44,000 --> 01:36:45,059
used by Edward Snowden.
1374
01:36:45,239 --> 01:36:45,998
You have the floor.
1375
01:36:46,358 --> 01:36:47,267
Thank you.
1376
01:36:47,417 --> 01:36:50,064
Lavabit is an email service
that hopefully one day
1377
01:36:50,314 --> 01:36:55,848
will be able to stand on its own
without any references to Snowden.
1378
01:36:56,158 --> 01:36:59,095
My service was designed to remove me
1379
01:36:59,375 --> 01:37:02,242
from the possibility of being forced
1380
01:37:02,482 --> 01:37:04,500
to violate a person's privacy.
1381
01:37:04,849 --> 01:37:05,739
Quite simply.
1382
01:37:06,108 --> 01:37:08,266
Lavabit was designed to
remove the service provider
1383
01:37:08,536 --> 01:37:09,784
from the equation,
1384
01:37:10,224 --> 01:37:12,252
by not having logs on my server
1385
01:37:12,612 --> 01:37:15,958
and not having access to
a person's emails on disk,
1386
01:37:16,238 --> 01:37:17,277
I wasn't elimitating
1387
01:37:17,547 --> 01:37:18,825
the possibility of surveillance,
1388
01:37:18,995 --> 01:37:22,052
I was simply removing myself
from that equation.
1389
01:37:23,331 --> 01:37:24,979
And that surveillance
would have to be conducted
1390
01:37:25,159 --> 01:37:26,578
on the target
1391
01:37:26,867 --> 01:37:27,966
either the sender
1392
01:37:28,166 --> 01:37:29,884
or the receiver of the messages.
1393
01:37:30,624 --> 01:37:34,030
But I was approached
by the FBI quite recently,
1394
01:37:34,230 --> 01:37:35,349
and told
1395
01:37:35,918 --> 01:37:38,026
that because I couldn't
turn over the information
1396
01:37:38,306 --> 01:37:40,014
from that one particular user,
1397
01:37:40,254 --> 01:37:42,322
I would be forced to
give up those SSL keys
1398
01:37:42,562 --> 01:37:44,470
and let the FBI
collect every communication
1399
01:37:44,720 --> 01:37:47,027
on my network without
any kind of transparency.
1400
01:37:48,406 --> 01:37:50,374
And of course,
1401
01:37:50,674 --> 01:37:52,242
I wasn't comfortable with that,
1402
01:37:52,731 --> 01:37:53,890
to say the least!
1403
01:37:54,630 --> 01:37:58,955
More disturbing was the fact that I couldn't
even tell anybody that it was going on.
1404
01:37:59,515 --> 01:38:01,183
So I decided:
1405
01:38:01,433 --> 01:38:04,250
"If I didn't win the
fight to unseal my case,"
1406
01:38:04,650 --> 01:38:05,878
if I didn't win the battle
1407
01:38:06,248 --> 01:38:08,775
to be able to tell people
what was going on,
1408
01:38:09,774 --> 01:38:12,432
then my only ethical choice left
was to shutdown...
1409
01:38:14,799 --> 01:38:16,917
Think about that.
1410
01:38:17,597 --> 01:38:21,892
I believe in the rule of law, I believe
in the need to conduct investigations,
1411
01:38:22,961 --> 01:38:26,678
but those investigations
are supposed to be difficult for a reason.
1412
01:38:27,047 --> 01:38:30,853
It's supposed to be difficult
to invade somebody's privacy.
1413
01:38:31,133 --> 01:38:33,511
Because of how intrusive it is,
1414
01:38:33,820 --> 01:38:36,088
because of how disruptive it is.
1415
01:38:36,528 --> 01:38:39,065
If we can't, if we don't have
a right to privacy,
1416
01:38:39,405 --> 01:38:42,162
how do we have
a free and open discussion?
1417
01:38:42,462 --> 01:38:44,729
What good is the right
to free speech,
1418
01:38:47,197 --> 01:38:49,505
if it's not protected,
1419
01:38:49,804 --> 01:38:51,992
in a sense that you can't have
a private discussion
1420
01:38:52,372 --> 01:38:55,009
with somebody else
about something you disagree with.
1421
01:38:55,748 --> 01:38:57,756
Think about the chilling effect
that that has.
1422
01:38:58,576 --> 01:39:00,294
Think about the chilling effect
it does have
1423
01:39:00,494 --> 01:39:03,511
on countries that don't have
a right to privacy.
1424
01:39:03,820 --> 01:39:05,878
I've noticed a really interesting
discussion point
1425
01:39:06,238 --> 01:39:08,517
which is that what people used to call
liberty and freedom
1426
01:39:08,735 --> 01:39:10,094
we now call privacy.
1427
01:39:11,123 --> 01:39:12,951
And we say in the same breath
1428
01:39:13,351 --> 01:39:14,869
that privacy is dead.
1429
01:39:15,409 --> 01:39:17,357
This is something
that really concerns me
1430
01:39:17,597 --> 01:39:18,635
about my generation
1431
01:39:18,915 --> 01:39:21,513
especially when we talk about
how we're not surprised by anything.
1432
01:39:21,822 --> 01:39:23,291
I think that we should consider that
1433
01:39:23,601 --> 01:39:25,569
when we lose privacy we lose agency,
1434
01:39:25,858 --> 01:39:26,997
we lose liberty itself
1435
01:39:27,277 --> 01:39:29,535
because we no longer feel free
to express what we think.
1436
01:39:30,244 --> 01:39:32,362
There is this myth of
the passive surveillance machine
1437
01:39:32,631 --> 01:39:35,299
but actually what is surveillance
except control?
1438
01:39:35,858 --> 01:39:37,477
This notion that the NSA are passive
1439
01:39:37,746 --> 01:39:38,556
this is nonsense
1440
01:39:38,815 --> 01:39:40,004
what we see is that they actively attack.
1441
01:39:40,354 --> 01:39:42,062
European citizens, American citizens and,
1442
01:39:43,081 --> 01:39:44,450
in fact, anyone that they can
1443
01:39:44,689 --> 01:39:45,888
if they perceive an advantage.
1444
01:41:22,611 --> 01:41:24,579
OK. Right.
1445
01:41:30,144 --> 01:41:32,492
I have to give that in testimony.
1446
01:41:32,871 --> 01:41:34,230
What are you going to tell?
1447
01:41:34,470 --> 01:41:37,726
Everything I can truthfully.
1448
01:41:38,196 --> 01:41:40,144
What will you talk about?
1449
01:41:40,474 --> 01:41:42,971
Uh, whatever the questions they ask me.
1450
01:41:43,231 --> 01:41:44,130
Yeah I think it's over there.
1451
01:41:44,360 --> 01:41:47,536
Ok, it's alright. Thank you.
1452
01:41:54,030 --> 01:41:55,329
Hey, how are you?
1453
01:41:55,469 --> 01:41:56,108
Good.
1454
01:41:56,318 --> 01:41:56,878
How are you?
1455
01:41:57,007 --> 01:41:57,566
Good to see you again.
1456
01:41:57,736 --> 01:41:58,935
Nice to meet you again, yes.
1457
01:42:00,434 --> 01:42:01,393
Yeah.
1458
01:43:30,194 --> 01:43:34,060
What do you think they're doing to reporters,
those of us that are working directly with...
1459
01:43:34,669 --> 01:43:35,978
Snowden documents?
1460
01:43:36,228 --> 01:43:38,276
How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?
1461
01:43:38,555 --> 01:43:41,692
You're.. You're on a
cast iron cover list.
1462
01:43:42,342 --> 01:43:45,618
Which means any electronic device you use
1463
01:43:46,278 --> 01:43:49,036
that they can attach to you
they all record and capture all that data.
1464
01:43:49,974 --> 01:43:52,112
And what do they do with that data? They're
just trying to figure out what we're doing?
1465
01:43:53,380 --> 01:43:55,209
Uh, well the primary...
1466
01:43:55,388 --> 01:43:57,087
That's part of it. But the
other part, primarily part,
1467
01:43:57,456 --> 01:43:59,594
is for them. I think it's to find the
sources of information you're getting.
1468
01:44:00,204 --> 01:44:03,990
So if I have a confidential source who's
giving me information as a whistleblower,
1469
01:44:04,649 --> 01:44:07,376
and he works within the US Government,
and he's concerned about
1470
01:44:07,806 --> 01:44:10,623
what he perceives as
violation of the Constitution,
1471
01:44:11,153 --> 01:44:13,211
uhm... and he gets in touch with me,
they...
1472
01:44:13,470 --> 01:44:14,050
Yeah...
1473
01:44:14,389 --> 01:44:15,149
Go ahead. Yeah.
1474
01:44:15,408 --> 01:44:18,785
Yeah. From there on, they would nail him
and start watching everything he did.
1475
01:44:20,643 --> 01:44:22,751
And if you start passing data,
I'm sure they'd take him off the street.
1476
01:44:23,021 --> 01:44:26,188
I mean, the way you have to do it
is like Deep Throat did, right?
1477
01:44:26,557 --> 01:44:30,034
In the Nixon years,
meet in a basement of a parking garage...
1478
01:44:30,813 --> 01:44:32,082
physically.
1479
01:45:13,001 --> 01:45:15,378
Let's disassociate our
metadata one last time.
1480
01:45:15,718 --> 01:45:18,995
So we don't have a clear record of your
true name in our final communication chain.
1481
01:45:21,113 --> 01:45:23,670
This is obviously not to say
you can't claim your involvement,
1482
01:45:23,840 --> 01:45:26,757
but as every trick in the book
is likely to be used and looking into this,
1483
01:45:27,476 --> 01:45:29,864
I believe it's better,
that that particular disclosure
1484
01:45:30,064 --> 01:45:31,592
come on your own terms.
1485
01:45:32,042 --> 01:45:34,489
Thank you again for all you've done.
1486
01:45:34,749 --> 01:45:36,527
So sorry again for the multiple delays.
1487
01:45:36,707 --> 01:45:38,226
But we've been entering a territory
1488
01:45:38,635 --> 01:45:39,914
with no model to benefit from.
1489
01:45:41,462 --> 01:45:42,891
If all ends well,
1490
01:45:43,270 --> 01:45:45,408
perhaps the demonstration
that our mess has worked
1491
01:45:45,918 --> 01:45:47,616
would embolden more to come forward.
1492
01:45:48,565 --> 01:45:49,864
Citizen.
1493
01:45:54,849 --> 01:45:58,755
So the update that I want
to give you is about the new,
1494
01:46:00,663 --> 01:46:02,741
uh.. the new source that, that we...
1495
01:46:04,140 --> 01:46:05,199
OK.
1496
01:46:07,936 --> 01:46:11,282
That... uh, this is what...
this is the...
1497
01:46:11,812 --> 01:46:15,438
you know this is the person who is doing
the... the most of the...
1498
01:46:15,608 --> 01:46:16,657
Right, right, right.
1499
01:46:17,017 --> 01:46:20,633
The work on it, uh...
And now... and now,
1500
01:46:20,813 --> 01:46:22,541
what basically, what happens is...
1501
01:46:25,508 --> 01:46:26,267
and...
1502
01:46:27,107 --> 01:46:29,524
That's actually...
That's really dangerous...
1503
01:46:31,173 --> 01:46:32,801
uh, on the source's side.
1504
01:46:33,121 --> 01:46:34,369
Do they know how to
take care of themselves...
1505
01:46:34,589 --> 01:46:35,588
Well he knows...
1506
01:46:36,757 --> 01:46:37,256
or do you know anything about...
1507
01:46:37,626 --> 01:46:38,625
he means it's, uh...
1508
01:46:40,533 --> 01:46:42,102
It's all being done..
Through this...
1509
01:46:42,331 --> 01:46:43,031
OK.
1510
01:46:43,530 --> 01:46:46,657
And they're all talking this way...
1511
01:46:46,977 --> 01:46:47,716
OK.
1512
01:46:48,106 --> 01:46:48,945
And, uh...
1513
01:46:49,234 --> 01:46:51,622
I was gonna say
one of the big questions there is:
1514
01:46:51,952 --> 01:46:53,350
Can they handle it?
You know with...
1515
01:46:53,570 --> 01:46:55,149
Yeah, they're very careful...
1516
01:46:55,718 --> 01:46:56,757
even they're through that.
1517
01:46:56,967 --> 01:46:57,736
OK
1518
01:46:58,006 --> 01:46:58,715
Yeah.
1519
01:47:02,731 --> 01:47:04,189
And...
1520
01:47:10,933 --> 01:47:13,560
That's what that is.
1521
01:47:14,869 --> 01:47:16,357
Wow, that's really something.
1522
01:47:20,763 --> 01:47:22,102
Oh, oh...
1523
01:47:29,574 --> 01:47:30,633
Did you know that?
1524
01:47:31,113 --> 01:47:38,096
One key thing: ALL drone strikes are done through
Ramstein Air Base in Germany - German govt has always.
1525
01:47:38,325 --> 01:47:39,624
It's not the actual plan.
1526
01:47:40,293 --> 01:47:42,012
Right, right right. You mean the control.
1527
01:47:42,131 --> 01:47:43,731
It's the process, who's sending the...
1528
01:47:43,780 --> 01:47:44,759
Yeah.
1529
01:47:45,148 --> 01:47:49,394
There's a... There's a chart.
You know, it goes like a whole layout in it
1530
01:47:49,604 --> 01:47:50,573
for everyone and it's...
1531
01:47:50,793 --> 01:47:52,112
Yeah. It's really bold,
but it's really risky.
1532
01:47:52,551 --> 01:47:54,269
But you know that... that's the thing if...
1533
01:47:54,309 --> 01:47:55,009
There's more...
1534
01:47:55,238 --> 01:47:56,147
if they understand
what they're doing.
1535
01:47:56,637 --> 01:48:00,773
There's this chart, it goes like this...
It shows the decision making chart.
1536
01:48:01,053 --> 01:48:07,386
It's a chart... It's, it's...
it's shaped like this.
1537
01:48:10,333 --> 01:48:10,973
- Hum hum...
- So up here it says "POTUS" (President of the Uniteed States)
1538
01:48:11,242 --> 01:48:13,890
That's the decision making
chart for each... one.
1539
01:48:19,124 --> 01:48:19,624
And...
1540
01:48:19,874 --> 01:48:21,352
And it's so political...
1541
01:48:21,582 --> 01:48:25,498
This is... This part's amazing.
1542
01:48:29,594 --> 01:48:30,643
That's...
1543
01:48:30,983 --> 01:48:32,871
That's fucking ridiculous.
1544
01:48:33,790 --> 01:48:35,448
This... This is... it's so shocking.
1545
01:48:38,225 --> 01:48:40,603
(laugh) That's...
1546
01:48:42,261 --> 01:48:42,861
No, I know...
1547
01:48:42,971 --> 01:48:43,470
That's...
1548
01:48:43,500 --> 01:48:44,099
I know...
1549
01:48:44,719 --> 01:48:47,116
There are 1.2 m people on various stages
of their watch list.
1550
01:48:47,506 --> 01:48:49,304
The population of an entire country.
1551
01:48:49,734 --> 01:48:50,573
I know.
1552
01:48:50,883 --> 01:48:54,139
That's... what we're working on.
1553
01:49:04,139 --> 01:49:06,797
That person is incredibly
bold, but, uh...
1554
01:49:07,676 --> 01:49:09,124
But also very well aware.
1555
01:49:09,534 --> 01:49:11,373
Right. I... You know, I just hope.
I mean...
1556
01:49:12,051 --> 01:49:12,941
No, I mean...
1557
01:49:13,400 --> 01:49:15,348
the boldness of it is shocking,
but I mean it was obviously..
1558
01:49:15,798 --> 01:49:17,486
But the other thing is just...
1559
01:49:17,796 --> 01:49:19,554
motivated by what you did,
I mean, it...
1560
01:49:19,584 --> 01:49:21,272
This is going to... This is going to...
1561
01:49:21,922 --> 01:49:23,750
That could raise a profile
1562
01:49:24,659 --> 01:49:25,979
of this whole political situation
1563
01:49:26,227 --> 01:49:28,515
with whistleblowing
to a whole new level, because...
1564
01:49:28,825 --> 01:49:29,434
exactly...
1565
01:49:29,784 --> 01:49:30,873
It's gonna...
1566
01:49:31,122 --> 01:49:31,922
Yeah, I mean...
1567
01:49:32,131 --> 01:49:33,610
I actually think
that's a great thing.
1568
01:49:33,820 --> 01:49:35,979
And I think people
are gonna see what's being hidden...
1569
01:49:36,547 --> 01:49:40,343
again, again..
By a totally different part.
1570
01:49:43,050 --> 01:49:46,267
POTUS