1
00:00:45,920 --> 00:00:48,073
"Laura, at this stage,

2
00:00:48,173 --> 00:00:50,909
I can offer nothing more than my word.

3
00:00:51,009 --> 00:00:54,788
I am a senior government employee
in the intelligence community.

4
00:00:54,888 --> 00:00:58,124
I hope you understand that
contacting you is extremely high risk

5
00:00:58,224 --> 00:01:00,502
and you are willing to agree
to the following precautions

6
00:01:00,602 --> 00:01:02,671
before I share more.

7
00:01:02,771 --> 00:01:04,730
This will not be a waste of your time.

8
00:01:05,899 --> 00:01:07,425
The following sounds complex

9
00:01:07,525 --> 00:01:11,262
but should only take minutes
to complete for someone technical.

10
00:01:11,362 --> 00:01:13,139
I would like to confirm out of email

11
00:01:13,239 --> 00:01:15,266
that the keys we exchanged
were not intercepted

12
00:01:15,366 --> 00:01:18,728
and replaced by your surveillance.

13
00:01:18,828 --> 00:01:21,982
Please confirm that no one has
ever had a copy of your private key

14
00:01:22,082 --> 00:01:23,984
and that it uses a strong passphrase.

15
00:01:24,084 --> 00:01:27,878
Assume your adversary is capable
of one trillion guesses per second.

16
00:01:28,880 --> 00:01:30,907
If the device you store the private key

17
00:01:31,007 --> 00:01:33,576
and enter your passphrase on
has been hacked,

18
00:01:33,676 --> 00:01:36,261
it is trivial to decrypt
our communications.

19
00:01:37,263 --> 00:01:39,916
Understand that the above steps
are not bulletproof

20
00:01:40,016 --> 00:01:42,168
and are intended only
to give us breathing room.

21
00:01:42,268 --> 00:01:44,421
In the end, if you publish
the source material,

22
00:01:44,521 --> 00:01:46,589
I will likely be immediately implicated.

23
00:01:46,689 --> 00:01:50,192
This must not deter you from releasing
the information I will provide.

24
00:01:51,778 --> 00:01:53,654
Thank you, and be careful.

25
00:01:54,781 --> 00:01:56,490
Citizenfour."

26
00:02:18,805 --> 00:02:22,208
Bottom line is... surveillance means

27
00:02:22,308 --> 00:02:25,462
that there are facts
that we no longer abide to.

28
00:02:25,562 --> 00:02:27,047
If you take away the surveillance,

29
00:02:27,147 --> 00:02:29,466
there are no facts that
the government can manufacture.

30
00:02:29,566 --> 00:02:32,719
Ah, that's right, and this is all
about creating an independent record.

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00:02:32,819 --> 00:02:36,848
To me, this goes to the question

32
00:02:36,948 --> 00:02:40,602
of independently verifying
what the government is doing.

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00:02:40,702 --> 00:02:43,396
That's why I keep going
back to that question.

34
00:02:43,496 --> 00:02:47,233
More with David Sirota after CBS news,

35
00:02:47,333 --> 00:02:51,712
traffic, and weather
on KKZN Denver/Boulder, AM 7...

36
00:02:57,218 --> 00:02:59,329
Hey, can you hear me?

37
00:02:59,429 --> 00:03:01,096
I am here, David, how are you?

38
00:03:05,602 --> 00:03:07,629
Well I would just point...
start by pointing to

39
00:03:07,729 --> 00:03:10,131
what Barack Obama himself
said about those questions

40
00:03:10,231 --> 00:03:13,093
when he was running for the office
that he now occupies.

41
00:03:13,193 --> 00:03:15,261
In December of 2007, he said, quote,

42
00:03:15,361 --> 00:03:18,848
"The president does not have
the power under the Constitution

43
00:03:18,948 --> 00:03:20,892
to unilaterally
authorize a military attack

44
00:03:20,992 --> 00:03:23,645
in a situation
that does not involve stopping

45
00:03:23,745 --> 00:03:25,438
an actual or imminent threat
to the nation."

46
00:03:25,538 --> 00:03:28,775
So by Obama's own words,
the president does not have the power

47
00:03:28,875 --> 00:03:31,277
that he is now exercising
under the Constitution.

48
00:03:31,377 --> 00:03:35,031
And as far as why it matters,
in... on August 1, 2007,

49
00:03:35,131 --> 00:03:38,785
when he laid out his reasons
why he was running for office

50
00:03:38,885 --> 00:03:41,663
and why he thought it was so important
to change the way we were doing things,

51
00:03:41,763 --> 00:03:45,542
he said, quote, "No more ignoring
the law when it's inconvenient.

52
00:03:45,642 --> 00:03:47,293
That is not who we are.

53
00:03:47,393 --> 00:03:49,420
We will again
set an example for the world

54
00:03:49,520 --> 00:03:52,507
that the law is not subject
to the whims of stubborn rulers..."

55
00:04:21,678 --> 00:04:24,205
You asked why I picked you.

56
00:04:24,305 --> 00:04:26,958
I didn't. You did.

57
00:04:27,058 --> 00:04:30,044
The surveillance you've experienced
means you've been "selected,"

58
00:04:30,144 --> 00:04:32,297
a term which will mean
more to you as you learn about

59
00:04:32,397 --> 00:04:35,190
how the modern SIGINT system works.

60
00:04:36,442 --> 00:04:38,845
For now, know that
every border you cross,

61
00:04:38,945 --> 00:04:41,973
every purchase you make,
every call you dial,

62
00:04:42,073 --> 00:04:45,226
every cell phone tower you pass,
friend you keep,

63
00:04:45,326 --> 00:04:49,063
article you write, site you visit,
subject line you type,

64
00:04:49,163 --> 00:04:51,983
and packet you route
is in the hands of a system

65
00:04:52,083 --> 00:04:55,210
whose reach is unlimited,
but whose safeguards are not.

66
00:04:56,838 --> 00:05:00,491
Your victimization by the NSA system means
that you are well aware of the threat

67
00:05:00,591 --> 00:05:04,829
that unrestricted secret police
pose for democracies.

68
00:05:04,929 --> 00:05:07,139
This is a story few but you can tell.

69
00:06:01,694 --> 00:06:03,680
Thank you for inviting me here

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00:06:03,780 --> 00:06:07,809
to give me the opportunity
to express my story.

71
00:06:07,909 --> 00:06:09,936
Let me give you some of my background.

72
00:06:10,036 --> 00:06:13,064
I spent about four years in the military,
and then I went into NSA.

73
00:06:13,164 --> 00:06:15,066
Directly, so...

74
00:06:15,166 --> 00:06:19,195
So I ended up with about
37 years of service combined.

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00:06:19,295 --> 00:06:21,155
Most of it was a lot of fun, I tell you,

76
00:06:21,255 --> 00:06:23,199
it was really a lot of fun,
breaking these puzzles you know,

77
00:06:23,299 --> 00:06:25,827
solving problems and things like that.

78
00:06:25,927 --> 00:06:28,955
And that's really what I did,
I fundamentally started working with data,

79
00:06:29,055 --> 00:06:31,207
looking at data and data systems
and how you do that.

80
00:06:31,307 --> 00:06:35,169
I was developing
this concept of analysis

81
00:06:35,269 --> 00:06:37,088
that you could lay it out in such a way

82
00:06:37,188 --> 00:06:39,716
that it could be coded
and executed electronically.

83
00:06:39,816 --> 00:06:42,218
Meaning you could automate analysis.

84
00:06:42,318 --> 00:06:45,888
And it has to do with metadata
and using metadata relationships.

85
00:06:45,988 --> 00:06:48,975
So that was the whole,
that was my whole theme there at NSA.

86
00:06:49,075 --> 00:06:50,727
That was eventually,
that's what I ended up to.

87
00:06:50,827 --> 00:06:53,313
I was the only one there
doing that, by the way.

88
00:06:53,413 --> 00:06:55,940
So any rate, 9/11 happened,

89
00:06:56,040 --> 00:07:00,862
and it must have been
right after, a few days,

90
00:07:00,962 --> 00:07:02,989
no more than a week after 9/11

91
00:07:03,089 --> 00:07:08,828
that they decided to begin actively
spying on everyone in this country.

92
00:07:08,928 --> 00:07:10,830
And they wanted the back part

93
00:07:10,930 --> 00:07:13,875
of our program to run all of the spying.

94
00:07:13,975 --> 00:07:18,338
All right?
So, that's exactly what they did.

95
00:07:18,438 --> 00:07:20,381
And then they started
taking the telecom data

96
00:07:20,481 --> 00:07:21,966
and expanded after that.

97
00:07:22,066 --> 00:07:25,470
I mean the one I knew was AT&T,

98
00:07:25,570 --> 00:07:28,931
and that one provided
320 million records every day.

99
00:07:29,031 --> 00:07:32,393
That program was reauthorized
every 45 days

100
00:07:32,493 --> 00:07:34,896
by what I call the "yes committee,"

101
00:07:34,996 --> 00:07:39,192
which was Hayden and Tenet and the DOJ.

102
00:07:39,292 --> 00:07:41,944
The program was called Stellar Wind.

103
00:07:42,044 --> 00:07:44,864
So first I went to
the House Intelligence Committee

104
00:07:44,964 --> 00:07:46,783
and the staff member
that I personally knew there,

105
00:07:46,883 --> 00:07:50,328
and she then went to
the chairman of the committee,

106
00:07:50,428 --> 00:07:52,554
Nancy Pelosi was the minority rep.

107
00:07:53,931 --> 00:07:55,583
They were all briefed into the program

108
00:07:55,683 --> 00:07:57,335
at the time, by the way,

109
00:07:57,435 --> 00:07:59,087
and all the other programs
that were going on,

110
00:07:59,187 --> 00:08:01,714
including all these CIA programs.

111
00:08:01,814 --> 00:08:04,759
I wasn't alone in this.
There were four others out of NSA,

112
00:08:04,859 --> 00:08:06,469
and we were all
trying to work internally

113
00:08:06,569 --> 00:08:08,054
in the government over these years

114
00:08:08,154 --> 00:08:10,223
trying to get them to come around

115
00:08:10,323 --> 00:08:11,933
to being constitutionally acceptable

116
00:08:12,033 --> 00:08:13,476
and take it into the courts

117
00:08:13,576 --> 00:08:15,645
and have the courts'
oversight of it too.

118
00:08:15,745 --> 00:08:17,688
So we, we naively kept thinking

119
00:08:17,788 --> 00:08:20,608
that could, uh, that could happen.

120
00:08:20,708 --> 00:08:22,834
And it never did.

121
00:08:23,961 --> 00:08:25,488
But any rate, after that,

122
00:08:25,588 --> 00:08:28,991
and all the stuff we were doing
they decided to raid us,

123
00:08:29,091 --> 00:08:31,369
to keep us quiet, threaten us, you know.

124
00:08:31,469 --> 00:08:34,414
So we were raided
simultaneously, four of us.

125
00:08:34,514 --> 00:08:36,457
In my case,
they came in with guns drawn.

126
00:08:36,557 --> 00:08:39,643
I don't know why they did that,
but they did, so...

127
00:08:59,121 --> 00:09:01,274
Laura, I will answer

128
00:09:01,374 --> 00:09:03,860
what I remember of your questions
as best I can.

129
00:09:03,960 --> 00:09:05,403
Forgive the lack of structure.

130
00:09:05,503 --> 00:09:09,130
I am not a writer, and I have
to draft this in a great hurry.

131
00:09:10,508 --> 00:09:13,995
What you know as Stellar Wind has grown.

132
00:09:14,095 --> 00:09:17,373
SSO, the expanded
Special Source Operations

133
00:09:17,473 --> 00:09:19,876
that took over Stellar Wind's
share of the pie,

134
00:09:19,976 --> 00:09:22,879
has spread all over the world
to practically include

135
00:09:22,979 --> 00:09:25,355
comprehensive coverage
of the United States.

136
00:09:26,274 --> 00:09:29,135
Disturbingly,
the amount of US communication

137
00:09:29,235 --> 00:09:32,680
ingested by NSA is still increasing.

138
00:09:32,780 --> 00:09:35,391
Publicly, we complain that
things are going dark,

139
00:09:35,491 --> 00:09:38,644
but in fact, our accesses are improving.

140
00:09:38,744 --> 00:09:41,564
The truth is that the NSA
has never in its history

141
00:09:41,664 --> 00:09:44,207
collected more than it does now.

142
00:09:46,043 --> 00:09:49,322
I know the location of most
domestic interception points

143
00:09:49,422 --> 00:09:52,700
and that the largest
telecommunication companies in the US

144
00:09:52,800 --> 00:09:54,702
are betraying
the trust of their customers,

145
00:09:54,802 --> 00:09:57,163
which I can prove.

146
00:09:57,263 --> 00:09:59,332
We are building the greatest
weapon for oppression

147
00:09:59,432 --> 00:10:00,917
in the history of man,

148
00:10:01,017 --> 00:10:04,311
yet its directors exempt themselves
from accountability.

149
00:10:05,688 --> 00:10:08,966
NSA director Keith Alexander
lied to Congress,

150
00:10:09,066 --> 00:10:11,552
which I can prove.

151
00:10:11,652 --> 00:10:15,196
Billions of US communications
are being intercepted.

152
00:10:16,449 --> 00:10:18,059
In gathering evidence of wrongdoing,

153
00:10:18,159 --> 00:10:20,436
I focused on the wronging
of the American people,

154
00:10:20,536 --> 00:10:21,938
but believe me when I say that

155
00:10:22,038 --> 00:10:24,607
the surveillance we live under
is the highest privilege

156
00:10:24,707 --> 00:10:27,735
compared to how we treat
the rest of the world.

157
00:10:27,835 --> 00:10:29,628
This I can also prove.

158
00:10:30,838 --> 00:10:33,616
On cyber operations,
the government's public position

159
00:10:33,716 --> 00:10:35,993
is that we still lack
a policy framework.

160
00:10:36,093 --> 00:10:37,578
This too is a lie.

161
00:10:37,678 --> 00:10:39,830
There is a detailed policy framework,

162
00:10:39,930 --> 00:10:42,250
a kind of Marshall Law
for cyber operations

163
00:10:42,350 --> 00:10:44,126
created by the White House.

164
00:10:44,226 --> 00:10:46,462
It's called Presidential
Policy Directive 20

165
00:10:46,562 --> 00:10:49,382
and was finalized
at the end of last year.

166
00:10:49,482 --> 00:10:52,134
This I can also prove.

167
00:10:52,234 --> 00:10:54,637
I appreciate your concern for my safety,

168
00:10:54,737 --> 00:10:56,973
but I already know
how this will end for me,

169
00:10:57,073 --> 00:10:59,100
and I accept the risk.

170
00:10:59,200 --> 00:11:01,727
If I have luck and you are careful,

171
00:11:01,827 --> 00:11:03,771
you will have everything you need.

172
00:11:03,871 --> 00:11:06,023
I ask only that
you ensure this information

173
00:11:06,123 --> 00:11:09,068
makes it home to the American public.

174
00:11:09,168 --> 00:11:14,073
Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizens' emails?

175
00:11:14,173 --> 00:11:15,548
No.

176
00:11:17,259 --> 00:11:23,082
Does the NSA intercept Americans'
cell phone conversations?

177
00:11:23,182 --> 00:11:24,166
No.

178
00:11:24,266 --> 00:11:26,836
- Google searches?
- No.

179
00:11:26,936 --> 00:11:29,338
- Text messages?
- No.

180
00:11:29,438 --> 00:11:32,341
- Amazon.com orders?
- No.

181
00:11:32,441 --> 00:11:34,218
- Bank records?
- No.

182
00:11:34,318 --> 00:11:37,888
What judicial consent
is required for NSA

183
00:11:37,988 --> 00:11:40,281
to intercept communications...

184
00:11:41,283 --> 00:11:44,312
and information
involving American citizens?

185
00:11:44,412 --> 00:11:47,315
Within the United States,
that would be the FBI lead.

186
00:11:47,415 --> 00:11:49,442
If it was a foreign actor
in the United States,

187
00:11:49,542 --> 00:11:52,194
the FBI would still have the lead
and could work that with...

188
00:11:52,294 --> 00:11:56,324
with NSA or other intelligence
agencies as authorized.

189
00:11:56,424 --> 00:11:57,924
But to conduct that kind of...

190
00:11:59,176 --> 00:12:02,913
of collection in the United States,
it would have to go through a court order,

191
00:12:03,013 --> 00:12:04,957
and the court
would have to authorize it.

192
00:12:05,057 --> 00:12:07,809
We are not authorized to do it,
nor do we do it.

193
00:12:15,943 --> 00:12:18,054
All rise.

194
00:12:18,154 --> 00:12:19,722
The United States Court of Appeals

195
00:12:19,822 --> 00:12:22,975
for the Ninth Circuit is now in session.

196
00:12:23,075 --> 00:12:24,451
Please be seated.

197
00:12:33,169 --> 00:12:36,087
Good morning, and welcome
to the Ninth Circuit.

198
00:12:37,173 --> 00:12:39,116
The first case for argument is

199
00:12:39,216 --> 00:12:42,203
Jewel versus National Security Agency.

200
00:12:42,303 --> 00:12:43,845
You may proceed.

201
00:12:46,640 --> 00:12:48,959
May it please the court, Kevin Bankston,

202
00:12:49,059 --> 00:12:53,130
for Carolyn Jewel and her fellow plaintiff
appellants in Jewel v. NSA.

203
00:12:53,230 --> 00:12:57,051
Your Honors, plaintiffs
have specifically alleged

204
00:12:57,151 --> 00:12:59,887
that their own communications
and communications records

205
00:12:59,987 --> 00:13:01,389
have been acquired by the government.

206
00:13:01,489 --> 00:13:03,808
But the District Court found that

207
00:13:03,908 --> 00:13:05,893
we had failed to allege facts

208
00:13:05,993 --> 00:13:08,854
that differentiated the injury
that our plaintiffs suffered

209
00:13:08,954 --> 00:13:12,566
from the injuries suffered
by every otherAT&T user

210
00:13:12,666 --> 00:13:15,277
whose communications and records
have been acquired by the government,

211
00:13:15,377 --> 00:13:19,156
basically concluding that
so long as everyone is being surveilled,

212
00:13:19,256 --> 00:13:21,409
no one has standing to sue.

213
00:13:21,509 --> 00:13:23,285
However, to deny standing to persons

214
00:13:23,385 --> 00:13:26,539
who are injured simply because
many others are also injured

215
00:13:26,639 --> 00:13:29,166
would mean that the most injurious
and widespread government actions

216
00:13:29,266 --> 00:13:30,876
could be questioned by nobody.

217
00:13:30,976 --> 00:13:33,254
Do you have anything
concrete that in fact

218
00:13:33,354 --> 00:13:39,051
a specific communication
of your client was intercepted?

219
00:13:39,151 --> 00:13:41,512
We have evidence
that all the communications

220
00:13:41,612 --> 00:13:45,057
passing between AT&T's network
and other networks

221
00:13:45,157 --> 00:13:48,102
in their Northern California
facility have been intercepted.

222
00:13:48,202 --> 00:13:51,105
And so that would necessarily include
the Internet communications

223
00:13:51,205 --> 00:13:53,649
of our Northern California plaintiffs.

224
00:13:53,749 --> 00:13:55,484
Okay, thank you.

225
00:13:55,584 --> 00:13:56,960
Thank you, Your Honors.

226
00:14:03,968 --> 00:14:06,996
May it please the court, I am Thomas Byron
from the Department of Justice

227
00:14:07,096 --> 00:14:09,081
here on behalf
of the government defendants.

228
00:14:09,181 --> 00:14:13,961
We think this litigation
need not be resolved in federal court

229
00:14:14,061 --> 00:14:17,131
in light of the oversight
of the political branches,

230
00:14:17,231 --> 00:14:19,592
both legislative and executive,

231
00:14:19,692 --> 00:14:23,387
which provides a better opportunity

232
00:14:23,487 --> 00:14:26,766
for oversight and resolution
of the concerns raised

233
00:14:26,866 --> 00:14:31,353
concerning nationwide policies
of alleged surveillance,

234
00:14:31,453 --> 00:14:33,230
uh, in these complaints.

235
00:14:33,330 --> 00:14:36,400
Even if it's revealed that
one or more of the plaintiffs

236
00:14:36,500 --> 00:14:39,779
had email or telephone
conversations intercepted

237
00:14:39,879 --> 00:14:42,907
that had nothing to do
with national security?

238
00:14:43,007 --> 00:14:45,284
Your Honor, I don't know
that anyone necessarily

239
00:14:45,384 --> 00:14:46,911
would have standing to raise

240
00:14:47,011 --> 00:14:49,955
the particular claims at issue
in these two cases.

241
00:14:50,055 --> 00:14:54,293
We think instead that the kinds
of claims at issue here

242
00:14:54,393 --> 00:14:56,378
against these defendants

243
00:14:56,478 --> 00:14:59,048
are those that are better suited
to resolution

244
00:14:59,148 --> 00:15:01,801
before the... the representative
branches of our government.

245
00:15:01,901 --> 00:15:05,638
So what role would the judiciary have

246
00:15:05,738 --> 00:15:09,183
if your approach is adopted?

247
00:15:09,283 --> 00:15:10,810
Judge Pregerson, I think that...

248
00:15:10,910 --> 00:15:14,188
I mean, we just
get out of the way, is that it?

249
00:15:14,288 --> 00:15:16,941
Well, Judge Pregerson, I think
that there is a narrow category,

250
00:15:17,041 --> 00:15:22,321
a subset of cases, in which
it may be appropriate to step aside

251
00:15:22,421 --> 00:15:24,406
for that narrow category of cases.

252
00:15:24,506 --> 00:15:27,493
But the judiciary plays a role...

253
00:15:27,593 --> 00:15:28,953
To be sure, Judge Pregerson...

254
00:15:29,053 --> 00:15:31,705
- ...in our system.
- Yes, Your Honor.

255
00:15:31,805 --> 00:15:33,457
And we don't mean to diminish that.

256
00:15:33,557 --> 00:15:36,585
You know, you're asking us
to abdicate that role.

257
00:15:36,685 --> 00:15:40,089
No, Your Honor, um, but it is
a question of this court's discretion

258
00:15:40,189 --> 00:15:41,924
whether to reach that issue.

259
00:15:42,024 --> 00:15:44,051
We do think that there is simply no way

260
00:15:44,151 --> 00:15:47,096
for the litigation to proceed
without risk of divulging

261
00:15:47,196 --> 00:15:51,725
those very questions of privileged
information that would cause,

262
00:15:51,825 --> 00:15:54,061
as the Director of National
Intelligence has explained,

263
00:15:54,161 --> 00:15:55,563
exceptionally grave damage

264
00:15:55,663 --> 00:15:58,748
to national security if disclosed.

265
00:16:01,835 --> 00:16:03,211
Um, thanks for having me.

266
00:16:04,463 --> 00:16:07,575
If anybody has any questions, like I said,
basically just raise your hand

267
00:16:07,675 --> 00:16:10,452
and I'll try to call on you
as soon as I possibly can.

268
00:16:10,552 --> 00:16:13,080
So who here actually feels like

269
00:16:13,180 --> 00:16:16,099
they are under surveillance
pretty regularly?

270
00:16:18,606 --> 00:16:19,712
Everyone inside of Occupy.

271
00:16:19,812 --> 00:16:22,006
How many people have been
arrested and had their,

272
00:16:22,106 --> 00:16:24,633
at their court date, they had
their phone taken into the back room?

273
00:16:24,733 --> 00:16:28,053
How many people in here
had their retina scanned?

274
00:16:28,153 --> 00:16:29,430
Wow.

275
00:16:29,530 --> 00:16:33,767
Um, so you guys are actually in a sense
the canaries in the coal mine.

276
00:16:33,867 --> 00:16:36,562
Right, because the incentives
are all lined up against you.

277
00:16:36,662 --> 00:16:38,355
Anybody see on the subway,

278
00:16:38,455 --> 00:16:41,275
"Link your MetroCard
to your debit card," right?

279
00:16:41,375 --> 00:16:42,651
Like, auto-refill?

280
00:16:42,751 --> 00:16:45,237
This is a concept which is key
to everything we'll talk about today.

281
00:16:45,337 --> 00:16:46,739
And it's called linkability:

282
00:16:46,839 --> 00:16:50,242
Take one piece of data and link it
to another piece of data.

283
00:16:50,342 --> 00:16:52,369
So, for example,
if you have your MetroCard

284
00:16:52,469 --> 00:16:54,413
and you have your debit card,
you have those things

285
00:16:54,513 --> 00:16:56,415
and you can draw a line
between them, right?

286
00:16:56,515 --> 00:17:00,127
So that's, like, not a scary thing,
except your bank card is tied

287
00:17:00,227 --> 00:17:02,254
to everything else that you do
during the day.

288
00:17:02,354 --> 00:17:05,674
So now they know where you're going,
when you make purchases.

289
00:17:05,774 --> 00:17:07,426
So when they decide to target you,

290
00:17:07,526 --> 00:17:09,345
they can actually
recreate your exact steps.

291
00:17:09,445 --> 00:17:12,097
With a MetroCard
and with a credit card, alone,

292
00:17:12,197 --> 00:17:14,308
like literally where you go
and what you buy,

293
00:17:14,408 --> 00:17:16,936
and potentially by linking
that data with other people

294
00:17:17,036 --> 00:17:19,063
on similar travel plans,

295
00:17:19,163 --> 00:17:21,899
they can figure out who you talk to
and who you met with.

296
00:17:21,999 --> 00:17:25,277
When you then take cell phone data,
which logs your location,

297
00:17:25,377 --> 00:17:27,279
and you link up purchasing data,

298
00:17:27,379 --> 00:17:30,032
MetroCard data, and your debit card,

299
00:17:30,132 --> 00:17:32,576
you start to get
what you could call "metadata"

300
00:17:32,676 --> 00:17:34,703
in aggregate over a person's life.

301
00:17:34,803 --> 00:17:37,706
And metadata, in aggregate, is content.

302
00:17:37,806 --> 00:17:40,918
It tells a story about you
which is made up of facts,

303
00:17:41,018 --> 00:17:42,711
but is not necessarily true.

304
00:17:42,811 --> 00:17:44,797
So for example, just because
you were on the corner

305
00:17:44,897 --> 00:17:48,175
and all those data points point to it,
it doesn't mean you committed the crime.

306
00:17:48,275 --> 00:17:50,094
So it's important to note that

307
00:17:50,194 --> 00:17:52,388
if someone has a perception
of you having done a thing,

308
00:17:52,488 --> 00:17:55,057
it will now follow you
for the rest of your life.

309
00:17:55,157 --> 00:17:57,685
So just keep in mind
that what happens to you guys,

310
00:17:57,785 --> 00:18:01,814
for example, with fingerprints
and retinal scans and photographs,

311
00:18:01,914 --> 00:18:04,358
that is what is going to
happen to people in the future

312
00:18:04,458 --> 00:18:06,944
when they resist policy changes
and when they try to protest

313
00:18:07,044 --> 00:18:09,212
in a totally constitutionally
protected way.

314
00:18:10,422 --> 00:18:13,325
This is for you, Director Clapper,
again on the surveillance front,

315
00:18:13,425 --> 00:18:15,995
and I hope we can do this
in just a yes or no answer

316
00:18:16,095 --> 00:18:18,330
because I know Senator Feinstein
wants to move on.

317
00:18:18,430 --> 00:18:23,544
So, does the NSA
collect any type of data at all

318
00:18:23,644 --> 00:18:27,548
on millions or hundreds
of millions of Americans?

319
00:18:27,648 --> 00:18:29,550
No, sir.

320
00:18:29,650 --> 00:18:31,484
It does not?

321
00:18:32,528 --> 00:18:34,680
Not wittingly.

322
00:18:34,780 --> 00:18:37,683
There are cases
where they could inadvertently,

323
00:18:37,783 --> 00:18:41,786
perhaps, collect, but not wittingly.

324
00:19:07,646 --> 00:19:11,341
The encrypted archive should
be available to you within seven days.

325
00:19:11,441 --> 00:19:14,152
The key will follow
when everything else is done.

326
00:19:16,071 --> 00:19:19,058
The material I provide,
and investigative effort required

327
00:19:19,158 --> 00:19:21,602
will be too much for any one person.

328
00:19:21,702 --> 00:19:25,189
I recommend at a very minimum,
you involve Glenn Greenwald.

329
00:19:25,289 --> 00:19:26,956
I believe you know him.

330
00:19:29,084 --> 00:19:30,486
The plain text of the payload

331
00:19:30,586 --> 00:19:33,337
will include my true name details
for the record...

332
00:19:34,339 --> 00:19:36,241
though it will be your decision
as to whether

333
00:19:36,341 --> 00:19:39,495
or how to declare my involvement.

334
00:19:39,595 --> 00:19:44,124
My personal desire is that you paint
the target directly on my back.

335
00:19:44,224 --> 00:19:47,169
No one, not even my most
trusted confidante,

336
00:19:47,269 --> 00:19:49,088
is aware of my intentions,

337
00:19:49,188 --> 00:19:53,759
and it would not be fair for them
to fall under suspicion for my actions.

338
00:19:53,859 --> 00:19:55,761
You may be the only one
who can prevent that,

339
00:19:55,861 --> 00:19:58,388
and that is by immediately
nailing me to the cross

340
00:19:58,488 --> 00:20:01,324
rather than trying
to protect me as a source.

341
00:20:03,952 --> 00:20:07,773
On timing, regarding
meeting up in Hong Kong.

342
00:20:07,873 --> 00:20:09,399
The first rendezvous attempt

343
00:20:09,499 --> 00:20:12,861
will be at 10:00 a.m. local time
on Monday.

344
00:20:12,961 --> 00:20:17,089
We will meet in the hallway outside
of a restaurant in the Mira Hotel.

345
00:20:18,258 --> 00:20:21,385
I will be working on a Rubik's Cube
so you can identify me.

346
00:20:22,638 --> 00:20:26,416
Approach me, and ask if I know
the hours of the restaurant.

347
00:20:26,516 --> 00:20:28,794
I'll respond by stating that
I'm not sure,

348
00:20:28,894 --> 00:20:31,547
and suggest you try the lounge instead.

349
00:20:31,647 --> 00:20:35,024
I'll offer to show you where it is,
and at that point we're good.

350
00:20:36,026 --> 00:20:38,152
You simply need to follow naturally.

351
00:21:15,649 --> 00:21:18,093
As far as positioning,
I mean, if you want us to sit

352
00:21:18,193 --> 00:21:19,553
in any particular way or whatever.

353
00:21:19,653 --> 00:21:22,822
You know, I'm gonna go there,
to try to get better light.

354
00:21:32,040 --> 00:21:35,861
So, um, there's, you know,
so many different

355
00:21:35,961 --> 00:21:37,988
enormous stories

356
00:21:38,088 --> 00:21:40,464
just, that are kind of
stand alone stories,

357
00:21:41,466 --> 00:21:43,118
that even, like, you know,

358
00:21:43,218 --> 00:21:44,703
certain things
about an individual document

359
00:21:44,803 --> 00:21:46,288
that can just be their own story.

360
00:21:46,388 --> 00:21:49,458
And I just want to start
churning those stories out.

361
00:21:49,558 --> 00:21:52,628
I basically woke up this morning
and already started writing stories.

362
00:21:52,728 --> 00:21:54,588
So I'm hoping to, you know,

363
00:21:54,688 --> 00:21:57,132
start publishing
like within a day or two days.

364
00:21:57,232 --> 00:21:59,218
- Okay.
- As long as you're good with that.

365
00:21:59,318 --> 00:22:00,886
- Yeah.
- Um, and...

366
00:22:00,986 --> 00:22:03,764
So, as far as like the stuff
we have to talk about,

367
00:22:03,864 --> 00:22:06,449
I'm kind of dichotomizing it,

368
00:22:07,951 --> 00:22:11,021
between stuff that
I'd like to talk to you about

369
00:22:11,121 --> 00:22:12,773
in terms of like the documents
and the content,

370
00:22:12,873 --> 00:22:14,483
and Laura has a bunch of
questions about that as well,

371
00:22:14,583 --> 00:22:15,984
sort of working through the documents,

372
00:22:16,084 --> 00:22:18,904
getting your take on
a lot of this stuff that,

373
00:22:19,004 --> 00:22:20,405
you know, will help me
understand it better.

374
00:22:20,505 --> 00:22:22,783
But then also the sort of "you" story,

375
00:22:22,883 --> 00:22:25,786
like the who you are, what you've done,

376
00:22:25,886 --> 00:22:27,496
why you've done what you've done.

377
00:22:27,596 --> 00:22:29,164
- Yeah.
- And I'd love to do that first.

378
00:22:29,264 --> 00:22:30,499
Okay.

379
00:22:30,599 --> 00:22:33,252
Um, in part because you're
the only one who can do that.

380
00:22:33,352 --> 00:22:36,380
So I'd just like to get that done
so that it's done, um,

381
00:22:36,480 --> 00:22:37,923
and also because, you know,

382
00:22:38,023 --> 00:22:40,133
it might be that
you want to do that early.

383
00:22:40,233 --> 00:22:42,052
- Because...
- Who knows what could happen...

384
00:22:42,152 --> 00:22:45,430
It might be necessary, we might
choose to have that done early.

385
00:22:45,530 --> 00:22:47,641
Tell me your thoughts on
where you are with that...

386
00:22:47,741 --> 00:22:49,142
The primary one on that,

387
00:22:49,242 --> 00:22:51,645
I think I've expressed that
a couple times online,

388
00:22:51,745 --> 00:22:56,692
is I feel the modern media has
a big focus on personalities.

389
00:22:56,792 --> 00:22:58,193
Totally.

390
00:22:58,293 --> 00:23:02,322
And I'm a little concerned
the more we focus on that,

391
00:23:02,422 --> 00:23:05,450
the more they're gonna use
that as a distraction.

392
00:23:05,550 --> 00:23:07,536
And I don't necessarily
want that to happen,

393
00:23:07,636 --> 00:23:09,830
which is why I've consistently
said, you know,

394
00:23:09,930 --> 00:23:12,456
"I'm not the story here."

395
00:23:13,433 --> 00:23:14,418
Nervous, huh?

396
00:23:14,518 --> 00:23:15,919
No, it's a very, very cheap pen,

397
00:23:16,019 --> 00:23:18,396
that just with the slightest
force broke, go ahead.

398
00:23:19,898 --> 00:23:22,092
But uh, yeah,

399
00:23:22,192 --> 00:23:24,970
anything I can do to help you guys

400
00:23:25,070 --> 00:23:26,847
get this out I will do.

401
00:23:26,947 --> 00:23:31,601
I don't have,
uh, any experience with media,

402
00:23:31,701 --> 00:23:36,690
with how this works,
so I'm kind of learning as I go.

403
00:23:36,790 --> 00:23:39,109
Right, so I just want to get a sense

404
00:23:39,209 --> 00:23:41,194
of why did you decide to do
what you've done.

405
00:23:41,294 --> 00:23:45,073
So, for me,
it all comes down to state power

406
00:23:45,173 --> 00:23:49,494
against the peoples' ability to
meaningfully oppose that power.

407
00:23:49,594 --> 00:23:52,205
And I'm sitting there, uh, every day

408
00:23:52,305 --> 00:23:55,500
getting paid to design methods

409
00:23:55,600 --> 00:23:58,754
to amplify that state power.

410
00:23:58,854 --> 00:24:00,881
And I'm realizing that if, you know,

411
00:24:00,981 --> 00:24:03,633
the policy switches
that are the only things

412
00:24:03,733 --> 00:24:05,969
that restrain these states,

413
00:24:06,069 --> 00:24:08,513
were changed, there...

414
00:24:08,613 --> 00:24:10,265
you couldn't meaningfully oppose these.

415
00:24:10,365 --> 00:24:11,850
I mean you would have to be

416
00:24:11,950 --> 00:24:13,602
the most incredibly sophisticated,

417
00:24:13,702 --> 00:24:15,520
technical actor in existence.

418
00:24:15,620 --> 00:24:17,981
I mean, I'm not sure there's anybody,

419
00:24:18,081 --> 00:24:20,776
no matter how gifted you are,

420
00:24:20,876 --> 00:24:23,653
who could oppose all of the offices

421
00:24:23,753 --> 00:24:26,865
and all the bright people,
even all the mediocre people

422
00:24:26,965 --> 00:24:29,993
out there with all of their tools
and all their capabilities.

423
00:24:30,093 --> 00:24:33,955
And as I saw the promise
of the Obama administration

424
00:24:34,055 --> 00:24:36,249
be betrayed and walked away from

425
00:24:36,349 --> 00:24:38,710
and in fact, actually advance...

426
00:24:38,810 --> 00:24:39,795
Uh-huh, uh-huh.

427
00:24:39,895 --> 00:24:42,130
...the things that had been promised

428
00:24:42,230 --> 00:24:46,176
to be sort of curtailed
and reigned in and dialed back,

429
00:24:46,276 --> 00:24:48,929
and actually get worse,
particularly drone strikes,

430
00:24:49,029 --> 00:24:50,430
which I also learned at NSA,

431
00:24:50,530 --> 00:24:54,158
we could watch drone videos
from our desktops.

432
00:24:57,037 --> 00:24:59,815
As I saw that, that really
hardened me to action.

433
00:24:59,915 --> 00:25:01,566
- In real time?
- In real time.

434
00:25:01,666 --> 00:25:04,069
Yeah, you... it'll stream

435
00:25:04,169 --> 00:25:06,947
a lower quality of the video
to your desktop.

436
00:25:07,047 --> 00:25:09,074
Typically you'd be watching
surveillance drones

437
00:25:09,174 --> 00:25:11,410
as opposed to actually
like you know murder drones

438
00:25:11,510 --> 00:25:13,453
where they're going out there
and bomb somebody.

439
00:25:13,553 --> 00:25:16,373
But you'll have a drone that's just
following somebody's house

440
00:25:16,473 --> 00:25:18,083
for hours and hours.

441
00:25:18,183 --> 00:25:19,584
And you won't know who it is,

442
00:25:19,684 --> 00:25:22,212
because you don't have
the context for that.

443
00:25:22,312 --> 00:25:23,964
But it's just a page,

444
00:25:24,064 --> 00:25:26,842
where it's lists
and lists of drone feeds

445
00:25:26,942 --> 00:25:28,343
in all these different countries,

446
00:25:28,443 --> 00:25:30,095
under all these different code names,

447
00:25:30,195 --> 00:25:32,321
and you can just click on
which one you want to see.

448
00:25:34,783 --> 00:25:37,102
Right, but, so if your self-interest

449
00:25:37,202 --> 00:25:40,355
is to live in a world in which
there's maximum privacy,

450
00:25:40,455 --> 00:25:43,150
doing something
that could put you into prison,

451
00:25:43,250 --> 00:25:45,735
in which your privacy
is completely destroyed,

452
00:25:45,835 --> 00:25:47,737
is sort of the antithesis of that.

453
00:25:47,837 --> 00:25:51,867
How did you reach the point where that
was a worthwhile calculation for you?

454
00:25:51,967 --> 00:25:55,412
I remember what the Internet was like
before it was being watched,

455
00:25:55,512 --> 00:25:58,331
and there's never been anything
in the history of man that's like it.

456
00:25:58,431 --> 00:26:01,877
I mean, you could again have children

457
00:26:01,977 --> 00:26:06,214
from one part of the world
having an equal discussion

458
00:26:06,314 --> 00:26:08,758
where, you know,
they were sort of granted,

459
00:26:08,858 --> 00:26:12,929
um, the same respect
for their ideas and conversation,

460
00:26:13,029 --> 00:26:15,765
with experts in a field
from another part of the world,

461
00:26:15,865 --> 00:26:20,645
on any topic, anywhere,
anytime, all the time.

462
00:26:20,745 --> 00:26:22,606
And it was free and unrestrained.

463
00:26:22,706 --> 00:26:25,901
And we've seen, uh, the chilling of that

464
00:26:26,001 --> 00:26:28,028
and the cooling of that
and the changing of that model,

465
00:26:28,128 --> 00:26:31,740
toward something in which people
self-police their own views,

466
00:26:31,840 --> 00:26:34,784
and they literally make jokes
about ending up on "the list"

467
00:26:34,884 --> 00:26:37,412
if they donate to a political cause

468
00:26:37,512 --> 00:26:39,498
or if they say something
in a discussion.

469
00:26:39,598 --> 00:26:42,751
Uh, and it's become an expectation

470
00:26:42,851 --> 00:26:44,794
that we're being watched.

471
00:26:44,894 --> 00:26:46,922
Um, many people I've talked to
have mentioned that

472
00:26:47,022 --> 00:26:49,674
they're careful about what
they type into search engines

473
00:26:49,774 --> 00:26:51,551
because they know that
it's being recorded.

474
00:26:51,651 --> 00:26:56,431
And that limits the boundaries
of their intellectual exploration.

475
00:26:56,531 --> 00:27:00,034
Uh... and I'm...

476
00:27:01,161 --> 00:27:06,691
I am more willing to risk imprisonment,

477
00:27:06,791 --> 00:27:10,403
or any other negative outcome,
personally,

478
00:27:10,503 --> 00:27:14,074
than I am willing to risk

479
00:27:14,174 --> 00:27:16,826
the curtailment
of my intellectual freedom

480
00:27:16,926 --> 00:27:20,330
and that of those around me

481
00:27:20,430 --> 00:27:24,334
whom I care for, uh,
equally, as I do for myself.

482
00:27:24,434 --> 00:27:27,420
And again, that's not to say
that I'm self-sacrificing,

483
00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:29,839
because it gives me...

484
00:27:29,939 --> 00:27:33,176
I feel good in my human experience

485
00:27:33,276 --> 00:27:35,569
to know that I can contribute
to the good of others.

486
00:27:52,045 --> 00:27:53,822
Could you elaborate on that?

487
00:27:53,922 --> 00:27:58,368
So, I don't know
how much of the programs

488
00:27:58,468 --> 00:28:01,746
and the actual technical capacities
everybody's talked to you about,

489
00:28:01,846 --> 00:28:06,058
but there's an infrastructure in place
in the United States and worldwide...

490
00:28:07,227 --> 00:28:09,379
that NSA has built,

491
00:28:09,479 --> 00:28:12,981
in cooperation with
other governments as well...

492
00:28:14,567 --> 00:28:20,682
that intercepts basically
every digital communication,

493
00:28:20,782 --> 00:28:25,770
every radio communication,
every analog communication

494
00:28:25,870 --> 00:28:29,149
that it has sensors in place to detect.

495
00:28:29,249 --> 00:28:34,029
And with these capabilities, basically,

496
00:28:34,129 --> 00:28:38,158
the vast majority of human

497
00:28:38,258 --> 00:28:40,910
and computer-to-computer communications,

498
00:28:41,010 --> 00:28:42,537
device-based communications,

499
00:28:42,637 --> 00:28:44,414
which sort of inform the relationships

500
00:28:44,514 --> 00:28:46,249
between humans,

501
00:28:46,349 --> 00:28:50,378
are automatically ingested
without targeting.

502
00:28:50,478 --> 00:28:53,798
And that allows individuals
to retroactively

503
00:28:53,898 --> 00:28:58,428
search your communications
based on self-certifications.

504
00:28:58,528 --> 00:29:04,184
So, for example, if I wanted to see
the content of your email,

505
00:29:04,284 --> 00:29:08,688
or, you know, your wife's phone calls,
or anything like that,

506
00:29:08,788 --> 00:29:12,942
all I have to do is
use what's called a "selector,"

507
00:29:13,042 --> 00:29:18,198
any kind of thing
in the communications chain

508
00:29:18,298 --> 00:29:21,201
that might uniquely or almost uniquely

509
00:29:21,301 --> 00:29:22,786
identify you as an individual.

510
00:29:22,886 --> 00:29:25,163
And I'm talking about things
like email addresses,

511
00:29:25,263 --> 00:29:28,541
IP addresses, phone numbers,
credit cards,

512
00:29:28,641 --> 00:29:31,961
um, even passwords
that are unique to you

513
00:29:32,061 --> 00:29:34,923
that aren't used by anyone else.

514
00:29:35,023 --> 00:29:37,342
I can input those into the system,

515
00:29:37,442 --> 00:29:39,469
and it will not only go back
through the database

516
00:29:39,569 --> 00:29:43,598
and go, "Have I seen this
anywhere in the past?"

517
00:29:43,698 --> 00:29:45,183
It will,

518
00:29:45,283 --> 00:29:48,353
basically put an additional
level of scrutiny on it,

519
00:29:48,453 --> 00:29:50,730
moving into the future, that says,

520
00:29:50,830 --> 00:29:53,608
"If this is detected now
or at anytime in the future

521
00:29:53,708 --> 00:29:56,319
I want this to go to me immediately,

522
00:29:56,419 --> 00:29:59,739
and alert me in real time"
that you're communicating with someone.

523
00:29:59,839 --> 00:30:01,256
Things like that.

524
00:30:05,345 --> 00:30:07,747
So I don't know who you are
or anything about you.

525
00:30:07,847 --> 00:30:10,125
Okay. Um...

526
00:30:10,225 --> 00:30:14,379
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton,

527
00:30:14,479 --> 00:30:16,214
a defense contractor,

528
00:30:16,314 --> 00:30:18,842
I'm sort of on loan to NSA.

529
00:30:18,942 --> 00:30:20,385
I don't talk to a Booz Allen boss,

530
00:30:20,485 --> 00:30:23,054
I don't get tasking from Booz Allen,
it's all from NSA.

531
00:30:23,154 --> 00:30:25,890
- Sorry, I don't know your name.
- Oh, sorry!

532
00:30:25,990 --> 00:30:28,893
I, uh... my name is Edward Snowden.

533
00:30:28,993 --> 00:30:31,354
I go by Ed. Um...

534
00:30:31,454 --> 00:30:33,732
Edward Joseph Snowden is the full name.

535
00:30:33,832 --> 00:30:37,068
- S-N...
- O-W-D-E-N

536
00:30:37,168 --> 00:30:38,403
And where are you from?

537
00:30:38,503 --> 00:30:41,906
I'm originally, I was born
in North Carolina,

538
00:30:42,006 --> 00:30:44,242
uh, small town, Elizabeth City.

539
00:30:44,342 --> 00:30:47,412
There's a Coast Guard station there.
I'm from a military family.

540
00:30:47,512 --> 00:30:49,539
But I spent most of my time

541
00:30:49,639 --> 00:30:53,016
growing up around Fort Meade
in Maryland.

542
00:30:54,769 --> 00:30:58,923
And your family,
what's the consequences for them?

543
00:30:59,023 --> 00:31:03,386
This is actually
what has made this hardest.

544
00:31:03,486 --> 00:31:07,056
My family doesn't know what's happening.

545
00:31:07,156 --> 00:31:08,574
They're unaware.

546
00:31:09,784 --> 00:31:15,064
I don't think I'll be able
to keep the family ties

547
00:31:15,164 --> 00:31:19,819
that I've had for my life, um,

548
00:31:19,919 --> 00:31:23,198
because of the risk
of associating them with this.

549
00:31:23,298 --> 00:31:26,785
And I'll leave, you know,
what to publish on this

550
00:31:26,885 --> 00:31:28,453
and what not to publish to you guys.

551
00:31:28,553 --> 00:31:31,539
I trust you to be responsible on this.

552
00:31:31,639 --> 00:31:36,294
Um, but basically,
the closer I stay to my family,

553
00:31:36,394 --> 00:31:38,505
the more likely they are to be
leaned on, you know.

554
00:31:38,605 --> 00:31:40,048
So you don't want me to report this?

555
00:31:40,148 --> 00:31:43,676
I mean, we definitely want
to do whatever we can

556
00:31:43,776 --> 00:31:46,721
not to include them
or bring them into the mix.

557
00:31:46,821 --> 00:31:49,307
Yeah, yeah, sure,
that's fine, I won't...

558
00:31:49,407 --> 00:31:50,517
I'm sorry, let me interrupt you.

559
00:31:50,617 --> 00:31:53,436
Can we just stop for a second and do
the documents and then go back to that?

560
00:31:53,536 --> 00:31:54,521
- Does that makes sense?
- Sure.

561
00:31:54,621 --> 00:31:56,022
What do I need?

562
00:31:56,122 --> 00:31:58,691
Do I need an email address
that we're using, or...?

563
00:31:58,791 --> 00:32:00,860
Well, so you can, you can send them...

564
00:32:00,960 --> 00:32:03,738
once you've encrypted it, you can send it
from whatever you think is appropriate.

565
00:32:03,838 --> 00:32:06,658
The main thing is you've got
to encapsulate all of this

566
00:32:06,758 --> 00:32:11,120
in a way that it can't be
decrypted and read

567
00:32:11,220 --> 00:32:13,081
when it's in transit
across the network...

568
00:32:13,181 --> 00:32:14,415
Right.

569
00:32:14,515 --> 00:32:16,709
...or on either of the end
points that it's received at.

570
00:32:16,809 --> 00:32:18,211
Just so you know, these documents are

571
00:32:18,311 --> 00:32:22,507
basically all gonna be uploaded
in like 48 hours, 72 hours, whatever...

572
00:32:22,607 --> 00:32:25,218
This is simply... you want to get in
the process of doing this for everything,

573
00:32:25,318 --> 00:32:28,263
because it seems hard, but it's not hard,
his is super easy.

574
00:32:28,363 --> 00:32:30,223
So just walk me through it, and...

575
00:32:30,323 --> 00:32:33,017
Okay. Show me... show me
the actual folder structure

576
00:32:33,117 --> 00:32:34,743
where these files are first.

577
00:32:38,122 --> 00:32:40,233
How many documents
did you say there were?

578
00:32:40,333 --> 00:32:41,526
Seven.

579
00:32:41,626 --> 00:32:42,944
Well, while you're working
did you want to...?

580
00:32:43,044 --> 00:32:45,697
Okay, go ahead.

581
00:32:45,797 --> 00:32:47,532
How many documents are we talking about?

582
00:32:47,632 --> 00:32:49,701
Because when The Guardian did WikiLeaks,

583
00:32:49,801 --> 00:32:52,036
technical people set up a system

584
00:32:52,136 --> 00:32:55,123
so they were available
for anybody to see.

585
00:32:55,223 --> 00:32:58,793
And I just wondered
if it's possible to do the same thing?

586
00:32:58,893 --> 00:33:01,921
That would be the ideal end game,

587
00:33:02,021 --> 00:33:06,926
um, but because some of these documents

588
00:33:07,026 --> 00:33:09,512
are legitimately classified in ways

589
00:33:09,612 --> 00:33:12,614
that could cause harm to people
and methods...

590
00:33:13,616 --> 00:33:17,020
I'm comfortable in my technical
ability to protect them,

591
00:33:17,120 --> 00:33:18,771
I mean you could literally
shoot me or torture me,

592
00:33:18,871 --> 00:33:22,442
and I could not disclose
the password if I wanted to.

593
00:33:22,542 --> 00:33:27,196
Um, you know, I have
the sophistication to do that.

594
00:33:27,296 --> 00:33:30,074
There are some journalists
that I think could do that,

595
00:33:30,174 --> 00:33:32,785
but there are a number of them
that couldn't.

596
00:33:32,885 --> 00:33:34,746
But the question becomes,

597
00:33:34,846 --> 00:33:40,335
can an organization actually
control that information

598
00:33:40,435 --> 00:33:42,962
in that manner without risking

599
00:33:43,062 --> 00:33:44,839
basically an uncontrolled disclosure?

600
00:33:44,939 --> 00:33:46,591
But I do agree with that.

601
00:33:46,691 --> 00:33:49,344
Honestly, I don't want to be the person

602
00:33:49,444 --> 00:33:50,845
making the decisions on

603
00:33:50,945 --> 00:33:52,555
what should be public
and what shouldn't.

604
00:33:52,655 --> 00:33:56,351
Which is why, rather than
publishing these on my own,

605
00:33:56,451 --> 00:33:59,854
or putting them out openly,
I'm running them through journalists.

606
00:33:59,954 --> 00:34:02,941
So that my bias,
you know, and my things...

607
00:34:03,041 --> 00:34:05,735
Because clearly
I have some strongly held views,

608
00:34:05,835 --> 00:34:07,236
are removed from that equation,

609
00:34:07,336 --> 00:34:09,656
and the public interest
is being represented

610
00:34:09,756 --> 00:34:11,157
in the most responsible manner.

611
00:34:11,257 --> 00:34:13,242
Yeah.

612
00:34:13,342 --> 00:34:17,121
Actually, given your sort of, you know,

613
00:34:17,221 --> 00:34:21,626
geographic familiarity
with the UK and whatnot,

614
00:34:21,726 --> 00:34:27,590
I'd like to point out that GCHQ has, uh,

615
00:34:27,690 --> 00:34:30,343
probably the most invasive...

616
00:34:30,443 --> 00:34:32,261
I've heard about that.

617
00:34:32,361 --> 00:34:34,514
...network intercept program
anywhere in the world.

618
00:34:34,614 --> 00:34:35,974
Yeah, yeah.

619
00:34:36,074 --> 00:34:39,602
It's called Tempora, T-E-M-P-O-R-A,

620
00:34:39,702 --> 00:34:42,355
and it's the world's first "full take,"

621
00:34:42,455 --> 00:34:43,898
they call it, and that means content

622
00:34:43,998 --> 00:34:46,208
in addition to metadata, on everything.

623
00:34:49,253 --> 00:34:52,115
Um, so this is what I'd like
to do in terms of scheduling,

624
00:34:52,215 --> 00:34:53,825
if it's good with everybody else.

625
00:34:53,925 --> 00:34:56,911
Um, are you... do you feel like
you're done with what you...?

626
00:34:57,011 --> 00:34:58,413
I am done.

627
00:34:58,513 --> 00:35:02,166
I'm anxious to go back,
get those articles done.

628
00:35:02,266 --> 00:35:04,961
And then there's a bunch of
documents that aren't about

629
00:35:05,061 --> 00:35:07,213
those first two or three stories that
I'd like to spend time with you...

630
00:35:07,313 --> 00:35:09,424
- Sure, yeah...
- ...you know, kind of going over it.

631
00:35:09,524 --> 00:35:11,676
- Um, and...
- I'm not going anywhere!

632
00:35:11,776 --> 00:35:14,137
You're available?
You want to check your book first?

633
00:35:14,237 --> 00:35:17,181
Yeah! Let me...
uh... let me check my schedule.

634
00:35:17,281 --> 00:35:18,433
Is that good for you, Laura?

635
00:35:18,533 --> 00:35:19,866
- It's great.
- Okay.

636
00:35:35,883 --> 00:35:37,702
Hello?

637
00:35:37,802 --> 00:35:39,454
Yes.

638
00:35:39,554 --> 00:35:41,930
My meal was great, thank you very much.

639
00:35:45,268 --> 00:35:47,795
No, I still have some left, and I think
I'm gonna be eating it later.

640
00:35:47,895 --> 00:35:50,063
So, uh, you can just
leave me alone for now.

641
00:35:52,400 --> 00:35:54,427
Okay, great. Thank you so much.

642
00:35:54,527 --> 00:35:56,027
Have a good one. Bye.

643
00:35:57,822 --> 00:36:00,824
Let's fix that real quick.

644
00:36:03,703 --> 00:36:05,855
So uh, another fun thing,
I was telling Laura about this:

645
00:36:05,955 --> 00:36:08,858
all these new VOIP phones,
they have little computers in them,

646
00:36:08,958 --> 00:36:10,985
and you can hot mic these
over the network...

647
00:36:11,085 --> 00:36:12,904
all the time,
even when the receiver's down.

648
00:36:13,004 --> 00:36:16,449
So as long as it's plugged in,
it can be listening in on you.

649
00:36:16,549 --> 00:36:18,951
And I hadn't even considered
that earlier, but yeah.

650
00:36:19,051 --> 00:36:20,036
Okay.

651
00:36:20,136 --> 00:36:22,955
There are so many ways this could be...

652
00:36:23,055 --> 00:36:26,000
Everything in here is gonna be
on the public record at some point.

653
00:36:26,100 --> 00:36:28,086
We, we should operate on that,
that basis, because...

654
00:36:28,186 --> 00:36:29,378
Yeah, we are.

655
00:36:29,478 --> 00:36:30,755
Do you have your air-gapped
machine with you?

656
00:36:30,855 --> 00:36:32,131
I do, I do.

657
00:36:32,231 --> 00:36:33,815
You can pop that out.

658
00:36:37,820 --> 00:36:39,263
Do you have an understanding
or commitment

659
00:36:39,363 --> 00:36:42,642
on when you guys are going to
press with the first stories?

660
00:36:42,742 --> 00:36:44,894
I suppose seven or eight
in the morning in London.

661
00:36:44,994 --> 00:36:46,369
Uh-huh, okay.

662
00:36:48,456 --> 00:36:50,248
Now let's see here.

663
00:36:58,007 --> 00:36:59,841
Oh, hey, look, there's the other one.

664
00:37:00,968 --> 00:37:03,246
Pro tip, let's not leave
the same SD cards

665
00:37:03,346 --> 00:37:05,388
in our laptops forever, in the future.

666
00:37:12,230 --> 00:37:16,509
Did you know this was still
kicking around in your laptop?

667
00:37:16,609 --> 00:37:17,927
Yeah, um, that was the...

668
00:37:18,027 --> 00:37:20,111
- Okay, just making sure.
- Okay, yeah.

669
00:37:21,113 --> 00:37:23,307
- This is that.
- Right there.

670
00:37:23,407 --> 00:37:26,519
You will have a new one that looks exactly
identical that's a different archive,

671
00:37:26,619 --> 00:37:30,314
so you might want to
take a Sharpie to it, or something.

672
00:37:30,414 --> 00:37:33,693
Could you pass me
my magic mantle of power?

673
00:37:33,793 --> 00:37:36,169
Mm-hmm. I'm gonna go pick up...

674
00:37:42,009 --> 00:37:44,537
Is that about the possibility of...

675
00:37:44,637 --> 00:37:46,763
Visual... yeah, visual collection.

676
00:37:53,688 --> 00:37:57,341
I don't think at this point there's
anything that will shock us.

677
00:37:58,013 --> 00:37:59,927
We've become pretty...

678
00:38:00,027 --> 00:38:03,097
In fact, Ewen said before, he's like,
he's like "I'm never leaving my room...

679
00:38:03,197 --> 00:38:06,058
I'm never leaving anything in my room
again, not a single machine."

680
00:38:06,158 --> 00:38:08,227
I was like, "You've been
infected by the paranoia bug.

681
00:38:08,327 --> 00:38:10,313
- Happens to all of us!"
- Yeah.

682
00:38:10,413 --> 00:38:11,814
The way he said it, he was like,

683
00:38:11,914 --> 00:38:16,235
"I would never leave a single device
in the room again alone."

684
00:38:16,335 --> 00:38:19,000
My bag is getting heavier and heavier.

685
00:38:22,300 --> 00:38:23,701
That's your evil influence, Ed.

686
00:38:23,801 --> 00:38:26,454
All right, I'm going need you
to enter your root password

687
00:38:26,554 --> 00:38:28,346
because I don't know what it is.

688
00:38:30,182 --> 00:38:32,851
If you want to use this,
you're more than welcome to.

689
00:38:33,853 --> 00:38:35,963
Looks like your root password's about
four characters long anyway, so...

690
00:38:36,063 --> 00:38:39,508
It's usually a lot longer, but that's
just a one-time-only thing, right?

691
00:38:39,608 --> 00:38:40,968
So it is... uh...

692
00:38:41,068 --> 00:38:43,262
It had been a lot longer,
but ever since I knew that

693
00:38:43,362 --> 00:38:45,014
it was just like a one time
only session one,

694
00:38:45,114 --> 00:38:47,516
I've been making it shorter.
Is that not good?

695
00:38:47,616 --> 00:38:51,145
It's actually not.
I was expressing this with Laura.

696
00:38:51,245 --> 00:38:54,148
The issue is, because of the fact that
it's got a hardware mac address

697
00:38:54,248 --> 00:38:55,650
and things like that, if people are able

698
00:38:55,750 --> 00:38:59,278
to identify your machine,
and they're able to...

699
00:38:59,378 --> 00:39:01,781
This is the fact you're about
to break the most upsetting story...

700
00:39:01,881 --> 00:39:03,032
Right, that's true, that's true.

701
00:39:03,132 --> 00:39:04,784
Yeah, so they might kind of
prioritize you...

702
00:39:04,884 --> 00:39:06,994
It's ten letters. I type very quickly.

703
00:39:07,094 --> 00:39:08,287
It actually is ten letters.

704
00:39:08,387 --> 00:39:10,539
Okay, so ten letters would be good

705
00:39:10,639 --> 00:39:12,917
if they had to brute force
the entire keyspace.

706
00:39:13,017 --> 00:39:14,418
Right.

707
00:39:14,518 --> 00:39:18,176
That would still probably
only take a couple days for NSA.

708
00:39:20,399 --> 00:39:22,802
That's a fire alarm.

709
00:39:22,902 --> 00:39:24,235
Okay.

710
00:39:25,654 --> 00:39:28,933
Hopefully it just sounds like
a three second test.

711
00:39:29,033 --> 00:39:32,118
Or is... do you want to call
the desk and ask?

712
00:39:33,996 --> 00:39:35,273
I think it's fine.

713
00:39:35,373 --> 00:39:37,525
Yeah, I don't think it's an issue,
but it's interesting that it just...

714
00:39:37,625 --> 00:39:39,402
Did that happen before?

715
00:39:39,502 --> 00:39:42,796
Maybe they got mad when they couldn't
listen in to us via the phone anymore.

716
00:39:44,507 --> 00:39:47,201
Has the fire alarm gone off before?

717
00:39:47,301 --> 00:39:49,954
No, that's the first time
that's happened.

718
00:39:50,054 --> 00:39:51,455
Let me see, just in case,

719
00:39:51,555 --> 00:39:54,182
they've got an alert that goes to...

720
00:39:55,267 --> 00:39:57,486
That's unusual.

721
00:39:59,563 --> 00:40:01,924
- You probably...
- We might have to evacuate.

722
00:40:02,024 --> 00:40:03,467
...shouldn't ignore that.

723
00:40:03,567 --> 00:40:05,337
I don't know.

724
00:40:06,112 --> 00:40:09,181
- It's not continuous.
- It's not continuous.

725
00:40:09,281 --> 00:40:12,200
No, I'm just saying, if it continues.

726
00:40:14,954 --> 00:40:17,857
And then we go and we meet
the guys down in the lobby...

727
00:40:17,957 --> 00:40:19,582
- Yeah, right?
- Yeah.

728
00:40:20,751 --> 00:40:22,987
Yeah, let's uh, let's leave it for now.

729
00:40:23,087 --> 00:40:25,338
Let me just finish this up.

730
00:40:27,915 --> 00:40:29,383
All right.

731
00:40:37,935 --> 00:40:39,337
Not that they're going to answer,

732
00:40:39,437 --> 00:40:41,438
because they probably got
like 7,000 calls.

733
00:40:44,733 --> 00:40:46,761
Hi, uh, we hear a loud buzzing

734
00:40:46,861 --> 00:40:49,513
on the tenth floor,
can you tell us what that is?

735
00:40:51,740 --> 00:40:53,267
Oh, okay.

736
00:40:53,367 --> 00:40:55,770
Okay great. Thank you. Bye.

737
00:40:56,954 --> 00:40:58,773
Fire alarm testing maintenance.

738
00:40:58,873 --> 00:41:00,775
That's good. That's what
we wanted to hear.

739
00:41:00,875 --> 00:41:03,277
Nice of them to uh...

740
00:41:03,377 --> 00:41:06,004
nice of them to let us know
about that in advance.

741
00:41:09,383 --> 00:41:10,785
Um...

742
00:41:10,885 --> 00:41:12,745
I just wanted to
give you kind of a quick tour,

743
00:41:12,845 --> 00:41:15,164
uh, when Laura was looking at this,
she was kind of salivating

744
00:41:15,264 --> 00:41:17,291
and couldn't stop actually
reading the documents...

745
00:41:17,391 --> 00:41:18,376
Right, right.

746
00:41:18,476 --> 00:41:21,295
So we'll try and restrain ourselves
without promising that we'll succeed.

747
00:41:21,395 --> 00:41:23,130
Yeah, I just wanted to kind of explain

748
00:41:23,230 --> 00:41:26,759
a brief overview of what these are
and how they're organized.

749
00:41:26,859 --> 00:41:28,803
Um, the beginning are
just some documents of interest.

750
00:41:28,903 --> 00:41:30,554
The primary purpose
of the second archive

751
00:41:30,654 --> 00:41:33,140
is to bring the focus over to SSO,

752
00:41:33,240 --> 00:41:34,809
as opposed to uh, PRISM.

753
00:41:34,909 --> 00:41:36,769
And this is in general.

754
00:41:36,869 --> 00:41:38,896
SSO are the Special Source Operations,

755
00:41:38,996 --> 00:41:43,192
those are the worldwide
passive collection on networks.

756
00:41:43,292 --> 00:41:47,079
They're both domestic to the US
and international.

757
00:41:47,179 --> 00:41:48,697
There's a lot of different ways
they do it,

758
00:41:48,797 --> 00:41:52,034
but corporate partnerships
are one of the primary things,

759
00:41:52,134 --> 00:41:54,578
uh, they do domestically,
they also do this with multinationals

760
00:41:54,678 --> 00:41:57,289
that might be headquartered
in the US they can kind of coerce,

761
00:41:57,389 --> 00:41:59,834
or just pay into giving them access.

762
00:41:59,934 --> 00:42:03,212
And they also do it bilaterally, with
the assistance of certain governments.

763
00:42:03,312 --> 00:42:05,172
And that's basically
on the premise that they go,

764
00:42:05,272 --> 00:42:06,966
"All right, we'll help you
set this system up

765
00:42:07,066 --> 00:42:08,926
if you give us all the data from it."

766
00:42:09,026 --> 00:42:10,469
Um, so yeah...

767
00:42:10,569 --> 00:42:13,055
There's, there's...

768
00:42:13,155 --> 00:42:16,851
There's a lot more in here than any
one person or probably one team could do.

769
00:42:16,951 --> 00:42:17,977
Right.

770
00:42:18,077 --> 00:42:21,981
Um, XKeyscore DeepDive,
XKeyscore in general,

771
00:42:22,081 --> 00:42:23,941
and there's a huge folder
of documentation

772
00:42:24,041 --> 00:42:26,110
on XKeyscore and how it works,

773
00:42:26,210 --> 00:42:28,863
is the front-end system
that analysts use

774
00:42:28,963 --> 00:42:31,991
for querying that sort of ocean of
raw SIGINT that I was telling you about.

775
00:42:32,091 --> 00:42:35,619
All of that stuff where you can
sort of do the retroactive searches

776
00:42:35,719 --> 00:42:37,496
and live searches
and get flagging and whatnot,

777
00:42:37,596 --> 00:42:42,001
XKeyscore is the front end for that.

778
00:42:42,101 --> 00:42:43,752
I'm just gonna show you one slide here

779
00:42:43,852 --> 00:42:46,380
'cause Laura thought it was valuable,

780
00:42:46,480 --> 00:42:48,883
and I was talking about
kind of how these,

781
00:42:48,983 --> 00:42:54,138
uh, capabilities ramp up
in sophistication over time.

782
00:42:54,238 --> 00:42:57,141
This is kinda nice.
As of fiscal year 2011,

783
00:42:57,241 --> 00:43:01,061
they could monitor one billion
telephone or Internet sessions

784
00:43:01,161 --> 00:43:04,523
simultaneously per one of these devices.

785
00:43:04,623 --> 00:43:09,862
And they could collect at the rate
of about 125 gigabytes a second,

786
00:43:09,962 --> 00:43:11,363
which is a terabit.

787
00:43:11,463 --> 00:43:12,990
That's just each one of these devices.

788
00:43:13,090 --> 00:43:14,658
That's for each one of these, yeah.

789
00:43:14,758 --> 00:43:17,077
And how many Tumult machines
would there be, then?

790
00:43:17,177 --> 00:43:20,414
Uh... per this, back then,
there were 20 sites,

791
00:43:20,514 --> 00:43:24,835
there's 10 at DOD installations,
but these are all outdated.

792
00:43:24,935 --> 00:43:27,020
We've expanded pretty rapidly.

793
00:43:28,522 --> 00:43:31,217
But still 20 sites,
that's at least 20 billion.

794
00:43:31,317 --> 00:43:33,177
This all needs to get out,
you know I mean?

795
00:43:33,277 --> 00:43:34,803
It's like...

796
00:43:34,903 --> 00:43:40,184
just in terms of understanding
the capabilities. It's so opaque.

797
00:43:40,284 --> 00:43:43,437
It's not science fiction.
This stuff is happening right now.

798
00:43:43,537 --> 00:43:46,440
No, that's what I mean, it's like,
the, the magnitude of it, and...

799
00:43:46,540 --> 00:43:51,028
and, like, this is a pretty
inaccessible technical document,

800
00:43:51,128 --> 00:43:54,031
but even this, like, is really chilling.

801
00:43:54,131 --> 00:43:55,449
- Do you know what I mean?
- Yeah.

802
00:43:55,549 --> 00:43:58,202
Yeah, I mean we should have...
we should be having debates about

803
00:43:58,302 --> 00:43:59,703
whether we want governments...

804
00:43:59,803 --> 00:44:02,540
I mean, this is massive
and extraordinary.

805
00:44:02,640 --> 00:44:04,083
It's amazing.

806
00:44:04,183 --> 00:44:06,835
Even though you know it,
even though you know that...

807
00:44:06,935 --> 00:44:10,339
to see it, like,
the physical blueprints of it,

808
00:44:10,439 --> 00:44:12,675
and sort of
the technical expressions of it,

809
00:44:12,775 --> 00:44:15,678
really hits home
in like a super visceral way

810
00:44:15,778 --> 00:44:17,320
that is so needed.

811
00:44:22,284 --> 00:44:24,436
This is CNN Breaking News.

812
00:44:24,536 --> 00:44:28,315
An explosive new report
is reigniting the concerns

813
00:44:28,415 --> 00:44:32,486
that your privacy is being violated
to protect America's security.

814
00:44:32,586 --> 00:44:36,365
It reveals a court order giving
the National Security Agency

815
00:44:36,465 --> 00:44:41,287
blanket access to millions of Verizon
customers' records on a daily basis.

816
00:44:41,387 --> 00:44:43,872
Earlier I had the chance to
conduct the first TV interview

817
00:44:43,972 --> 00:44:47,084
with the reporter who broke
this story wide open:

818
00:44:47,184 --> 00:44:49,227
Glenn Greenwald of The Guardian.

819
00:44:50,229 --> 00:44:51,505
Congratulations on the scoop.

820
00:44:51,605 --> 00:44:55,843
Explain for our viewers
why this is important.

821
00:44:55,943 --> 00:44:58,137
It's important
because people have understood

822
00:44:58,237 --> 00:44:59,805
that the law that this was done under,

823
00:44:59,905 --> 00:45:02,558
which is the Patriot Act,
enacted in the wake of 9/11,

824
00:45:02,658 --> 00:45:04,226
was a law that allowed the government

825
00:45:04,326 --> 00:45:07,521
very broad powers
to get records about people

826
00:45:07,621 --> 00:45:11,900
with a lower level of suspicion than
probable cause, the traditional standard.

827
00:45:12,000 --> 00:45:14,278
So it's always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act,

828
00:45:14,378 --> 00:45:16,238
if the government had even any suspicion

829
00:45:16,338 --> 00:45:18,407
that you were involved
in a crime or terrorism,

830
00:45:18,507 --> 00:45:20,618
they could get a lot of
information about you.

831
00:45:20,718 --> 00:45:23,537
What this court order does
that makes it so striking,

832
00:45:23,637 --> 00:45:25,914
is that it's not directed
at any individuals

833
00:45:26,014 --> 00:45:29,293
who they believe or have suspicion
of committing crimes

834
00:45:29,393 --> 00:45:30,794
or are part of a terrorist organization,

835
00:45:30,894 --> 00:45:33,881
it's collecting the phone records
of every single customer

836
00:45:33,981 --> 00:45:35,799
of Verizon business

837
00:45:35,899 --> 00:45:39,720
and finding out every single call that
they've made, internationally and locally,

838
00:45:39,820 --> 00:45:41,805
so it's indiscriminate
and it's sweeping.

839
00:45:41,905 --> 00:45:44,308
It's a government program
designed to collect information

840
00:45:44,408 --> 00:45:46,435
about all Americans, not just people

841
00:45:46,535 --> 00:45:49,662
where they believe there's reason
to think they've done anything wrong.

842
00:46:49,556 --> 00:46:51,709
Ah, it's, it's a tough situation,

843
00:46:51,809 --> 00:46:54,503
you know, hearing that
the person that you love,

844
00:46:54,603 --> 00:46:57,256
that you've spent the decade with,

845
00:46:57,356 --> 00:46:58,940
may not be coming back.

846
00:47:03,862 --> 00:47:05,889
What did they ask her?

847
00:47:05,989 --> 00:47:09,017
Um, when was the last time she saw me,

848
00:47:09,117 --> 00:47:12,104
where am I, um, what am I doing,

849
00:47:12,204 --> 00:47:13,981
you know, what does she know about

850
00:47:14,081 --> 00:47:16,775
my illness, things like that.

851
00:47:16,875 --> 00:47:17,875
Uh...

852
00:47:19,503 --> 00:47:20,571
so.

853
00:47:20,671 --> 00:47:24,382
Yeah, they're um...
they're pretty solidly aware.

854
00:47:25,467 --> 00:47:26,592
'Cause, uh...

855
00:47:27,636 --> 00:47:30,137
I'm clearly not at home ill.

856
00:47:51,159 --> 00:47:52,686
- Hello?
- Hello?

857
00:47:52,786 --> 00:47:57,123
Hello, let me disconnect
from the Internet.

858
00:47:59,668 --> 00:48:03,572
So, there's some news?

859
00:48:03,672 --> 00:48:06,700
Yes, there was indeed some news.
I have config.

860
00:48:06,800 --> 00:48:10,037
Today, I think,
maybe just a few hours ago?

861
00:48:10,137 --> 00:48:13,457
What... what kind of people visited?

862
00:48:13,557 --> 00:48:15,083
Uh...

863
00:48:15,183 --> 00:48:17,836
An H.R. lady, I'm assuming from NSA

864
00:48:17,936 --> 00:48:21,548
as opposed to,
uh, as opposed to Booz Allen,

865
00:48:21,648 --> 00:48:23,425
because she was accompanied
by a police officer,

866
00:48:23,525 --> 00:48:25,093
which means NSA police.

867
00:48:25,193 --> 00:48:26,595
And they were planning
to break into my house,

868
00:48:26,695 --> 00:48:29,014
which regular police don't do.

869
00:48:29,114 --> 00:48:30,307
Does she live there?

870
00:48:30,407 --> 00:48:34,728
Yeah, she lives there.
So I told her to cooperate fully...

871
00:48:34,828 --> 00:48:36,230
I can't find my phone,
just one second...

872
00:48:36,330 --> 00:48:37,356
You know, don't worry about herself.

873
00:48:37,456 --> 00:48:40,359
You know what, I'll just
take out the stuff I wanna use...

874
00:48:40,459 --> 00:48:42,486
Okay.

875
00:48:42,586 --> 00:48:45,489
Okay, well look, I mean,
this is not a surprising development.

876
00:48:45,589 --> 00:48:47,825
Nah, I know, I planned for it,
but it's just, you know,

877
00:48:47,925 --> 00:48:49,576
when it's impacting them
and they're talking to you,

878
00:48:49,676 --> 00:48:50,869
it's a little bit different.

879
00:48:50,969 --> 00:48:51,969
Absolutely.

880
00:48:53,722 --> 00:48:56,959
But it's possible that they just
noticed that you're missing.

881
00:48:57,059 --> 00:48:58,460
I guess it's not really a possibility.

882
00:48:58,560 --> 00:49:00,728
It is, but they're, I mean...

883
00:49:05,275 --> 00:49:08,611
Um... Let me just get rid of this.

884
00:49:10,864 --> 00:49:14,241
Sorry, I obviously was focused on
other things than appearance this morning.

885
00:49:16,745 --> 00:49:19,398
How was... How did she react?
Was she relatively calm about it?

886
00:49:19,498 --> 00:49:20,983
She's relatively calm...

887
00:49:21,083 --> 00:49:23,652
Does she know anything about
what you're doing and why?

888
00:49:23,752 --> 00:49:25,779
She has no idea.

889
00:49:25,879 --> 00:49:27,463
And that's, I mean, I...

890
00:49:28,507 --> 00:49:31,535
I feel badly about that, but that's
the only way I could think of where,

891
00:49:31,635 --> 00:49:33,287
like, she can't be in trouble.

892
00:49:33,387 --> 00:49:35,289
Did you just basically do a,
"I have to go somewhere

893
00:49:35,389 --> 00:49:37,457
for reasons that I can't tell you
about" kind of thing, or...?

894
00:49:37,557 --> 00:49:39,918
I just disappeared
when she was on vacation.

895
00:49:40,018 --> 00:49:44,381
Um, and I left a note saying, "Hey, I'm
going to be gone for a while for work,"

896
00:49:44,481 --> 00:49:46,300
which isn't unusual for me
in my business.

897
00:49:46,400 --> 00:49:48,719
- Right.
- You know, so...

898
00:49:48,819 --> 00:49:51,388
Okay, so let me ask you
a couple things just quickly.

899
00:49:51,488 --> 00:49:54,975
Are they gonna be able to go into
your stuff and figure out what you took?

900
00:49:55,075 --> 00:50:00,147
Um, in some kind of...

901
00:50:00,247 --> 00:50:03,817
some sort of, like, peripheral senses,
but not necessarily...

902
00:50:03,917 --> 00:50:05,903
- Not with great specificity.
- Yes.

903
00:50:06,003 --> 00:50:08,530
Because I cast such a wide net.

904
00:50:08,630 --> 00:50:10,824
If they do that the only thing
they're gonna do is have a heart attack

905
00:50:10,924 --> 00:50:12,784
because they're gonna go,
"He had access to everything."

906
00:50:12,884 --> 00:50:14,077
Yeah.

907
00:50:14,177 --> 00:50:17,289
And they're not gonna know
what specifically has been done.

908
00:50:17,389 --> 00:50:20,167
I think they're gonna start to
actually feel a little better,

909
00:50:20,267 --> 00:50:22,794
although they're not gonna be wild

910
00:50:22,894 --> 00:50:25,505
about this in any case,
when they see that the stories

911
00:50:25,605 --> 00:50:28,300
are kind of cleaving to a trend,
you know, it's not like,

912
00:50:28,400 --> 00:50:30,844
"Here's the list of everybody
who works everywhere."

913
00:50:30,944 --> 00:50:32,054
Right.

914
00:50:32,154 --> 00:50:34,806
I also think, you know, they're gonna
be paranoid in the extreme,

915
00:50:34,906 --> 00:50:38,602
and assuming all kinds of
worst case scenarios,

916
00:50:38,702 --> 00:50:41,355
which is gonna,
you know, I think make them

917
00:50:41,455 --> 00:50:42,856
react in ways that probably aren't,

918
00:50:42,956 --> 00:50:46,735
like, gonna be particularly
rational on their part.

919
00:50:46,835 --> 00:50:48,862
But, at the same time,

920
00:50:48,962 --> 00:50:51,573
there's... I do think
they're limited for the moment.

921
00:50:51,673 --> 00:50:56,036
I agree, and I mean,
I had kinda time to set a stage

922
00:50:56,136 --> 00:50:58,705
where we all enjoy at least
a minimum level of protection,

923
00:50:58,805 --> 00:51:00,707
you know, no matter who we are,
who's involved in this,

924
00:51:00,807 --> 00:51:03,669
you know, you're either a journalist,
or you're either out of jurisdiction,

925
00:51:03,769 --> 00:51:06,713
so we have some time to play this
before they can really get nasty.

926
00:51:06,813 --> 00:51:08,340
I think it's over, you know, the weeks
when they have times,

927
00:51:08,440 --> 00:51:12,844
to get lawyers really sort of go,
"This is a special situation.

928
00:51:12,944 --> 00:51:14,763
How can we interpret this
to our advantage?"

929
00:51:14,863 --> 00:51:16,765
We... we see them do this
all the time, you know,

930
00:51:16,865 --> 00:51:19,267
whether it's drones
or wiretapping or whatever,

931
00:51:19,367 --> 00:51:22,646
they'll go, "Well according
to this law from the 1840s,

932
00:51:22,746 --> 00:51:25,273
you know, with X, Y, or Z authority..."

933
00:51:25,373 --> 00:51:27,484
But that takes time.
And that takes agreement...

934
00:51:27,584 --> 00:51:29,403
And also, you know, I mean,

935
00:51:29,503 --> 00:51:32,656
I think the more public we are
out there too, like as journalists,

936
00:51:32,756 --> 00:51:35,508
the more protection
that's gonna give as well.

937
00:51:36,635 --> 00:51:39,871
Have you started to give thought to
when you're ready to come forward?

938
00:51:39,971 --> 00:51:43,291
I'm ready whenever, um...

939
00:51:43,391 --> 00:51:46,169
Honestly, I think
there's sort of an agreement

940
00:51:46,269 --> 00:51:48,922
that it's not going to bias
the reporting process.

941
00:51:49,022 --> 00:51:50,173
That's my primary concern at this point.

942
00:51:50,273 --> 00:51:52,676
I don't want to get myself
into the issue

943
00:51:52,776 --> 00:51:55,387
before it's gonna happen anyway,
and where it takes away

944
00:51:55,487 --> 00:51:56,904
from the stories that are getting out.

945
00:52:36,236 --> 00:52:39,139
We're talking about tens
of millions of Americans,

946
00:52:39,239 --> 00:52:41,433
who weren't suspected of doing anything,

947
00:52:41,533 --> 00:52:43,060
who were surveilled in this way.

948
00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:45,687
Hold your thoughts for a moment.
I want to continue this conversation

949
00:52:45,787 --> 00:52:47,856
because these are really important,
sensitive issues,

950
00:52:47,956 --> 00:52:51,068
and the public out there
has a right to know what's going on.

951
00:52:51,168 --> 00:52:53,586
This is CNN Breaking News.

952
00:52:54,588 --> 00:52:56,865
Another explosive article
has just appeared,

953
00:52:56,965 --> 00:52:58,867
this time in The Washington Post.

954
00:52:58,967 --> 00:53:01,953
It's breaking news
and it reveals another broad

955
00:53:02,053 --> 00:53:04,623
and secret US government
surveillance program.

956
00:53:04,723 --> 00:53:07,209
The Washington Post
and The Guardian in London

957
00:53:07,309 --> 00:53:09,628
reporting that the NSA and the FBI

958
00:53:09,728 --> 00:53:12,756
are tapping directly
into the central servers

959
00:53:12,856 --> 00:53:15,133
of nine leading Internet companies,

960
00:53:15,233 --> 00:53:17,969
including Microsoft,
Yahoo, Google, Facebook,

961
00:53:18,069 --> 00:53:20,889
AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple.

962
00:53:20,989 --> 00:53:23,141
The Post says they're extracting audio,

963
00:53:23,241 --> 00:53:26,228
video, photographs, emails, documents,

964
00:53:26,328 --> 00:53:28,480
and connection logs that enable analysts

965
00:53:28,580 --> 00:53:32,150
to track a person's movements
and contacts over time.

966
00:53:32,250 --> 00:53:36,988
Let's discuss this latest revelation...
they're coming out fast. Bill Binney,

967
00:53:37,088 --> 00:53:40,242
former official of the NSA
who quit back in 2001,

968
00:53:40,342 --> 00:53:42,160
you were angry over what was going on,

969
00:53:42,260 --> 00:53:44,329
you are known
as a whistleblower right now.

970
00:53:44,429 --> 00:53:46,623
Bill, what do you think about
this Washington Post story?

971
00:53:46,723 --> 00:53:50,168
Well, I assume it's just a continuation
of what they've been doing all along.

972
00:53:50,268 --> 00:53:51,503
So you're not surprised.

973
00:53:51,603 --> 00:53:53,797
Do you have any idea who is
leaking this information?

974
00:53:53,897 --> 00:53:56,049
I don't know who leaked this.

975
00:53:56,149 --> 00:53:58,135
I have no doubt that the administration

976
00:53:58,235 --> 00:54:00,387
will launch an investigation,

977
00:54:00,487 --> 00:54:04,307
not into who approved these programs
but into who leaked the information.

978
00:54:04,407 --> 00:54:07,185
I'm not shocked
the companies are denying it,

979
00:54:07,285 --> 00:54:09,437
- I don't assume...
- Do you believe them?

980
00:54:09,537 --> 00:54:11,189
There may be some technical basis

981
00:54:11,289 --> 00:54:14,442
on which they can say that
we are not actively collaborating

982
00:54:14,542 --> 00:54:17,571
or they don't have what we consider
in our own definition

983
00:54:17,671 --> 00:54:19,322
to be direct access to our servers

984
00:54:19,422 --> 00:54:22,325
but what I do know is that I've talked
to more than one person

985
00:54:22,425 --> 00:54:26,329
who has sat at a desk at a web portal

986
00:54:26,429 --> 00:54:31,001
and typed out commands and reached
into those servers from a distance.

987
00:54:31,101 --> 00:54:34,171
So whatever they want to call that,
that's what's happening.

988
00:54:34,271 --> 00:54:36,590
Well, what I would call it
is the single biggest infringement

989
00:54:36,690 --> 00:54:39,593
on American civil liberties
probably of all time, isn't it?

990
00:54:39,693 --> 00:54:41,678
It's interesting, already
you have The New York Times

991
00:54:41,778 --> 00:54:44,431
now today saying that the administration
has lost all credibility.

992
00:54:44,531 --> 00:54:46,516
The New York Times
slammed President Obama for this,

993
00:54:46,616 --> 00:54:48,018
and frankly I was used to that.

994
00:54:48,118 --> 00:54:49,895
The New York Times
used to slam George Bush

995
00:54:49,995 --> 00:54:51,813
for protecting the country
and for the steps he took.

996
00:54:51,913 --> 00:54:54,858
I don't want us to drop our guard,
I don't want us to be struck again.

997
00:54:54,958 --> 00:54:58,111
As we saw in Boston,
Anderson, people are willing

998
00:54:58,211 --> 00:54:59,613
to sacrifice their civil liberties.

999
00:54:59,713 --> 00:55:01,072
People sheltered inside...

1000
00:55:01,172 --> 00:55:03,074
How can you believe
in freedom, do you think...

1001
00:55:03,174 --> 00:55:04,993
I mean, try and play
Devil's Advocate for me,

1002
00:55:05,093 --> 00:55:09,080
when you have secret courts,
secret operations like PRISM,

1003
00:55:09,180 --> 00:55:12,042
secret investigations which go
into every spit and cough

1004
00:55:12,142 --> 00:55:13,752
of every American's lives,

1005
00:55:13,852 --> 00:55:15,837
without any member of the American
public knowing about it.

1006
00:55:15,937 --> 00:55:17,380
That's not freedom, is it?

1007
00:55:17,480 --> 00:55:20,634
In 2008, they eliminated
the warrant requirement

1008
00:55:20,734 --> 00:55:23,762
for all conversations
except ones that take place

1009
00:55:23,862 --> 00:55:26,306
by and among Americans
exclusively on American soil.

1010
00:55:26,406 --> 00:55:29,476
So they don't need warrants
now for people

1011
00:55:29,576 --> 00:55:31,144
who are foreigners outside of the US,

1012
00:55:31,244 --> 00:55:33,980
but they also don't need
warrants for Americans

1013
00:55:34,080 --> 00:55:36,274
who are in the United States
communicating with people

1014
00:55:36,374 --> 00:55:38,652
reasonably believed to be
outside of the US.

1015
00:55:38,752 --> 00:55:41,238
So again, the fact that there are
no checks, no oversight

1016
00:55:41,338 --> 00:55:43,657
about who is looking
over the NSA's shoulder,

1017
00:55:43,757 --> 00:55:45,408
means that they can take
whatever they want.

1018
00:55:45,508 --> 00:55:47,786
And the fact that it's all
behind a wall of secrecy

1019
00:55:47,886 --> 00:55:50,038
and they threaten people
who want to expose it,

1020
00:55:50,138 --> 00:55:53,500
means that whatever they're doing,
even violating the law,

1021
00:55:53,600 --> 00:55:56,711
is something that we're unlikely to know
until we start having real investigations

1022
00:55:56,811 --> 00:56:00,257
and real transparency into
what it is that the government is doing.

1023
00:56:00,357 --> 00:56:04,135
Glenn Greenwald, congratulations again
on exposing what is a true scandal.

1024
00:56:04,235 --> 00:56:05,652
I appreciate you joining me.

1025
00:56:51,825 --> 00:56:55,603
I just heard from Lindsay,

1026
00:56:55,703 --> 00:56:59,566
and uh, she's still alive,
which is good, and free.

1027
00:56:59,666 --> 00:57:02,444
My rent checks apparently are no longer

1028
00:57:02,544 --> 00:57:04,195
getting through to my landlord,

1029
00:57:04,295 --> 00:57:06,823
uh, so they said if we don't pay them

1030
00:57:06,923 --> 00:57:09,701
in five days we'll be evicted,
which is strange

1031
00:57:09,801 --> 00:57:13,220
because I've got a system set
up that automatically pays them.

1032
00:57:14,472 --> 00:57:16,374
Uh, so there's that,

1033
00:57:16,474 --> 00:57:18,376
and apparently
there's construction trucks

1034
00:57:18,476 --> 00:57:21,353
all over the street of my house,
so that's uh...

1035
00:57:24,858 --> 00:57:26,483
I wonder what they're looking for.

1036
00:58:10,028 --> 00:58:15,642
It is... uh, it is an unusual feeling
that's kind of hard to...

1037
00:58:15,742 --> 00:58:19,437
hard to like describe or...
or convey in words,

1038
00:58:19,537 --> 00:58:21,940
but not knowing what's going to
happen the next day,

1039
00:58:22,040 --> 00:58:25,151
the next hour, the next week,
it's scary,

1040
00:58:25,251 --> 00:58:26,653
but at the same time it's liberating.

1041
00:58:26,753 --> 00:58:28,822
You know, the, uh...

1042
00:58:28,922 --> 00:58:30,573
the planning comes a lot easier

1043
00:58:30,673 --> 00:58:33,034
because you don't have that many
variables to take into play.

1044
00:58:33,134 --> 00:58:35,761
You can only act and then act again.

1045
00:58:36,930 --> 00:58:39,457
Now all these phone calls
are being recorded digitally,

1046
00:58:39,557 --> 00:58:42,252
not for content
but for origin and destination,

1047
00:58:42,352 --> 00:58:44,838
now word the government is going
right into the servers

1048
00:58:44,938 --> 00:58:46,506
of these large Internet companies.

1049
00:58:46,606 --> 00:58:49,300
How does the government,
politically speaking,

1050
00:58:49,400 --> 00:58:52,470
make the argument that this is
essential to national security

1051
00:58:52,570 --> 00:58:56,641
and not a dramatic overreach
in terms of personal privacy?

1052
00:58:56,741 --> 00:58:59,477
It's difficult Matt, because,
as Peter was pointing out,

1053
00:58:59,577 --> 00:59:03,481
overnight we had an extraordinary,
late-night... close to midnight...

1054
00:59:03,581 --> 00:59:05,150
announcement and a declassification

1055
00:59:05,250 --> 00:59:06,985
from the Director
of National Intelligence.

1056
00:59:07,085 --> 00:59:08,236
They are scrambling.

1057
00:59:08,336 --> 00:59:11,781
The administration's already supported
strongly by leaders in both parties

1058
00:59:11,881 --> 00:59:13,324
from the intelligence committees.

1059
00:59:13,424 --> 00:59:17,620
GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia,
at the top secret,

1060
00:59:17,720 --> 00:59:19,456
you know, super classified level, uh,

1061
00:59:19,556 --> 00:59:22,292
where anybody working intelligence
can work on anything they want.

1062
00:59:22,392 --> 00:59:23,376
Yep.

1063
00:59:23,476 --> 00:59:25,795
That's what this is, I'm giving it to you,
you can make the decisions on that,

1064
00:59:25,895 --> 00:59:27,297
what's appropriate, what's not.

1065
00:59:27,397 --> 00:59:29,507
It's going to be
documents of different types,

1066
00:59:29,607 --> 00:59:33,219
pictures and PowerPoints,
Word documents, stuff like that.

1067
00:59:33,319 --> 00:59:34,596
- Um...
- Sorry, can I take a seat?

1068
00:59:34,696 --> 00:59:35,696
Yeah.

1069
00:59:38,241 --> 00:59:42,270
Sorry, I get you to repeat,
so in these documents they all show...

1070
00:59:42,370 --> 00:59:44,147
Yeah, there'll be a couple
more documents on that,

1071
00:59:44,247 --> 00:59:45,648
that's only one part though.

1072
00:59:45,748 --> 00:59:48,026
Like, it talks about Tempora
and a little more thing,

1073
00:59:48,126 --> 00:59:50,236
that's the Wiki article itself.

1074
00:59:50,336 --> 00:59:52,780
It was also talking about
a self-developed tool

1075
00:59:52,880 --> 00:59:56,034
called UDAQ, U-D-A-Q.

1076
00:59:56,134 --> 00:59:58,536
It's their search tool
for all the stuff they collect,

1077
00:59:58,636 --> 01:00:00,246
was what it looked like.

1078
01:00:00,346 --> 01:00:01,539
It's going to be projects,

1079
01:00:01,639 --> 01:00:05,001
it's going to be troubleshooting pages
for a particular tool...

1080
01:00:05,101 --> 01:00:06,085
Thanks.

1081
01:00:06,185 --> 01:00:08,546
Um... what's the next step?

1082
01:00:08,646 --> 01:00:10,423
When do you think you'll go public?

1083
01:00:10,523 --> 01:00:13,927
Ah, I think it's pretty soon,
I mean with the reaction,

1084
01:00:14,027 --> 01:00:15,261
this escalated more quickly.

1085
01:00:15,361 --> 01:00:18,640
I think pretty much as soon as they start
trying to make this about me,

1086
01:00:18,740 --> 01:00:20,558
which should be any day now.

1087
01:00:20,658 --> 01:00:22,060
Yep.

1088
01:00:22,160 --> 01:00:23,561
I'll come out just to go,

1089
01:00:23,661 --> 01:00:29,442
"Hey, this is not a question of somebody
skulking around in the shadows."

1090
01:00:29,542 --> 01:00:32,028
These are public issues,
these are not my issues,

1091
01:00:32,128 --> 01:00:34,322
you know, these are everybody's issues.

1092
01:00:34,422 --> 01:00:35,907
And I'm not afraid of you, you know.

1093
01:00:36,007 --> 01:00:40,203
You're not going to bully me into silence
like you've done to everybody else.

1094
01:00:40,303 --> 01:00:42,497
And if nobody else
is gonna do it, I will,

1095
01:00:42,597 --> 01:00:45,291
and hopefully when I'm gone,
whatever you do to me,

1096
01:00:45,391 --> 01:00:47,460
there will be somebody else
who'll do the same thing.

1097
01:00:47,560 --> 01:00:50,713
It'll be the sort of Internet
principle of the hydra.

1098
01:00:50,813 --> 01:00:54,217
You know, you can stomp one person,
but there's gonna be seven more of us.

1099
01:00:54,317 --> 01:00:56,026
Yeah.

1100
01:00:58,571 --> 01:00:59,973
Are you getting more nervous?

1101
01:01:02,186 --> 01:01:04,852
I mean, no.

1102
01:01:04,952 --> 01:01:06,479
I think, uh...

1103
01:01:06,579 --> 01:01:09,065
I think the way I look at stress,

1104
01:01:09,165 --> 01:01:11,985
particularly because I sort of
knew this was coming,

1105
01:01:12,085 --> 01:01:14,862
you know, because I sort of volunteered

1106
01:01:14,962 --> 01:01:17,172
to walk into it, um...

1107
01:01:19,300 --> 01:01:23,121
I'm already sort of familiar
with the idea.

1108
01:01:23,221 --> 01:01:24,622
I'm not worried about it.

1109
01:01:24,722 --> 01:01:26,833
When somebody, like, busts in the door?

1110
01:01:26,933 --> 01:01:28,501
Suddenly I'll get nervous,
and it'll affect me,

1111
01:01:28,601 --> 01:01:31,838
but until they do...
I don't know, you know.

1112
01:01:31,938 --> 01:01:36,358
I'm eating a little less,
that's the only difference, I think.

1113
01:01:41,989 --> 01:01:44,017
Let's talk about the issue with,

1114
01:01:44,117 --> 01:01:45,685
when we're gonna say who you are.

1115
01:01:45,785 --> 01:01:47,395
Yeah.

1116
01:01:47,495 --> 01:01:50,398
This is, you know, you have to
talk me through this.

1117
01:01:50,498 --> 01:01:52,150
Because I have a big worry about this.

1118
01:01:52,250 --> 01:01:53,234
Okay, tell me.

1119
01:01:53,334 --> 01:01:57,087
Which is that, if we come out and...

1120
01:01:58,256 --> 01:02:01,618
I know that you believe
that your detection

1121
01:02:01,718 --> 01:02:04,662
is inevitable and that
it's inevitable imminently.

1122
01:02:04,762 --> 01:02:06,581
There's, you know,
in the New York Times today,

1123
01:02:06,681 --> 01:02:11,044
Charlie Savage, the fascinating
Sherlock Holmes of political reporting,

1124
01:02:11,144 --> 01:02:13,796
deduced that the fact that there's
been these leaks in succession

1125
01:02:13,896 --> 01:02:16,549
probably means that there's some
one person who decided to leak...

1126
01:02:16,649 --> 01:02:19,427
Somebody else quoted you
as saying it was one of your readers,

1127
01:02:19,527 --> 01:02:21,179
and somebody else put another thing,

1128
01:02:21,279 --> 01:02:23,681
So, you know, it's fine.
I want people...

1129
01:02:23,781 --> 01:02:27,560
I want it to be like,
you know, like, this is a person...

1130
01:02:27,660 --> 01:02:30,271
I want to start introducing the concept
that this is a person

1131
01:02:30,371 --> 01:02:33,358
who has a particular set
of political objectives

1132
01:02:33,458 --> 01:02:35,902
about informing the world
about what's taking place.

1133
01:02:36,002 --> 01:02:39,030
So I'm keeping it all
anonymous, totally,

1134
01:02:39,130 --> 01:02:41,366
but I want to start introducing you

1135
01:02:41,466 --> 01:02:43,284
in that kind of incremental way.

1136
01:02:43,384 --> 01:02:45,328
But... here's the thing.

1137
01:02:45,428 --> 01:02:48,373
What I'm concerned is that
if we come out and say,

1138
01:02:48,473 --> 01:02:50,124
"Here's who this is,
here's what he did,"

1139
01:02:50,224 --> 01:02:51,793
the whole thing that we talked about,

1140
01:02:51,893 --> 01:02:54,045
that we're gonna basically be doing
the government's work for them.

1141
01:02:54,145 --> 01:02:56,547
And we're basically
going to be handing them,

1142
01:02:56,647 --> 01:02:59,258
you know, a confession,

1143
01:02:59,358 --> 01:03:01,511
and helping them identify who found it.

1144
01:03:01,611 --> 01:03:02,804
Maybe you're right,

1145
01:03:02,904 --> 01:03:05,556
maybe they'll find out quickly,
and maybe they'll know,

1146
01:03:05,656 --> 01:03:07,433
but is there any possibility
that they won't?

1147
01:03:07,533 --> 01:03:12,397
Are we kind of giving them
stuff that we don't... or, or...

1148
01:03:12,497 --> 01:03:13,648
The possibility that they know

1149
01:03:13,748 --> 01:03:15,400
but they don't want to reveal it
because they don't know.

1150
01:03:15,500 --> 01:03:18,027
Or that they don't know and we're
going to be telling them, like...

1151
01:03:18,127 --> 01:03:21,406
Is it a possibility that they're going
to need two, three months of uncertainty,

1152
01:03:21,506 --> 01:03:23,700
and we're going to be
solving that problem for them?

1153
01:03:23,800 --> 01:03:27,412
Or, let me just say, the or part,
maybe it doesn't matter to you,

1154
01:03:27,512 --> 01:03:30,054
maybe you wanted...

1155
01:03:30,556 --> 01:03:33,668
You're not coming out
because you think inevitably

1156
01:03:33,768 --> 01:03:36,337
they're going to catch you,
and you want to do it first,

1157
01:03:36,437 --> 01:03:38,423
you're coming out because
you want to fucking come out.

1158
01:03:38,523 --> 01:03:39,924
- And you wanna be heard.
- Well, there is that.

1159
01:03:40,024 --> 01:03:42,301
I mean that's the thing,
I don't want to hide on this

1160
01:03:42,401 --> 01:03:44,721
and skulk around,
I don't think I should have to.

1161
01:03:44,821 --> 01:03:47,306
Um, obviously there are circumstances
that are saying that,

1162
01:03:47,406 --> 01:03:50,101
and I think it is powerful
to come out and be like,

1163
01:03:50,201 --> 01:03:52,353
look, I'm not afraid, you know,

1164
01:03:52,453 --> 01:03:54,105
and I don't think
other people should either.

1165
01:03:54,205 --> 01:03:57,191
I was sitting in the office
right next to you last week.

1166
01:03:57,291 --> 01:03:59,986
You know, we all have a stake in this.
This is our country.

1167
01:04:00,086 --> 01:04:04,073
And the balance of power between
the citizenry and the government

1168
01:04:04,173 --> 01:04:06,951
is becoming that of the ruling
and the ruled

1169
01:04:07,051 --> 01:04:10,455
as opposed to actually, you know,
the elected and the electorate.

1170
01:04:10,555 --> 01:04:15,209
Okay, so that's what I needed
to hear, that this is not about...

1171
01:04:15,309 --> 01:04:17,003
But I do want to say:

1172
01:04:17,103 --> 01:04:20,214
I don't think there's a case
that I'm not going to be discovered

1173
01:04:20,314 --> 01:04:23,217
in the fullness of time,
it's a question of time frame.

1174
01:04:23,317 --> 01:04:25,720
You're right, it could take them
a long time. I don't think it will.

1175
01:04:25,820 --> 01:04:28,389
But I didn't try to hide
the footprint because again,

1176
01:04:28,489 --> 01:04:30,308
I intended to come forward
the whole time.

1177
01:04:30,408 --> 01:04:34,187
I'm going to post this morning just
a general defense of whistleblowers...

1178
01:04:34,287 --> 01:04:35,688
That's fine, yeah.

1179
01:04:35,788 --> 01:04:38,065
...and you in particular without
saying anything about you.

1180
01:04:38,165 --> 01:04:39,317
I'm gonna go post that
right when I get back.

1181
01:04:39,417 --> 01:04:41,861
And I'm also doing like
a big fuck-you to all the people

1182
01:04:41,961 --> 01:04:43,863
who keep, like,
talking about investigations.

1183
01:04:43,963 --> 01:04:45,297
I want that to be...

1184
01:04:46,299 --> 01:04:48,242
The fearlessness and the fuck-you to,

1185
01:04:48,342 --> 01:04:50,703
like, the bullying tactics has gotta be

1186
01:04:50,803 --> 01:04:52,872
completely pervading everything we do.

1187
01:04:52,972 --> 01:04:54,874
And I think that's brilliant.

1188
01:04:54,974 --> 01:04:58,377
Your principles on this I love,
I can't support them enough.

1189
01:04:58,477 --> 01:05:02,590
Because it's inverting the model
that the government has laid out,

1190
01:05:02,690 --> 01:05:04,842
where people who are trying to,
you know, say the truth

1191
01:05:04,942 --> 01:05:06,385
skulk around and they hide in the dark

1192
01:05:06,485 --> 01:05:07,970
and they quote anonymously
and whatnot...

1193
01:05:08,070 --> 01:05:09,138
I say yes, fuck that, let's just...

1194
01:05:09,238 --> 01:05:11,474
Okay, so here's the plan then.

1195
01:05:11,574 --> 01:05:13,491
And this is the thing.

1196
01:05:14,619 --> 01:05:16,270
I think we just all felt the fact

1197
01:05:16,370 --> 01:05:18,648
that this is the right way to do it.

1198
01:05:18,748 --> 01:05:21,734
You feel the power of your
choice, you know what I mean?

1199
01:05:21,834 --> 01:05:24,362
I want that power
to be felt in the world.

1200
01:05:24,462 --> 01:05:25,988
And it is...

1201
01:05:26,088 --> 01:05:27,782
it's the ultimate standing up to them.

1202
01:05:27,882 --> 01:05:30,493
Right, like,
"I'm not gonna fucking hide,

1203
01:05:30,593 --> 01:05:32,161
even for like one second,

1204
01:05:32,261 --> 01:05:34,121
I'm gonna get right in your face.

1205
01:05:34,221 --> 01:05:35,623
You don't have to investigate,

1206
01:05:35,723 --> 01:05:37,792
there's nothing to investigate,
here I am."

1207
01:05:37,892 --> 01:05:38,918
- Yeah.
- You know?

1208
01:05:39,018 --> 01:05:41,796
And I just think that is
just incredibly powerful.

1209
01:05:41,896 --> 01:05:44,257
And then the question just becomes

1210
01:05:44,357 --> 01:05:45,758
how do we do this in the right...

1211
01:05:45,858 --> 01:05:47,677
you know, the perfect way,
and that's my burden.

1212
01:05:47,777 --> 01:05:49,136
And that's what I'm gonna...

1213
01:05:49,236 --> 01:05:52,014
So today is gonna be
the story in the morning,

1214
01:05:52,114 --> 01:05:54,267
assuming that it doesn't change
with The Guardian,

1215
01:05:54,367 --> 01:05:55,351
it's gonna be the story in the morning,

1216
01:05:55,451 --> 01:05:58,938
just to keep the momentum going,
just to keep the disclosures coming,

1217
01:05:59,038 --> 01:06:00,439
a big one at night.

1218
01:06:00,539 --> 01:06:05,528
Now it's becoming, like, okay,
this is a major leak, and after today,

1219
01:06:05,628 --> 01:06:07,822
when we post the two things
that we're gonna post,

1220
01:06:07,922 --> 01:06:11,284
it's gonna be,
"What the fuck is this leak,

1221
01:06:11,384 --> 01:06:13,218
and who did it," I guarantee you.

1222
01:06:23,521 --> 01:06:25,965
I just want to make sure...
move over slightly.

1223
01:06:26,065 --> 01:06:27,925
Do you want me to move
a little more over, or, okay.

1224
01:06:28,025 --> 01:06:29,526
I just wanna... all right.

1225
01:06:32,196 --> 01:06:33,681
All right, we're rolling.

1226
01:06:33,781 --> 01:06:36,559
So let's just begin with some
basic background information,

1227
01:06:36,659 --> 01:06:38,728
like, just state your name,

1228
01:06:38,828 --> 01:06:40,730
what position you held
in the intelligence community,

1229
01:06:40,830 --> 01:06:44,108
and... and how long you
worked within that community.

1230
01:06:44,208 --> 01:06:46,736
Okay, um, just so I'm aware of
where we're going,

1231
01:06:46,836 --> 01:06:48,863
how in depth are we going,
just in general,

1232
01:06:48,963 --> 01:06:50,823
like 'I'm currently
an infrastructure analyst

1233
01:06:50,923 --> 01:06:52,825
you know, Booz Allen Hamilton,

1234
01:06:52,925 --> 01:06:54,493
not going through
my whole back story...'

1235
01:06:54,593 --> 01:06:55,578
- Yeah.
- Okay.

1236
01:06:55,678 --> 01:06:56,996
Just like, yeah, summary kind of...

1237
01:06:57,096 --> 01:06:58,122
Okay.

1238
01:06:58,222 --> 01:07:01,083
Uh, My name's Ed Snowden,
I'm, uh, 29 years old,

1239
01:07:01,183 --> 01:07:03,753
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton

1240
01:07:03,853 --> 01:07:07,605
as an infrastructure analyst
for NSA, uh, in Hawaii.

1241
01:07:08,607 --> 01:07:10,009
And what are some of the positions

1242
01:07:10,109 --> 01:07:12,762
that you held previously within
the intelligence community?

1243
01:07:12,862 --> 01:07:16,599
Uh, I've been, uh, a systems engineer,
systems administrator,

1244
01:07:16,699 --> 01:07:21,896
uh, senior advisor, uh, for the, uh,

1245
01:07:21,996 --> 01:07:23,397
Central Intelligence Agency,

1246
01:07:23,497 --> 01:07:25,983
solutions consultant and a, uh,

1247
01:07:26,083 --> 01:07:29,028
telecommunications informations
systems officer.

1248
01:07:29,128 --> 01:07:31,781
And what kind of clearances have...

1249
01:07:31,881 --> 01:07:33,616
have you held,
what kind of classification?

1250
01:07:33,716 --> 01:07:37,260
Uh, Top Secret, uh... Hm...

1251
01:07:40,014 --> 01:07:43,250
So people in my levels of access
for systems administration

1252
01:07:43,350 --> 01:07:45,920
or as a... a infrastructure analyst,

1253
01:07:46,020 --> 01:07:48,506
typically have, uh, higher accesses

1254
01:07:48,606 --> 01:07:51,884
than an NSA employee
would normally have.

1255
01:07:51,984 --> 01:07:55,054
Normal NSA employees have
a combination of clearances

1256
01:07:55,154 --> 01:07:59,433
called TS, SI, TK, and Gamma.

1257
01:07:59,533 --> 01:08:01,894
Um, that's Top Secret,

1258
01:08:01,994 --> 01:08:05,439
uh, Signals Intelligence,
Talent Keyhole, and Gamma.

1259
01:08:05,539 --> 01:08:07,441
And they all,
uh, relate to certain things

1260
01:08:07,541 --> 01:08:10,194
that are sort of core
to the NSA mission.

1261
01:08:10,294 --> 01:08:12,446
As a systems administrator,

1262
01:08:12,546 --> 01:08:14,573
you get a special clearance
called PRIVAC,

1263
01:08:14,673 --> 01:08:16,283
for Privileged Access,

1264
01:08:16,383 --> 01:08:18,160
which allows you to be exposed

1265
01:08:18,260 --> 01:08:20,329
to information of any classification,

1266
01:08:20,429 --> 01:08:23,389
regardless of what your position
actually needs.

1267
01:08:58,342 --> 01:09:00,619
Just before we go,
a reminder of our top story,

1268
01:09:00,719 --> 01:09:03,247
that's that
the former CIA technical worker

1269
01:09:03,347 --> 01:09:07,126
Edward Snowden says he's responsible
for leaking information

1270
01:09:07,226 --> 01:09:12,006
that US authorities had been
monitoring phone and Internet data.

1271
01:09:12,106 --> 01:09:13,758
The US Justice Department confirmed

1272
01:09:13,858 --> 01:09:17,136
it's in the first stages
of a criminal investigation.

1273
01:09:17,236 --> 01:09:19,722
Leave it longer or cut it shorter,
what do you think?

1274
01:09:19,822 --> 01:09:22,016
As far as the video that people saw?

1275
01:09:22,116 --> 01:09:24,727
- Am I less identifiable now?
- Lose it?

1276
01:09:24,827 --> 01:09:27,271
Cause I can't go all the way down.
It's still gonna be stubble.

1277
01:09:27,371 --> 01:09:29,581
I don't have the blade for closer.

1278
01:09:32,126 --> 01:09:35,529
Will you be talking to any
other media about this story today?

1279
01:09:35,629 --> 01:09:37,490
I am.

1280
01:09:37,590 --> 01:09:39,241
Will you be coming to our
office at Associated Press?

1281
01:09:39,341 --> 01:09:42,495
We'd be interested to ask about where
is Snowden now, what his plans are.

1282
01:09:42,595 --> 01:09:44,747
I'm not going to talk about that,
so unless you have other questions,

1283
01:09:44,847 --> 01:09:46,248
it's gonna be a fruitless interview.

1284
01:09:46,348 --> 01:09:47,875
What are your plans, please?

1285
01:09:47,975 --> 01:09:49,668
Are you staying in Hong Kong
for the time being?

1286
01:09:49,768 --> 01:09:51,087
For a little while.

1287
01:09:51,187 --> 01:09:54,048
And do you have any hopes
to write more about this story,

1288
01:09:54,148 --> 01:09:56,166
or are you stopping
new writing about this story?

1289
01:09:56,266 --> 01:09:58,077
No, I'm gonna continue
to write about it.

1290
01:09:58,177 --> 01:10:00,513
Have you had any pressure
from the US authorities

1291
01:10:00,613 --> 01:10:03,057
- about continuing to report on this?
- No.

1292
01:10:03,157 --> 01:10:06,685
And have you heard anything
about what could be the attitude

1293
01:10:06,785 --> 01:10:08,687
of Hong Kong authorities
towards this case,

1294
01:10:08,787 --> 01:10:11,565
whether they've contacted you
or asked you anything about

1295
01:10:11,665 --> 01:10:14,652
the whereabouts of Snowden
and whether that is another...

1296
01:10:14,752 --> 01:10:17,503
I haven't heard from the authorities
of any government.

1297
01:10:18,923 --> 01:10:22,201
And where do you think
the story is going, for you

1298
01:10:22,301 --> 01:10:25,454
and of course for Snowden,
and of course for the US media

1299
01:10:25,554 --> 01:10:27,206
and the US administration in general?

1300
01:10:27,306 --> 01:10:29,834
Well, for me I can tell, I'm
gonna continue to report on...

1301
01:10:29,934 --> 01:10:32,169
do my reporting on what
the government has been doing

1302
01:10:32,269 --> 01:10:34,421
and what I think my readers
should know about.

1303
01:10:34,521 --> 01:10:36,507
Um, as for him, I don't...
I don't think anyone knows.

1304
01:10:36,607 --> 01:10:38,384
They could have people come after me

1305
01:10:38,484 --> 01:10:40,845
or any of their third-party partners.

1306
01:10:40,945 --> 01:10:43,806
You know, they work closely
with a number of other nations.

1307
01:10:43,906 --> 01:10:45,975
Or, you know,
they could pay off the triads.

1308
01:10:46,075 --> 01:10:48,352
You know, any of their agents or assets,

1309
01:10:48,452 --> 01:10:51,105
uh... we have a CIA station
just up the road,

1310
01:10:51,205 --> 01:10:54,501
at the consulate here in Hong Kong.

1311
01:11:19,233 --> 01:11:22,344
Hello, I'm Daniela Ritorto.
The top story this hour:

1312
01:11:22,444 --> 01:11:26,098
facing a criminal investigation,
the whistleblower who revealed details

1313
01:11:26,198 --> 01:11:31,478
on how the US is monitoring phone
calls and Internet data goes public.

1314
01:11:31,578 --> 01:11:35,357
Security forces in Afghanistan
say a number of Taliban insurgents

1315
01:11:35,457 --> 01:11:38,152
have targeted Kabul's airport.

1316
01:11:38,252 --> 01:11:40,404
Now it's time for our newspaper review

1317
01:11:40,504 --> 01:11:43,157
and looking at what's making
headlines around the world.

1318
01:11:43,257 --> 01:11:45,159
Let's start with The Guardian,
our top story,

1319
01:11:45,259 --> 01:11:49,413
which is revealing the identity
of the former CIA employee

1320
01:11:49,513 --> 01:11:51,290
who the paper says leaked information

1321
01:11:51,390 --> 01:11:56,086
exposing the scale of American
surveillance of the Internet.

1322
01:11:56,186 --> 01:11:57,296
Edward Snowden.

1323
01:11:57,396 --> 01:11:58,505
What a great story.

1324
01:11:58,605 --> 01:11:59,673
Kira, Ewen, what do you think?

1325
01:11:59,773 --> 01:12:01,258
Well, I think it's a fantastic story...

1326
01:12:01,358 --> 01:12:03,928
first off, it could be straight
out of a John Le Carre novel.

1327
01:12:04,028 --> 01:12:06,388
I mean, when you read what he did,
yes, he got the material.

1328
01:12:06,488 --> 01:12:08,724
He then decided to go
to the place he identified

1329
01:12:08,824 --> 01:12:10,351
as being very difficult
for America to get at him...

1330
01:12:10,451 --> 01:12:11,435
God damn it.

1331
01:12:11,535 --> 01:12:15,397
...which is Hong Kong, because,
of course, technically inside China,

1332
01:12:15,497 --> 01:12:18,067
the one country,
two systems policy there,

1333
01:12:18,167 --> 01:12:21,779
meaning he would get potentially
some protection abroad.

1334
01:12:21,879 --> 01:12:24,698
All very well-planned. It could have
been just out of a spy novel.

1335
01:12:24,798 --> 01:12:26,116
But what about the details?

1336
01:12:30,054 --> 01:12:32,305
Well, that could make it worse, but...

1337
01:12:36,060 --> 01:12:39,145
I don't know, only shows
the lower half of my face.

1338
01:13:12,679 --> 01:13:15,207
Snowden says he'd become
increasingly dismayed

1339
01:13:15,307 --> 01:13:18,627
by what he saw as
the growing power of the NSA,

1340
01:13:18,727 --> 01:13:21,005
hence his decision to pass on documents

1341
01:13:21,105 --> 01:13:24,091
which are said to reveal
not only that the organization

1342
01:13:24,191 --> 01:13:26,385
monitored millions of phone calls,

1343
01:13:26,485 --> 01:13:28,762
but that it had direct access
to some of the biggest...

1344
01:13:28,862 --> 01:13:29,862
How do you feel?

1345
01:13:31,156 --> 01:13:33,267
Um...

1346
01:13:33,367 --> 01:13:36,270
what happens, happens.
We've, uh, we've talked about this.

1347
01:13:36,370 --> 01:13:38,772
I knew what the risks were.

1348
01:13:38,872 --> 01:13:40,858
If I get arrested, I get arrested.

1349
01:13:40,958 --> 01:13:41,999
Um...

1350
01:13:43,001 --> 01:13:47,505
We were able to get the information,
uh, that needed to get out, out.

1351
01:13:48,882 --> 01:13:52,619
And you and Glenn
are able to keep reporting,

1352
01:13:52,719 --> 01:13:54,762
regardless of what happens to me.

1353
01:13:56,140 --> 01:14:00,507
Now what 29-year-old
Edward Snowden said that US...

1354
01:14:04,898 --> 01:14:07,176
The Guardian newspaper
reveals his identity...

1355
01:14:07,276 --> 01:14:08,886
Yes?

1356
01:14:08,986 --> 01:14:10,554
...from Washington,
David Willis has this.

1357
01:14:10,654 --> 01:14:12,780
Uh, I'm sorry, who's asking?

1358
01:14:15,159 --> 01:14:16,685
Uh, I'm afraid you have the wrong room.

1359
01:14:16,785 --> 01:14:18,721
Thank you.

1360
01:14:19,121 --> 01:14:20,522
Wall Street Journal.

1361
01:14:31,884 --> 01:14:33,552
Yes?

1362
01:14:36,054 --> 01:14:37,805
Uh, I'm sorry, say again?

1363
01:14:40,058 --> 01:14:42,336
Uh, no. No thank you. No calls.

1364
01:14:42,436 --> 01:14:44,020
I think they have the wrong number.

1365
01:14:45,314 --> 01:14:48,550
Yeah, no calls. Thank you.
Uh, wait, I'm sorry.

1366
01:14:48,650 --> 01:14:52,096
If it's uh, if it's two men
from the front desk,

1367
01:14:52,196 --> 01:14:53,847
they can call, but no outside calls...

1368
01:14:53,947 --> 01:14:55,907
Wait, actually, just let them through.

1369
01:14:58,035 --> 01:15:00,862
Wait, wait, ma'am? Fuck!

1370
01:15:05,334 --> 01:15:07,168
Yes?

1371
01:15:12,174 --> 01:15:14,467
Uh, wait, is it... is it a lawyer?

1372
01:15:16,678 --> 01:15:19,081
Yeah, no, no, no, I mean
the people who are asking,

1373
01:15:19,181 --> 01:15:21,182
ask them if they are lawyers.

1374
01:15:27,189 --> 01:15:30,384
Uh, no. Tell her that, uh,
she has the wrong number

1375
01:15:30,484 --> 01:15:32,693
and there's no Mr. Snowden here.

1376
01:15:40,744 --> 01:15:43,397
Hi, Robert, can you talk right now?

1377
01:15:43,497 --> 01:15:46,191
I safely got into the room.

1378
01:15:46,291 --> 01:15:49,111
I'm now safely with the client, okay?

1379
01:15:49,211 --> 01:15:52,739
So, can we talk together about the plan?

1380
01:15:52,839 --> 01:15:56,717
Did this application start already
or what? Technically?

1381
01:15:59,513 --> 01:16:00,914
Yeah, but...

1382
01:16:01,014 --> 01:16:03,224
So technically it hasn't started yet.

1383
01:16:13,151 --> 01:16:15,778
Would you mind to talk in speakerphone?

1384
01:16:16,947 --> 01:16:18,098
Sorry.

1385
01:16:18,198 --> 01:16:19,349
Hey, Robert.

1386
01:16:19,449 --> 01:16:20,934
Yeah, hi.

1387
01:16:21,034 --> 01:16:22,535
Hi, I'm the client.

1388
01:16:23,537 --> 01:16:25,439
Hi, Edward, how are you holding up?

1389
01:16:25,539 --> 01:16:28,275
Uh, pretty good. I'm doing well.

1390
01:16:28,375 --> 01:16:33,697
Okay, I just met with the head
of the UNHCR here in Hong Kong,

1391
01:16:33,797 --> 01:16:37,284
and they are aware that you are raising

1392
01:16:37,384 --> 01:16:40,954
the protection you are entitled to
under the UNHCR and

1393
01:16:41,054 --> 01:16:43,165
and they would like you
to come in with us to the UN.

1394
01:16:43,265 --> 01:16:44,599
Okay.

1395
01:16:45,183 --> 01:16:47,294
If you come now, it's lunchtime,

1396
01:16:47,394 --> 01:16:50,172
but they're gonna let us in.
No one else can get in.

1397
01:16:50,272 --> 01:16:51,715
Okay.

1398
01:16:51,815 --> 01:16:54,801
At the UNHCR there are
separate exits from the building

1399
01:16:54,901 --> 01:16:56,261
so we have a good opportunity,

1400
01:16:56,361 --> 01:16:58,680
if any of the media
finds out you're there...

1401
01:16:58,780 --> 01:16:59,765
Yeah.

1402
01:16:59,865 --> 01:17:01,892
...you'll be able to exit
a different way from the building.

1403
01:17:01,992 --> 01:17:04,686
Okay, that's great.
Is it okay if I bring equipment?

1404
01:17:04,786 --> 01:17:06,313
'Cause I'm just kind of going

1405
01:17:06,413 --> 01:17:08,232
so I can leave in any direction
at any time

1406
01:17:08,332 --> 01:17:10,567
and not come back, if necessary.

1407
01:17:10,667 --> 01:17:13,111
Just walk out of there.
You don't have to go back.

1408
01:17:13,211 --> 01:17:14,196
Okay.

1409
01:17:14,296 --> 01:17:16,698
Take whatever you want with you,
and just go with Mr. Man.

1410
01:17:16,798 --> 01:17:19,409
I will pick you... he knows where
I'm gonna pick you guys up,

1411
01:17:19,509 --> 01:17:20,953
and then I'll bring you to the UNHCR.

1412
01:17:21,053 --> 01:17:22,470
Okay, that sounds good.

1413
01:17:23,472 --> 01:17:25,123
Thank you, uh, thank you
so much for helping me.

1414
01:17:25,223 --> 01:17:28,293
He's quite worried about the next step,

1415
01:17:28,393 --> 01:17:30,712
about accommodation,
where he is going to stay,

1416
01:17:30,812 --> 01:17:35,467
whether there is something private and
he would not be discovered by the police.

1417
01:17:35,567 --> 01:17:38,679
Don't worry about that now.
Let's just get him to the UN.

1418
01:17:38,779 --> 01:17:39,763
Okay, I see.

1419
01:17:39,863 --> 01:17:43,225
Okay, I will give you a call
before we start, okay?

1420
01:17:43,325 --> 01:17:44,309
- Okay, thank you.
- Okay, thank you.

1421
01:17:44,409 --> 01:17:46,418
- Bye-bye.
- Bye.

1422
01:17:46,662 --> 01:17:48,245
So...

1423
01:17:48,747 --> 01:17:50,607
We don't have a car.

1424
01:17:50,707 --> 01:17:51,692
Okay.

1425
01:17:51,792 --> 01:17:53,694
What I'm thinking...

1426
01:17:53,794 --> 01:17:58,448
we may ask the concierge
to arrange a car,

1427
01:17:58,548 --> 01:18:00,784
or we just go down and catch a taxi.

1428
01:18:00,884 --> 01:18:02,327
But it's quite...

1429
01:18:02,427 --> 01:18:06,665
The traffic here in Tsim Sha Tsui
is quite difficult to get a taxi.

1430
01:18:06,765 --> 01:18:07,833
Yeah...

1431
01:18:07,933 --> 01:18:10,294
And so is there a precedent for this,

1432
01:18:10,394 --> 01:18:14,089
where Hong Kong would extradite
someone for political speech?

1433
01:18:14,189 --> 01:18:16,174
No, I'm not aware of.

1434
01:18:16,274 --> 01:18:18,260
But if we have a torture claim

1435
01:18:18,360 --> 01:18:20,095
or asylum-seeking claim,

1436
01:18:20,195 --> 01:18:22,264
then they ought, under the law,

1437
01:18:22,364 --> 01:18:24,808
they ought to give you recognizance

1438
01:18:24,908 --> 01:18:26,435
for you to stay in Hong Kong

1439
01:18:26,535 --> 01:18:30,746
because they don't know
where to dump you back yet.

1440
01:19:21,715 --> 01:19:23,533
The president certainly
does not welcome the way

1441
01:19:23,633 --> 01:19:25,994
that this debate has earned
greater attention in the last week,

1442
01:19:26,094 --> 01:19:29,122
the leak of classified information
about sensitive programs

1443
01:19:29,222 --> 01:19:31,375
that are important in our fight
against terrorists

1444
01:19:31,475 --> 01:19:34,753
who would do harm to Americans,
is a problem.

1445
01:19:34,853 --> 01:19:38,397
But the debate itself is legitimate
and should be engaged.

1446
01:21:25,630 --> 01:21:30,676
"The US Spied on Millions of
Brazilian Emails and Phone Calls"

1447
01:21:31,887 --> 01:21:35,248
I'd like to show you
the new document now.

1448
01:21:35,348 --> 01:21:38,627
You'll see it much more clearly.

1449
01:21:38,727 --> 01:21:45,091
This map shows the cables they use
to collect the data for PRISM.

1450
01:21:45,191 --> 01:21:49,095
Here it shows how much
they are collecting.

1451
01:21:49,195 --> 01:21:53,266
The thicker the line,
the more they're collecting.

1452
01:21:53,366 --> 01:21:55,477
You can see these lines,

1453
01:21:55,577 --> 01:22:00,440
the cables, are quite thick
in the south of Brazil

1454
01:22:00,540 --> 01:22:02,984
and up north in the Sea of Brazil.

1455
01:22:03,084 --> 01:22:06,029
So they're collecting a lot
through the PRISM program,

1456
01:22:06,129 --> 01:22:09,616
which I think is very important
because PRISM is Facebook,

1457
01:22:09,716 --> 01:22:12,786
Skype, YouTube, Yahoo, Hotmail.

1458
01:22:12,886 --> 01:22:15,763
And it shows a lot
is being stolen from Brazil.

1459
01:22:16,514 --> 01:22:21,002
But we don't know how much
the Brazilian government knows,

1460
01:22:21,102 --> 01:22:26,049
or whether it's collaborating
with Brazilian companies.

1461
01:22:26,149 --> 01:22:28,218
But we're going to know, I believe.

1462
01:22:28,318 --> 01:22:30,720
One day we will know everything.
Or almost everything.

1463
01:22:30,820 --> 01:22:31,820
Yes.

1464
01:23:29,921 --> 01:23:32,115
All right, so which ones
do we want here, then?

1465
01:23:32,215 --> 01:23:34,993
This is operational stuff,
so we mustn't say any of this...

1466
01:23:35,093 --> 01:23:36,286
So redact that.

1467
01:23:36,386 --> 01:23:37,996
Go... go to top.

1468
01:23:38,096 --> 01:23:39,497
What about the Alexander quote?

1469
01:23:39,597 --> 01:23:40,999
Yeah, that's in TARMAC.

1470
01:23:41,099 --> 01:23:44,377
"Why can't we collect
all the signals all the time?

1471
01:23:44,477 --> 01:23:47,422
Sounds like a good summer
homework project for Menwith."

1472
01:23:47,522 --> 01:23:50,634
Keith Alexander, the head of the NSA,
on a visit to UK.

1473
01:23:50,734 --> 01:23:52,594
- This one.
- Yeah.

1474
01:23:52,694 --> 01:23:55,430
Secret document, isn't it?
Secret document.

1475
01:23:55,530 --> 01:23:59,851
We've got a stick here that should
just have three single slides on them.

1476
01:23:59,951 --> 01:24:03,871
If it's got more than three single slides,
we have to be extremely careful.

1477
01:24:06,499 --> 01:24:08,151
- Yeah?
- Yeah, that's it.

1478
01:24:08,251 --> 01:24:12,113
This is really dangerous
stuff for us, The Guardian, isn't it?

1479
01:24:12,213 --> 01:24:15,033
You make mistakes and at the very end
where we kept it all under lock and key...

1480
01:24:15,133 --> 01:24:17,634
And no one knows. I'm not saying that...

1481
01:24:18,762 --> 01:24:20,914
They will come in and smack
the front door down if we...

1482
01:24:21,014 --> 01:24:22,389
if we elaborate on that.

1483
01:24:23,475 --> 01:24:26,795
He said the Prime Minister's
extremely concerned about this.

1484
01:24:26,895 --> 01:24:29,646
And they kept saying,
"This is from the very top."

1485
01:25:40,176 --> 01:25:41,703
As you can see on this map,

1486
01:25:41,803 --> 01:25:43,538
the flight that reportedly
has Snowden aboard

1487
01:25:43,638 --> 01:25:45,999
has almost reached
its destination here in Moscow,

1488
01:25:46,099 --> 01:25:48,877
scheduled to land in the
Russian capital within minutes.

1489
01:25:48,977 --> 01:25:54,716
As you may have heard,
there is a CIA Agent

1490
01:25:54,816 --> 01:25:57,260
who has revealed a lot of information,

1491
01:25:57,360 --> 01:26:01,973
and he is now trapped in the,
um, the airport in Moscow.

1492
01:26:02,073 --> 01:26:04,309
We managed to get him out of Hong Kong,

1493
01:26:04,409 --> 01:26:06,978
but when he landed
in the Moscow airport,

1494
01:26:07,078 --> 01:26:10,940
the American government
had canceled his passport.

1495
01:26:11,040 --> 01:26:14,069
So, formally, he hasn't
entered into Russian territory.

1496
01:26:14,169 --> 01:26:17,072
He is in the transit area
of the airport,

1497
01:26:17,172 --> 01:26:20,408
and one of our people
is accompanying him.

1498
01:26:20,508 --> 01:26:26,664
We are trying to arrange
a private jet to, um

1499
01:26:26,764 --> 01:26:32,045
take him from Moscow to Ecuador

1500
01:26:32,145 --> 01:26:37,550
or perhaps maybe Venezuela
or maybe Iceland,

1501
01:26:37,650 --> 01:26:39,359
countries where he will be safe.

1502
01:26:52,999 --> 01:26:55,527
The floor is yours,
for the time that you deem necessary.

1503
01:26:55,627 --> 01:26:58,613
Thank you and hello.

1504
01:26:58,713 --> 01:27:04,160
First of all, Americans' justification
for everything

1505
01:27:04,260 --> 01:27:07,956
since the September 11 attacks
is terrorism.

1506
01:27:08,056 --> 01:27:10,208
Everything is in the name
of national security,

1507
01:27:10,308 --> 01:27:12,168
to protect our population.

1508
01:27:12,268 --> 01:27:18,007
In reality, it's the opposite.
A lot of the documents

1509
01:27:18,107 --> 01:27:24,639
have nothing to do with
terrorism or national security,

1510
01:27:24,739 --> 01:27:27,559
but with competition between countries,

1511
01:27:27,659 --> 01:27:32,605
and with companies' industrial,
financial, or economic issues.

1512
01:27:32,705 --> 01:27:35,942
Secondly, there's XKeyscore.

1513
01:27:36,042 --> 01:27:40,864
When we first started
publishing articles,

1514
01:27:40,964 --> 01:27:42,949
the US government's defense

1515
01:27:43,049 --> 01:27:47,078
was that it was not invading
the content of communications,

1516
01:27:47,178 --> 01:27:48,788
just taking the metadata.

1517
01:27:48,888 --> 01:27:54,169
That means the names
of the people talking,

1518
01:27:54,269 --> 01:27:58,131
who is calling whom, call durations.

1519
01:27:58,231 --> 01:28:03,094
But if I know all the people
you are communicating with,

1520
01:28:03,194 --> 01:28:06,264
and everyone
they are communicating with,

1521
01:28:06,364 --> 01:28:09,142
where you are
when you are communicating,

1522
01:28:09,242 --> 01:28:11,561
the call duration and the location,

1523
01:28:11,661 --> 01:28:14,856
then I can learn a lot
about your personality,

1524
01:28:14,956 --> 01:28:17,150
your activity, and your life.

1525
01:28:17,250 --> 01:28:20,820
This is a major invasion of privacy.

1526
01:28:20,920 --> 01:28:24,365
In reality, that defense
is totally false.

1527
01:28:24,465 --> 01:28:29,579
The US government has the ability
to get not only metadata,

1528
01:28:29,679 --> 01:28:36,294
but the actual content of your emails
or what you say on the phone,

1529
01:28:36,394 --> 01:28:41,799
the words you type into Google searches,

1530
01:28:41,899 --> 01:28:45,553
the websites you visit,

1531
01:28:45,653 --> 01:28:49,599
the documents you send to colleagues.

1532
01:28:49,699 --> 01:28:57,440
This system can track nearly everything
that every individual is doing online.

1533
01:28:57,540 --> 01:29:02,820
So if you're a journalist investigating
the American government,

1534
01:29:02,920 --> 01:29:08,618
if you work for a company
with American competitors,

1535
01:29:08,718 --> 01:29:14,374
or if you work in human rights
involving the American government,

1536
01:29:14,474 --> 01:29:16,709
or any other field,

1537
01:29:16,809 --> 01:29:21,547
they can very easily
intercept your communication.

1538
01:29:21,647 --> 01:29:24,968
If you're an American living in the US,

1539
01:29:25,068 --> 01:29:28,346
they have to seek permission
from a court,

1540
01:29:28,446 --> 01:29:30,056
but they always get it.

1541
01:29:30,156 --> 01:29:34,310
But if you're not American,
they don't need anything,

1542
01:29:34,410 --> 01:29:37,855
no special permission at all.

1543
01:29:37,955 --> 01:29:44,362
I think the consequences of eliminating
privacy are difficult to predict,

1544
01:29:44,462 --> 01:29:49,659
but we must understand that this
will have an enormous impact.

1545
01:29:49,759 --> 01:29:53,329
The population's ability
to have demonstrations

1546
01:29:53,429 --> 01:30:01,770
or to organize is greatly reduced
when people don't have privacy.

1547
01:30:09,278 --> 01:30:11,863
May I collect all phones, please?

1548
01:30:15,535 --> 01:30:16,660
Okay.

1549
01:30:20,039 --> 01:30:21,373
I have everything here, so...

1550
01:30:24,293 --> 01:30:26,386
Put them in the refrigerator.

1551
01:30:29,799 --> 01:30:30,924
So...

1552
01:30:36,931 --> 01:30:40,168
So as you know, in June,

1553
01:30:40,268 --> 01:30:45,173
Snowden was charged
with three legal violations,

1554
01:30:45,273 --> 01:30:50,595
felonies, principally under
a World War I-era criminal law

1555
01:30:50,695 --> 01:30:52,195
called the Espionage Act.

1556
01:30:53,448 --> 01:30:56,809
The Espionage Act
is an extremely broad criminal

1557
01:30:56,909 --> 01:31:00,855
prohibition against the sharing
or dissemination

1558
01:31:00,955 --> 01:31:02,940
of what's called
national defense information.

1559
01:31:03,040 --> 01:31:07,153
It was only used to,
uh, prosecute people

1560
01:31:07,253 --> 01:31:10,239
who had been accused of acting
with a foreign power.

1561
01:31:10,339 --> 01:31:11,741
Spies, not whistleblowers.

1562
01:31:11,841 --> 01:31:14,911
And it's a very unusual
legal representation, I think,

1563
01:31:15,011 --> 01:31:17,637
not just for all of you
but for me as well.

1564
01:31:18,806 --> 01:31:22,168
The Espionage Act does not
distinguish between leaks

1565
01:31:22,268 --> 01:31:24,420
to the press in the public interest

1566
01:31:24,520 --> 01:31:26,506
and selling secrets to foreign enemies

1567
01:31:26,606 --> 01:31:28,091
for personal profit.

1568
01:31:28,191 --> 01:31:31,886
So under the Espionage Act,
it's not a defense

1569
01:31:31,986 --> 01:31:35,264
if the information that was
disclosed should not have been

1570
01:31:35,364 --> 01:31:37,934
withheld in the first place,
that it was improperly classified,

1571
01:31:38,034 --> 01:31:40,812
it's not a defense if the dissemination

1572
01:31:40,912 --> 01:31:42,980
was in the public interest,
that it led to reforms,

1573
01:31:43,080 --> 01:31:46,567
um, even if a court determines
that the programs

1574
01:31:46,667 --> 01:31:49,195
that were revealed were illegal
or unconstitutional,

1575
01:31:49,295 --> 01:31:51,781
that's still not a defense
under the Espionage Act,

1576
01:31:51,881 --> 01:31:54,826
the government doesn't have
to defend the classification,

1577
01:31:54,926 --> 01:31:58,162
it doesn't have to demonstrate
harm from the release,

1578
01:31:58,262 --> 01:32:00,123
um, all of this is irrelevant.

1579
01:32:00,223 --> 01:32:03,084
So when we say
that the trial wouldn't be fair,

1580
01:32:03,184 --> 01:32:06,546
we're not talking about
what human rights lawyers

1581
01:32:06,646 --> 01:32:08,214
think of as fair trial practices.

1582
01:32:08,314 --> 01:32:10,190
We're saying the law,
the statute itself...

1583
01:32:11,817 --> 01:32:14,345
eliminates
any kind of defense that Snowden

1584
01:32:14,445 --> 01:32:15,847
might be able to make,

1585
01:32:15,947 --> 01:32:18,599
and essentially would equate him
with a spy.

1586
01:32:18,699 --> 01:32:21,477
And of course those
three counts could be increased

1587
01:32:21,577 --> 01:32:23,604
to a hundred or two hundred
or three hundred.

1588
01:32:23,704 --> 01:32:25,606
They could charge him separately
for each document

1589
01:32:25,706 --> 01:32:28,860
that has been published by a journalist.

1590
01:32:28,960 --> 01:32:31,362
And I think that...
that we all recognize,

1591
01:32:31,462 --> 01:32:34,323
even though we sit here
as lawyers in a lawyer's meeting,

1592
01:32:34,423 --> 01:32:37,952
that it's probably 95 percent politics

1593
01:32:38,052 --> 01:32:41,930
and five percent law
how this will be resolved.

1594
01:33:13,921 --> 01:33:16,866
Mr. Snowden has been charged
with very serious crimes,

1595
01:33:16,966 --> 01:33:19,410
and he should be returned
to the United States

1596
01:33:19,510 --> 01:33:21,162
where he will be granted
full due process

1597
01:33:21,262 --> 01:33:24,973
and every right available to him
as a United States citizen...

1598
01:33:26,309 --> 01:33:29,319
facing our justice system
under the Constitution.

1599
01:34:19,945 --> 01:34:22,098
No, I don't think
Mr. Snowden was a patriot.

1600
01:34:22,198 --> 01:34:28,145
I called for a thorough review
of our surveillance operations

1601
01:34:28,245 --> 01:34:30,205
before Mr. Snowden made these leaks.

1602
01:34:31,540 --> 01:34:36,487
My preference, and I think the
American peoples' preference,

1603
01:34:36,587 --> 01:34:39,365
would have been for a lawful,

1604
01:34:39,465 --> 01:34:42,493
orderly examination of these laws.

1605
01:34:42,593 --> 01:34:48,082
A thoughtful, fact-based debate,

1606
01:34:48,182 --> 01:34:51,726
uh, that would then lead us
to a better place.

1607
01:35:29,265 --> 01:35:32,392
Oh, my God. David.

1608
01:35:34,645 --> 01:35:37,173
Hello, my baby, how you doing?

1609
01:35:37,273 --> 01:35:38,591
- I'm okay.
- You okay?

1610
01:35:38,691 --> 01:35:39,899
Let's go.

1611
01:35:43,738 --> 01:35:44,889
I just want to go home.

1612
01:35:44,989 --> 01:35:47,282
Okay, okay, you just have to walk.

1613
01:35:55,166 --> 01:35:56,233
How are you?

1614
01:35:56,333 --> 01:35:58,444
Good, I'm totally fine,
I didn't sleep at all,

1615
01:35:58,544 --> 01:35:59,654
- I couldn't sleep.
- I know.

1616
01:35:59,754 --> 01:36:04,591
"Brazil Demands Explanation
from UK Government"

1617
01:36:22,318 --> 01:36:24,595
Recent reports have
revealed that the NSA

1618
01:36:24,695 --> 01:36:26,847
have access to encryption keys

1619
01:36:26,947 --> 01:36:28,349
and they paid tech companies

1620
01:36:28,449 --> 01:36:30,851
to introduce back doors
in encryption protocols.

1621
01:36:30,951 --> 01:36:32,687
So we're going to talk about

1622
01:36:32,787 --> 01:36:35,231
ways in which we can defend ourselves

1623
01:36:35,331 --> 01:36:38,192
against governments spying on us.

1624
01:36:38,292 --> 01:36:40,611
So Mr. Jacob Applebaum is an encryption

1625
01:36:40,711 --> 01:36:43,197
and security software developer
and journalist.

1626
01:36:43,297 --> 01:36:47,576
Ladar Levinson is the founder
of the encrypted email service

1627
01:36:47,676 --> 01:36:49,870
Lavabit, used by Edward Snowden.

1628
01:36:49,970 --> 01:36:51,372
You have the floor.

1629
01:36:51,472 --> 01:36:52,581
Thank you.

1630
01:36:52,681 --> 01:36:55,876
Lavabit is an email service
that hopefully one day will be able

1631
01:36:55,976 --> 01:37:00,256
to stand on its own without
any references to Snowden.

1632
01:37:00,356 --> 01:37:03,801
My service was designed to remove me

1633
01:37:03,901 --> 01:37:09,223
from the possibility of being
forced to violate a person's privacy.

1634
01:37:09,323 --> 01:37:12,518
Quite simply,
Lavabit was designed to remove

1635
01:37:12,618 --> 01:37:14,562
the service provider from the equation.

1636
01:37:14,662 --> 01:37:18,607
By not having logs on my server
and not having access

1637
01:37:18,707 --> 01:37:21,026
to a person's emails on disk,

1638
01:37:21,126 --> 01:37:24,113
I wasn't eliminating
the possibility of surveillance,

1639
01:37:24,213 --> 01:37:28,033
I was simply removing myself
from that equation.

1640
01:37:28,133 --> 01:37:31,871
In that surveillance would have
to be conducted on the target,

1641
01:37:31,971 --> 01:37:34,665
either the sender
or the receiver of the messages.

1642
01:37:34,765 --> 01:37:39,003
But I was approached by the FBI
quite recently

1643
01:37:39,103 --> 01:37:43,007
and told that because I couldn't
turn over the information

1644
01:37:43,107 --> 01:37:45,134
from that one particular user,

1645
01:37:45,234 --> 01:37:47,511
I would be forced to give up
those SSL keys

1646
01:37:47,611 --> 01:37:49,638
and let the FBI collect
every communication

1647
01:37:49,738 --> 01:37:52,641
on my network without
any kind of transparency.

1648
01:37:52,741 --> 01:37:54,617
And of course...

1649
01:37:55,995 --> 01:37:59,565
I wasn't comfortable with that,
to say the least.

1650
01:37:59,665 --> 01:38:01,317
More disturbing was the fact that

1651
01:38:01,417 --> 01:38:03,626
I couldn't even tell anybody
that it was going on.

1652
01:38:04,795 --> 01:38:09,200
So I decided if I didn't win
the fight to unseal my case,

1653
01:38:09,300 --> 01:38:11,911
if I didn't win the battle
to be able to tell people

1654
01:38:12,011 --> 01:38:13,996
what was going on,

1655
01:38:14,096 --> 01:38:17,015
then my only ethical choice left
was to shut down.

1656
01:38:19,768 --> 01:38:20,977
Think about that.

1657
01:38:22,688 --> 01:38:24,089
I believe in the rule of law,

1658
01:38:24,189 --> 01:38:27,108
I believe in the need
to conduct investigations.

1659
01:38:28,152 --> 01:38:31,514
But those investigations are
supposed to be difficult for a reason.

1660
01:38:31,614 --> 01:38:36,018
It's supposed to be difficult
to invade somebody's privacy.

1661
01:38:36,118 --> 01:38:37,869
Because of how intrusive it is.

1662
01:38:38,871 --> 01:38:40,413
Because of how disruptive it is.

1663
01:38:41,790 --> 01:38:44,318
If we can't... if we don't
have our right to privacy,

1664
01:38:44,418 --> 01:38:46,419
how do we have a free
and open discussion?

1665
01:38:47,546 --> 01:38:49,756
What good is the right to free speech...

1666
01:38:52,509 --> 01:38:53,801
if it's not protected...

1667
01:38:55,179 --> 01:38:57,456
in the sense that you can't have
a private discussion

1668
01:38:57,556 --> 01:39:00,016
with somebody else about
something you disagree with.

1669
01:39:01,060 --> 01:39:03,337
Think about the chilling effect
that that has.

1670
01:39:03,437 --> 01:39:05,422
Think about
the chilling effect it does have

1671
01:39:05,522 --> 01:39:08,717
on countries that don't have
a right to privacy.

1672
01:39:08,817 --> 01:39:11,178
I've noticed a really
interesting discussion point.

1673
01:39:11,278 --> 01:39:13,556
Which is that what people used
to call liberty and freedom,

1674
01:39:13,656 --> 01:39:15,073
we now call privacy.

1675
01:39:16,450 --> 01:39:19,577
And we say, in the same breath,
that privacy is dead.

1676
01:39:20,829 --> 01:39:23,858
This is something that really
concerns me about my generation.

1677
01:39:23,958 --> 01:39:26,569
Especially when we talk about
how we're not surprised by anything.

1678
01:39:26,669 --> 01:39:28,362
I think that we should consider that

1679
01:39:28,462 --> 01:39:32,116
when we lose privacy,
we lose agency, we lose liberty itself.

1680
01:39:32,216 --> 01:39:34,535
Because we no longer feel
free to express what we think.

1681
01:39:34,635 --> 01:39:37,621
There's this myth of the passive
surveillance machine.

1682
01:39:37,721 --> 01:39:40,583
But actually what is
surveillance, except control?

1683
01:39:40,683 --> 01:39:43,544
This notion that the NSA
are passive, this is nonsense.

1684
01:39:43,644 --> 01:39:46,589
What we see is that they actively
attack European citizens,

1685
01:39:46,689 --> 01:39:49,383
American citizens, and in fact,
anyone that they can

1686
01:39:49,483 --> 01:39:51,109
if they perceive an advantage.

1687
01:40:06,208 --> 01:40:09,570
And then there's the key
paragraph that says

1688
01:40:09,670 --> 01:40:13,324
it was the SCS that intercepted

1689
01:40:13,424 --> 01:40:16,785
Chancellor Merkel's mobile phone.

1690
01:40:16,885 --> 01:40:18,644
We have the number.

1691
01:41:32,293 --> 01:41:34,877
What will you tell the German people?

1692
01:41:35,130 --> 01:41:36,824
I'll have to give that in testimony.

1693
01:41:36,924 --> 01:41:41,052
- What are you going to tell?
- Everything I can, truthfully.

1694
01:41:43,430 --> 01:41:45,624
What will you talk about?

1695
01:41:45,724 --> 01:41:47,141
Whatever the questions they ask me.

1696
01:41:48,143 --> 01:41:52,355
- Yeah, I think it's over there.
- Okay, all right. Thank you.

1697
01:41:56,944 --> 01:41:58,095
Hello, Mr. Binney.

1698
01:41:58,195 --> 01:42:01,724
Hey, how are you? How are you?
Good to see you again.

1699
01:42:01,824 --> 01:42:03,032
Nice to meet you again, yes.

1700
01:42:13,627 --> 01:42:17,197
It is my pleasure to be here.
I feel that it's important to testify

1701
01:42:17,297 --> 01:42:19,700
about what's really going on
behind the scenes

1702
01:42:19,800 --> 01:42:22,745
in the intelligence communities
around the world.

1703
01:42:22,845 --> 01:42:24,830
Not just in NSA.

1704
01:42:24,930 --> 01:42:27,416
All those programs that
Edward Snowden has exposed

1705
01:42:27,516 --> 01:42:31,420
fundamentally are ways
of acquiring information.

1706
01:42:31,520 --> 01:42:34,631
Every dictatorship down through
history has always done that.

1707
01:42:34,731 --> 01:42:36,508
One of the first things they need to do

1708
01:42:36,608 --> 01:42:39,428
is try to acquire knowledge
of their population.

1709
01:42:39,528 --> 01:42:42,222
And that's exactly
what these programs do.

1710
01:42:42,322 --> 01:42:46,325
I see this as the most major threat
to our democracies all around the world.

1711
01:43:35,250 --> 01:43:37,569
What do you think
they're doing to reporters,

1712
01:43:37,669 --> 01:43:39,196
those of us that are working directly

1713
01:43:39,296 --> 01:43:41,573
with the Snowden documents?

1714
01:43:41,673 --> 01:43:44,701
How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?

1715
01:43:44,801 --> 01:43:46,636
You're on the cast iron cover list.

1716
01:43:47,804 --> 01:43:51,166
Which means any...
any electronic device you use

1717
01:43:51,266 --> 01:43:55,003
that they can attach to you they'll record
and capture all that data.

1718
01:43:55,103 --> 01:43:58,215
And what do they do with that data?
Trying to figure out what we're doing?

1719
01:43:58,315 --> 01:44:00,551
Uh, well, that's part of it,

1720
01:44:00,651 --> 01:44:03,220
but the other part for them I think

1721
01:44:03,320 --> 01:44:05,305
is to find the sources
of information you're getting.

1722
01:44:05,405 --> 01:44:07,182
So if I have a confidential source

1723
01:44:07,282 --> 01:44:09,685
who's giving me information
as a whistleblower,

1724
01:44:09,785 --> 01:44:11,353
and he works within the US government,

1725
01:44:11,453 --> 01:44:13,313
and he's concerned about

1726
01:44:13,413 --> 01:44:16,733
what he perceives as violations
of the Constitution,

1727
01:44:16,833 --> 01:44:20,612
and he gets in touch with me,
they... go ahead.

1728
01:44:20,712 --> 01:44:24,116
From there on, they would nail him
and start watching everything he did,

1729
01:44:24,216 --> 01:44:27,051
and if he started passing data,
I'm sure they'd take him off the street.

1730
01:44:28,345 --> 01:44:31,874
I mean, the way you'd have to do
it is like Deep Throat did, right?

1731
01:44:31,974 --> 01:44:33,375
In the Nixon years.

1732
01:44:33,475 --> 01:44:37,520
Meet in the basement
of a parking garage, physically.

1733
01:45:17,644 --> 01:45:20,297
"Let's disassociate
our metadata one last time...

1734
01:45:20,397 --> 01:45:22,758
so we don't have a record
of your true name

1735
01:45:22,858 --> 01:45:25,177
in our final communication chain.

1736
01:45:25,277 --> 01:45:28,305
This is obviously not to say
you can't claim your involvement,

1737
01:45:28,405 --> 01:45:32,100
but as every trick in the book
is likely to be used in looking into this,

1738
01:45:32,200 --> 01:45:34,353
I believe it's better that
that particular disclosure

1739
01:45:34,453 --> 01:45:35,870
come on your own terms.

1740
01:45:37,664 --> 01:45:39,775
Thank you again for all you've done.

1741
01:45:39,875 --> 01:45:41,944
So sorry again for the multiple delays,

1742
01:45:42,044 --> 01:45:45,296
but we've been in uncharted territory
with no model to benefit from.

1743
01:45:47,049 --> 01:45:50,953
If all ends well, perhaps
the demonstration that our methods worked

1744
01:45:51,053 --> 01:45:52,887
will embolden more to come forward.

1745
01:45:53,930 --> 01:45:55,056
Citizen."

1746
01:46:00,103 --> 01:46:02,089
So the update that I wanna give you

1747
01:46:02,189 --> 01:46:04,899
is about the new, um...

1748
01:46:06,568 --> 01:46:08,569
the new source that we...

1749
01:46:09,571 --> 01:46:10,931
Okay.

1750
01:46:11,031 --> 01:46:13,949
That... This is what...

1751
01:46:17,079 --> 01:46:19,231
This is the person
who's doing the most...

1752
01:46:19,331 --> 01:46:20,857
Mm-hmm, right.

1753
01:46:20,957 --> 01:46:22,458
...the work on it, um...

1754
01:46:24,294 --> 01:46:27,338
And now, basically what's happened is...

1755
01:46:30,759 --> 01:46:31,743
And...

1756
01:46:31,843 --> 01:46:34,830
That's actually...
that's really dangerous.

1757
01:46:34,930 --> 01:46:38,250
Um... on the source's side.

1758
01:46:38,350 --> 01:46:39,960
Do they know how to
take care of themselves?

1759
01:46:40,060 --> 01:46:43,938
I mean he... it's all being done...

1760
01:46:46,316 --> 01:46:47,509
through this.

1761
01:46:47,609 --> 01:46:48,844
Okay.

1762
01:46:48,944 --> 01:46:50,361
And they're all talking...

1763
01:46:51,405 --> 01:46:52,597
this way.

1764
01:46:52,697 --> 01:46:54,099
Okay.

1765
01:46:54,199 --> 01:46:56,768
I was gonna say,
one of the big questions there is,

1766
01:46:56,868 --> 01:46:58,520
can they handle it?

1767
01:46:58,620 --> 01:47:00,647
No, they're very careful.

1768
01:47:00,747 --> 01:47:02,623
- Even... through that. Yeah.
- Okay.

1769
01:47:07,879 --> 01:47:09,088
And...

1770
01:47:16,513 --> 01:47:17,721
That's where that is.

1771
01:47:20,016 --> 01:47:21,767
Wow, that's really something.

1772
01:47:34,489 --> 01:47:36,115
Did you know that?

1773
01:47:42,372 --> 01:47:44,441
It's not the actual planes.

1774
01:47:44,541 --> 01:47:47,069
Right, right, you mean the control.

1775
01:47:47,169 --> 01:47:49,863
It's the process,
who's sending the... yeah.

1776
01:47:49,963 --> 01:47:52,449
There's a chart.

1777
01:47:52,549 --> 01:47:55,285
There's like a whole layout
for every one...

1778
01:47:55,385 --> 01:47:57,954
That is really bold; it's really risky.

1779
01:47:58,054 --> 01:48:00,457
You know, that's the thing,
if they understand what they're doing...

1780
01:48:00,557 --> 01:48:03,043
There's this chart, it goes like this.

1781
01:48:03,143 --> 01:48:05,545
It shows the decision-making chart.

1782
01:48:05,645 --> 01:48:07,438
It's shaped like this:

1783
01:48:13,820 --> 01:48:15,972
- So up here it says...
- Mm-hmm.

1784
01:48:16,072 --> 01:48:19,700
That's the decision-making chart
for each... one.

1785
01:48:24,789 --> 01:48:28,042
- It's so political!
- This is this part's amazing.

1786
01:48:35,091 --> 01:48:38,120
- That's...
- That's fucking ridiculous.

1787
01:48:38,220 --> 01:48:39,845
This is... It's so shocking.

1788
01:48:46,061 --> 01:48:49,563
That's... that's the population
of entire countries.

1789
01:48:53,360 --> 01:48:55,611
That's what we're working on.

1790
01:49:09,918 --> 01:49:11,319
That person is incredibly bold.

1791
01:49:11,419 --> 01:49:12,612
But, um...

1792
01:49:12,712 --> 01:49:15,449
But also very well aware.

1793
01:49:15,549 --> 01:49:17,784
You know, I just hope... I mean...

1794
01:49:17,884 --> 01:49:19,995
No, I mean,
the boldness of it is shocking,

1795
01:49:20,095 --> 01:49:23,123
but it was obviously
motivated by what you did,

1796
01:49:23,223 --> 01:49:25,333
- I mean...
- This is going to.

1797
01:49:25,433 --> 01:49:29,353
This is going to
That could raise the profile...

1798
01:49:30,438 --> 01:49:31,882
of this whole political situation

1799
01:49:31,982 --> 01:49:34,217
with whistleblowing
to a whole new level.

1800
01:49:34,317 --> 01:49:36,386
- Exactly.
- It's gonna...

1801
01:49:36,486 --> 01:49:39,222
Yeah, I actually think
that's a great thing.

1802
01:49:39,322 --> 01:49:42,642
And I think people are gonna see
what's being hidden again,

1803
01:49:42,742 --> 01:49:46,078
again, by a totally different part
of the government.