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[upbeat instrumental music playing]
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[narrator] Most people
feel comfortable flying.
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I would say the majority of people
have gotten accustomed
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to how safe the system is.
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Every day,
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tens of thousands of flights,
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all over the world.
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There's an old saying in aviation,
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"If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going."
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Boeing has had such a storied history
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and such an incredible stature
in the industry.
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At any given moment,
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roughly 10,000 Boeing aircraft
are in service
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in more than 150 countries.
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I've reported on aviation
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for more than 20 years
at The Wall Street Journal.
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Hello there. It's, uh, Andy Pasztor
from The Wall Street Journal.
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I know that you've been asked not to talk,
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but I'm hoping
that you can take a few minutes
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just to answer some questions.
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[Pasztor] By the beginning of 2018,
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we'd come through the safest period
for commercial aviation
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in the history of aviation.
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There actually hadn't been
a big passenger jet crash
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anywhere in the world the previous year.
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Boeing has had so much success
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producing incredibly safe,
reliable aircraft
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that pilots and passengers
admire and love to fly on.
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They had the public's trust.
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And then two planes
dropped out of the sky.
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[solemn instrumental music playing]
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[woman] I don't remember the time.
I would say quite early in the morning.
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It was dark, I remember.
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[announcer speaking Indonesian over radio]
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[woman] My husband
prepared his flight bag,
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checked his schedule,
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checked out with his colleague
that he's flying with.
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[teapot whistles]
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We had a meal
and had a chat for 20, 30 minutes.
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That was the normal routine
before he left for his flight.
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After he left, I went back to sleep,
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and after a few hours,
I was expecting a call from him.
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You know, just normal working day.
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[air traffic control] Lion Inter 610
cleared for takeoff, runway 2-5 left
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[pilot] Lion Inter 610
cleared for takeoff, 2-5 left.
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[airplane engine revving]
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- [on-board computer] V1.
- [pilot] Noted.
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[stick shaker rattling]
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[on-board computer] Airspeed low.
Airspeed low.
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[pilot] Indicated Airspeed Disagree,
Captain.
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[on-board computer] Airspeed low.
Airspeed low.
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[pilot] Feel Differential.
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[on-board computer] Bank angle.
Bank angle. Bank angle.
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[pilot] Altitude Disagree, Captain.
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[rattling and whirring]
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- [air traffic control] Lion Inter 610?
- [pilot] We have a flight control problem.
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[on-board computer] Terrain. Terrain.
Pull up. Pull up.
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[on-board computer] Terrain. Terrain.
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[pilot] Fly up! Fly up!
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[phone ringing]
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[woman] I got a call
from one of his colleagues,
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"We are not able to find his aircraft."
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I'm like, "Don't worry."
Because I knew... I... I knew my husband.
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I knew how he flew.
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I was just expecting a call from him.
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You know, "I've reached."
That was the norm that we used to follow.
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So I was expecting that call
from him instead of anyone else.
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And after that,
it's just been... Everyone knows.
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[breathes deeply]
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[news anchor 1] Lion Air Flight 610
went missing from radar
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just a few minutes
after taking off from Jakarta.
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A brand-new Boeing 737
with 189 people onboard
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crashing moments after takeoff...
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[news anchor 2 speaking Spanish]
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[speaking Korean]
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[news anchor 3] You mentioned
this was a... a Boeing aircraft.
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What more do we know
about the plane, Benjamin?
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Yeah, a Boeing, as you said,
uh, almost brand-new.
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They had taken delivery of it
back in August.
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It was a 737 Max.
That's the updated version of the 737.
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They haven't been out that long.
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[indistinct chattering]
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[Sethi] That morning,
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our families were trying
to find out information.
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Trying to understand what was going on.
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Very soon, everyone there
became aware of what had happened.
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And that nobody was coming back.
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[sobbing]
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[Sethi] What I was going through,
it was just pain.
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I don't remember a thing.
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Just except the pain,
there was nothing, purely pain.
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To my husband,
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all that mattered
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was the safety
and security of his passengers.
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He's flying with 188 people
along with him.
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And the grief
that I felt for those families,
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unbelievable.
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Unbelievable.
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[camera shutters clicking]
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[Pasztor] In the first day
or two days after a crash,
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there's really very little information
about the cause.
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[speaking Indonesian]
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In this case,
the weather appeared to be good.
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It was very close to the airport.
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And this is a brand-new plane
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built by America's
premier aircraft manufacturer.
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And unless the black boxes
are found quickly,
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it's all speculation.
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[news anchor]Lion Air
has a spotty safety record.
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Along with several Indonesian carriers,
the low-cost airline was banned
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from flying into the United States
and Europe
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but improved in recent years.
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[Sethi] I was following the news,
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reading each and every article,
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anything that was online.
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They all said the same thing.
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They started blaming.
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There was a blame game going on.
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Blaming the country,
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blaming the airline,
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blaming the pilots,
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saying that it was their incompetence.
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The airline probably needed to do
a better job of making sure its pilots
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understood exactly what to do
in case the aircraft was performing
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in a unique, unusual way
and how to get out of the problem.
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Should passengers getting
on a 737 Max be concerned?
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I don't think so.
Certainly, in the United States,
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they understand
how to operate this aircraft.
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[man] No one thought it was the airplane.
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I am in... in print being asked
what this could possibly be and I said,
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I would be phenomenally surprised
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if it was related to any...
any part of the airplane's design.
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I mean, it was a Boeing.
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[Pasztor] Everyone in the world
knew what Boeing stood for.
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Their reputation for safety
was tremendous.
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And at that point,
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there really wasn't enough information
to draw any conclusions.
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But then, the Indonesian investigators
found the black boxes.
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[man] There are two black boxes,
both of which are orange, by the way.
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One is called a cockpit voice recorder,
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and the other one
is called a flight data recorder.
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It records the altitude
and the airspeed and the direction
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and what the throttles are doing.
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Thousands of parameters,
eight times a second,
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so it's a very comprehensive tally
of what happened on the airplane.
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The flight data recorder
showed that right after takeoff,
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there was a failure of
the left-hand angle-of-attack indicator.
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That's a sensor that's located
on either side of the airplane
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that measures the angle
of the nose during flight.
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As soon as
the faulty angle-of-attack sensors sent
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bad data to the aircraft systems,
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the stick shaker on the captain's side
would have been loudly vibrating
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his control column
to warn of an impending stall.
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But that was a false warning.
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The airplane wasn't stalling.
It was flying.
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[man] Right away,
not only did the stick shaker go off,
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but there was a master caution light,
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airspeed disagree alerts,
and the altitude's not reading right.
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You have this tidal wave of distraction.
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And on top of all that,
something was putting
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repeated nose-down pressure
on the airplane.
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These pilots are fighting
and are pulling back up on the airplane
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and trying to get it to come back up.
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But it happens again
and drives the nose back down.
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So they're having this oscillating battle.
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I remember thinking,
"What's making that happen?"
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[Pasztor] The official response
from Boeing was,
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we're looking at it, we're cooperating,
we don't know quite what happened.
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Our sincere apologies to the families.
What you would expect.
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Dennis Muilenburg,
who was chairman, simply said,
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"Well, you know, we can't really comment
on the investigation."
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But we found out that behind the scenes,
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Boeing was saying that an American pilot
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would never have gotten
into this kind of a situation
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and that the Indonesian crew didn't do
everything they were supposed to do.
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[Sethi] I wouldn't say it was racist,
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but I actually remember a point
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where they spoke
about my husband's qualifications.
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They wanted to know
where he completed his flight training.
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In fact, he finished
his training in the US.
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[Pasztor] By this time,
the second week of November...
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It's Andy Pasztor
from The Wall Street Journal.
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...we began asking questions
about the design of this aircraft,
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rather than the operation of the aircraft.
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I'm hoping to talk with you
about the 737 investigation.
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We could not understand what was going on.
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How could a single damaged sensor
make the plane behave like this?
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[Cox] Finally, Boeing
released a statement,
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saying it looks like the Lion Air airplane
had an erroneous MCAS activation.
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And all of us went, "What's an MCAS?"
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[Tajer] MCAS?
I've never heard of this before.
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What is this?
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I'm looking through the manual.
It was in the abbreviation section.
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How could it be in the abbreviations
but nowhere else? What is this system?
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[man] The MCAS,
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or the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System,
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really is just some software
connected to the angle-of-attack sensors.
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Because of the flight characteristics
of the new Max,
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when certain angle-of-attacks
were reached, at certain speeds,
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the airplane tended to stall out.
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So the MCAS was designed
to automatically push the nose back down.
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Simple concept.
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All they had to do was to add
a few lines of code to an existing system.
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[Ostrower] MCAS was designed
to work in the background,
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using the speed trim motor
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to swivel the horizontal stabilizer
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just a little bit each time it sensed
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that the angle-of-attack
was... was too high.
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It would smoothly bring the nose down.
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But in the case of the Lion Air crash,
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an angle-of-attack sensor was broken,
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which erroneously activated MCAS,
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and it activated repeatedly.
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Boeing said that the crew did not respond
in a way that they expected them to.
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They didn't switch the system off.
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[Pasztor] The only problem was,
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and everybody was
completely flummoxed and surprised
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when they found out,
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Boeing had never told pilots
that the MCAS system was on the aircraft.
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Say what? [chuckles]
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Uh, huh. Uh...
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Yeah, I mean, that was
my response, like, "What?"
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Um, yeah, uh...
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[splutters] How... how the heck
could this happen?
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[Pasztor] Hello there. It's Andy Pasztor
from The Wall Street Journal.
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Is this a good time to talk?
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Good. I just wanted
to follow up on our last discussion.
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You were nice enough
to give me some time, and, uh...
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After a lot of knocking on doors,
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a very senior Boeing executive
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told me, "We never informed
the pilots about MCAS."
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"We never explained it to them."
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"We never trained them on it,
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because we didn't want
to overwhelm them with information."
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That took my colleagues
and myself quite aback.
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We'd never heard a senior Boeing official
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talking along those lines.
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Boeing had always prided itself
for being the pilot's advocate.
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So we wrote a story
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saying that Boeing
had proactively decided not to tell pilots
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about the MCAS system.
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New questions this morning for Boeing.
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The Wall Street Journal is reporting
that Boeing withheld information
244
00:16:13,764 --> 00:16:17,559
on its 737 model,
according to safety experts and others...
245
00:16:17,643 --> 00:16:21,355
[Pasztor] As soon as it became clear
that this wasn't an oversight,
246
00:16:21,438 --> 00:16:24,233
this wasn't just left out by accident,
247
00:16:24,316 --> 00:16:25,859
pilots went berserk.
248
00:16:27,152 --> 00:16:28,779
[man] We couldn't believe it.
249
00:16:28,862 --> 00:16:33,742
And once we started learning more
about this MCAS system,
250
00:16:33,826 --> 00:16:36,453
it became our number one priority.
251
00:16:39,832 --> 00:16:42,292
I found it disrespectful. Um,
252
00:16:42,376 --> 00:16:44,253
every pilot I ever taught,
253
00:16:44,336 --> 00:16:47,423
I said you want to know
as much about your airplane as possible.
254
00:16:48,215 --> 00:16:49,975
[computer trainer] In this series
of modules,
255
00:16:50,009 --> 00:16:51,593
we will discuss the differences
256
00:16:51,677 --> 00:16:56,098
between the Boeing 737 NG
and 737 Max aircraft.
257
00:16:56,181 --> 00:17:01,020
The 737 Max is the successor
to the 737 Next Generation...
258
00:17:01,103 --> 00:17:03,647
[Sethi] Facts should not be hidden
from the pilots.
259
00:17:04,732 --> 00:17:07,026
The only training my husband was given
260
00:17:07,109 --> 00:17:10,362
was an iPad training,
and it never mentioned MCAS.
261
00:17:10,446 --> 00:17:12,882
[computer trainer] ...improvements
similar to existing aircraft...
262
00:17:12,906 --> 00:17:17,661
I kept on insisting with the investigators
that this aircraft should be grounded.
263
00:17:18,454 --> 00:17:21,457
But Boeing has
a big reputation around the world.
264
00:17:21,540 --> 00:17:23,500
[phone ringing]
265
00:17:23,584 --> 00:17:25,669
[Carey] Here's what Boeing did.
266
00:17:25,753 --> 00:17:28,672
They started contacting pilots' unions.
267
00:17:29,423 --> 00:17:32,134
So I got a call saying
that Boeing's gonna come down
268
00:17:32,217 --> 00:17:35,220
and brief us on this MCAS system.
269
00:17:35,971 --> 00:17:39,141
This was monumental. It's the first time
high-level Boeing executives
270
00:17:39,224 --> 00:17:42,394
have ever come to visit
the Allied Pilots Association.
271
00:17:43,062 --> 00:17:47,483
So, on November 27th,
I met them at the door.
272
00:17:49,068 --> 00:17:51,361
First of all,
they brought their lobbyists.
273
00:17:51,862 --> 00:17:54,448
Who brings a lobbyist to a safety meeting?
274
00:17:57,201 --> 00:18:01,413
I could see that they weren't interested
in, uh... in exchanging pleasantries,
275
00:18:02,456 --> 00:18:04,666
so, we went into our conference room.
276
00:18:07,169 --> 00:18:08,253
We all sat down.
277
00:18:09,213 --> 00:18:12,674
I just assumed they were gonna bring
PowerPoint presentations,
278
00:18:12,758 --> 00:18:14,593
graphs, charts, data.
279
00:18:15,636 --> 00:18:17,554
And they don't have anything.
280
00:18:19,181 --> 00:18:20,682
It's just them.
281
00:18:22,184 --> 00:18:24,269
I could see that they were worried.
282
00:18:25,145 --> 00:18:26,563
So I taped the meeting.
283
00:18:28,190 --> 00:18:30,818
[pilot 1] These guys didn't even know
the damn system was on here.
284
00:18:30,901 --> 00:18:32,069
Nor did anybody else.
285
00:18:32,569 --> 00:18:34,964
[executive] We try not to overload
the crews with information
286
00:18:34,988 --> 00:18:35,989
that's unnecessary.
287
00:18:37,116 --> 00:18:39,036
[pilot 2] I would think
there would be a priority
288
00:18:39,076 --> 00:18:41,995
on explanations of things
that could kill you.
289
00:18:42,496 --> 00:18:44,748
[executive] We take your point.
We really do.
290
00:18:45,499 --> 00:18:49,128
[pilot 2] Is there something being done
where Boeing might address
291
00:18:49,211 --> 00:18:50,891
ways to make sure it doesn't happen again?
292
00:18:51,713 --> 00:18:54,716
[executive] We're looking at relatively
straightforward software changes
293
00:18:54,800 --> 00:18:57,970
that we expect we can get out
in a fairly short period of time.
294
00:18:58,053 --> 00:18:59,179
Maybe six weeks.
295
00:19:00,639 --> 00:19:02,182
They've told us at that meeting,
296
00:19:02,266 --> 00:19:04,768
they're gonna have
a software fix in six weeks.
297
00:19:05,269 --> 00:19:07,938
Nothing gets done in six weeks.
298
00:19:09,606 --> 00:19:13,694
So we asked, "Why don't you just ground
the airplane till you have this fix?"
299
00:19:14,945 --> 00:19:17,906
[executive] 'Cause no one
has yet concluded
300
00:19:18,407 --> 00:19:21,535
that the sole cause of this
was dysfunction of the airplane.
301
00:19:22,536 --> 00:19:24,705
[Pasztor] They could have grounded
the plane,
302
00:19:25,330 --> 00:19:31,170
but Boeing had the stature to say,
"This is a terrible thing that happened."
303
00:19:31,253 --> 00:19:33,297
"We're working on it. Trust us."
304
00:19:33,797 --> 00:19:35,799
[news anchor] Joining me
right now is the chairman,
305
00:19:35,883 --> 00:19:38,677
president, and CEO of Boeing,
Dennis Muilenburg.
306
00:19:38,760 --> 00:19:40,655
- Dennis, it's good to see you.
- Good to see you.
307
00:19:40,679 --> 00:19:43,473
Thank you so much for joining us.
What can you tell us in terms of
308
00:19:43,557 --> 00:19:46,518
what was told
to the pilots and the airlines
309
00:19:46,602 --> 00:19:50,105
about any new equipment in that 737.
310
00:19:50,189 --> 00:19:53,275
We've already issued additional bulletins
to our operators and pilots
311
00:19:53,358 --> 00:19:56,820
around the world that point them back
to existing flight procedures
312
00:19:56,904 --> 00:19:58,614
to handle that kind of condition.
313
00:19:58,697 --> 00:20:02,159
The bottom line here
is the 737 Max is safe.
314
00:20:11,960 --> 00:20:14,588
[news anchor] Our breaking news,
an Ethiopian Airlines flight
315
00:20:14,671 --> 00:20:17,716
has crashed shortly after takeoff
from Addis Ababa,
316
00:20:17,799 --> 00:20:21,345
killing all 157 passengers and crew
317
00:20:21,428 --> 00:20:22,763
thought to be on board.
318
00:20:22,846 --> 00:20:23,889
The airline told...
319
00:20:23,972 --> 00:20:29,478
[man] My wife, Nadia, she stayed up,
and at night she would listen to the BBC.
320
00:20:29,561 --> 00:20:32,940
And the BBC said that there was just a...
321
00:20:34,358 --> 00:20:35,484
a crash
322
00:20:36,526 --> 00:20:40,489
of an airplane
that had just left Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
323
00:20:41,865 --> 00:20:46,036
Our daughter, Samya,
had texted us earlier that night to say,
324
00:20:46,536 --> 00:20:51,333
"I just landed in Addis.
Just a few more hours and on to Nairobi."
325
00:20:53,627 --> 00:20:56,088
Samya had had a career in public health.
326
00:20:57,047 --> 00:21:00,384
She had been to Africa
a couple times before.
327
00:21:00,467 --> 00:21:02,427
You know, it's just another trip.
328
00:21:03,220 --> 00:21:07,683
And, uh, so Nadia
woke me up and, uh, said,
329
00:21:08,183 --> 00:21:11,144
"I think Samya was
on a plane that just crashed."
330
00:21:13,188 --> 00:21:15,023
And I thought, "That can't be."
331
00:21:16,358 --> 00:21:17,609
"That can't be."
332
00:21:23,156 --> 00:21:25,117
"It can't be her flight."
333
00:21:25,784 --> 00:21:30,872
And then we found out
it was... she was on Flight 302.
334
00:21:30,956 --> 00:21:33,500
[exhales deeply] That was her plane.
335
00:21:36,503 --> 00:21:41,675
[woman] Everybody else's dad, you know,
drinks alcohol, maybe smokes cigarettes.
336
00:21:42,301 --> 00:21:44,386
My dad was addicted to tea.
337
00:21:45,470 --> 00:21:47,973
He would have 20 cups a day.
338
00:21:49,808 --> 00:21:51,518
He was going back to Kenya
339
00:21:52,019 --> 00:21:55,522
because he wanted to better
the community that he grew up in.
340
00:21:56,940 --> 00:21:59,985
He called from the airport,
and he just said, you know,
341
00:22:00,068 --> 00:22:03,572
"Hey, Zippy, I just wanted to let you know
I'm about to board the flight."
342
00:22:03,655 --> 00:22:05,699
It was about 8:00 p.m. at night,
343
00:22:05,782 --> 00:22:08,577
and I remember I sat on my couch
and said, "Okay, Dad."
344
00:22:09,161 --> 00:22:13,081
I just remember he said, "I love you."
And I said, you know, "I love you too."
345
00:22:16,752 --> 00:22:18,420
[phone ringing]
346
00:22:19,296 --> 00:22:21,882
The next morning, my phone was ringing,
347
00:22:22,966 --> 00:22:24,634
and it's my brother calling.
348
00:22:25,510 --> 00:22:28,722
And he said,
"I need you to brace yourself."
349
00:22:28,805 --> 00:22:32,893
"There's a plane
that has crashed in Ethiopia,
350
00:22:32,976 --> 00:22:35,687
and there's a high chance
that it's the flight that Dad was on."
351
00:22:36,730 --> 00:22:40,067
And I was like,
"Dad never flew on Ethiopian Airlines,
352
00:22:40,734 --> 00:22:45,447
so he definitely wasn't on that plane."
And he was like, "No, this time he did."
353
00:22:49,785 --> 00:22:52,037
[Stumo] Nadia said,
"We... we have to go there."
354
00:22:53,997 --> 00:22:55,957
So, we drove to JFK
355
00:22:56,458 --> 00:22:57,667
and got on a plane.
356
00:23:02,839 --> 00:23:07,344
When we got to Ethiopia, they wouldn't let
people go to the crash site.
357
00:23:08,220 --> 00:23:10,430
So we stayed in Addis Ababa,
358
00:23:11,556 --> 00:23:13,850
as did many other families.
359
00:23:16,186 --> 00:23:20,565
It took us three days
to really verify that there just is no...
360
00:23:22,859 --> 00:23:24,694
bodies to recover.
361
00:23:26,113 --> 00:23:29,282
So finally they took us to the crash site.
362
00:23:29,366 --> 00:23:32,119
[all crying]
363
00:23:33,537 --> 00:23:35,664
[Stumo] There was
a few plane parts around,
364
00:23:36,623 --> 00:23:39,167
not nearly enough
to make up a whole plane.
365
00:23:41,545 --> 00:23:45,924
There were personal things
strewn all around the crash site.
366
00:23:47,217 --> 00:23:49,761
Some clothes that were fluttering about.
367
00:23:49,845 --> 00:23:51,555
Some papers fluttering about.
368
00:23:55,016 --> 00:23:56,268
And there was a hole.
369
00:23:57,519 --> 00:24:00,772
The plane went 500, 600 miles an hour
370
00:24:00,856 --> 00:24:03,900
straight into the...
straight into the ground.
371
00:24:05,235 --> 00:24:07,237
[sobbing]
372
00:24:07,320 --> 00:24:10,991
[Stumo] I saw people gathered
about the crater looking down.
373
00:24:12,951 --> 00:24:14,536
Some brought flowers.
374
00:24:16,288 --> 00:24:21,042
Nadia had brought flowers,
roses for Samya Rose and threw them...
375
00:24:24,504 --> 00:24:25,505
threw them in.
376
00:24:26,298 --> 00:24:28,550
[crying]
377
00:24:39,644 --> 00:24:43,231
[Pasztor] Just the idea that a plane
within five months, the same plane,
378
00:24:43,315 --> 00:24:47,486
a new plane went down
in eerily similar circumstances,
379
00:24:47,986 --> 00:24:52,616
close to the airport,
relatively low altitude, not bad weather.
380
00:24:52,699 --> 00:24:57,287
All the obvious reasons
that planes would... would... would crash.
381
00:24:57,370 --> 00:25:00,332
Boeing faces a lot
of safety questions this morning
382
00:25:00,415 --> 00:25:04,044
because this is the second crash
in just five months involving
383
00:25:04,127 --> 00:25:06,338
their best-selling passenger jet.
384
00:25:06,421 --> 00:25:09,382
Major US carriers use this new aircraft.
385
00:25:09,466 --> 00:25:12,260
Hundreds are in service,
thousands are on order,
386
00:25:12,344 --> 00:25:15,805
and there are calls
this morning to ground all of them.
387
00:25:16,932 --> 00:25:18,850
[Ostrower] Two crashes
of brand-new airplanes
388
00:25:18,934 --> 00:25:20,727
within five months of each other.
389
00:25:21,228 --> 00:25:24,314
That doesn't happen in modern aviation.
390
00:25:25,190 --> 00:25:27,651
But Boeing would not publicly consider
391
00:25:27,734 --> 00:25:30,904
that something was... was wrong
with the design of the airplane.
392
00:25:30,987 --> 00:25:33,949
There are a lot of passengers
who are afraid of the Max.
393
00:25:34,032 --> 00:25:36,451
Again, our commitment
to safety is unwavering,
394
00:25:36,535 --> 00:25:39,079
and, uh, we do regret
the impact that this has had...
395
00:25:39,663 --> 00:25:42,832
Safety is at the core
of who we are at Boeing.
396
00:25:43,333 --> 00:25:46,211
And ensuring safe
and reliable travel on our airplanes...
397
00:25:46,294 --> 00:25:50,006
The statement coming from Boeing,
"Safety is Boeing's number one priority."
398
00:25:50,090 --> 00:25:53,051
"We have full confidence
in the safety of the Max."
399
00:25:53,134 --> 00:25:56,972
"It is also important to note
that the Federal Aviation Administration
400
00:25:57,055 --> 00:26:00,725
is not mandating
any further action at this time."
401
00:26:02,060 --> 00:26:03,060
[Pasztor] The FAA,
402
00:26:03,478 --> 00:26:05,480
the Federal Aviation Administration,
403
00:26:05,564 --> 00:26:08,692
who's in charge
of aviation safety in the US,
404
00:26:08,775 --> 00:26:11,403
had the power to ground the aircraft.
405
00:26:13,446 --> 00:26:15,740
[Cox] The FAA said
it was waiting for data,
406
00:26:16,324 --> 00:26:18,410
and until we have that data,
407
00:26:18,994 --> 00:26:21,204
making a decision would be premature.
408
00:26:22,080 --> 00:26:24,874
So they didn't make
a decision one way or the other.
409
00:26:24,958 --> 00:26:26,459
[speaking Chinese]
410
00:26:26,543 --> 00:26:31,756
[Pasztor] The day after the crash,
the Chinese absolutely floored everyone
411
00:26:31,840 --> 00:26:35,427
when they, on their own,
unilaterally ground this aircraft.
412
00:26:35,510 --> 00:26:38,388
[continues speaking Chinese]
413
00:26:38,471 --> 00:26:42,601
And that started a whole series of moves
414
00:26:42,684 --> 00:26:44,311
by other countries.
415
00:26:44,394 --> 00:26:46,730
[news anchor] Australia,
New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore,
416
00:26:46,813 --> 00:26:49,899
France, Germany, Italy,
UK, Ireland, Netherlands.
417
00:26:49,983 --> 00:26:51,067
I could go on.
418
00:26:51,568 --> 00:26:54,821
It does seem like
a bit of a rebuke of the FAA.
419
00:26:56,448 --> 00:26:57,574
[woman] If an issue
420
00:26:58,450 --> 00:27:02,579
that affects safety is identified,
421
00:27:02,662 --> 00:27:07,125
the department and the FAA
will not hesitate
422
00:27:07,208 --> 00:27:10,962
to take immediate and appropriate action.
423
00:27:11,546 --> 00:27:14,633
[Stumo] To us,
to the families of the victims,
424
00:27:15,216 --> 00:27:18,720
it was astounding
that the plane was still up in the air,
425
00:27:19,220 --> 00:27:22,641
especially after two crashes.
426
00:27:22,724 --> 00:27:25,977
We turn now to new developments
in the deadly Ethiopian Airlines crash.
427
00:27:26,061 --> 00:27:27,562
With a cause still a mystery,
428
00:27:27,646 --> 00:27:30,273
the black boxes
are being analyzed in France,
429
00:27:30,357 --> 00:27:33,610
as new details emerge
about the flight's final moments.
430
00:27:34,194 --> 00:27:36,988
[Tajer] We're getting
more information on the flight path,
431
00:27:37,072 --> 00:27:41,034
and it's looking
very similar to the Lion Air crash.
432
00:27:43,453 --> 00:27:46,998
And then in Ethiopia,
they found the jackscrew.
433
00:27:48,291 --> 00:27:51,878
Jackscrew is this long screw,
about so thick,
434
00:27:52,379 --> 00:27:54,714
that operates the stabilizer trim.
435
00:27:57,926 --> 00:28:02,180
They found the jackscrew
in a full nose-down position.
436
00:28:03,682 --> 00:28:05,350
Hands down, it was the MCAS.
437
00:28:06,601 --> 00:28:08,019
Within 30 minutes,
438
00:28:08,103 --> 00:28:09,854
President Trump is on television,
439
00:28:09,938 --> 00:28:11,314
grounding the airplane.
440
00:28:11,398 --> 00:28:14,693
I'm gonna be issuing
an emergency order of prohibition
441
00:28:14,776 --> 00:28:20,532
to ground all flights of the 737 Max 8
442
00:28:20,615 --> 00:28:23,868
and the 737 Max 9.
443
00:28:23,952 --> 00:28:26,996
Any plane currently in the air
will go to its destination
444
00:28:27,080 --> 00:28:30,458
and thereafter be grounded
until further notice.
445
00:28:36,715 --> 00:28:39,175
To my knowledge, it's the only airplane
446
00:28:39,259 --> 00:28:41,928
ever to be grounded
by the president of the United States.
447
00:28:43,054 --> 00:28:46,057
But even after the Max was grounded,
448
00:28:46,141 --> 00:28:49,018
and the planes had to be flown
to storage facilities,
449
00:28:50,270 --> 00:28:53,648
we had pilots calling to say
they don't want to fly them there.
450
00:28:55,358 --> 00:28:59,195
When a pilot doesn't want
to fly a brand-new Boeing,
451
00:29:00,780 --> 00:29:01,781
that's an issue.
452
00:29:20,717 --> 00:29:22,719
[man] Two days after the second crash,
453
00:29:23,219 --> 00:29:25,013
I started an investigation.
454
00:29:26,222 --> 00:29:29,517
We knew something big was afoot here,
455
00:29:29,601 --> 00:29:32,729
that this plane appeared
to be defective in some manner.
456
00:29:33,605 --> 00:29:35,690
I had just hired my investigative staff,
and I said,
457
00:29:35,774 --> 00:29:38,318
"Here's your first job, Boeing 737 Max."
458
00:29:40,779 --> 00:29:44,240
[Pasztor] In addition to Congress
trying to get to the bottom of this,
459
00:29:44,741 --> 00:29:49,454
the families of the victims
really took this on as a personal issue.
460
00:29:51,206 --> 00:29:54,501
They felt that there
needed to be some explanation
461
00:29:54,584 --> 00:29:58,880
of how two planes could have crashed
within such a short period of time.
462
00:30:01,382 --> 00:30:04,260
[Stumo] The crash families
started coming to DC
463
00:30:04,969 --> 00:30:09,766
to help put pressure on Congress
to hold Boeing responsible.
464
00:30:11,100 --> 00:30:13,853
Peter DeFazio, we're indebted to,
465
00:30:13,937 --> 00:30:16,272
because he made this
the biggest investigation
466
00:30:16,356 --> 00:30:19,567
in the history of the Transportation
Infrastructure Committee.
467
00:30:20,568 --> 00:30:23,822
Paul Njoroge from Kenya lost his wife,
468
00:30:23,905 --> 00:30:25,198
his three children,
469
00:30:25,990 --> 00:30:27,325
and his mother-in-law.
470
00:30:28,201 --> 00:30:30,411
[Sethi] I've been in touch
with the crash families,
471
00:30:30,495 --> 00:30:33,915
and we definitely talk
about how to go about it
472
00:30:34,415 --> 00:30:37,377
and understand what
has to be done to get justice.
473
00:30:40,755 --> 00:30:42,423
This is who we've lost.
474
00:30:44,801 --> 00:30:47,428
This is the cost
of doing business as usual.
475
00:30:49,430 --> 00:30:53,726
[Kuria] I remember looking
at the full list of passenger names
476
00:30:54,561 --> 00:30:57,438
from so many different countries.
477
00:30:57,522 --> 00:31:00,441
People all over the world
have been impacted
478
00:31:00,525 --> 00:31:01,985
by what has taken place.
479
00:31:02,068 --> 00:31:04,237
[speaking Chinese]
480
00:31:04,320 --> 00:31:06,990
[speaking Spanish]
481
00:31:07,073 --> 00:31:10,827
[speaking Swahili]
482
00:31:10,910 --> 00:31:14,289
[speaking French]
483
00:31:14,372 --> 00:31:17,041
[Sethi] We want this thing
to come out in the public.
484
00:31:18,167 --> 00:31:20,169
We want Boeing to show all the papers.
485
00:31:20,253 --> 00:31:22,255
We want them to come out
with the true facts.
486
00:31:25,049 --> 00:31:27,552
[DeFazio] When we started
the investigation,
487
00:31:27,635 --> 00:31:31,639
a lot of people around the world
were angry and appalled
488
00:31:31,723 --> 00:31:33,474
at what had been allowed to happen.
489
00:31:34,058 --> 00:31:36,019
Do you feel your story is getting out?
490
00:31:36,769 --> 00:31:39,355
I... right now it is
because we're having a hearing.
491
00:31:39,439 --> 00:31:42,066
My concern is that weeks will pass,
492
00:31:42,150 --> 00:31:45,278
and... and the FAA
will just put the plane back in the air
493
00:31:45,361 --> 00:31:46,446
without any scrutiny.
494
00:31:46,529 --> 00:31:48,281
They have the power to do that.
495
00:31:49,198 --> 00:31:51,326
[DeFazio] In the United States of America,
496
00:31:51,409 --> 00:31:53,786
Congress has oversight duties,
497
00:31:53,870 --> 00:31:54,871
plain and simple.
498
00:31:55,580 --> 00:32:01,002
And the question was,
did Boeing put an unsafe plane in the air?
499
00:32:01,878 --> 00:32:04,255
- [gavel knocking]
- [DeFazio] Meeting come to order.
500
00:32:04,756 --> 00:32:07,717
We're here today in response
to two catastrophic crashes
501
00:32:07,800 --> 00:32:12,055
that claimed 346 lives
in the span of five months.
502
00:32:12,555 --> 00:32:16,476
We're very much in the beginning
of, uh, our investigation.
503
00:32:17,060 --> 00:32:20,563
I would like to recognize
the family members of those killed,
504
00:32:20,647 --> 00:32:22,649
uh, some of whom are here today,
505
00:32:22,732 --> 00:32:25,818
and we're here to ensure
that the lives of your family members
506
00:32:25,902 --> 00:32:28,905
were not lost, uh,
in vain and without response.
507
00:32:29,405 --> 00:32:33,159
Today, we'll hear from pilots
and other safety professionals
508
00:32:33,242 --> 00:32:35,078
who, uh, work on those planes.
509
00:32:35,745 --> 00:32:38,414
Now, the question is,
what were the factors?
510
00:32:39,207 --> 00:32:43,753
[Pasztor] Congress's goal, of course,
was first to lay out for the public
511
00:32:43,836 --> 00:32:45,713
what happened and why,
512
00:32:45,797 --> 00:32:48,883
and secondly,
to look at legislative changes
513
00:32:48,967 --> 00:32:51,135
that could prevent future crashes.
514
00:32:52,220 --> 00:32:54,806
After the second crash occurred,
515
00:32:54,889 --> 00:32:59,268
Boeing was trying to push
the focus onto the Ethiopian pilots.
516
00:32:59,936 --> 00:33:03,231
They acknowledged that MCAS had misfired
517
00:33:03,314 --> 00:33:06,359
but maintained that the Ethiopian crew
518
00:33:06,442 --> 00:33:10,989
did not do everything precisely
as they were supposed to.
519
00:33:12,073 --> 00:33:15,493
It was the same argument
they used with Lion Air,
520
00:33:16,411 --> 00:33:20,957
and they waged a pretty vigorous
public relations campaign
521
00:33:21,040 --> 00:33:23,001
to try to get their point across.
522
00:33:24,043 --> 00:33:28,464
We learned that Boeing's lobbyists
were hiring firms in Washington
523
00:33:28,548 --> 00:33:33,302
to spread the message
that foreign pilots were to blame.
524
00:33:33,803 --> 00:33:37,223
Captain Carey, uh, Ethiopia Air,
the pilot in the right seat
525
00:33:37,306 --> 00:33:39,976
could not fly at our standards here.
526
00:33:40,059 --> 00:33:43,354
We need to look at
their pilot qualifications and training.
527
00:33:43,438 --> 00:33:48,151
You know, Ethiopian Airlines flies a plane
into, uh, Washington Dulles every day
528
00:33:48,234 --> 00:33:50,445
from Addis Ababa,
and they have been doing it for years.
529
00:33:50,528 --> 00:33:52,613
They have a proud aviation culture,
530
00:33:53,239 --> 00:33:56,117
and you have to remember,
uh, sir, and members of the panel,
531
00:33:56,200 --> 00:33:58,995
this is a sudden violent
and terrifying event.
532
00:33:59,912 --> 00:34:02,957
[congressman] Captain Sullenberger,
is it fair to blame these pilots?
533
00:34:03,041 --> 00:34:06,419
I just don't want to take the easy path
and blame... blame the pilots.
534
00:34:06,919 --> 00:34:09,088
[Sullenberger] We shouldn't be blaming
the pilots,
535
00:34:09,172 --> 00:34:13,926
and we shouldn't expect pilots
to have to compensate for flawed designs.
536
00:34:14,510 --> 00:34:17,263
These crews would have been fighting
for their lives
537
00:34:17,764 --> 00:34:19,557
in the fight of their lives.
538
00:34:33,488 --> 00:34:35,865
[Pasztor] Soon after the hearings
got underway,
539
00:34:35,948 --> 00:34:40,328
we managed to get more information
about what actually happened
540
00:34:40,411 --> 00:34:43,498
in the cockpit of the Ethiopian aircraft.
541
00:34:44,916 --> 00:34:47,752
We got the information from the FAA
542
00:34:47,835 --> 00:34:52,090
within hours after they received it
from the Ethiopian investigators.
543
00:34:54,217 --> 00:34:55,843
It was very late at night,
544
00:34:55,927 --> 00:34:59,263
and we tried to put together
the most comprehensive story we could.
545
00:35:03,434 --> 00:35:04,811
When it came out,
546
00:35:04,894 --> 00:35:08,397
this was the first story that revealed
547
00:35:08,481 --> 00:35:13,194
that the crew, in fact,
realized that MCAS had kicked off.
548
00:35:14,362 --> 00:35:17,156
And they did
what Boeing instructed them to do.
549
00:35:23,955 --> 00:35:25,540
[Tajer] When the MCAS kicks in,
550
00:35:26,749 --> 00:35:28,543
it runs for ten seconds
551
00:35:29,043 --> 00:35:32,130
and pushes the airplane
very powerfully nose-down.
552
00:35:34,882 --> 00:35:37,093
Runs for ten, off for five.
553
00:35:37,844 --> 00:35:40,429
Runs for ten, off for five.
554
00:35:43,266 --> 00:35:46,811
[Cox] They've got
this cacophony of stick shaker,
555
00:35:46,894 --> 00:35:50,231
master cautions,
airspeed disagree, altitude disagree.
556
00:35:50,815 --> 00:35:52,984
All of these... these warnings going off.
557
00:35:53,776 --> 00:35:58,739
The captain, who's flying the airplane,
is trying to figure out what's gone wrong.
558
00:36:01,033 --> 00:36:05,037
[Tajer] The first officer called out,
"Stab trim cutout switches, Captain."
559
00:36:05,121 --> 00:36:06,622
I think he said it twice.
560
00:36:07,248 --> 00:36:08,666
He did what Boeing said.
561
00:36:09,625 --> 00:36:11,502
He turned off the MCAS system.
562
00:36:12,712 --> 00:36:15,840
I remember reading that,
and I said, "Man, the kid got it right."
563
00:36:16,841 --> 00:36:18,092
"The kid got it right."
564
00:36:19,135 --> 00:36:23,181
[Cox] The problem now
is that the airplane is going too fast.
565
00:36:24,307 --> 00:36:27,185
And because of the force
on the tail itself,
566
00:36:28,019 --> 00:36:30,938
they cannot manually trim the airplane
567
00:36:31,022 --> 00:36:32,523
to be able to recover.
568
00:36:40,656 --> 00:36:42,241
[warning siren blares]
569
00:36:42,325 --> 00:36:45,703
[on-board computer] Terrain. Terrain.
Pull up. Pull up.
570
00:36:51,083 --> 00:36:53,085
[indistinct chattering]
571
00:37:14,482 --> 00:37:18,361
[Pasztor] The pilots in the first crash
had no inkling.
572
00:37:19,612 --> 00:37:22,031
Their plane was behaving
completely differently
573
00:37:22,114 --> 00:37:26,035
from the way that they had ever seen it,
and they didn't know what to do.
574
00:37:27,578 --> 00:37:29,121
In the Ethiopian airplane,
575
00:37:29,205 --> 00:37:32,541
it was a crew
that had been briefed by Boeing
576
00:37:32,625 --> 00:37:34,877
on how this MCAS system worked.
577
00:37:35,378 --> 00:37:37,880
And they did
what they were supposed to do.
578
00:37:38,631 --> 00:37:40,258
They turned the system off,
579
00:37:41,634 --> 00:37:43,177
and they still crashed.
580
00:37:44,595 --> 00:37:48,599
For Boeing, this was a tremendous problem
581
00:37:49,433 --> 00:37:52,395
and extremely damaging
to their reputation.
582
00:37:53,646 --> 00:37:57,275
A reputation
that had been years in the making.
583
00:38:30,725 --> 00:38:33,436
[man] My father was
a fighter pilot in the Air Force
584
00:38:34,103 --> 00:38:36,022
and an engineer at the Boeing Company.
585
00:38:36,856 --> 00:38:39,608
Boeing was headquartered
here in the Pacific Northwest,
586
00:38:40,443 --> 00:38:43,487
and far and away,
it was Seattle's biggest employer.
587
00:38:45,281 --> 00:38:46,824
The Boeing pay was good,
588
00:38:47,325 --> 00:38:51,370
so my father was able
to provide us a nice house
589
00:38:51,454 --> 00:38:55,541
and, you know, put himself
square in the middle of the middle class.
590
00:38:57,335 --> 00:38:59,628
Boeing was an engineering firm first,
591
00:38:59,712 --> 00:39:02,840
and it had always been engineering-led.
592
00:39:04,008 --> 00:39:07,219
By focusing on quality and innovation,
593
00:39:07,303 --> 00:39:11,223
they created the products
that made Boeing part of America's pride
594
00:39:12,224 --> 00:39:15,436
and had a tremendous impact
on the country's economy.
595
00:39:17,813 --> 00:39:22,735
[Cox] Boeing's signatures are on some
of the greatest technical advances made
596
00:39:23,319 --> 00:39:24,737
during the 20th century.
597
00:39:25,946 --> 00:39:29,450
Military airplanes,
unmanned vehicles, spacecraft,
598
00:39:29,533 --> 00:39:32,620
and most notably,
commercial passenger jets,
599
00:39:33,287 --> 00:39:36,791
starting in the late '50s with the 707.
600
00:39:38,459 --> 00:39:41,045
That was followed by the 727
601
00:39:41,629 --> 00:39:44,298
and then the workhorse
of the fleet, the 737.
602
00:39:45,758 --> 00:39:47,885
[woman] There was just amazing engineering
603
00:39:47,968 --> 00:39:49,553
that was coming out of Seattle.
604
00:39:50,679 --> 00:39:54,183
Boeing's history of safety
and quality first
605
00:39:54,266 --> 00:39:57,478
was something that the American public
came to understand.
606
00:39:58,729 --> 00:40:01,524
People knew that if it's a Boeing plane,
607
00:40:01,607 --> 00:40:02,900
they felt safe.
608
00:40:04,819 --> 00:40:06,904
[Cox] It was the dawn of the Jet Age,
609
00:40:07,488 --> 00:40:09,156
and Boeing excelled at it.
610
00:40:10,241 --> 00:40:14,203
They were cranking out
new modern airplanes one after the other.
611
00:40:15,663 --> 00:40:20,209
And then, in the late '60s,
Boeing took an almost unimaginable risk.
612
00:40:20,876 --> 00:40:22,356
[announcer] The mostest of everything
613
00:40:22,420 --> 00:40:26,006
describes the new giant
of commercial aviation, the jetliner 747.
614
00:40:26,507 --> 00:40:31,846
Contrasted with conventional aircraft,
the 747 will carry 490 passengers.
615
00:40:31,929 --> 00:40:35,433
Its engines will be
twice as powerful as today's airliners.
616
00:40:35,516 --> 00:40:38,686
The first of these great birds
will be delivered by the Boeing Company
617
00:40:38,769 --> 00:40:41,313
to Pan American Airways in 1969.
618
00:40:43,107 --> 00:40:46,485
[Ludtke] The 747 program was a moon shot.
619
00:40:48,195 --> 00:40:51,657
Boeing bet on itself
to put together a fantastic airplane.
620
00:40:52,783 --> 00:40:56,579
And they'd said it's gonna be the safest.
It's gonna be the most innovative.
621
00:40:56,662 --> 00:40:58,247
It's gonna be the best.
622
00:41:00,207 --> 00:41:03,210
[Cox] The 747 revolutionized air travel.
623
00:41:04,128 --> 00:41:06,839
For the very first time,
it became affordable
624
00:41:06,922 --> 00:41:09,300
for people to travel internationally,
625
00:41:09,383 --> 00:41:11,510
and it brought the world closer together.
626
00:41:14,430 --> 00:41:16,265
[Ludtke] The moon shots like the 747
627
00:41:16,974 --> 00:41:18,976
are what put
the Boeing Company on the map.
628
00:41:20,436 --> 00:41:24,315
It was, we're gonna do this at all cost.
Whatever it costs, we're gonna do it.
629
00:41:27,234 --> 00:41:29,945
[Cole] I worked
for the Boeing Company for 32 years.
630
00:41:30,446 --> 00:41:32,990
It was a culture of mutual trust,
631
00:41:33,491 --> 00:41:37,161
and we're in this together,
building a quality-engineered product
632
00:41:37,244 --> 00:41:38,579
that makes us all proud.
633
00:41:38,662 --> 00:41:40,748
- [employee] That looks good.
- Okay? Thank you.
634
00:41:43,292 --> 00:41:47,296
[man] When I was working for Boeing,
they came out with this team-wear for us,
635
00:41:47,880 --> 00:41:49,757
and it had the Boeing logo on it.
636
00:41:49,840 --> 00:41:53,385
You know, and at first, we're like,
"Pfft, you know, who wants team-wear?"
637
00:41:53,469 --> 00:41:56,889
But it was amazing
when you actually put that shirt on,
638
00:41:56,972 --> 00:41:58,307
and you go out in public.
639
00:41:58,891 --> 00:42:02,436
And I can't tell you how many people
that were just, "Oh my God,
640
00:42:02,520 --> 00:42:04,438
you work for Boeing. That is wonderful."
641
00:42:04,522 --> 00:42:05,940
[employee] Looking good, Don.
642
00:42:06,023 --> 00:42:08,150
[Barnett] And it really instilled
a lot of pride.
643
00:42:08,234 --> 00:42:12,530
- [employee 1] Perfect!
- [employees cheering and clapping]
644
00:42:12,613 --> 00:42:14,323
All right, all right. Good job, you guys!
645
00:42:14,406 --> 00:42:16,926
- [employee 1] There it is, first one.
- [employee 2] First one.
646
00:42:18,452 --> 00:42:22,081
I really loved working there
because I had a say.
647
00:42:22,164 --> 00:42:23,791
And when something wasn't right,
648
00:42:23,874 --> 00:42:26,710
I could bring it up,
and I wasn't afraid of being fired.
649
00:42:28,087 --> 00:42:30,839
Boeing management
knew that safety came first,
650
00:42:30,923 --> 00:42:33,801
and if we'd said, "Hey, it's not safe.
It's not ready to fly,"
651
00:42:33,884 --> 00:42:35,052
we're... we're not going.
652
00:42:37,763 --> 00:42:41,433
[Barnett] The culture back then
was we're all in this together,
653
00:42:41,517 --> 00:42:43,852
and, you know,
Boeing's gonna look out for you,
654
00:42:43,936 --> 00:42:46,480
and we expect you to look out for Boeing.
655
00:42:46,564 --> 00:42:48,482
[emcee] Now will you please join me
in welcoming
656
00:42:48,566 --> 00:42:52,570
the 777 division vice president
and general manager, Alan Mulally.
657
00:42:52,653 --> 00:42:53,821
[crowd cheering]
658
00:42:53,904 --> 00:42:55,614
So, good morning to you all.
659
00:42:56,657 --> 00:42:59,910
[Barnett] There was a sense
of belonging and a sense of structure
660
00:42:59,994 --> 00:43:02,079
and a sense of family.
661
00:43:02,871 --> 00:43:03,956
We were a family.
662
00:43:04,039 --> 00:43:06,125
[Mulally] We've come a long way together.
663
00:43:06,208 --> 00:43:08,669
[Barnett] It was
an excellent company to work for.
664
00:43:11,630 --> 00:43:16,176
And then, imagine coming into work,
and you got a whole new set of bosses,
665
00:43:16,260 --> 00:43:19,722
and everything you've learned
in 30 years is now wrong.
666
00:43:19,805 --> 00:43:23,267
Good evening, everyone.
It is a multibillion-dollar deal
667
00:43:23,350 --> 00:43:26,103
that is sending shock waves
through the aerospace industry.
668
00:43:26,186 --> 00:43:28,063
The planned merger
between the Boeing Company
669
00:43:28,147 --> 00:43:29,273
and McDonnell Douglas.
670
00:43:29,857 --> 00:43:33,527
The thought that was going through my head
as I walked up here was, "Wow."
671
00:43:33,611 --> 00:43:39,366
I will serve as the chairman
and CEO of the company.
672
00:43:39,450 --> 00:43:42,578
Harry Stonecipher will serve
as the president
673
00:43:42,661 --> 00:43:45,372
and chief operating officer
of the company.
674
00:43:46,040 --> 00:43:48,250
And our intention, like we expect
675
00:43:48,334 --> 00:43:51,837
of everyone in the organization
is to work together.
676
00:43:51,920 --> 00:43:54,798
And with that, I'd like
to introduce Harry Stonecipher. Harry.
677
00:43:56,133 --> 00:43:57,301
Thank you, Phil.
678
00:43:57,384 --> 00:43:58,636
Ladies and gentlemen...
679
00:43:59,136 --> 00:44:03,557
[man] The 1996 acquisition
of McDonnell Douglas by Boeing
680
00:44:03,641 --> 00:44:06,769
was part and parcel
of what was happening across the country.
681
00:44:07,978 --> 00:44:10,689
Merger, buyouts, consolidation.
682
00:44:11,190 --> 00:44:15,402
That was the way companies viewed
their ability to stay competitive.
683
00:44:16,570 --> 00:44:19,531
Boeing's place in the aviation industry
684
00:44:19,615 --> 00:44:20,783
was preeminent.
685
00:44:20,866 --> 00:44:22,159
They were the gold standard.
686
00:44:22,242 --> 00:44:25,162
They were the people you looked up to
for their engineering excellence.
687
00:44:26,121 --> 00:44:31,001
But that began to fall apart
when McDonnell Douglas and Boeing merged.
688
00:44:32,753 --> 00:44:36,674
[Ludtke] Harry Stonecipher
was the CEO of McDonnell Douglas,
689
00:44:36,757 --> 00:44:40,511
and he ended up
the CEO of the Boeing Company.
690
00:44:41,220 --> 00:44:43,055
So, pretty quickly,
691
00:44:43,138 --> 00:44:46,350
McDonnell Douglas
became in charge at the very top.
692
00:44:47,851 --> 00:44:51,021
[Goldfarb] This was following
on the heels of the 1980s
693
00:44:51,605 --> 00:44:53,691
when cash was king on Wall Street.
694
00:44:54,566 --> 00:44:56,193
You know, uh, "Greed is good."
695
00:44:59,113 --> 00:45:03,992
When Harry Stonecipher took over,
he believed that the most important thing
696
00:45:04,076 --> 00:45:07,162
was to take a company
and create value on Wall Street.
697
00:45:07,663 --> 00:45:09,790
He said, "Hey,
we're in business to make money."
698
00:45:10,290 --> 00:45:15,045
I want to hear about product and margin.
I want to hear that it's cost-effective.
699
00:45:16,672 --> 00:45:18,465
[Ostrower]
The McDonnell Douglas leadership
700
00:45:18,549 --> 00:45:20,801
took Boeing
in a more accelerated direction
701
00:45:20,884 --> 00:45:23,470
toward being a financially driven company.
702
00:45:24,221 --> 00:45:26,348
Wall Street demanded
its shareholder returns.
703
00:45:26,432 --> 00:45:30,602
And they wanted Boeing
to act like a big industrial company
704
00:45:30,686 --> 00:45:32,396
that delivered those returns.
705
00:45:34,523 --> 00:45:36,400
[Ludtke] Not long after the merger,
706
00:45:36,483 --> 00:45:39,528
there was a major campaign launched
707
00:45:39,611 --> 00:45:40,863
called ShareValue.
708
00:45:41,655 --> 00:45:46,034
And the idea was that they wanted
everybody to be aware of the stock price,
709
00:45:46,535 --> 00:45:50,414
and they wanted everybody working together
to increase the stock value.
710
00:45:52,291 --> 00:45:53,709
Even the technical meetings,
711
00:45:53,792 --> 00:45:56,712
everything revolved
around Boeing stock prices.
712
00:45:58,172 --> 00:46:01,383
To turn around and see
the McDonnell Douglas executives
713
00:46:01,467 --> 00:46:04,261
bringing their business plan
into the Boeing Company,
714
00:46:04,344 --> 00:46:05,429
that upset a lot of us.
715
00:46:06,263 --> 00:46:08,766
We knew back then
that that was a bad plan.
716
00:46:10,058 --> 00:46:13,979
They drove the company as if it was
making washing machines, for instance.
717
00:46:14,062 --> 00:46:15,564
[chuckles] Dishwashers.
718
00:46:16,148 --> 00:46:19,777
All the airplanes had to be
manufactured more cheaply.
719
00:46:20,944 --> 00:46:23,489
They were reducing
the number of people working,
720
00:46:23,572 --> 00:46:25,949
expecting everyone to do more with less.
721
00:46:27,993 --> 00:46:31,121
We saw the company
changing before our eyes.
722
00:46:33,624 --> 00:46:37,127
[Cole] You know, I'd been working there
in the Seattle area for a long time,
723
00:46:37,211 --> 00:46:39,755
and the environment
that we ended up merging with
724
00:46:40,339 --> 00:46:41,715
was so different.
725
00:46:42,299 --> 00:46:44,802
McDonnell Douglas was
the good old boys' network.
726
00:46:45,761 --> 00:46:49,264
They weren't respectful
of our processes for our employees.
727
00:46:50,724 --> 00:46:55,437
And then we were told they were moving
the headquarters to Chicago.
728
00:46:55,521 --> 00:46:58,148
It is official.
Boeing is confirming that it's moving
729
00:46:58,232 --> 00:47:00,442
its new international headquarters
to Chicago.
730
00:47:01,109 --> 00:47:04,863
And all of us that had been there
more than a week was like, "You're crazy."
731
00:47:05,447 --> 00:47:10,327
Because back then, Boeing was Seattle,
and Seattle was Boeing. I mean they were...
732
00:47:11,036 --> 00:47:12,162
They were lockstep.
733
00:47:12,663 --> 00:47:14,540
We looked at all the data,
734
00:47:14,623 --> 00:47:18,335
and we believe that Chicago
is the best choice for Boeing.
735
00:47:21,213 --> 00:47:23,715
[Ludtke] One of the arguments
for moving to Chicago
736
00:47:23,799 --> 00:47:28,262
was to gain separation
from the technical people back in Seattle
737
00:47:29,388 --> 00:47:32,474
so that executives
could make financial decisions
738
00:47:32,558 --> 00:47:36,520
without as much pushback
from, um, engineers.
739
00:47:37,938 --> 00:47:41,024
[Cole] Before McDonnell Douglas,
we just didn't take shortcuts
740
00:47:41,108 --> 00:47:43,402
'cause it just wasn't the Boeing culture.
741
00:47:43,485 --> 00:47:44,485
No shortcuts.
742
00:47:45,320 --> 00:47:46,738
You do it right,
743
00:47:46,822 --> 00:47:49,032
and you build in
the quality and the safety,
744
00:47:49,116 --> 00:47:50,409
and the profits will follow.
745
00:47:51,743 --> 00:47:53,495
But all that changed,
746
00:47:53,996 --> 00:47:55,873
and it was just heartbreaking.
747
00:47:57,666 --> 00:48:00,878
I think we all tried
to appease ourselves by saying,
748
00:48:00,961 --> 00:48:03,255
"Well, maybe we're just upset
because it's a change."
749
00:48:04,923 --> 00:48:08,802
But in reality, our gut concerns
were really valid at the time.
750
00:48:09,720 --> 00:48:12,639
That... that this was going to affect
the company in... in ways
751
00:48:12,723 --> 00:48:14,850
that we couldn't... couldn't even imagine.
752
00:48:17,394 --> 00:48:18,812
It's been a bad year for Boeing
753
00:48:18,896 --> 00:48:22,065
and a better year
for its European competitor, Airbus.
754
00:48:22,149 --> 00:48:25,527
For the year, Boeing has 368 new orders,
755
00:48:25,611 --> 00:48:28,196
and Airbus has 427.
756
00:48:28,822 --> 00:48:31,283
By the time that the merger
in 1997 happened,
757
00:48:31,950 --> 00:48:35,495
the competition had just chipped away
at the market share
758
00:48:36,163 --> 00:48:39,124
that Boeing had fought
to acquire over decades.
759
00:48:40,459 --> 00:48:45,088
Boeing found themselves
in a very unusual position.
760
00:48:46,340 --> 00:48:49,426
They were being challenged
by other manufacturers,
761
00:48:49,509 --> 00:48:53,055
and that pressure was primarily coming
from the Europeans,
762
00:48:53,972 --> 00:48:55,057
meaning Airbus.
763
00:48:56,308 --> 00:48:58,644
[Ostrower] Over the years,
there has been a lot
764
00:48:58,727 --> 00:49:01,313
of bad blood between Boeing and Airbus.
765
00:49:02,439 --> 00:49:03,982
But here's the thing about Airbus,
766
00:49:04,066 --> 00:49:06,193
it didn't happen overnight
767
00:49:06,276 --> 00:49:09,613
that it became
this incredible force in the industry.
768
00:49:10,489 --> 00:49:12,824
It happened one little piece at a time.
769
00:49:13,492 --> 00:49:15,911
It was a slow build,
770
00:49:15,994 --> 00:49:17,996
little by little, little by little,
771
00:49:18,080 --> 00:49:22,918
so that by 2003, Airbus ended up
overtaking Boeing's market share.
772
00:49:24,378 --> 00:49:25,712
[Cox] Boeing was behind.
773
00:49:25,796 --> 00:49:27,422
Boeing needed to catch up.
774
00:49:28,590 --> 00:49:32,886
So they started to push
even harder to get the airplanes out.
775
00:49:33,470 --> 00:49:38,934
And over time, the laser focus
on safety that had been traditional
776
00:49:39,643 --> 00:49:40,686
was compromised.
777
00:49:44,523 --> 00:49:47,901
[woman] My job
at Boeing was quality manager.
778
00:49:48,819 --> 00:49:51,259
If something's not right,
you need to find it and get it fixed
779
00:49:51,321 --> 00:49:52,321
or get it corrected.
780
00:49:53,490 --> 00:49:57,077
To ensure safety, finding things
was what you're supposed to do.
781
00:49:58,912 --> 00:50:02,457
But instead of fixing problems,
everything was about speed.
782
00:50:02,541 --> 00:50:06,920
Everything was about getting stuff done.
Let's move it. Let's get it done.
783
00:50:07,004 --> 00:50:08,880
You can't stop. You can't slow down.
784
00:50:10,048 --> 00:50:12,718
[Barnett] Used to be
when you raise your hand and say,
785
00:50:12,801 --> 00:50:14,177
"We got a problem here,"
786
00:50:14,261 --> 00:50:17,055
they would say,
"Yeah, you're right. We're gonna fix it."
787
00:50:17,139 --> 00:50:19,641
After the merger with McDonnell Douglas
788
00:50:19,725 --> 00:50:21,268
and the Airbus coming on,
789
00:50:21,768 --> 00:50:23,937
Boeing quit listening to their employees.
790
00:50:24,604 --> 00:50:27,482
So every time I'd raise my hand and say,
"Hey, we got a problem here,"
791
00:50:27,566 --> 00:50:29,401
they would attack the messenger
792
00:50:29,901 --> 00:50:32,362
and... and ignore the message.
793
00:50:33,405 --> 00:50:36,575
[Goldfarb] Historically, Boeing was
a culture of telling bad news.
794
00:50:36,658 --> 00:50:39,578
They discussed concerns freely
in building planes.
795
00:50:40,203 --> 00:50:41,747
Now it became a problem
796
00:50:41,830 --> 00:50:43,957
that you do not bring
bad news to the boss.
797
00:50:44,916 --> 00:50:47,085
Boeing had highly-paid CEOs,
798
00:50:47,586 --> 00:50:49,963
whose main incentive was
to increase the stock price
799
00:50:50,797 --> 00:50:52,340
and to please Wall Street.
800
00:50:54,509 --> 00:50:58,555
These CEOs demanded
that all their managers hit their marks,
801
00:50:58,638 --> 00:51:00,348
and they don't care how they do that.
802
00:51:02,684 --> 00:51:04,978
[Kitchens] So I guess
to speed up production,
803
00:51:05,062 --> 00:51:09,066
they got quality inspectors,
quality managers out of the picture.
804
00:51:10,400 --> 00:51:12,444
A mechanic could speed up his job
805
00:51:13,028 --> 00:51:17,449
by doing the work and then just saying
to the guy next to him, "Approve this
806
00:51:17,532 --> 00:51:19,284
so that I can move on to the next spot."
807
00:51:20,077 --> 00:51:21,912
[employee] Between me and you,
808
00:51:21,995 --> 00:51:24,456
they didn't put a shim
on the landing gear yesterday.
809
00:51:24,539 --> 00:51:26,875
On the lugs. Night shift didn't.
810
00:51:26,958 --> 00:51:28,168
Oh, fuck.
811
00:51:28,251 --> 00:51:31,588
[employee] They said we don't have time
to fucking put it on.
812
00:51:32,214 --> 00:51:34,466
[Kitchens] They have,
like, one quality person
813
00:51:34,549 --> 00:51:37,344
for almost a whole building on each shift.
814
00:51:38,220 --> 00:51:41,223
We used to have, you know, 15.
815
00:51:42,891 --> 00:51:45,268
[Barnett] I was getting
complaints about debris.
816
00:51:46,061 --> 00:51:50,232
Every day, we were finding crap
on airplanes that people were leaving.
817
00:51:50,732 --> 00:51:52,901
There was drawings, tools,
818
00:51:53,693 --> 00:51:54,736
fasteners.
819
00:51:55,445 --> 00:51:57,280
There was this one 787,
820
00:51:57,948 --> 00:51:59,199
and after a test flight,
821
00:51:59,699 --> 00:52:02,577
they found a ladder
inside the horizontal stabilizer.
822
00:52:03,203 --> 00:52:06,998
All it would have taken was that ladder
to fall up against the jackscrew assembly,
823
00:52:07,082 --> 00:52:09,543
and that... that plane
would have been history.
824
00:52:12,838 --> 00:52:16,800
[Kitchens] These are pictures
of metal shavings in wire bundles.
825
00:52:17,676 --> 00:52:21,638
These shavings can cause
a... a fire or a short.
826
00:52:22,931 --> 00:52:25,142
And these aircraft fly by wire,
827
00:52:25,225 --> 00:52:27,811
so if you have a... a short,
828
00:52:28,353 --> 00:52:30,814
it could cause malfunctions
in your instruments,
829
00:52:30,897 --> 00:52:34,901
in your landing gear. I mean, everything
that runs by wire would be affected.
830
00:52:37,237 --> 00:52:39,156
[Goldfarb] Boeing whistleblowers have said
831
00:52:39,239 --> 00:52:43,285
that anybody that reported
a problem at the South Carolina plant
832
00:52:43,368 --> 00:52:44,452
was either fired
833
00:52:45,537 --> 00:52:47,539
or let go or moved on.
834
00:52:49,499 --> 00:52:53,170
[Barnett] My pay was docked
for putting quality concerns in writing.
835
00:52:54,254 --> 00:52:57,966
They told us flat out they do not want
anything in documentation
836
00:52:58,049 --> 00:53:00,677
so they can maintain culpable deniability.
837
00:53:01,970 --> 00:53:04,014
They don't want anything documented.
838
00:53:16,735 --> 00:53:19,779
[DeFazio] There are a lot of questions
that still remain unanswered,
839
00:53:19,863 --> 00:53:23,033
and Boeing has yet to provide
a single document.
840
00:53:23,116 --> 00:53:27,287
I'm hoping they will provide
the documents we've requested voluntarily,
841
00:53:27,787 --> 00:53:29,873
uh, and in the not-too-distant future.
842
00:53:30,665 --> 00:53:33,001
[DeFazio] From the start
of the investigation,
843
00:53:33,084 --> 00:53:35,337
Boeing has been
very difficult to deal with
844
00:53:35,420 --> 00:53:38,131
in terms of interviews and/or documents.
845
00:53:39,549 --> 00:53:41,384
They have essentially ignored
846
00:53:41,468 --> 00:53:43,261
the families of the victims.
847
00:53:46,097 --> 00:53:49,226
[Kuria] Boeing has never reached out
to us directly.
848
00:53:50,685 --> 00:53:54,648
It communicates their lack of remorse,
their lack of accountability.
849
00:53:55,440 --> 00:53:57,025
And that's infuriating.
850
00:53:59,486 --> 00:54:01,738
For them, it was business as usual.
851
00:54:02,489 --> 00:54:05,867
But we're the ones
who were trying to make sure that
852
00:54:05,951 --> 00:54:09,120
other families never have to deal
with what we're dealing with.
853
00:54:10,956 --> 00:54:16,294
[Stumo] We've met with, I don't know,
55 congressmen and women and senators.
854
00:54:17,671 --> 00:54:18,505
It's hard.
855
00:54:18,588 --> 00:54:23,093
You go, and you relive this
55 times in a row
856
00:54:24,803 --> 00:54:26,680
and talk about your daughter dying.
857
00:54:30,350 --> 00:54:33,979
When we held up
pictures of our lost loved ones
858
00:54:34,062 --> 00:54:37,148
in the hearing room, we were told,
"You're not supposed to do that."
859
00:54:37,232 --> 00:54:39,192
"They're like protest signs."
860
00:54:40,318 --> 00:54:42,737
And we said, "They're not protest signs."
861
00:54:43,363 --> 00:54:44,864
"They're our loved ones."
862
00:54:47,826 --> 00:54:52,372
I personally have probably been
at s... seven hearings.
863
00:54:52,455 --> 00:54:55,875
Good afternoon. Thank you
for inviting me to testify today.
864
00:54:56,376 --> 00:54:58,044
My name is Ed Pierson.
865
00:54:58,128 --> 00:55:01,089
I believe production problems
at the Renton Factory
866
00:55:01,172 --> 00:55:04,175
may have contributed
to these two tragic crashes.
867
00:55:04,884 --> 00:55:09,097
I formally warned Boeing leadership
in writing on multiple occasions,
868
00:55:09,180 --> 00:55:11,891
specifically once
before the Lion Air crash
869
00:55:11,975 --> 00:55:14,227
and again
before the Ethiopian Airlines crash.
870
00:55:15,061 --> 00:55:18,315
Those warnings were ignored. On June 9th...
871
00:55:18,398 --> 00:55:23,111
[Stumo] We've heard
lots of testimony about the 737 Max,
872
00:55:24,321 --> 00:55:27,699
but the committee wanted
actual documents from Boeing.
873
00:55:29,075 --> 00:55:31,745
No documents had been received, nothing.
874
00:55:31,828 --> 00:55:34,331
[DeFazio] We fully expect
at a future hearing
875
00:55:34,414 --> 00:55:35,957
to have Boeing into this committee,
876
00:55:36,041 --> 00:55:39,419
uh, once we have, uh,
the documentation digested
877
00:55:39,502 --> 00:55:43,673
that we need to ask the meaningful,
very pointed questions we will ask.
878
00:55:44,257 --> 00:55:48,428
I was really frustrated. I thought
that Boeing was dragging its feet.
879
00:55:50,430 --> 00:55:54,351
When will you talk to Boeing
as part of your ongoing investigation?
880
00:55:54,434 --> 00:55:57,645
I really, uh, want to have
documents from Boeing
881
00:55:57,729 --> 00:56:01,900
before I call them as a witness so we get
the meaningful information we want
882
00:56:01,983 --> 00:56:04,319
and not just a pile of stuff this high.
883
00:56:05,028 --> 00:56:07,530
[Pasztor] Congress expected answers.
884
00:56:07,614 --> 00:56:10,825
The families of the victims
expected answers.
885
00:56:12,410 --> 00:56:17,040
But Boeing actively tried
to keep emails and documents
886
00:56:17,123 --> 00:56:20,377
and internal memos
out of the public domain.
887
00:56:28,426 --> 00:56:32,472
You know, they say aircraft crashes
are a combination of events
888
00:56:32,555 --> 00:56:34,474
that all come together uniquely.
889
00:56:35,975 --> 00:56:38,395
In this case, one of those events
890
00:56:38,478 --> 00:56:41,189
was back when Boeing
lost its competitive edge.
891
00:56:42,524 --> 00:56:45,151
These days,
Boeing finds itself facing turbulence
892
00:56:45,235 --> 00:56:46,945
caused not by the weather
893
00:56:47,028 --> 00:56:49,614
but by a foreign rival
with some very big ambitions.
894
00:56:50,198 --> 00:56:54,077
[news anchor] Airbus now leads the world
in building commercial airplanes,
895
00:56:54,160 --> 00:56:58,123
a big stick in the eye to America
and to the Boeing Corporation.
896
00:56:59,124 --> 00:57:02,502
[Goldfarb] In the 2000s,
Airbus was on a roll.
897
00:57:03,211 --> 00:57:06,381
They had several years
of selling more planes than Boeing.
898
00:57:07,215 --> 00:57:08,466
And that raised eyebrows.
899
00:57:08,967 --> 00:57:12,178
[news anchor] In 1999,
Boeing delivered 620 planes.
900
00:57:12,262 --> 00:57:14,013
Last year, 285.
901
00:57:15,265 --> 00:57:17,600
[Michael Goldfarb] And then, in 2010,
902
00:57:18,351 --> 00:57:21,354
Airbus introduced the A320neo.
903
00:57:24,232 --> 00:57:30,864
For carriers, the ultimate goal,
of course, is maximum fuel efficiency.
904
00:57:31,823 --> 00:57:36,202
A big part of an airline's cost
is what they paid for fuel.
905
00:57:37,662 --> 00:57:40,039
[Ostrower] Oil prices
had gone to record levels.
906
00:57:40,123 --> 00:57:43,418
Airlines were saying, "We need
fuel efficiency, and we need it now."
907
00:57:44,085 --> 00:57:45,462
And Airbus delivered.
908
00:57:46,254 --> 00:57:47,839
The 320neo.
909
00:57:48,381 --> 00:57:51,092
You scored an absolute home run
910
00:57:51,176 --> 00:57:56,097
by making that decision to get out there
and offer it before Boeing.
911
00:57:56,181 --> 00:58:01,060
No airplane in aviation history
has ever sold so quickly and so well.
912
00:58:02,854 --> 00:58:07,942
Back in Chicago, the neo
sent Boeing into a panic
913
00:58:08,026 --> 00:58:10,069
because they didn't have
a plane ready to compete.
914
00:58:11,696 --> 00:58:14,240
[Pasztor] Boeing thought
about a new aircraft,
915
00:58:14,324 --> 00:58:17,619
but the price tag
would have been significant.
916
00:58:18,453 --> 00:58:21,039
And they didn't have the luxury
917
00:58:21,122 --> 00:58:25,960
of taking seven, eight, ten years
to develop a brand-new plane.
918
00:58:28,922 --> 00:58:33,051
So instead, they decided to put
more fuel-efficient engines
919
00:58:33,551 --> 00:58:35,929
on the existing 737 model.
920
00:58:36,971 --> 00:58:39,057
[woman] We are making a decision
921
00:58:39,140 --> 00:58:41,976
to invest in the 737 family.
922
00:58:42,060 --> 00:58:44,437
We are announcing the 737 Max.
923
00:58:45,647 --> 00:58:49,651
The 737 Max gives our airline customers
924
00:58:49,734 --> 00:58:51,611
the most efficient airplane
925
00:58:52,278 --> 00:58:53,947
in the single-aisle segment.
926
00:58:55,406 --> 00:58:58,660
[Ludtke] We were disappointed.
We wanted a new airplane.
927
00:58:59,452 --> 00:59:03,456
We really believed the 37 had...
was long in the tooth and had...
928
00:59:03,540 --> 00:59:06,751
We had squeezed as much
as we possibly could from that airplane.
929
00:59:07,252 --> 00:59:09,921
I mean, the design was over 40 years old.
930
00:59:15,093 --> 00:59:19,556
[Pasztor] The 737 had been flying
for more than four decades,
931
00:59:20,139 --> 00:59:23,226
and different versions
of them had been developed.
932
00:59:24,102 --> 00:59:26,062
A little bit better of an engine,
933
00:59:26,563 --> 00:59:27,897
digital cockpits,
934
00:59:28,523 --> 00:59:29,732
a little longer.
935
00:59:30,650 --> 00:59:36,030
The 737 Max was seen
as a slightly updated,
936
00:59:36,114 --> 00:59:38,783
more fuel-efficient version
of the same plane.
937
00:59:40,034 --> 00:59:41,536
For a manufacturer,
938
00:59:42,036 --> 00:59:43,955
the advantage of these derivatives,
939
00:59:44,038 --> 00:59:45,456
as they're called,
940
00:59:45,540 --> 00:59:49,877
was they required less time
to get approved by the FAA.
941
00:59:52,046 --> 00:59:54,632
And the added benefit to the airlines
942
00:59:54,716 --> 00:59:58,511
was you might not need
any additional pilot training.
943
00:59:59,220 --> 01:00:02,640
[Ludtke] Training pilots is
a major cost of operating an airline.
944
01:00:03,224 --> 01:00:07,353
Despite how expensive the airplanes are,
it's the people that cost the most.
945
01:00:07,437 --> 01:00:10,940
And training pilots
is a major piece of that pie.
946
01:00:12,483 --> 01:00:16,779
[Goldfarb] If the Max turned out
to be too different from the existing 737,
947
01:00:17,447 --> 01:00:19,699
that would have triggered immediately
948
01:00:19,782 --> 01:00:21,492
an FAA red flag.
949
01:00:22,493 --> 01:00:25,121
And simulator training
would be required fleet-wide
950
01:00:25,204 --> 01:00:26,664
for all Max pilots.
951
01:00:28,750 --> 01:00:31,502
[Pasztor] We're talking about
devoted simulator training,
952
01:00:32,003 --> 01:00:34,130
taking pilots off the flight line,
953
01:00:34,213 --> 01:00:36,049
not having them fly passengers.
954
01:00:36,674 --> 01:00:38,801
Getting them to come
into a training center
955
01:00:38,885 --> 01:00:42,013
and sit for, whatever,
two days in a simulator.
956
01:00:43,056 --> 01:00:46,017
[Ludtke] So when Boeing
was designing the Max,
957
01:00:46,517 --> 01:00:48,811
in order to remain competitive,
958
01:00:48,895 --> 01:00:51,064
they made guarantees to the airlines
959
01:00:51,564 --> 01:00:54,275
that their pilots
wouldn't need simulator training.
960
01:00:55,568 --> 01:00:57,236
[Ostrower] The strategy worked,
961
01:00:57,737 --> 01:01:00,323
and the 737 Max sold phenomenally well.
962
01:01:01,240 --> 01:01:04,702
Boeing got orders
for hundreds and hundreds of airplanes.
963
01:01:04,786 --> 01:01:08,623
[man] This is the largest firm order
that we've ever gotten,
964
01:01:09,123 --> 01:01:12,585
in terms of number of airplanes
and also the value of this deal.
965
01:01:12,669 --> 01:01:15,254
So, truly another historical day for us.
966
01:01:16,923 --> 01:01:19,634
[Ludtke] Boeing thought
that they could do this project
967
01:01:19,717 --> 01:01:21,552
very quickly and very cheaply.
968
01:01:21,636 --> 01:01:23,638
That it wouldn't take much effort.
969
01:01:24,138 --> 01:01:26,474
They just thought
a little bit of tweak to the structure,
970
01:01:26,557 --> 01:01:30,603
and you can stick an engine on there
and lengthen the landing gear,
971
01:01:30,687 --> 01:01:31,979
and you're good to go.
972
01:01:34,732 --> 01:01:38,069
And because there could be
no additional pilot training,
973
01:01:38,778 --> 01:01:40,905
there was tons of motivation
within the company
974
01:01:40,988 --> 01:01:44,867
to either build a design
that doesn't have significant differences
975
01:01:46,119 --> 01:01:49,455
or potentially to cover up
a design that does.
976
01:02:10,435 --> 01:02:15,648
[DeFazio] We had to go through
very lengthy negotiations with Boeing
977
01:02:15,732 --> 01:02:17,358
to receive documents.
978
01:02:18,025 --> 01:02:20,987
We had engaged the House attorneys here,
979
01:02:21,529 --> 01:02:23,698
and then we finally started getting
980
01:02:24,407 --> 01:02:28,453
the first of the hundreds of thousands
of pages of documents that they gave us.
981
01:02:33,458 --> 01:02:35,460
And my investigative staff
982
01:02:35,543 --> 01:02:37,211
started going through it.
983
01:02:41,716 --> 01:02:44,761
Virtually everything
was stamped "proprietary,"
984
01:02:45,428 --> 01:02:48,097
and it took quite some time
to come to an agreement
985
01:02:48,181 --> 01:02:51,851
so we could reveal
the contents of those documents.
986
01:02:54,645 --> 01:03:00,276
And I think the reason is
because they are so damning on their face.
987
01:03:01,694 --> 01:03:03,988
In that massive tranche of documents,
988
01:03:04,572 --> 01:03:06,532
one was particularly telling.
989
01:03:08,534 --> 01:03:11,037
We found out
that a group of Boeing employees
990
01:03:11,120 --> 01:03:15,666
had held a meeting
and discussed the MCAS system.
991
01:03:17,001 --> 01:03:21,047
This memo, discovered
by the committee, and this is early on
992
01:03:21,130 --> 01:03:22,715
in the development of the aircraft,
993
01:03:22,799 --> 01:03:27,303
revealed that the MCAS system
was a problem for Boeing
994
01:03:27,386 --> 01:03:28,805
from the very beginning.
995
01:03:30,181 --> 01:03:31,974
[DeFazio] Back in 2013,
996
01:03:32,058 --> 01:03:35,186
when Boeing was just starting
to build the Max,
997
01:03:35,269 --> 01:03:38,314
they were re-engining
a 45-year-old airframe
998
01:03:38,815 --> 01:03:41,776
with these giant,
new fuel-efficient engines.
999
01:03:42,485 --> 01:03:44,612
Because these engines are bigger,
1000
01:03:45,112 --> 01:03:49,158
they had to be positioned further forward
and higher up on the wings.
1001
01:03:49,826 --> 01:03:53,204
And so Boeing was worried about the plane
1002
01:03:53,287 --> 01:03:56,499
getting into, uh, too much of a nose-up,
1003
01:03:56,999 --> 01:03:59,252
and then the plane could stall.
1004
01:04:00,419 --> 01:04:03,089
So, if it starts to pitch up,
1005
01:04:03,172 --> 01:04:06,968
MCAS was designed
to help the pilot level the plane out.
1006
01:04:09,470 --> 01:04:13,558
[Pasztor] The problem was
MCAS was a significant new system
1007
01:04:13,641 --> 01:04:18,187
and could prompt the FAA
to require some additional training.
1008
01:04:19,021 --> 01:04:21,858
So, what's the solution
in th... in this memo?
1009
01:04:23,109 --> 01:04:26,821
[DeFazio] They said, "If we emphasize
MCAS is a new function,
1010
01:04:27,572 --> 01:04:30,867
there may be greater certification
and training impact."
1011
01:04:32,034 --> 01:04:35,454
Everybody at Boeing knew
you can't have pilot retraining.
1012
01:04:35,538 --> 01:04:38,082
No matter what we do,
no matter how we change this plane,
1013
01:04:38,165 --> 01:04:42,295
we've gotta pretend
it's the same plane as the predecessor.
1014
01:04:44,255 --> 01:04:46,090
[Pasztor] So they decided,
1015
01:04:46,173 --> 01:04:50,720
"Externally, we would communicate
it is an addition to Speed Trim."
1016
01:04:51,345 --> 01:04:56,142
Speed Trim is the existing system,
which pilots had already been trained on.
1017
01:04:57,393 --> 01:05:01,022
"Internally continue using
the acronym MCAS."
1018
01:05:02,648 --> 01:05:05,568
They determined
that they would conceal the existence
1019
01:05:05,651 --> 01:05:09,614
to anybody, uh, outside
of Boeing of the MCAS system.
1020
01:05:12,617 --> 01:05:16,329
[Pasztor] Once these documents
became public, it showed
1021
01:05:16,412 --> 01:05:20,458
that there were major, big issues
broiling under the surface
1022
01:05:21,042 --> 01:05:25,171
and a widespread pattern
inside Boeing of deceitful behavior.
1023
01:05:26,547 --> 01:05:32,094
This next piece of evidence was one
of the most important specific documents
1024
01:05:32,178 --> 01:05:35,765
relating to the design of the plane
and of the MCAS system.
1025
01:05:37,099 --> 01:05:41,312
It shows that MCAS changed
over the course of the design.
1026
01:05:42,438 --> 01:05:46,442
Boeing didn't end up with the same system
that they started out with.
1027
01:05:47,234 --> 01:05:49,987
To begin with,
it became much more powerful.
1028
01:05:51,948 --> 01:05:55,910
[Ostrower] It wasn't until Boeing got
into flight testing that they realized
1029
01:05:55,993 --> 01:05:59,497
that they actually had to expand
how the MCAS system worked.
1030
01:06:00,331 --> 01:06:03,542
They thought at first that it was
only gonna be for when the airplane
1031
01:06:03,626 --> 01:06:04,877
was at high speeds.
1032
01:06:06,337 --> 01:06:09,548
But what became clear
was that the Max needed MCAS
1033
01:06:09,632 --> 01:06:12,718
when the airplane
was flying at low speeds as well.
1034
01:06:14,136 --> 01:06:16,722
And it was this transition
to low-speed handling
1035
01:06:16,806 --> 01:06:19,767
that made the system far more significant.
1036
01:06:21,560 --> 01:06:24,397
The result was
is that MCAS gained more power.
1037
01:06:25,439 --> 01:06:27,942
So it had the ability
to make larger movements
1038
01:06:28,025 --> 01:06:29,527
of the horizontal stabilizer,
1039
01:06:30,027 --> 01:06:33,531
which could push the nose
of the airplane down very quickly.
1040
01:06:38,160 --> 01:06:41,372
[Pasztor] In addition
to this increased power of the system,
1041
01:06:41,455 --> 01:06:45,459
there was a second change,
something even more problematic.
1042
01:06:46,377 --> 01:06:51,841
Boeing changed the MCAS system
to only use one sensor instead of two.
1043
01:06:55,177 --> 01:06:58,472
[DeFazio] It turns out
this way more powerful system
1044
01:06:58,556 --> 01:07:02,351
was controlled
by just one angle-of-attack sensor.
1045
01:07:03,519 --> 01:07:06,689
The MCAS system is safety-critical.
1046
01:07:07,440 --> 01:07:10,693
And on an airplane, you never ever have
1047
01:07:10,776 --> 01:07:15,614
a safety-critical system
that has a single point of failure.
1048
01:07:17,116 --> 01:07:18,743
[Carey] The angle-of-attack sensors
1049
01:07:19,243 --> 01:07:22,788
protrude out of either side
of the fuselage, near the cockpit.
1050
01:07:23,789 --> 01:07:26,834
If a happy-birthday Mylar balloon
1051
01:07:26,917 --> 01:07:30,171
gets stuck on that vane,
it becomes unreliable.
1052
01:07:32,089 --> 01:07:34,842
Believe it or not,
we hit balloons, we hit birds,
1053
01:07:35,342 --> 01:07:39,722
uh, and all of these things,
uh, are not uncommon.
1054
01:07:41,599 --> 01:07:44,727
[DeFazio] If that sensor
is damaged or faulty,
1055
01:07:45,311 --> 01:07:48,439
it will send a wrong message
to the MCAS system,
1056
01:07:48,522 --> 01:07:51,776
which then tries to take over
the plane from the pilots.
1057
01:07:53,736 --> 01:07:58,199
[Reed] None of this
was communicated by anybody at Boeing
1058
01:07:58,282 --> 01:08:03,370
to the FAA engineer
who was in charge of oversight,
1059
01:08:03,954 --> 01:08:05,748
and yeah, it should have been.
1060
01:08:06,499 --> 01:08:08,709
[Ostrower] The FAA
was kept out of the loop.
1061
01:08:09,418 --> 01:08:11,462
Usually, there's a constant negotiation
1062
01:08:11,962 --> 01:08:15,257
between... between a regulator
and the regulated
1063
01:08:15,341 --> 01:08:17,843
about what parts of the airplane
are gonna change.
1064
01:08:19,553 --> 01:08:21,430
[DeFazio] But in the case of Boeing,
1065
01:08:21,514 --> 01:08:23,641
they had a culture of concealment,
1066
01:08:24,183 --> 01:08:28,312
deliberate concealment
regarding the MCAS system.
1067
01:08:29,772 --> 01:08:32,274
And the evidence kept mounting.
1068
01:08:36,445 --> 01:08:39,073
[Ludtke] Coordination sheets
are technical documents
1069
01:08:39,156 --> 01:08:41,867
written to archive information.
1070
01:08:43,828 --> 01:08:48,833
This coord sheet
is capturing the history of MCAS.
1071
01:08:50,334 --> 01:08:52,711
[Pasztor] This is basically
about the safety issues
1072
01:08:52,795 --> 01:08:55,005
that were analyzed inside Boeing,
1073
01:08:55,714 --> 01:08:58,759
and the most relevant part of this dealt
1074
01:08:58,843 --> 01:09:01,470
with how quickly pilots
would be able to react
1075
01:09:01,554 --> 01:09:03,347
if the system went haywire.
1076
01:09:05,891 --> 01:09:08,811
[Ludtke] I haven't seen
this particular coord sheet before.
1077
01:09:09,812 --> 01:09:10,812
Hmm.
1078
01:09:14,150 --> 01:09:17,111
With pilot training
to recognize the runaway,
1079
01:09:17,194 --> 01:09:20,739
a reaction time scenario
greater than ten seconds
1080
01:09:20,823 --> 01:09:23,033
found the failure to be catastrophic.
1081
01:09:24,493 --> 01:09:26,078
[Carey] So if you don't respond
1082
01:09:26,162 --> 01:09:30,541
in less than ten seconds
to this situation,
1083
01:09:31,250 --> 01:09:32,418
you can't recover.
1084
01:09:33,127 --> 01:09:34,295
Ten seconds,
1085
01:09:35,212 --> 01:09:37,965
which is ridiculous.
1086
01:09:40,342 --> 01:09:43,304
[Ludtke] But the problem here
is not just the reaction time.
1087
01:09:43,846 --> 01:09:46,515
The problem here is
the term "pilot training."
1088
01:09:47,850 --> 01:09:51,896
It says, "With pilot training
to recognize the runaway,"
1089
01:09:52,730 --> 01:09:55,858
they're saying
that we can't just throw pilots at this
1090
01:09:55,941 --> 01:09:58,485
without awareness of the system.
1091
01:09:59,195 --> 01:10:03,657
And... which... which that's
the real "gotcha" right in this statement.
1092
01:10:04,867 --> 01:10:10,039
Pilots need to be trained on MCAS
to potentially avoid killing people.
1093
01:10:11,624 --> 01:10:14,168
And Boeing knew that this was the case.
1094
01:10:15,711 --> 01:10:17,963
And yet pilot training never happened.
1095
01:10:19,089 --> 01:10:21,300
[keyboard clacking]
1096
01:10:22,968 --> 01:10:27,640
Our reporting and the memos
and documents that had been released
1097
01:10:27,723 --> 01:10:31,352
revealed an underbelly,
an underside of the company.
1098
01:10:32,519 --> 01:10:37,650
In this March 28, 2017,
internal Boeing communication,
1099
01:10:38,150 --> 01:10:42,488
the chief technical pilot
for the 737 Max writes,
1100
01:10:42,571 --> 01:10:45,407
"I want to stress
the importance of holding firm
1101
01:10:45,491 --> 01:10:49,745
that there will not be
any type of simulator training required."
1102
01:10:50,829 --> 01:10:53,624
"Boeing will not allow that to happen."
1103
01:10:54,375 --> 01:10:59,046
"We'll go face-to-face with any regulator
who tries to make that a requirement."
1104
01:11:00,339 --> 01:11:01,799
The tragedy of it is,
1105
01:11:01,882 --> 01:11:05,552
some of these emails
were actually conversations with Lion Air.
1106
01:11:06,595 --> 01:11:10,266
In a June 6, 2017 email exchange,
1107
01:11:10,349 --> 01:11:12,977
which took place
the year before the crash,
1108
01:11:13,060 --> 01:11:16,689
Lion Air says,
in effect, wouldn't it be better,
1109
01:11:16,772 --> 01:11:19,900
wouldn't it be safer
to have some additional training?
1110
01:11:20,401 --> 01:11:23,487
We want more
than you're... you're recommending.
1111
01:11:24,822 --> 01:11:28,701
And Boeing writes, flat out,
"There is absolutely no reason
1112
01:11:28,784 --> 01:11:31,787
to require a Max simulator
to begin flying the Max."
1113
01:11:33,622 --> 01:11:37,293
If they had said
what the true power of MCAS was,
1114
01:11:38,043 --> 01:11:42,881
simulator training would be required
fleet-wide for all 737 Max pilots.
1115
01:11:44,091 --> 01:11:47,219
Instead, Boeing literally mocked Lion Air,
1116
01:11:47,720 --> 01:11:50,681
mocked them for wanting
to have simulator training.
1117
01:11:52,725 --> 01:11:55,602
[DeFazio] Boeing had to,
you know, berate them.
1118
01:11:56,103 --> 01:11:59,606
"You cannot have simulator training."
1119
01:11:59,690 --> 01:12:02,026
"You can't do it.
It costs money. We lose money."
1120
01:12:03,527 --> 01:12:08,741
They talked about Jedi-mind tricking
regulators around the world
1121
01:12:09,491 --> 01:12:14,705
into adopting the standard
of no simulator training required.
1122
01:12:15,664 --> 01:12:19,835
So, we're supposed to react
in less than ten seconds
1123
01:12:19,918 --> 01:12:24,131
to a system that's never been
on any airplane we've ever flown before.
1124
01:12:25,174 --> 01:12:30,137
Boeing knew pilots had
a monster waiting for them
1125
01:12:30,220 --> 01:12:31,430
in the MCAS system,
1126
01:12:32,264 --> 01:12:35,768
but they conspire to not offer training.
1127
01:12:37,311 --> 01:12:38,311
It's just
1128
01:12:39,229 --> 01:12:40,689
unconscionable to me.
1129
01:12:40,773 --> 01:12:42,816
[splutters] It just...
1130
01:12:43,901 --> 01:12:44,901
It's nuts.
1131
01:12:49,114 --> 01:12:51,450
[Pasztor] In the end, Boeing succeeded,
1132
01:12:52,409 --> 01:12:55,329
and when the plane
was delivered to airlines,
1133
01:12:55,412 --> 01:12:59,166
it didn't appear from the outside
1134
01:12:59,249 --> 01:13:02,461
that there was something
fundamentally wrong with the aircraft.
1135
01:13:04,046 --> 01:13:07,049
I mean, they were making sales
all over the world.
1136
01:13:07,132 --> 01:13:08,717
[camera shutters clicking]
1137
01:13:08,801 --> 01:13:11,220
[crowd applauding]
1138
01:13:11,303 --> 01:13:14,431
[Ostrower] Boeing sold over 5,000 Maxes.
1139
01:13:15,057 --> 01:13:16,517
It's an unbelievable number.
1140
01:13:17,643 --> 01:13:21,146
It really was the product
that brought the financial performance
1141
01:13:21,230 --> 01:13:24,358
on Wall Street up to a... a level
that Boeing had never seen before.
1142
01:13:25,317 --> 01:13:27,319
[Goldfarb] Boeing's profit soared.
1143
01:13:28,112 --> 01:13:30,697
The stock value went through the roof.
1144
01:13:31,573 --> 01:13:33,242
And that was the whole idea.
1145
01:13:33,826 --> 01:13:37,162
Performance was being judged
in quarterly returns,
1146
01:13:37,913 --> 01:13:39,248
and the Max delivered.
1147
01:13:40,666 --> 01:13:45,129
The 737 Max was going to be
the major meal ticket for Boeing
1148
01:13:45,212 --> 01:13:46,380
for coming decades.
1149
01:13:46,463 --> 01:13:49,258
This is a company
that, yeah, 500's a reasonable number.
1150
01:13:49,341 --> 01:13:52,261
[Pasztor] And it was seen as a sure thing.
1151
01:13:52,344 --> 01:13:55,013
[crowd cheering]
1152
01:13:57,891 --> 01:14:00,561
[executive] Unprecedented value
for our customers,
1153
01:14:00,644 --> 01:14:03,647
in terms of saving fuel,
in terms of being reliable,
1154
01:14:03,730 --> 01:14:05,315
in terms of being maintainable.
1155
01:14:05,399 --> 01:14:07,860
And you know what we've done?
We've created an airplane
1156
01:14:07,943 --> 01:14:11,738
that's gonna exceed their expectations
by any way you measure it.
1157
01:14:13,615 --> 01:14:16,785
[Ostrower] Everyone thought
that the good times would never end.
1158
01:14:20,205 --> 01:14:23,167
And then, in October of 2018, they did.
1159
01:14:32,217 --> 01:14:34,678
[Pasztor] The Lion Air pilots
not only didn't know
1160
01:14:34,761 --> 01:14:36,305
how this system worked,
1161
01:14:36,388 --> 01:14:38,765
they didn't know the name of the system.
1162
01:14:39,266 --> 01:14:43,979
They didn't even know
that the MCAS system was on the aircraft.
1163
01:14:47,107 --> 01:14:50,444
[Carey] You just got the airplane
into the air, and all of a sudden, bang,
1164
01:14:50,527 --> 01:14:53,280
all these bells and warnings
and whistles and stick shaker going off.
1165
01:14:53,363 --> 01:14:54,683
[on-board computer] Airspeed low.
1166
01:14:55,407 --> 01:14:59,411
[Sullenberger] An angle-of-attack sensor,
which had either failed or was damaged,
1167
01:14:59,495 --> 01:15:02,456
was sending a bad input to the cockpit.
1168
01:15:02,539 --> 01:15:04,917
It would have taken
more than a few seconds certainly
1169
01:15:05,000 --> 01:15:07,920
for the pilots to determine
what the cause was.
1170
01:15:09,213 --> 01:15:12,257
And then as soon
as the flaps were retracted,
1171
01:15:13,675 --> 01:15:15,928
MCAS was activated.
1172
01:15:19,348 --> 01:15:20,933
You started the clock, right?
1173
01:15:21,016 --> 01:15:23,101
One Mississippi, two Mississippi,
1174
01:15:23,185 --> 01:15:24,269
three Mississippi...
1175
01:15:24,353 --> 01:15:26,313
[warning siren blares]
1176
01:15:27,272 --> 01:15:31,485
[Sullenberger] The way MCAS
kept pushing the nose of the airplane down
1177
01:15:31,568 --> 01:15:32,903
was maniacal.
1178
01:15:32,986 --> 01:15:35,656
And the pilots never understood
1179
01:15:35,739 --> 01:15:37,866
it was trying to kill them.
1180
01:15:38,659 --> 01:15:41,995
[on-board computer] Terrain. Terrain.
Pull up. Pull up.
1181
01:15:44,957 --> 01:15:46,375
[Carey] You've got ten seconds,
1182
01:15:48,085 --> 01:15:49,920
which is impossible.
1183
01:15:51,880 --> 01:15:54,800
So basically, ten seconds, you're dead.
1184
01:15:58,178 --> 01:16:01,390
[on-board computer] Terrain. Terrain.
Pull up. Pull up.
1185
01:16:17,030 --> 01:16:18,574
[crew speaking Indonesian]
1186
01:16:20,325 --> 01:16:23,579
[Sethi] We now know
that within few days of the crash,
1187
01:16:23,662 --> 01:16:25,622
Boeing knew what the problem was.
1188
01:16:27,291 --> 01:16:28,875
They knew what he had faced,
1189
01:16:28,959 --> 01:16:31,503
what my husband
had to go through in that flight.
1190
01:16:33,672 --> 01:16:36,300
Boeing knew what the problems were
with MCAS.
1191
01:16:37,301 --> 01:16:39,428
It's not that they were not aware of it.
1192
01:16:41,179 --> 01:16:43,307
There should be a sense of responsibility.
1193
01:16:46,310 --> 01:16:47,769
[Pasztor] Here in the US,
1194
01:16:47,853 --> 01:16:51,064
they never seriously considered
grounding the aircraft.
1195
01:16:52,149 --> 01:16:54,109
After the first crash,
1196
01:16:54,610 --> 01:16:56,445
Boeing was all about,
1197
01:16:56,528 --> 01:17:00,240
how can we justify
keeping the planes flying?
1198
01:17:02,618 --> 01:17:06,788
[DeFazio] We didn't know
at the time that after the Lion Air crash,
1199
01:17:06,872 --> 01:17:10,500
the FAA had done a very technical analysis
1200
01:17:10,584 --> 01:17:11,585
called a TARAM.
1201
01:17:12,961 --> 01:17:14,504
[Stumo] TARAM. T-A-R-A-M.
1202
01:17:14,588 --> 01:17:18,050
A Transport Aircraft
Risk Assessment Methodology.
1203
01:17:19,259 --> 01:17:22,512
They've projected
that there could be, without a fix,
1204
01:17:22,596 --> 01:17:24,681
15 more crashes
1205
01:17:25,557 --> 01:17:27,267
of this aircraft during its life.
1206
01:17:29,811 --> 01:17:34,441
[Pasztor] They projected that
there could be as many as one fatal crash
1207
01:17:34,524 --> 01:17:37,027
every two years of a Max.
1208
01:17:38,278 --> 01:17:42,115
That would make the Max
the most dangerous modern jet ever built.
1209
01:17:46,328 --> 01:17:48,872
At the time,
nobody heard about this report.
1210
01:17:50,165 --> 01:17:51,500
It wasn't made public.
1211
01:17:53,043 --> 01:17:57,297
But we verified
that Boeing knew about the results
1212
01:17:57,381 --> 01:18:00,300
at the same time
that the FAA knew about them.
1213
01:18:02,177 --> 01:18:05,222
Boeing argued that it's never possible
1214
01:18:05,305 --> 01:18:08,475
to actually predict
the timing of another crash
1215
01:18:08,975 --> 01:18:12,396
and that they would have a software fix
1216
01:18:12,479 --> 01:18:16,274
developed and tested
and implemented very quickly.
1217
01:18:18,026 --> 01:18:21,405
And in the end,
the FAA accepted Boeing's argument.
1218
01:18:23,573 --> 01:18:26,993
[DeFazio] There were people, a few people,
at Boeing who rang alarm bells,
1219
01:18:27,077 --> 01:18:28,537
but they were ignored.
1220
01:18:29,705 --> 01:18:31,581
Up there in the executive offices,
1221
01:18:31,665 --> 01:18:35,085
they were watching the stock price
and calculating their bonuses.
1222
01:18:37,045 --> 01:18:39,673
[Stumo] Just six weeks
after the Lion Air crash,
1223
01:18:39,756 --> 01:18:43,051
the Boeing board decided
to increase stock buybacks
1224
01:18:43,135 --> 01:18:44,386
and increase dividends.
1225
01:18:45,262 --> 01:18:47,264
Total disregard for what happened.
1226
01:18:47,347 --> 01:18:52,477
All of our customers are flying
all of their Maxes daily around the world.
1227
01:18:52,561 --> 01:18:55,564
The airplane is safe,
and we're very confident in that.
1228
01:18:57,983 --> 01:19:00,360
It's the corporate culture
that they had built up.
1229
01:19:00,444 --> 01:19:01,778
It was their greed.
1230
01:19:03,488 --> 01:19:06,450
Are the profits
more important than the human life?
1231
01:19:08,618 --> 01:19:10,620
[crowd speaking Indonesian]
1232
01:19:17,461 --> 01:19:20,172
[crying]
1233
01:19:23,341 --> 01:19:25,761
[Stumo] You know,
once they got the TARAM report,
1234
01:19:26,428 --> 01:19:28,847
Boeing should have grounded the Max.
1235
01:19:30,223 --> 01:19:31,433
They didn't do that.
1236
01:19:33,059 --> 01:19:35,645
This was after the Lion Air crash,
1237
01:19:35,729 --> 01:19:37,147
before my daughter died.
1238
01:19:38,648 --> 01:19:40,358
They let it go up in the air.
1239
01:19:43,278 --> 01:19:45,739
[Pasztor] I think
that is the most disturbing
1240
01:19:45,822 --> 01:19:48,366
and most revealing part
of the whole story.
1241
01:19:49,743 --> 01:19:54,206
Boeing did the absolute least
that they could do
1242
01:19:54,790 --> 01:19:58,001
to cope with this situation.
The absolute minimum.
1243
01:19:59,586 --> 01:20:04,716
Basically, they were betting
that the problem would not reoccur
1244
01:20:04,800 --> 01:20:07,511
before a permanent fix
could be implemented.
1245
01:20:09,304 --> 01:20:12,307
And of course
that turned out to be a fatal mistake.
1246
01:20:15,936 --> 01:20:18,480
It's just a horrible, horrible story.
1247
01:20:31,827 --> 01:20:33,912
[indistinct chattering]
1248
01:20:33,995 --> 01:20:36,957
[Stumo] Boeing's failure
to do everything they could do
1249
01:20:37,040 --> 01:20:41,044
to prevent the second crash
made our lives miserable.
1250
01:20:42,462 --> 01:20:44,798
And this isn't just about Samya
and our family.
1251
01:20:44,881 --> 01:20:47,676
It's about everybody
that died on those planes.
1252
01:20:49,719 --> 01:20:52,764
And so, in October of 2019,
1253
01:20:52,848 --> 01:20:55,308
when Muilenburg was scheduled to testify
1254
01:20:55,392 --> 01:20:56,726
at the Senate hearing,
1255
01:20:57,561 --> 01:21:00,188
we were all highly motivated to be there.
1256
01:21:05,986 --> 01:21:08,071
Muilenburg walks in,
1257
01:21:08,154 --> 01:21:09,197
and for a moment,
1258
01:21:09,990 --> 01:21:12,117
he glanced at us, at the families,
1259
01:21:14,035 --> 01:21:16,329
but he never really looked at us.
1260
01:21:24,045 --> 01:21:30,218
A lot of the testimony that day was
about the internal Boeing communications.
1261
01:21:31,511 --> 01:21:33,889
You're the CEO. The buck stops with you.
1262
01:21:33,972 --> 01:21:35,599
Did you read this document?
1263
01:21:36,266 --> 01:21:40,979
And how did your team not run in
with their hair on fire,
1264
01:21:41,646 --> 01:21:43,940
saying, "We got a real problem here."
1265
01:21:44,441 --> 01:21:48,820
Senator, when I was made aware
of the existence of this kind of document,
1266
01:21:48,904 --> 01:21:52,157
I relied on our counsel to provide that
to the appropriate authorities.
1267
01:21:52,991 --> 01:21:54,576
[Cruz] How did you not say,
1268
01:21:54,659 --> 01:21:57,078
"We need to figure out
exactly what happened,
1269
01:21:57,662 --> 01:22:00,373
not after all the hearings,
not after the pressure,
1270
01:22:00,457 --> 01:22:03,543
but because people have died
and we don't want another person to die."
1271
01:22:03,627 --> 01:22:06,838
Senator, as... as you mentioned, uh... uh,
1272
01:22:06,922 --> 01:22:10,342
I didn't, uh, see the details
of this exchange until recently.
1273
01:22:10,926 --> 01:22:14,387
[Stumo] Our family at that time
still had heard nothing from Boeing.
1274
01:22:15,680 --> 01:22:18,308
We had heard Dennis Muilenburg
1275
01:22:19,142 --> 01:22:21,728
apologize to cameras
1276
01:22:23,355 --> 01:22:24,689
but never to us.
1277
01:22:24,773 --> 01:22:27,943
We began work on an MCAS software update
in that time frame.
1278
01:22:28,652 --> 01:22:31,571
[Stumo] When Senator Blumenthal's time
came to question,
1279
01:22:31,655 --> 01:22:35,241
he asked the family members to stand up
1280
01:22:35,325 --> 01:22:37,702
and hold their loved ones' pictures.
1281
01:22:37,786 --> 01:22:41,748
To the relatives who have lost loved ones,
1282
01:22:41,831 --> 01:22:44,000
if you could please stand.
1283
01:22:44,668 --> 01:22:46,753
[Stumo] And at that point,
1284
01:22:47,253 --> 01:22:51,049
Dennis Muilenburg had to turn around
and look at us.
1285
01:22:51,716 --> 01:22:54,052
[emotional music playing]
1286
01:23:31,881 --> 01:23:33,800
[DeFazio] In the 21st century,
1287
01:23:34,426 --> 01:23:38,013
to lose two planes
within months of each other
1288
01:23:38,096 --> 01:23:39,723
and kill so many people,
1289
01:23:40,223 --> 01:23:42,934
it just never ever ever
should have happened.
1290
01:23:44,978 --> 01:23:47,355
The safety culture at Boeing fell apart.
1291
01:23:48,606 --> 01:23:50,650
It was corrupted from the top down
1292
01:23:50,734 --> 01:23:53,194
by pressures from Wall Street,
plain and simple.
1293
01:23:54,070 --> 01:23:55,488
[DeFazio] Mr. Muilenburg,
1294
01:23:55,572 --> 01:23:58,283
we have seen
that, you know, pressures from Wall Street
1295
01:23:58,366 --> 01:24:02,370
have a way of influencing the decisions
of the best companies in the worst way,
1296
01:24:03,329 --> 01:24:05,999
endangering the public,
jeopardizing the good work
1297
01:24:06,082 --> 01:24:09,419
of countless, countless
hardworking employees
1298
01:24:09,502 --> 01:24:10,920
on the factory lines.
1299
01:24:11,629 --> 01:24:14,966
And I hope that's not the story
that is ultimately, uh, gonna be written
1300
01:24:15,050 --> 01:24:18,011
about this long-admired company.
1301
01:24:33,943 --> 01:24:35,862
[Pasztor] I've thought
about this story a lot
1302
01:24:36,362 --> 01:24:39,157
in terms of what it means
and what it will mean.
1303
01:24:40,825 --> 01:24:44,162
Some of the mistakes
that Boeing made were irreparable.
1304
01:24:46,206 --> 01:24:49,876
The people who died
and their families and their friends
1305
01:24:49,959 --> 01:24:52,504
and the lives that ended in tragedy,
1306
01:24:53,004 --> 01:24:54,798
those can never be repaired.
1307
01:25:03,014 --> 01:25:05,016
How many times
have you heard companies say,
1308
01:25:05,100 --> 01:25:06,559
"We're committed to excellence."
1309
01:25:06,643 --> 01:25:10,188
"We're committed to safety.
We're committed to our customers."
1310
01:25:11,481 --> 01:25:14,651
But no matter how big the company is
and how sophisticated
1311
01:25:14,734 --> 01:25:18,696
and what a fantastic past it had,
which is all true for Boeing,
1312
01:25:19,364 --> 01:25:20,740
we should be skeptical.
1313
01:25:23,159 --> 01:25:24,953
All of us should be skeptical.
1314
01:25:41,177 --> 01:25:44,347
The Boeing 737 Max planes
now back in the air.
1315
01:25:44,430 --> 01:25:46,826
Flight happening today
for the first time in nearly two years
1316
01:25:46,850 --> 01:25:48,290
after the planes, they were grounded
1317
01:25:48,351 --> 01:25:51,521
following two fatal crashes
that killed hundreds of people.
1318
01:25:51,604 --> 01:25:54,149
[news anchor] Yesterday, we spoke
exclusively with Dave Calhoun,
1319
01:25:54,232 --> 01:25:56,484
the president and CEO of Boeing.
1320
01:25:56,568 --> 01:26:00,655
[Calhoun] We don't want to hide anything
because we're proud of what we do.
1321
01:26:00,738 --> 01:26:04,200
The products that we make are incredible.
They're good for humanity.
1322
01:26:04,284 --> 01:26:07,579
And I'm very proud of our team,
and I'm very proud of that airplane.
1323
01:26:07,662 --> 01:26:09,789
It is a, uh, remarkable machine
1324
01:26:09,873 --> 01:26:12,292
and as safe
as anything... anything in the air.
1325
01:26:12,375 --> 01:26:15,003
[dramatic music playing]
1326
01:26:27,182 --> 01:26:29,809
[solemn music playing]